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EN
North Cameroon displays nearly sixty local languages for an estimated 3,500,000 people. Such a multilingualism is offset by the use of a major trade language, Fulfulde or Fula (spoken by Fulɓe or Fulani), which allows basic exchanges to take place in many settings. Owing to increased rates of school attendance, French has been taking on a greater but still limited role in interethnic communication. The question of language comes immediately to the fore in any medical consultation, yet there are also prior cultural factors in play which have a strong impact on the procedure.
EN
Objectives This study analyzed the effect of the number of mosquito nets that are owned by households, dwelling characteristics and maternal demographic characteristics on malaria infections. Material and Methods The 2011 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data for children under 5 years of age were used. The children were subjected to haemoglobin test and rapid diagnostic test (RDT) to ascertain the presence of malaria parasites. Data were analyzed using probit regression method. Results It was found that 2.43% and 8.68% of the children were living in houses that were prone to landslide and flooding, respectively. Also, 19.93%, 17.08% and 16.26% of the children lived in houses without windows, with broken windows, and with a hole in the roof, respectively. Only 5.59% and 23.96% of the children lived in houses with window and door nets, respectively. Mosquito nets were owned by 64.03% of the households, where Adamawa Region had the lowest coverage (52.23%). Reasons for not owning mosquito nets by all the households included: lack of financial means (25.17%), using something else (1.80%) and not having many mosquitoes in the vicinity (5.53%). In the probit regression, variables that significantly reduced malaria infections among the children (p < 0.05) included: the number of mosquito nets, urban residence, improved toilet, ownership of a radio, residence in flood-prone area, mother’s secondary education, mother’s tertiary education and residence in areas with not many mosquitoes, while infections increased along with the household size, residence in areas prone to landslide, severe anaemia, moderate anaemia, mild anaemia and age of the children. Conclusions Ownership of mosquito nets and dwelling characteristics are critical factors influencing infections with malaria. There is a need to ensure compliance with its use since there are disparities between access and actual usage. Also, addressing malaria problem in Cameroon should consider regional disparity in malaria incidence rates and more engagement of the media, among others, for appropriate sensitization.
EN
Kirdi - acephalic peoples of north Cameroon, joined together in the history, mainly by contacts and fights with the large state organisms, based on the Islam. Their main characteristic feature was acephalic social structure based on the blood relationship. To those structures there was linked the whole system of law, social life, economy, religion and morality. Crucial period in the history of Kirdi people was time of pressure of the Islam from the northern Cameroon through Fulbhe (Fula, Fulani). The permanent danger from the Fulbhe people created two strategies among those Kirdi, which didn't surrender to their total dominance. One strategy was to withdraw to more inaccessible lands and the second was the attempts of organizing the military resistance in political unities - chief commands formed at the resemblance of the Fulbhe structures. Also those groups which chose to escape to inaccessible lands (mountains, bogs) changed their organizational structure moving the accent from the importance of blood ties to territorial bonds. Introduction by the colonial and postcolonial state of the institution of "traditional leader" weakened even more traditional Kirdi structures, giving advantage to feudal Fulbhe structures. A tendency of weakening this traditional structures of Kirdi people is deepening also in our times through introduction of the new cultivations, by using money, through the phenomenon of the urbanization and by the system of education. Traditional bonds of acephalic communities based on the self-sufficiency and family life have problems in new reality, since they also do not have a basis in traditional religious structures which are undergoing severe crisis. Communities which developed system of the chief command do better. It is more adapted to new administrative reality.
EN
Aim/purpose – This study attempts to examine the correlates of environmental hygiene and the influence of environmental hygiene on child health outcomes in Cameroon while controlling for other variables. Design/methodology/approach – The study made the use of Heckman/Control function Model through the 2011 Demographic and Health Survey with a sample size of 11.732 households. Findings – Result shows that environmental hygienic strongly corroborates with child health outcomes, meaning that improve latrines is associated with increase in child health in Cameroon. Result of determinants shows that education, father’s age, father present in the house and urban residence are strongly correlating with environmental hygiene. Research implications/limitations – Highlights the need for decision-makers to be more intentional with allocating economic resources towards sanitation projects. Originality/value/contribution – Empirically, this study attempted to quantify the link between environmental hygiene and child health outcomes using the Cameroon DHS while solving for endogeneity, heterogeneity, simultaneity, and selectivity bias.
