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EN
Hitler did not hide the fact that he was a firm opponent of democracy. The analysis of his many statements indicates that he substantiated his anti-democratic argumentation with various contentions. He primarily accentuated crucial role played in national life by great individuals. He constantly repeated that great inventions are a result of great personalities’ efforts and not a consequence of majority’s endeavor. Democracy is nothing but a rule of the mediocre and the average; it destroys personality. He also claimed that parliamentarian democracy is closely linked with Jewry. The analysis of this fragment of Hitler’s rhetoric shows that he employed arguments which had been well-known for a long time (for example Plato’s statement that it is difficult to choose boat’s helmsman by vote). The prevalent majority of these arguments can be found on the pages of textbooks on history of political philosophy. Hitler only put them forward in much more primitive, or even brutal, form. Against the background of the above-mentioned arguments, Hitler’s attitude towards the institution of referendum during the Weimar period is provided. Hitler and NSDAP were involved with the referendum initiative concerning the rejection of the Young’s Plan but refused to participate in the referendum initiative which was supposed to lead to the strengthening of presidential powers. According to Hitler, referendums should only be employed to gain approval for already committed deeds. That was a meaning of referendums organized in 1933, 1934, 1936 and 1938 which Hitler linked with popular elections. They only provided elements of democratic decorum but they were of no account as far as Hitler’s activities were concerned. They were nothing more than a useful propaganda tool. By invoking referendums, Hitler attempted to secure for himself – mostly in the eyes of foreign countries – recognition as a national leader who enjoys his people’s support.
EN
The article is an extensive discussion and comparison of books published by two authors in 2014, Grzegorz Ławnikowicz and Władysław T. Kulesza, devoted to the same figure from the inter-war period, Wacław Makowski. They present the political ideas of Makowski, a theorist of the state, who created a concept of social state, a state based on the solidarity principle, and, at the same time, was an opponent of liberal democracy based on the protection of human rights. Apart from bringing Makowski back from obscurity, the present author shows first of all how different two books on the same topic can be, a difference stemming from the research methodology applied, but probably also from the personality of the two authors. A rhetorical question remains whether the fact that two scholars explore the same topic for quite a while reflects well on communication between research centres in Poland.
EN
On the basis of articles published in “Przegląd Zachodni” (“Western Review”) in the years 1945-1989 the author attempts a reconstruction of the image of Germans and Germany conveyed in them. The image changed depending on the intensity of censorship, transformations of the political system in Poland and foreign policy of the Polish People’s Republic. Immediately after the Second World War the account was highly negative and emotional, and amounted to equating all Germans with Nazis. Later on a revisionist picture of Germans and the FRG was sketched and contrasted with the good Germans from the “progressive” GDR. The latter image was evidently counterfeited. A marked change took place after 1970 and in the 1980s. Since criticism of the GDR was avoided, less and less was written about Germans from the GDR, whereas information about the FRG became more and more matter-of-fact. The analysis culminates in the conclusion that the authors of the researched texts gave priority to the Polish raison d’état, i.e. recognition of the finality and integrity of Poland’s western border, while texts on Germany and Germans contain a significant message about life in the Polish People’s Republic.
EN
The article presents a historical analysis of the content of one subject offered since 1956 to the Polish students of law, namely the “History of political and legal doctrines.” Until the 1989 this subject was treated as an introduction and presentation of only false, non-scientific ideas, confronted with the only true Marxist theory of law and state. After 1990 the subject called “Political and legal doctrines” or “Political and legal ideas” was steadily developing, it gave the broad knowledge of different political ideas like liberalism, conservatism, socialism as well as knowledge of different understanding of law, beginning with natural law, positivism and so on. At the same time the subject was depreciated and treated as a second rank, the score for students steadily diminished or the subject became non-obligatory. The article describes the long discussion of researchers and academic teachers of “Political and legal doctrines” at the faculties of law, focusing on the content of subject, the scope of coursebooks, the methodology of research and the methods of teaching. But the most important argument is, that “political and legal doctrines” became actually – together with history of law – almost the only subject, giving the students understanding and knowledge about the connection between philosophy, social science and law. The vast horizons seem necessary for lawyers, if they don’t want to be excessive positivist and dogmatic practitioners of statutes. The knowledge of different doctrines should allow them in future to have critical and broaden attitude to statutes. The conclusion is, that without the studying of “Political and legal doctrines” the studies of law change into simple dogmatic legal training.
