Hannah Arendt es una pensadora que en los últimos años ha cobrado relevancia en el ámbito de la filosofía política gracias a sus sugerentes reflexiones sobre el totalitaris-mo, la revolución, la naturaleza de la libertad, la condición humana, por mencionar al-gunos campos. Se trata, sin duda, de una de las filósofas políticas más sugerentes del pasado siglo XX. En el artículo se propone a leer a Arendt a la luz de Kant y Heideg-ger. Además, desde esta perspectiva, se introduce la pregunta, ¿cuál es la relación en-tre el pensamiento de Arendt y la cuestión mexicana?
EN
Hannah Arendt is a thinker who has gained importance in the field of political philosophy thanks to her evocative reflections on totalitarianism, revolution, the nature of freedom, human condition, to name a few fields in recent years. This is undoubtedly one of the most inspiring political philosophers of the twentieth century. The article proposes to read Arendt in the light of Kant and Heidegger. Moreover, from this perspective, it introduces the question, what is the relation between Arendt’s thoughts and Mexico like?
This article is a presentation of Hannah Arendt’s doctoral thesis publishedin 1929 and devoted to the notion of love in Augustine (Der Liebesbegriff beiAugustin). Its aim is to demonstrate the originality of Arendt’s work towards hermajor influence and object of criticism – the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Herconcept of natality, derived from Augustinian thought, opposes to being-towards--death. This movement makes a different conception of subjectivity possible: Heideggerianegocentrism can be substituted by a plurality. Vitalism (as proposed by AgataBielik-Robson) is noticeable in the interpretational efforts of Arendt and defendsa particular subjectivity against dissolution of any kind into Wholeness. Simultaneously,a vision of a community is formed – the community of equals constructedthanks to the recognition of contingency in conditio humana. In other words, herargument overcomes claims to absolute freedom. Reflections from the “pretheologicalsphere” (Arendt) take the form of philosophical anthropology, crucial to subsequentArendtian thought. Speculations concerning a notion of God are linkedwith the dissimilar approaches to a neighbor’s love. This is reflected in the problemof the constitution of dependent subjectivity, the main feature of which is a dialecticallyunderstood gratitude: the recognition of one’s dependence is a first step toovercoming it. It corresponds with a complicated attitude towards modernity farfrom simple resolutions: a sense of historicity builds a strategic position as a conditionof successful emancipation.
PL
Artykuł koncentruje się na prezentacji opublikowanej w 1929 roku rozprawy doktorskiej Hanny Arendt poświęconej pojęciu miłości u Augustyna (Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin). Ekspozycja linii argumentacyjnej tej pracy służy do wykazania jej oryginalności w stosunku do filozofii Heideggera, będącej jednocześnie najsilniejszą inspiracją oraz obiektem krytyki. Arendt byciu-ku-śmierci przeciwstawia natalność, wywiedzioną właśnie z pism Augustyna. Pozwala to na odmienną koncepcję podmiotowości: Heideggerowskiegocentryzm zastąpiony zostaje wielością. Widoczny w wysiłkach interpretacyjnych Arendt witalizm (w wersji proponowanej przez Agatę Bielik-Robson) skłania do obrony podmiotowości poszczególnej przed roztopieniemjej w Całości, zarazem forując wizję wspólnoty równych, budowanej dzięki rozpoznaniu kontyngencji conditio humana, a więc dzięki przezwyciężeniu roszczeń do wolności absolutnej. Rozważania w obrębie „sfery przedteologicznej” (Arendt) przybierają postać antropologii filozoficznej, stanowiącej prolegomena do późniejszej twórczości Hanny Arendt. Spekulacje dotyczące pojęcia Boga są powiązane z odmiennymi ujęciami miłości bliźniego i dają się przełożyć na problem konstytucji podmiotu zależnego. Jego istotną cechą jest dialektycznie ujęta postawa wdzięczności, któraz uznania zależności czyni pierwszy krok do jej przepracowania. Odpowiada temu złożony stosunek do modernitas:wyczucie historyczności to pozycja strategiczna stanowiąca warunek udanej emancypacji.
The aim of the article is to examine the philosophical value of the famous and widespread American educational project of the “Philosophy in the Classroom”. To fulfil this task, the author analyses the key concepts and the basic premises of the project in terms of their consistency and philosophical background. The critique is embedded in the conceptual framework of Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy as well as of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics.
The author analyses Hannah Arendt’s writings in search of inspirations for reflecting on the contemporary world’s problems in humanistic (school) education, finding such inspirations in the topics that interested the author of The Human Condition and in her perception of politics, citizenship and thinking as such. Koc’s thesis is that educational documents show a clear deficit of reflection on current challenges, often transnational, that need to be analysed from multiple angles. The article emphasises Arendt’s warningsabout non-thinking as an attitude conducive to totalitarianism, which should unsettle anyone interested in the concept of educating young people. Reconstructing Arendt’s axiology of citizenship and emphasising thevalue of journalistic texts as stories that uncover ambiguity and ask key questions, the author calls for a reconsideration of the nature of Polish language education in contemporary school.
