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1

GENERAL WLADYSLAW SIKORSKI'S GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND IN LONDON (JULY-SEPTEMBER 1940) AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PROVISIONAL CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT

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Kaminski M. K.
Dzieje Najnowsze
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2004
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issue 1
88-99
EN
Edvard Benes' attemts to gain in 1940 British recognition of the Czechoslovak National Committee, evacuated from France, as the Provisional Czechoslovak Government met with reservation and he was not granted the official status of the head of the Czechoslovak state abroad. In contrast to the French and British government, initially the Polish government did not recognise the Czechoslovak National Committee because of Benes' earlier rejection of the proposed Polish conditions. However, on 29 July 1940 the Polish Council of Ministers decided to recognise the Provisional Government and informed the Czechoslovak side that it did so in the firm conviction that the new government would acknowledge Polish-Czechoslovak borders from October 1938 and strive towards to an arrangement of friendly relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks. The Polish Prime Minister, General Wladyslaw Sikorski, also allowed Benes to impose the grounds for a discussion about the future social structure of Poland, in this way irresponsibly permitting outside intervention in the domestic issues of the Polish state and society. Furthermore, Sikorski convinced the Polish government to withdraw financial subventions for the 'Polish-Czechoslovak Cultural Co-Operation Circle', thus putting a halt to further effective co-operation with Milan Hodza, a rival of Benes, who attempted to assume the role of a representative of the Slovak population in the future Czechoslovakia. The Polish authorities ineffectively tried to persuade the British authorities to discharge Hodza's co-workers, interned at Benes' request, thus opting for co-operation with him despite the mistrust of the particular members of the Polish cabinet.
2

THE CZECHOSLOVAK ÉMIGRÉ COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND RELATIONS WITH POLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION (JANUARY-JUNE 1943)

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Kaminski M. K.
Dzieje Najnowsze
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2007
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issue 1
41-59
EN
In the first half of 1943 the Czechoslovak Émigré Council of Ministers did not play a positive part as regards cooperation with the Polish government–in–exile.Upon the initiative of Ladislav Karel Feierabend, the minister of finances, Hubert Ripka, the minister of state in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, proposed a conception of Czechoslovak policy relating to Central Europe, outlined at special sessions held by the government on 19 January and 2 February 1943. The project demonstrated that the Polish side had no chances for any sort of a rapprochement with the Czechoslovak state, i.e. an alliance or a confederation agreement. Such an eventuality was secured by a number of conditions, the most important being the 'accord' between the Polish government and the Soviet Union. After Stalin broke off diplomatic relations with the legal Polish government–in–exile (25 April 1943) the Czechoslovak government did not change its attitude, and for all practical purposes expressed its support for the Soviet side. On 7 May 1943 the Czechoslovak Council of Ministers approved the thesis suggested by Minister Ripka, namely, that on 23 April 1943 Benes had achieved his 'greatest political success' by winning Soviet agreement for an alliance which could be signed also by the Polish side. The declaration made by Ripka, claiming that in this manner the Soviet Union had spoken in favour of maintaining the outer and domestic sovereignty not only of Czechoslovakia but also Poland, was approved by the Czechoslovak ministers who remained deaf to the warnings of Polish politicians. The attitude represented by the émigré Czechoslovak authorities enabled Stalin to drive a wedge deep between the governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Apparently, the Czechoslovak government remained totally oblivious to the threat of Soviet expansionism, intent at absorbing the whole of Eastern Europe and reducing Central Europe, to the status of vassals. Only the German menace carried some weight. The Czechoslovak government was incapable of understanding that a rapprochement with Poland could have seriously hampered Soviet expansion in Central Europe.
3

THE VISIT PAID BY EDVARD BENES IN MOSCOW IN DECEMBER 1943

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Kaminski M. K.
Dzieje Najnowsze
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2008
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issue 2
61-84
EN
The titular visit was the outcome of six months of efforts made by Czechoslovak diplomacy. The prime item on the agenda was the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and post-war cooperation signed on 12 December 1943. Benes was under the impression that in this way he would guarantee the independence and sovereignty of Czechoslovakia and non-ntervention in her domestic affairs. Just as essential were the talks held by the President with Stalin and Molotov. Benes presented postulates that both Soviet leaders appeared to approve, e. g. the transfer of the German and Hungarian minorities from the Czechoslovak state. The President could, therefore, consider that he had succeeded by achieving understanding on the part of the Soviet dictator and his commissar for foreign affairs. Meanwhile, at Molotov's suggestion, Stalin rejected the possibility of signing any sort of obligations in the protocol prepared by Benes on assorted questions discussed in the bilateral talks. Naturally, both Soviet leaders stressed that they could not interfere in the internal issues of the Czechoslovak state, which did not prevent Stalin from expressing the opinion that Czechoslovakia should get rid of 'old democracy', conceived as 'incapable of further existence' and doomed to fall. Communists inspired by the dictator, and headed by Gottwald, began to put pressure on Benes, a tactic that was to destabilise the Czechoslovak émigré authorities as the war was nearing its end. The President not only succumbed, but also proposed to create within the post-war Czechoslovak government a bloc of left-wing parties in which the leading role would be played by the communists. For all practical purposes, Benes had severely impaired the cause of the independent Czechoslovak state. His policy could also have adverse consequences on the future fate of Central-Eastern Europe. This threat became increasingly vivid when, queried by Stalin, Benes spoke about Polish affairs and seemed to suggest to the Soviet dictator a further course of conduct vis a vis the legal Polish government-in-exile. At the same time, he declared support for Soviet efforts to disintegrate the Polish authorities in London. An assessment of Benes' visit must lead to the conclusion that his appeasement policy regarding Soviet strivings towards territorial and systemic expansion was doomed to fail, a course of events that the President of Czechoslovakia appeared not to appreciate.
4