PL
Konferencja katedr doktryn polityczno-prawnych: „Polska i Polacy w oczach cudzoziemców. Polacy wobec cudzoziemców”
EN
The First World War and its consequences constituted the soil, on which the fascists movements rose in all European countries, gathering people mainly on the basis of discontent and disagreement with the Treaty of Versailles. On the one hand, after the end of multinational imperial state, promise to respect the right of every nation to self-ruling was a popular idea; on the other hand, the Treaty of Versailles did not always respect the idea, e.g. in case of Slovakia, Austria or Hungarian. The so-called little treaty, concerning the minorities, was also treated as non-equal position of nation. The fascists movements based on this and began not only to identify everyone on the basis of national identity, but also to glorify war as a unique experience, as an example of heroism, something much better than pacifism. This idea was fundamental in education, beginning with children. It seems also very important to underline the fact, that most of the charismatic leaders of fascists movements personally took part in the First World War, treating the war as a splendid example of national community, it was the case not only of Mussolini and Hitler. The dream that the Treaty concluded after the Great War will be a guarantee of eternal peace, from the very beginning was contested by fascist movements, leading in the end to the Second World War.
PL
Pierwsza wojna światowa i jej skutki stanowiły podłoże, na którym w całej Europie wyrosły ruchy faszystowskie, zarówno faszyzm włoski, jak i niemiecki nazizm, belgijski reksizm, węgierscy strzałokrzyżowcy i inni. Chociaż tylko nieliczne zdobyły władzę, wszystkie jednak odwoływały się do programu walki ze skutkami wojny, najczęściej dążąc do nowej wojny. Z jednej strony I wojna światowa, która wywołała rozpad wielkich wielonarodowych imperiów, a w której padło hasło samostanowienia narodów, wymagała zdecydowanej identyfikacji jednostki ze względu na przynależność narodową, z drugiej zaś traktat wersalski nie zawsze respektował te narodowe dążenia, jak w przypadku Słowacji, Austrii czy Węgier. Niezadowolenie z ładu powojennego było istotnym podłożem dla ruchów faszystowskich. Drugim elementem była gloryfikacja i rehabilitacja wojny jako przeciwieństwa tchórzliwego pacyfizmu, jako wspaniałej postawy narodowej. W tym duchu wychowywano młodzież, a nawet dzieci. Wreszcie – co trzeba podkreślić – większość charyzmatycznych przywódców rozmaitych ruchów faszystowskich brała udział w I wojnie światowej, odbierając ją jako wielkie przeżycie wspólnoty. Dotyczyło to nie tylko Mussoliniego czy Hitlera. Pragnienie, by ład wersalski był ładem trwałym, od początku było zatem skazane na kontestację. W tej roli wystąpili faszyści, którzy doprowadzili do II wojny światowej.
DE
Jewgienij Bronisławowicz Paszukanis (1891-1937) wird als der einfluss- reichste Rechtstheoretiker in Sowjetrussland bezeichnet. In dem 1924, 1925 und 1927 erschiene- nen Buch Allgemeine Rechtstheorie und Marxismus definiert er das Recht als eine Form, die die reale Beziehung zwischen Menschen im Prozess der Produktion und des Austauschs von Waren zum Ausdruck bringt; eine Form, deren höchster Ausdruck die Rechtsstaatlichkeit ist, wenn sie zur Mystifizierung wird sowie einen echten und tiefen Interessenkonflikt verbirgt. Paszukanis war zutiefst davon überzeugt, dass im Kommunismus jede Form von Recht verloren geht, weil der Klasseninteressenkonflikt verschwindet. Er wiederholte auch Marx’ Prophezeiung aus dem Kommunistischen Manifest, dass der Kapitalismus verschwindet. Karl Raimund Popper zeigte und kritisierte, dass die Prophezeiung falsch ist und die Geschichte keine Wissenschaft wie Phy- sik ist. Die Einschränkung des Rechts, die darauf abzielt, nur Klasseninteressen auszudrücken, ist ebenfalls falsch, weil viele gesetzliche Bestimmungen nicht mit dem wirtschaftlichen Inter- esse zusammenhängen. Die These, dass das Recht nur in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft existiert, veranlasste die Machthaber Sowjetrusslands zweifellos dazu, das Gesetz zu verachten, wenn man berücksichtigt, dass sein Buch in der Bildung bekannt war und verwendet wurde. Inter-essant ist die Tatsache, dass in der Volksrepublik Polen das Buch im Jahre 1985 in polnischer Sprache herausgegeben wurde und mit dem Kommentar versehen war, dass es eine wichtige und belehrende Rechtstheorie darstellt.
