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1
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Znaczenie Unii Lubelskiej po 440 latach dla Europy XXI w.

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Nikžentaitis A.
Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica
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2010
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vol. 9
9-14
EN
In 1569 a union between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland was proclaimed in Lublin. It lasted for 226 years and was one of the longest lasting unions between European states in the history. It generally was a good example of coexistence of two unified nations. Pope John Paul II once quoted: “From union of Lublin towards European Union”, stressing that the Lublin Union was a kind of first step towards European integration. However, historians and politicians in Lithuania were very critical about the results of Union for the Lithuanian nation. You may observe the same standpoint in Belarus and Ukraine. But now, in new political situation, the opinions about Union are changing and becoming more and more positive.
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Culture of Memory and Politics of History in Lithuania in 1989–2018

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Nikžentaitis A.
Institute of National Remembrance Review
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2019
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vol. 1
119-163
EN
This article aims to analyse the transformation of the culture of memory in Lithuania and the most important directions of Lithuanian politics of history in the period from 1989 to 2018. While discussing these questions, special attention is paid to the role of political factors (internal and external) and interstate relations, as well as to changes in the relationship between Lithuania’s culture of memory, and the cultures of memory and identity of the national minorities in Lithuania. The paper emphasises the processes of transformation of the Lithuanian culture of remembrance which started around 2005, when it was most recently updated. The research material presented herein shows that Lithuania’s culture of memory is full of contradictions and conflicts, and that its central figure has changed.
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Kultura pamięci i polityka historyczna w dzisiejszej Rosji

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Nikžentaitis A.
Acta Baltico-Slavica
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2018
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vol. 42
EN
Memory culture and historical politics in today’s RussiaConsidering that other countries are still conducting their studies, it is too early to make conclusions and summarise the question of Russia’s memory culture and historical politics. However, it is possible to share some insights concerning this topic:(1) This analysis indicates that Russia’s case is in stark contrast to the opinions of those theorists who negate the existence of national memory culture. In Russia, this culture began to materialise in 2005, after the complicated period of post-Soviet transformation. What became central was the narrative of the empire (derzhava), whose status should also be recognised by the rest of the world. The main symbolical resource used in the construction of the motif of powerful Russia is a myth of victory in the Great Patriotic War. More recently, however, this general myth has been strengthened by selected facts from other historical periods.(2) Symbolical figures of Russia’s memory culture – both those developing and those already formed – are continuously reinterpreted. Since 1992 the myth of victory has undergone a few stages of transformation: the first years of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency (until 1995) were dominated by active efforts to deconstruct this myth; in the period between 1995 and 2000 it was restored, with a particular stress put on the status of Russian people as the unconquered victim; in 2000–2005, the State regained its vital place in the structure of the myth. Recently, the myth has been instrumentalised and used as an argument in Russia’s confrontation with the West. The period since 2011 has seen a noticeable increase in attempts to expand the symbolic instrumentarium through active use of selected facts from other historical periods(3) Although what dominates in Russia is the imperial mega narrative (derzhava),there is also an alternative stream that makes a substantial opposition – the myth of a victim. The years 2009–2013 have shown us that the memory of Stalin’s crimes is really strong. In this sense, the structure of memory in Russia, although with some exceptions, is comparable to the Polish one. On the other hand, substantial differences are noticed in comparison with Germany, Lithuania or Belarus. Those countries have only one memory culture, although with different topics included in the content. Ukraine remains beyond the regional context: even though the process of forming a single policy of remembrance is in place, it is only in its initial phase.  Kultura pamięci i polityka historyczna w dzisiejszej RosjiBadania nad zagadnieniem kultury pamięci w Rosji i krajach ościennych ciągle trwają, dlatego nie można jeszcze mówić o ich podsumowaniu. Istnieją jednak przesłanki, by przedstawić pewne wnioski na ten temat.1. Przeprowadzona analiza ukazuje, że przypadek Rosji wyraźnie przeczy poglądom tych teoretyków, którzy negują możliwość istnienia narodowej kultury pamięci. Po skomplikowanym etapie transformacji postsowieckiej w Rosji kultura pamięci w 2005 roku nabrała konkretnych kształtów. W jej centrum znalazła się opowieść o imperium (dieržava), którego status powinna uznać także reszta świata. Podstawowym symbolicznym zasobem dla toposu silnego państwa rosyjskiego jest mit zwycięstwa w Wielkiej Wojnie Ojczyźnianej. Jednak w ostatnim czasie do wzmocnienia mitu centralnego aktywnie wykorzystuje się także selektywnie wybrane fakty z innych epok historycznych.2. Symboliczne figury tworzącej się czy też już ukształtowanej kultury pamięci są w Rosji stale reinterpretowane. Także mit zwycięstwa po 1992 roku przeszedł kilka etapów transformacji: w pierwszych latach prezydentury Borysa Jelcyna (do roku 1995) dominowały aktywne próby dekonstrukcji tego mitu, w latach 1995–2000 był on odnowiony, akcentowano przede wszystkim status rosyjskiego narodu jako niepokonanej ofiary. W latach 2000–2005 w centrum mitu znów usytuowano państwo, a w ostatnim czasie został on poddany instrumentalizacji i wykorzystany jako argument w konfrontacji Rosji z Zachodem. Po 2011 roku wyraźnie widać próby ilościowego rozszerzenia zasobu instrumentarium symbolicznego za pomocą aktywnego wykorzystania wybranych faktów z innych epok historycznych.3. Choć w Rosji wyraźnie dominuje meganarracja imperialna (dieržava), to jednak ma ona swoją konkurencję. W Rosji nadal w silnej opozycji do mitu zwycięstwa pozostaje mit ofiary. Lata 2009–2013 wyraźnie pokazały żywotność pamięci o ofiarach stalinowskich. W tym sensie struktura pamięci Rosji, choć z pewnymi wyjątkami, może być porównywana do polskiej, jednocześnie różniąc się istotnie od niemieckiej, litewskiej czy białoruskiej. W tych krajach dobitnie wyrażona jest jedna kultura pamięci, choć jej treść zawiera różne wątki tematyczne. W kontekście regionalnym nie mieści się Ukraina, w której jednolita polityka pamięci jest wprawdzie formowana, ale to dopiero początek procesu.
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Vladas Sirutavičius. Lietuviai ir Lietuvos lenkai, Lietuva ir Lenkija 1988–1994. Vilnius: Lietuvos istorijos institutas, 2017. 495 p. ISBN 978-609-8183-29-0