In this article, we examine, in the light of Arendt’s categories, the fundamental structure of traditional claims on moral life. In other words, we evaluate the spirit in which traditional morality relates to the human world, especially, to the human condi-tion of plurality. In this way, we shall be led to a perceptive reading of Arendt’s groundbreaking view on morality and its borderline possibility of assuming a paradoxi-cally significant role in the worldly affairs.
The aim of the article is to examine the philosophical value of the famous and widespread American educational project of the “Philosophy in the Classroom”. To fulfil this task, the author analyses the key concepts and the basic premises of the project in terms of their consistency and philosophical background. The critique is embedded in the conceptual framework of Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy as well as of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics.
In this paper, I address the question of Arendt’s distinction between power and violence. While violence according to Arendt is ruled by means-end reasoning, power corresponds to the human ability to act in concert. Thus power is the essence of all government, deriving its legitimacy from the people acting as a political community, while violence can never lead to the legitimate exercise of authority. Power and violence usually appear together, and violence may sometimes be justified; however, violence should never be equated with power in Arendt’s sense. Arendt also considers the relation between violence and terror. While terror involves violence, it is not identical with violence. She illustrates the difference by revealing the characteristic of terror in totalitarian regimes: the capacity to systematically destroy legitimate power and human plurality by destroying the space of action, the common world that is created between people.
In this article, the author addresses the question whether individual citizens are responsible for the aggressive policy of their national leader by comparing the views of Hannah Arendt, Michael Walzer and Jeff McMahan on the problem of personal responsibility. The author agrees with Arendt and McMahan that responsibility presupposes thinking. Taking into account a number of arguments, the author claims that responsibility should be interpreted as a collective duty. Guilt, however, is found at the individual level. A person may be guilty for his own decisions and be responsible for the decisions of the government, but he could not be condemned for the crimes of the latter. In conclusion, the author claims that this idea applies at the international level as well, because states are collectively responsible for maintaining justice and peace in the world.
Adolf Arendt (1862-1932), a teacher of freehand drawing in Galician secondary schools, was long considered to have been Bruno Schulz's first art teacher in Drohobych Secondary School. However, in his article entitled Lekcja profesora Arendta [A Lesson Given by Professor Arendt], Professor Władysław Panas shows that Arendt could not have been Schulz's teacher. Panas also discusses why Bruno Schulz immortalised the figure of this art teacher from Drohobych in his Sklepy cynamonowe [Cinnamon The Street of Crocodiles]. Arendt is the only character from Schulz's prose who actually lived in Drohobych. The author of this article meticulously reconstructs the biography of the actual Adolf Arendt, basing it on detailed bibliographic and archival research. Reconstructing unknown facts from Arendt's life, at the same time he outlines the broader historical background of Schulz's oeuvre, which complements the previous findings concerning both Schulz's literary and visual works.
PL
Adolf Arendt (1862-1932), nauczyciel rysunków odręcznych w galicyjskich gimnazjach, uważany jest za pierwszego nauczyciela rysunków Brunona Schulza w drohobyckim gimnazjum. Pisarz uczynił go jedną z postaci w Sklepach cynamonowych i, jak się okazuje, jest to jedyna postać w prozie Schulza, która miała swój realny i jednocześnie bezpośredni pierwowzór w rodzinnym mieście pisarza. Autor artykułu pieczołowicie rekonstruuje biografię rzeczywistego Arendta, opierając się na szczegółowych badaniach bibliograficznych oraz licznych kwerendach archiwalnych. Rekonstruując nieznane dotychczas fakty z jego życia, jednocześnie kreśli także szersze tło historyczne dzieła Schulza, uzupełniając dotychczasowe badania nad jego twórczością literacką i plastyczną.
The article delivers a commentary to Hannah Arendt’s 1949 essay The Rights of Man. What Are They? The author argues, that the concept of “the right to have rights”, which Arendt introduced in this early text, bears significant relevance for contemporary political situation worldwide. The subsequent parts of the article (1) present the two fundamental features of the situation of the rightless, which are brought up by Arendt, (2) describe “the right to have rights” as an insurmountable problem of modern times and (3) refer to possible solutions of the issue proposed by O. Höffe and S. Benhabib.
W tym artykule autor przygląda się przynależeniu jako potencjalnie jednej z najważniejszych wartości domu. Omawia wybrane koncepcje filozoficzne, badania psychologiczne i intuicje przejawiające się w języku potocznym, po to aby znaleźć odpowiedź na pytanie, czy nie jest tak, że przynależenie jest jedną z najważniejszych wartości związanych z pojęciem domu.