EN
In many traditional societies, beliefs and taboos influence human behaviour towards the natural environment. Such beliefs and taboos are informal institutions where norms rather than official laws determine land use and nature protection in general and wildlife in particular. The present study on beliefs and taboos of the people of the northern periphery of the Korup National Park is an attempt to reveal how norms influence their relation to the environment. A total of 195 households were sampled through a household survey conducted in four villages. The results revealed that before the application of “modern” approaches for wildlife protection and management, the people relied on norms to establish a relationship with wildlife and nature. The enactment of the 1994 legislation on forest, wildlife and fisheries resulted in stiff resistance as it contradicts traditional norms. It was found that 57.4 % of the respondents still perceive wildlife as a resource that can never get extinct. Traditional norms had a differentiated impact especially on game protection. The study recommends that a wildlife benefiting code of beliefs and taboos is developed to provide a basis for establishing a synergy between park management laws and traditional belief/taboo systems that drive the management of wildlife.
EN
German colonial rule in Africa in the late 19th century has often been described by scholars and researchers of African history as exploitative, harsh, brutal, and repressive. Motivated by the aforementioned arguments that look at the negative aspects of German colonial rule; this study sets out to show that, in the pursuance of their diverse colonial motives, the Germans directly or indirectly contributed to the social advancement of the Bakundu people. The Bakundu people, who are found in the present day South West region of Cameroon, have been subject to many external influences since the 18th century that have left a trace in the way they presently think and act, in which their encounter with the Germans stands tall. This encounter brought with it; the construction of roads, the introduction of Western education – and a new form of administration that gave a wider horizon to the people -, as well as the establishment of cash-crop agriculture, which introduced the people to the international market, and so improving their income and living standards. This article thus tries to explore the social developments brought by German colonial rule during their 30 year stay in Bakundu. The realization of the aim of this article is based on a constructivist approach and from diverse documentation. Oral reports from elderly people who, in one way or another, lived through these developments, Archival materials from the National Archives Buea (NAB) plus the results of academic research are the main sources for this work. The exploitation of these sources has concretely presented the activities of the Germans during their stay in Bakundu.
EN
Christian missions in Cameroon were quite closely related to European colonization. It came with noble slogans of bringing civilization and freedom. But it had primarily economic and political goals. Although missionary activity was born from other motives, it was nolens volens entangled in the politics of the colonial states. The Cameroonian coast nominally belonged for centuries to Portugal. At the end of the 18th century the missionary activity in Africa had almost completely disappeared. The beginnings of the mission in Cameroon were entangled in the intricate politics of England, Germany, and France in particular. Without this political dimension it is impossible to fully understand the contemporaneity of the various Christian denominations in Cameroon.
EN
A review of a book by Zygmunt Frajzyngier, Paul Eguchi, Roger Prafé, Megan Schwabauer "Dictionary of Hdi. A Central Chadic Language of Cameroon".
EN
After the unification of Anglophone and Francophone regions of Cameroon in 1961, English-speaking Cameroonians have accused the central authorities in Yaoundé of marginalizing this part of the country. In 2016, expressions of discontent in this part of Cameroon gained momentum, and on October 1, 2017, the most extreme factions declared the independence of Cameroon’s two Anglophone regions and the birth of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia. This contributed to escalating tensions in the two English-speaking regions and led to strikes and bloody fighting. The central government and the separatists have taken irreconcilable positions. According to estimates, at least 4,000 people have died in the conflict and more than one million have been internally displaced. Most of the internally displaced are women and children. The Catholic Church has taken on the difficult task of finding ways of reconciling the hostile sides. The Church’s action is significant. The Church is one of the most influential non-governmental institutions throughout the country, including in English-speaking regions.
PL
Ekonomia sektora publicznego, oprócz charakterystyki tego sektora i pomiaru jego udziału w gospodarce, zajmuje się podstawami ekonomii dobrobytu, dochodem narodowym, budżetem publicznym i wydatkami, systemami podatkowymi i polityką fiskalną, przedsiębiorstwami państwowymi, prywatyzacją i inwestycjami publicznymi. Inaczej przebiega zarządzanie gospodarką w państwach rozwiniętych, a inaczej w rozwijających się, które są zależnymi gospodarczo peryferiami. Instrumenty państwa dobrobytu zmieniają się, ponieważ podnosi się wskaźnik Giniego. Jest to m.in. wynik polityki rządu i niesprawiedliwego systemu danin publicznych. Budżet obywatelski i partycypacyjny może być środkiem zmiany tego stanu rzeczy, ale wtedy, gdy władza zechce go zastosować. Nie robi tego, ponieważ nie chce pozbawić się możliwości marnotrawienia funduszy publicznych. Dlatego też nie dopuszcza do głębszej decentralizacji i nad etos pracy na rzecz dobra publicznego przedkłada w przedsiębiorstwach państwowych upolitycznienie kadr. Coś dzieje się w historii, że następują po sobie fale nacjonalizacji, prywatyzacji i reprywatyzacji, z krzywdą dla ludzi, którzy odbudowują rynek po okresie kryzysu. Na część z tych problemów znajdziemy odpowiedź w książce Public Economics and Finance pod redakcją Bernur Açıkgöz. Zawiera ona teoretyczną, acz niepełną, analizę polityki społecznej w kontekście państwa dobrobytu, przeglądowy i przydatny tekst o długu publicznym, zbiór podręcznikowych postulatów na temat nowych form budżetowania, interesujące rozważania o decentralizacji w Kamerunie i bardzo wąski dziedzinowo wątek spółek publicznych we Włoszech.