EN
Paszukanis (1891-1937)   is noted as the most influential  theorist of law in Soviet Russia. In his book on “General theory of law and Marxism”, issued in 1924. 1925 and 1927,  he  defines law as a form, expressing  the real  relation between people in process of production and exchange of goods;  the form, that reaches its highest  level as the  rule of law (Rechtsstaat), when it becomes a mirage, covering the real and deep conflict of interests.  Paszukanis is sure, that in communism any form of  law will disappear, because there will be no  class conflict of interests.  He also repeated the prophesy of Marx, that capitalism will disappear, as expressed in Communist Manifesto.  That the prophesy is false and that we cannot have a science of history  similar to physics showed and criticized Karl Raimund Popper. And reduction of  rule of law to   expression of only class interest seems to be false, because many legal regulations are not connected to  economic interests. The  thesis, that law is connected only with bourgeois society surely led to contempt of any law  by people ruling in Soviet Russia, taking into account that Paszukanis book was popular and used in education. Interesting enough, the book was printed in Poland in 1985, with the commentary that is  still a very instructive and important theory of law. 
PL
Jewgienij Bronisławowicz Paszukanis (1891-1937) jest wymieniany  jako najbardziej wpływowy teoretyk prawa w Rosji Sowieckiej. W książce „Ogólna teoria prawa a marksizm”, wydanej  w 1924, 1925 i 1927, definiuje on prawo jako formę, wyrażającą realny stosunek między ludźmi w procesie produkcji i wymiany towarów;  formę, której najwyższym wyrazem jest państwo prawne, kiedy to staje się ona mistyfikacją, skrywającą rzeczywisty i głęboki konflikt interesów.  Paszukanis był głęboko przekonany, że w komunizmie zaniknie jakakolwiek forma prawa, ponieważ zaniknie klasowy konflikt interesów.  Powtarzał   także proroctwo Marksa, że kapitalizm zniknie, zawarte w „Manifeście komunistycznym”. To, że proroctwo jest fałszywe a historia nie jest nauką taką jak fizyka, wykazał i skrytykował Karl Raimund Popper. Zaś zredukowanie prawa do wyrazu wyłącznie interesu klasowego też jest fałszem, ponieważ wiele regulacji prawnych nie ma związku z interesem ekonomicznym. Teza, że prawo występuje jedynie w społeczeństwie burżuazyjnym,  z pewnością prowadziła rządzących w Rosji Sowieckiej do pogardy wobec prawa, biorąc pod uwagę, że jego książka była znana i używana w edukacji.  Ciekawostką jest fakt, że w PRL wydano książkę po polsku w 1985 roku, z komentarzem, że przedstawia ważną i  pouczającą teorię prawa.    
EN
Nowadays the term “liberalism” is more and more used in political debates together with pejorative adjectives like “rotten”, “passed” and others. Instead of “liberal democracy” we hear about “sovereign democracy”, “independent democracy” and of course “national democracy”. Looking for the roots of such development, the author sees one of them in the identification of liberal ideas with the liberal economy. Although the deepened studies show, that even the most prominent liberals never were so orthodox like the libertarians, among them especially Hans-Hermann Hoppe, for whom no liberty is possible without absolute freedom of property, commerce and production. The idea is false, taking into account the liberals like John Maynard Keynes, even John Stuart Mill or Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse. The second misunderstanding is in the notion of democracy. Nowadays the most popular idea is that democracy means simply the political majority. That is the point in which the liberals were always very cautious, beginning with Benjamin Constant, Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill. The liberals accepted democracy, but – according to the famous words of Mill – defined as the rule of majority, but with respect of minorities. It is clear, that this role of liberalism is nowadays in retreat. Democracy is often meant and understood as the sovereignty of the people, according to the words of Jean-Jacques Rousseau “unlimited, unalienable and indivisible”, and means freedom of nation and not freedom of individual. The historical experience shows that such “unlimited will of the people” was used as a veil for the most horrific political systems. But on the other hand, it is clear that under authoritarian regimes, liberalism, especially political liberalism, becomes the point of gathering of the opposition, as the examples of II French Empire, of fascist Italy, German III Reich, and communist regime confirm.