The Policy of Edvards Benes and his Provisional Czechoslovak Authorities towards General Wladyslaw Sikorski's Polish Government-in-Exile (July 1940-June 1941)

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Kaminski M. K.
Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej
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2004
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vol. 39
137-182
EN
Edvard Benes decided to put the fall of France (June 1940) to use in order to gain British recognition of the Czechoslovak National Committee as the Provisional Czechoslovak Government (PCzG). The British authorities, however, were not prepared to acknowledge the legal continuation of the Republic of Czechoslovakia and Benes himself was not granted the official status of the head of the Czechoslovak state abroad. Aiming at a further reinforcement of his own position and that of the PCzG on the international arena he tried not only to get an official recognition by the Polish government, but, to create a situation in which he would be de facto treated on par with the Polish President. In all significant political talks with General Władyslw Sikorski, the Polish Prime Minister, Benes decided to opt for a rapprochement with the Polish side for several reasons, the first being the wish of the British side, which planned to create a Polish-Czechoslovak confederation. Second, he wished to prevent eventual contacts between the Polish authorities and his rivals, i. e. Milan Hodza, the former Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, and Stefan Osuski, the former Czechoslovak legate in Paris. He also maintained contacts with the Soviet side, hostile both towards Poland and her government. In order to avoid antagonising the Soviet side, he tried to formulate the least possible obligations towards Poland, in this way wishing to, at least initially, pay for Soviet neutrality at the end of the war with Polish eastern territories. From the Polish point of view, Benes was objectively speaking the least suitable candidate for a serious partner of political talks. By imposing the principle of disinteressement as regards his partner's frontiers, he thus a priori rejected the eventuality of supporting his Polish partner's postulates relating to the Soviet Union, which at the time was in a state of war with Poland. Furthermore, Benes did not want to recognise that in October 1938 Poland had regained the same part of Cieszyn Silesia which she had lost as a result of the Czech military invasion in January 1919. Having agreed to the initiation of a discussion with Polish politicians about a postwar sui generis confederation between Poland and Czechoslovakia, he tried to delay concrete negotiations, and was satisfied with an exchange of letters with General Sikorski. Unexperienced in relations with the Soviets, Benes naively believed in the possibility of credible conventions, which would be voluntarily kept by the Soviet partner.
5

ÉMIGRÉ CZECHOSLOVAK AUTHORITIES AND THE PERSPECTIVE OF A VISIT BY EDVARD BENES TO MOSCOW (JUNE-OCTOBER 1943)

100%
Kaminski M. K.
Dzieje Najnowsze
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2007
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issue 3
57-87
EN
In June 1943 the pro-Soviet foreign policy pursued by Edvard Benes encountered serious obstacles created by the British side. The latter had recognised that an alliance involving the Benes team and the Soviet government would further isolate the Polish government-in-exile and make it difficult to induce the Soviet side to re-establish diplomatic relations. Anthony Eden, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, was not so much against the visit paid by the Czechoslovak leader in Moscow as a friendship, mutual assistance and post-war cooperation treaty, to be signed upon that occasion. At the some time, he referred to the oral ascertainment of June and July 1942, binding both for the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and relating to the avoidance of alliance treaties with lesser Allied state. The Soviet side refused to acknowledge that it had accepted any sort of limitations and rejected the possibility of Benes's arrival to Moscow without attaining a subsequent political treaty. The President represented a stand claiming that the British and the Soviet Union should resolve such divergences before his planned trip to the USSR. The Czechoslovak authorities started to disclose certain differences in their approach to the whole issue. Jan Masaryk, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, appeared not to advocate a hurried alliance with the Soviet Union. Hubert Ripka, a Minister of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was inclined to accuse Benes of being insufficiently pro-Soviet. The Czechoslovak government, headed by Prime Minister Jan Sramek, fearing the Council of State, in which particular activity was displayed by the communists and their advocates, opted for an anti-British course, thus generating a diplomatic note, the government resolution of 24 September 1943. The British riposte assumed the form of a memorandum of 16 October 1943 in which the British rejected the Czechoslovak thesis maintaining that initially, in April 1943, they had been kindly disposed towards the conception of the Czechoslovak-Soviet alliance and then in June 1943 they had changed their opinion. Benes was greatly displeased with the clash with the British side, and put the blame on Ripka. Ultimately, in the course of the Moscow conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States, Eden ceded to Molotov, 24 October 1943, and consented to Benes coming to Moscow for the purpose of signing an alliance treaty. The Czechoslovak President could, therefore, briefly enjoy an illusory satisfaction, unable to understand that the political line accepted by him would render Czechoslovakia a vassal of the Soviet Union.
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