EN
The economics of the public sector besides making its characteristic and measuring its participation in the economy, deals with basics of the welfare state, national income, public budgeting and expenditure, tax systems and fiscal policy, public enterprises, privatization and public investment. Public management is different in the developed and developing countries, which comprise an economically dependent periphery. The welfare state instruments are changing, because the Gini index increases. This is a result of the government policy and unfair state tax system. The civic and participatory budget can change this situation, but the authority doesn’t want to give up the possibilities to waste public funds. Therefore it doesn’t let deeper decentralization. In public enterprises it puts the interest of political parties above the work ethos for public good. Something happens in the history that waves of nationalization, privatization and reprivatization follow each other, with harm to people who rebuild the national economy after a crash. Some of these problems can be found in the book Public Economics and Finance edited by Bernur Açıkgöz. It contains a theoretical, but incomplete, analysis of social policy in the context of the welfare state, a useful text on public debt, a collection of the postulates on new forms of budgeting, an interesting consideration on the decentralization in Cameroon and a very narrow topic of the public companies in Italy.
EN
In northern Nigeria in the 19th century, the Fulbe cleverly exploited Islam as a motivating and justifying factor in their war against the local Muslim rulers. In this way, they managed to establish a regional power – the caliphate (sultanate) of Sokoto, which for a long period dominated the feudal structures of the Fulani in northern Cameroon. Britain and then Germany aided in the downfall of the power and unity of the Sokoto caliphate. However, neither Germany nor later on France succeeded in eradicating Fulbe dominance over other peoples (Kirdi) in northern Cameroon. This was facilitated by the adoption of an indirect system of government. No change was brought about during Cameroon's years of independence. The Fulbe retained control of the state administration and beyond. Their influence, however, was challenged at the turn of the 20th century by new radical Muslim groups. These new Muslim groups embraced some of the ideas and practices that the Fulbe had previously used as weapons against them.
PL
W XIX wieku w północnej Nigerii Fulbe umiejętnie wykorzystywali islam jako siłę motywującą i usprawiedliwiającą walkę z lokalnymi muzułmańskimi władcami. W ten sposób udało im się ustanowić regionalną potęgę - kalifat (sułtanat) Sokoto, który na długi czas podporządkował sobie feudalne struktury Fulanów w północnym Kamerunie. Do upadku potęgi i jedności kalifatu Sokoto przyczyniła się Wielka Brytania, a następnie Niemcy. Jednak w północnym Kamerunie ani Niemcom, ani później Francji nie udało się wyeliminować dominacji Fulbe nad innymi ludami (Kirdi). Przyczynił się do tego przyjęty pośredni system rządów. Nie zmieniło się to w latach niepodległości Kamerunu. Fulbe nadal pozostawali u władzy w administracji państwowej i poza nią. Jednak na przełomie XIX i XX wieku ich władza została zakwestionowana przez nowe radykalne grupy muzułmańskie. Te nowe grupy muzułmańskie de facto odwoływały się do niektórych idei i praktyk, których Fulbe używali wcześniej jako własnej broni.
EN
The earliest inroads of Islam on the northern edges of today's Cameroon came from northern Africa. They led all the way from Arabian Egypt and Libya still in the times of the Berbers. Early islamification yielded Moslem states, created mainly in the area of Lake Chad. This first onset was connected primarily with acquiring slaves and new subjects. The next inroad of Islamic infiltration came from Fulani infiltration of territory in northern Cameroon, beginning in the 17th and 18th centuries. In the 19th century the Fulani conquered northern Cameroon, although numerous enclaves of the Kirdi peoples evaded their authority. The Fulani achieved much greater mastery over the Kirdi during the time of French and German rule. They took advantage of their dominant political position and of their cooperation with the colonizers. In this way they brought about the greater islamification of these lands, but they did not win the majority of the population to their religion. In the mid-20th century Catholic and also Protestant missionary activity began a robust development in Kirdi territory. Their activity was restrained by the Fulani leaders. Additionally, favoritism of the Fulani and Islam in northern Cameroon continued after Cameroon gained independence in 1982. The intense rivalry began, however, to give place to a more peaceful coexistence, and even cooperation in many areas of social life. The time had arrived for a difficult dialogue, a dialogue which continually struggles with the past, with prejudice, and with a lack of understanding among many religious and political leaders.
