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1
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Konflikt zbrojny w Mali 2012- 2013 (część II)

100%
Danielewicz K.
Przegląd Geopolityczny
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2018
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vol. 25
133-150
EN
Based on the analysis of the armed conflict in Mali, it can be concluded that terrorist organizations, despite differences, are able to cooperate with each other very well and threaten the existence of entire countries. Negotiating with terrorists only strengthens their sense of power. Regional international organizations, such as ECOWAS, without real armed forces, ready for immediate use, are useless in quickly and effectively solving armed conflicts. Also the UN is not a very effective organization in solving armed conflicts, it only provides the legal basis for the effective use of troops by other states. In Africa, the fear of military attacks is causing African countries' reluctance to strengthen the armed forces, which leads to the inability to deal with challenges such as the conflict in Mali on their own. The use of mobile maneuvering units, using air support and reconnaissance information, gives excellent results in the fight against terrorist organizations.
2
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Konflikt zbrojny w Mali w latach 2012-2013 (część I)

89%
Danielewicz K.
Przegląd Geopolityczny
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2018
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vol. 24
112-133
PL
Celem artykułu jest wyjaśnienie genezy oraz przedstawienie przebiegu konfliktu zbrojnego w Mali, rozpoczętego w styczniu 2012 r. W rozwiązanie tego konfliktu zaangażowane były także siły zbrojne Polski, które wspólnie z innymi krajami Unii Europejskiej szkoliły malijskie siły zbrojne. Konflikt ten jest doskonałym przykładem ukazania możliwości organizacji terrorystycznych w zderzeniu ze słabym państwem, przy biernej postawie środowiska międzynarodowego. Wojna w Mali pokazuje także, jak zaangażowanie się środowiska międzynarodowego w jeden konflikt – w tym przypadku w Libii – może mieć wpływ na destabilizację sytuacji bezpieczeństwa w drugim kraju – tj. w Mali. W artykule omówiono skutki upadku dyktatury Muammara Kadafiego dla wybuchu rebelii w Mali, przedstawiono także najważniejsze organizacje zbrojne zaangażowane w konflikt, ich rolę oraz skutki kilkumiesięcznych rządów na północy Mali. Zaprezentowano również działania, podjęte przez środowisko międzynarodowe w celu zakończenia konfliktu oraz stworzenia warunków do przywrócenia demokratycznych rządów w Mali.
EN
The aim of the article is to explain the origins and the course of the armed conflict in Mali, launched in January 2012. The Polish armed forces, which together with other European Union countries trained the Malian armed forces, were also involved in resolving this conflict. This conflict is a perfect example of showing the possibilities of terrorist organizations in the face of a weak state, with the passive attitude of the international environment. The war in Mali also shows how the involvement of the international environment into one conflict - in this case in Libya - may have an impact on the destabilization of the security situation in the other country – i.e. in Mali. The article discusses the effects of the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi's dictatorship on the outbreak of the insurrection in Mali, as well as the most important armed organizations involved in the conflict, their role and the effects of several-month rule in the north of Mali. Actions taken by the international community to end the conflict and create conditions for the restoration of democratic rule in Mali were also presented
3
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Samozwańczy Azawad kontra Republika Mali. Konflikt widziany oczami etnologa

71%
Buchalik L.
Forum Politologiczne
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2014
|
vol. 17 - Konteksty bezpieczeństwa w Afryce. Konflikty, wojny, polityki bezpieczeństwa
197-222
EN
The conflict between the Tuareg people and the Republic of Mali which erupted again in 2012 may be analyzed at many levels - political, economic, military. Being an ethnologist I would like to draw attention to the cultural aspects of this situation. The Tuareg people do not identify themselves with countries they live in because of basically two reasons: skin colour and some substantial cultural differences manifested, among others, in a lack of participation in a conventional similarity of jokes. This article is devoted to the second issue. During the time of persistent conflict between the Tuareg and modern countries (Mali, Niger) the best solution would be to grant a farreaching autonomy for areas inhabited by pastoral people to the north of the Niger River valley excluding big cities (Gao, Timbuktu) and to include nomads to create more or less unified society - if cultural differences will not stand in the way. If the Tuareg will be still feeling hurt in Mali or Niger, they may enter into communication with Islamic fundamentalists and terrorist groups. A great deal of it depends on whether governments in Bamako and Niamey will stick to the European definition of a country or whether they will concentrate on the manner of the functioning of old African states.
4
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Azawad - nowe państwo w Afryce. Dramat Republiki Mali czy ostoja islamistaów?

71%
Jaremczuk E. J.
Forum Politologiczne
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2014
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vol. 17 - Konteksty bezpieczeństwa w Afryce. Konflikty, wojny, polityki bezpieczeństwa
171-197
EN
Two years after the outbreak of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen continues chaotic transition to democracy. Fighting Intensifies in Syria, while in other countries (Mali, Morocco, Jordan) situation also becomes more and more tense. Although their regimes hold fast to protest movements have not been entirely suppressed. In Mali, the Tuareg secession intensifies. Azawad state emerged. Western states are considering various options to resolve the conflict, more and more talk of military intervention. The disintegration of Mali, as well as before the division of Somalia and Sudan dramatically shows the fragility of the limits imposed on Africa by the colonial powers. So how do we react to the movements for independence in the Sahel. Heads of states grouped in the Community of West African States in favour of retaining power by Mali. In this region of Africa we still have to deal with the whole “system conflicts” pervasive across national borders. Thus, the real threat for Europe and one of the reasons for the intervention of French forces in the Republic of Mali.
5
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Kryzys w Mali. Rola afrykańskich sił pokojowych AFISMA

71%
Lizak W.
Forum Politologiczne
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2014
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vol. 17 - Konteksty bezpieczeństwa w Afryce. Konflikty, wojny, polityki bezpieczeństwa
141-159
EN
At basis in crisis in Mali in 2012 lay Tuaregs independence aspirations. The Separatist National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, aim at secession of northern provinces of the country, has been intensified in 2011 due to inflow for country arms and former soldiers from Libyan army. Military progress of MNLA have allowed proclamation of independence Azawad, however fundamentalist organizations have taken charge of this territory: Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). Such evolution of situation has made a threat to the secu¬rity interests for African states as well as powers of the West. As a consequence the procedures and mechanisms were launched in support of the Government in Mali in regaining control of the northern provinces of the country. Member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established operation AFISMA (African-led International Support Mission to Mali), with the support of the African Union and the United Nations. France, simultaneously, decided on military intervention in Mali (operation “Serval”). Within several weeks at the beginning of 2013 French and African combat units take control on northern Mali making impossible further expansion of fundamentalist organization, and AFISMA has taken stabilization operation next weeks. Operation lasted for half 2013, when it has been substituted by UN mission (MINUSMA).
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