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Nikžentaitis A.
Lietuvos istorijos metraštis
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2017
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issue 2
211-215
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Abiejų Tautų Respublikos Ir Lietuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštystės praeitis lietuvių, lenkų, baltarusių Ir ukrainiečių atminties kultūroje po 1990 metų

100%
Nikžentaitis A.
Lietuvos istorijos metraštis
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2016
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issue 1
49-70
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Litewski Žalgiris, polski Grunwald: dwa toposy narodowe w kontekście analizy porównawczej

63%
Nikžentaitis A., Mikailienė Ž.
Zapiski Historyczne
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2010
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vol. 75
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issue 2
7-21
EN
The article deals with the images of the Žalgiris battle in Lithuanian and Polish societies and their place in the cultures of memory in those countries. Considering the centuries old tradition of this event, the problem is analyzed historically, focusing on the epoch of nationalism and the images of this event created in this period. Discussing the image change of the Žalgiris battle in Lithuanian society, several periods can be identified: the memory about this battle just after this event and acquisition of some finite forms in the middle of the 16th century; the second half of the 16th century – the beginning of the 20th century; the interwar period in Lithuania; the Soviet time and narrative transformation after 1990. It should be noted that the theme of Žalgiris was relevant to Lithuanians in order to highlight the differences between Poles and Lithuanians (the first half of the 16th century – the first half of the 20th century), in order to move closer to Poles (from the end of the 16th century until the beginning of the nationalism era and after the 1990’s), and only once in the Soviet period, this theme was used as a weapon against the imperialist West. Like in Lithuania, in Poland the Grunwald theme has also survived several periods. The theme has become particularly important in the last hundred years, which was associated with the demands of the creation of the Polish identity. In this article the author analyzes the differences in the content of Žalgiris and Grunwald narratives in Lithuania and Poland. Žalgiris and Grunwald are compared as Lithuanian and Polish national myths and also as integral parts of cultures of memory and remembrance. Similar feature of Žalgiris and Grunwald can be noticed – they can both be defined as national myths. However, unlike in Poland, where Grunwald became the national myth at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, in Lithuanian society Žalgiris gained greater importance only in the Soviet period. It is also noteworthy to underline the different structure of the Žalgiris and Grunwald national toposes. Žalgiris did not play an independent role in the interwar period and it was one of the parts of the national Vytautas myth in Lithuania. Grunwald at the beginning of the 20th century had the features of the national myth, however during the interwar period the Grunwald rose in importance in comparison with the Žalgiris theme – it became, among other events in the history of Poland, an integral part of Pilsudski‘s national myth. During World War II Žalgiris and Grunwald were instrumentalized by communists in order to motivate those two nations to struggle against Hitler’s Germany. Later they were used to legitimate the postwar regime in Europe. It should be noted that despite some differences in content and themes used by the Communist ideology, both Žalgiris and Grunwald were popular in the Lithuanian and Polish opposition or semi-opposition milieu. Consequently, in this context the influence of the culture of remembrance or previous Žalgiris and Grunwald traditions for the Lithuanian and Polish societies can be noticed. Although Žalgiris and Grunwald in Lithuania and Poland are judged differently, they continue to be a part of culture of remembrance in Lithuania and Poland.
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Baltijos kelio dvidešimtmetis: eilinis jubiliejus ar kultūrinės atminties transformacijos pradžia?

63%
Nikžentaitis A., Šutinienė I.
Lietuvos istorijos metraštis
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2010
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issue 1
71-82
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