PL
Punktem wyjścia w niniejszym opracowaniu jest stwierdzenie faktu, że termin „liberalizm” nabiera pejoratywnego charakteru; w wypowiedziach polityków i publicystów pojawiają się określenia typu „zgniły” „upadły” czy „skompromitowany” liberalizm. Przyczyną tego zjawiska jest utożsamienie terminu „liberalizm” z nieograniczoną gospodarką wolnorynkową albo z absolutną, niemal anarchistyczną wolnością jednostki. To zjawisko nasiliło się szczególnie za sprawą szkoły chicagowskiej i libertarianizmu, czego najbardziej wymownym przykładem jest książka Demokracja – bóg, który zawiódł. Druga przyczyna to niewątpliwie stosunek klasycznych liberałów do demokracji. Liberałowie walczyli wprawdzie o powszechne prawa wyborcze (także dla kobiet), ale ich naczelnym zadaniem i ideałem było postawienie granic temu, co Jan Jakub Rousseau określił jako „nieograniczoną, suwerenną i niepozbywalną władzą ludu (narodu)”. Stąd określenie „demokracja liberalna” zawierało konkretną treść, taką jak prawa jednostki, rządy prawa, podział władzy. Jesteśmy aktualnie świadkami wzrostu popularności ideału Rousseau, mówi się przecież o „suwerennej demokracji”, woli narodu. To każe jednak pamiętać, że właśnie rządy autorytarne i totalitarne posługiwały się taką retoryką, mówiąc o demokracji jako o wyrazie woli narodu i nie przewidując żadnych dla tej woli ograniczeń. Czy to oznacza kres idei liberalnych? Historia poucza nas, że liberalizm stawał się ważną ideologią zawsze w momentach kryzysowych, jak np. w II Cesarstwie Francuskim, jak również po upadku III Rzeszy, dyktatury Francisco Franco i komunizmu. Można sądzić, że nie tyle liberalizm jako teoria ekonomiczna, ile liberalizm jako ograniczenie władzy absolutnej – nawet jeśli władza ta pochodzi z demokratycznych wyborów – będzie nadal spełniać tę funkcję.
EN
The NSDAP programme of 1920 contained the point 19, where one reads “We demand replacement of Roman law, serving the materialistic world order, by the German com- munity law”. This phrase was repeated by all Nazi lawyers and politicians, one can find it not only in Roland Freisler’s, Hans Frank’s and the statements of other politicians, but in almost all doctoral thesis, academic manuals and the like. The question here, is what did it mean. Analysis of the Nazi texts leads to the conclusion, that it was used to break with and justify rejection of many of the Roman general legal rules (paremiae), for instance “lex retro non agit”, “dura lex sed lex”, “nulla poena sine lege”, to annihilate and destroy the difference between “ius publicum and ius privatum”, and especially the Roman idea of property, understood as “ius utendi, fruendi et abutendi”. The verbal rejection of Roman legal tradition enabled justification of the deep changes in law, both criminal and civil, which not only presented the possibility of retroaction in criminal law, of which lex van der Lubbe was the best known but not unique example, it also served to deny the essence of property changing it into a kind of feudal possession, which meant that the owner had to act only on behalf and in the interest of the German people. Generally, because the Roman law meant certain formalism, clear formulation of legal notions and because the Nazis refused to accept any limitation of state activity, they fre- quently repeated that law is not in the statutes but it is in the hearts of Germans. It seems, that Roman law was also rejected in any totalitarian states, such regimes in principle reject any legal control over the scope of state activity. Carl Joachim Friedrich once stated, that they don’t even deserve the name “state”, because they don’t accept the legal basis of state power. Adam Lityński’s studies on Soviet law also confirm that Roman law and especially its most general rules, cannot be accepted by any totalitarian regime.
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