Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 1

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  CHECHOSLOVAK-SOVIET RELATION
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
In December 1943, upon his return from a visit to Moscow, which he regarded as the greatest success of his foreign policy, Edvard Benes became even more involved in appearing on the international scene in the role of an agent of Soviet impact. He was of the opinion that a constant demonstration of a pro-Soviet stand would strengthen the position of the Czechoslovak authorities abroad also vis a vis the Anglo-American powers. True, initially his conduct met with the approval of the British Prime Minster. Winston Churchill counted on using Benes for forcing the Polish government-in-exile to capitulate in the face of Soviet territorial claims. The Czechoslovak President also tried to suggest that the Polish side should accept Soviet demands to relegate from the Polish state leadership certain politicians, in other words, agree to a decomposition of its own centre of power. By doing so, he acted clearly in the Soviet interest, while at the same time making the reservation that he was not acting the part of an intermediary and did not wish to interfere in questions relating to others. The realisation of Churchill's intention, benefiting from Benes' support, failed, and in January 1944 the President was taken by surprise by a brutal anti-Polish Soviet propaganda campaign which, on the one hand, rendered the conflict public, something which Benes never expected, and, on the other hand, declared that Stalin never aimed at an agreement with the legal Polish government. Nonetheless, Benes did not intend to resign from the pro-Soviet line of his foreign policy. The proposals made by the Czechoslovak authorities started to lose importance among the British government circles, which began to treat Benes and his team - in accordance with the actual state of things - as an outpost of Soviet influence in Europe. The Czechoslovak President attempted to prevent this development, and at the end of March 1944 tried to convince the British side that a large loan, made as quickly as possible for setting into motion the economic potential of Czechoslovakia, and thus for balancing Soviet impact, lay in its own interest. Benes and his entourage remained under the constant pressure of the Soviet authorities, which demanded the organisation of an active Resistance movement in Czechoslovakia. When at the beginning of February 1944 the President called for the inauguration of a Resistance, he appeared to doubt the effectiveness of such an appeal. At any rate, more than a month later, this was the attitude recorded in his diaries by Eduard Táborský, the President's secretary. The Czechoslovak authorities were well aware that the situation might become further complicated, since in their talks with the Czechoslovak generals the Soviet military did not conceal the fact that Slovakia was to become a region of partisan armed operations containing the German forces. Benes enjoyed a rather partial success - the signing on 8 May 1944 of a Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement concerning the administration of Czechoslovak territory after the entry of the Red Army. The fact that he was incapable of attaining similar pacts with the United Kingdom and the United States was to a great extent the outcome of the constantly demonstrated pro-Soviet stand of the Czechoslovak authorities-in-exile. Having found themselves, of their volition, within the orbit of Soviet influence, they gradually became increasingly dependent upon the Kremlin.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.