EN
This paper takes a look at belonging as potentially one of the most important values of home. The author discusses selected philosophical concepts, psychological research and intuitions manifested in everyday language to find an answer to the question whether belonging is indeed one of the most important values associated with the concept of home.
The article focuses on presenting Arendt's theory of judgment, with particular emphasis on its function of uniting the past with the future. The author identifies two parables as motifs of judgment: the first, Kafkaesque, defining judgment as a gap in time, and the second, Pythagorean, referring to what has been lost. By treating the present as the domain of judgment-following antiquity, where reason triumphed, and the Middle Ages, where authority belonged to the will-Arendt seems to argue that the break in our intellectual tradition offers us an opportunity. In a globalized world where the end of grand narratives has been declared, humans are particularly called upon to make judgments about themselves and the (beauty of the) reality surrounding them. The role of arbiter becomes all the more necessary when tradition, religion, or authority no longer provide clear guidelines for thinking (hence Arendt's famous phrase *Denken ohne Geländer*, or thinking without banisters). The potential ability to generate one's own criteria for judgment is, according to the author, an emanation of the divine element within humans and a testament to their (non)involvement in the issues of evil.
PL
Artykuł koncentruje się na prezentacji Arendtowskiej teorii sądzenia ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem jej funkcji scalającej czasy minione z przyszłością. Autorka wylicza dwie parabole jako motywy sądzenia: pierwszą kafkowską - definiującą sąd jako rozstęp w czasie, drugą pitagorejską - stanowiącą odwołanie do tego, co zostało utracone. Traktując obecne czasy jako domenę sądzenia - po epoce starożytności, w której triumf święcił rozum oraz średniowiecza, gdzie dowodzenie należało do władzy woli - Arendt zdaje się nas przekonywać, jakoby zerwanie ciągłości naszej tradycji intelektualnej było dla nas szansą. W świecie globalizacji, w którym ogłoszono koniec wielkich narracji, człowiek w szczególny sposób zostaje wezwany do wydawania sądów o sobie i (pięknie) otaczającej go rzeczywistości. Tym bardziej zajmowana przez niego rola arbitra staje się konieczna, gdy tradycja, religia czy autorytet nie oferują już jasnych wytycznych myślenia (stąd słynne hasło Arendt Denken ohne Geländer; myślenie bez podpórek). Potencjalnie rozumiana umiejętność generowania własnych kryteriów osądzania to, zdaniem autorki artykułu, emanacja boskiego pierwiastka w człowieku i świadectwo jego politycznego (nie) zaangażowania w kwestie zła.
If “classical” lies aimed to conceal truth and “modern” ones attempted to destroy it, “postmodern” propaganda targets the self and the certainty of thinking. The organized lies of our times aim to silence the self by sabotaging our ability to make sense of the world. As a result, it is difficult to speak truth today. It is equally difficult to hear it, not in the least because truth, unlike propaganda, is unwilling to admit that it is one opinion among others. An artificial form – a metaphor, a paradox, a novel, or a painting – can help truth be heard. Literature can help me decide something that has already been decided. Hannah Arendt’s essay “Truth and Politics,” the text written by Parmenides, Merab Mamardashvili’s concept of artificial organs, and Stanislav Aseyev’s recent memoir help me establish these claims.
One of the major questions emerging in present-day reflections on politics is related to violence and its relation to institutional order and law. In the paper, an issue of concern for a very particular form of political conflict, that is, civil war, is addressed. Violence in politics, and particularly its specific form, that is, stasis (civil war), has been omitted from philosophical reflection on the origins of politics. Contrary to the traditional representation of the constitution of the political sphere, contemporary political philosophy attempts to grasp the fundamental place of violence in politics. This paper will analyze two major ways of representing politics: the traditional one, which suppresses violence, and the contemporary one, which brings to the forefront of reflection the presence of it. The comparison of these two depictions of politics affords us a comprehension of the evolution of contemporary reflection on politics, and deeply modifies how we understand politics. This article focuses on the reinterpretation of the view of politics offered by Nicole Loraux and Chantal Mouffe and discloses the influence of their reflection on our understanding of politics.
This paper takes a look at the current state of Western democracy and the crises looming within it. Financialization of the democratic system, evident in the far-reaching influence of well-funded interest groups; emergence of the new media platforms that can sway public opinion almost instantly; the growing influence of digital technology giants due to the vast amount of user data that they possess; the overall influence of the Internet as an abstract entity; the failure of the education system unable to cope with modern day challenges – these are some of the factors that have significantly eroded the Western democracies for the past several decades. The text uses both discourse and content analysis in a complementary way. It is the author’s opinion that the factors listed in this paper indicate that Western democratic regimes are likely to transform into some forms of oligarchy, authoritarianism or, most worryingly, ultra-modern manifestations of totalitarianism aided by the array of modern technologies and methods of mass legitimization.
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