PL
Najstarsza droga naporu islamu na krańce północne dzisiejszego Kamerunu prowadziła z północny Afryki. Wczesnej islamizacji uległy państwa muzułmańskie, tworzone głównie w okolicach jeziora Czad. Druga droga rozprzestrzeniania się islamu związana była z przenikaniem Fulbe na tereny północnego Kamerunu. W XIX w. Fulbe podbili północny Kamerun, jednak ich władzy umykały liczne enklawy ludów Kirdi. Fulbe uzyskali o wiele większą dominację nad Kirdi w czasach panowania Niemców i Francuzów. Wykorzystali swoją dominującą pozycję polityczną i fakt współpracy z kolonizatorami. Doprowadzili w ten sposób do większej islamizacji tych ziem, ale nie zdobyli większości populacji dla swej religii. W połowie XX w. na terenach Kirdi zaczęły rozwijać prężnie swoją działalność misje katolickie, a także protestanckie. Ich działalność była powstrzymywana przez władców Fulbe. Także po uzyskaniu przez Kamerun niepodległości (do 1982 r.) trwało faworyzowanie Fulbe i islamu w północnym Kamerunie. Ta ostra rywalizacja zaczęła jednak ustępować bardziej pokojowemu współżyciu, a nawet współpracy w wielu dziedzinach życia społecznego. Nastąpił czas trudnego dialogu, który wciąż boryka się z przeszłością, uprzedzeniami i niezrozumieniem wśród wielu przywódców religijnych i politycznych.
Nurt SVD
|
2016
|
issue 1
240-259
FR
Une crise identitaire opposant Boko Haram, partisan de la rigueur intégriste, de la réforme sociétale et de la promotion de l’éducation islamique, à deux États laïcs de la Sous-Région d’Afrique Centrale et d’Afrique de l’Ouest (Nigeria et Cameroun), issus de la colonisation et de la modernisation capitaliste, débouche sur une grave crise qui a failli embraser toute la Sous-Région Afrique Centrale. Au coeur de cette affirmation identitaire et de cette crise sécuritaire, domine le phénomène Boko Haram, comme indicateur du rôle prépondérant des religions (notamment d’un renouveau islamique) au coeur des mutations socio-politiques à l’oeuvre en ce moment en Afrique. La lutte contre Boko Haram se révèle inefficace. Bien que l’opinion internationale porte un jugement unanime sur ce mouvement en condamnant ces aspirations, d’autres initiatives à grande échelle (notamment militaires) ne sont pas prises. Les solidarités politiques et économiques locales ou supranationales laissent des populations envahies par la «guerre sainte» déclarée par Boko Haram à leur triste sort.
EN
Islamist extremist group Boko Haram, seeking to impose radical Islam in Nigeria and Cameroon, has brought about a major crisis in the social, political and religious life of these two countries. In fact, the crisis may have already spilled over to other states of the Central Africa Subregion, influenced by Western culture through colonialism, capitalism and modernisation. To the already complex and often unsettling transformations in the economic, social and cultural make-up of African societies, Boko Haram adds a violent attempt to create a kind of a new African identity, which would be radically and decisively Islamic. So far, all opposition to Boko Haram has proved ineffective. Though it has been condemned far and wide, governments have fallen short of any meaningful intervention, especially a military one, to check its progress. It is hard to escape an impression that political and economic solidarity, both on local and international level, is proving itself powerless in the face of the "holy war" waged by Boko Haram, leaving those trapped in the middle of it to fend for themselves.
PL
Autor szkicuje charakterystykę poważnego kryzysu społeczno-polityczno-religijnego wywołanego przez bojowników ekstremistycznej organizacji Boko Haram, usiłującej wprowadzić skrajnie radykalny islam w dwu laickich państwach podregionu Afryki Centralnej i Zachodniej - Nigerii i Kamerunie. Autor wysuwa tezę, że kryzys ten mógł ogarnąć cały podregion Afryki Centralnej - kraje naznaczone kulturą zachodnią (kolonializmem i kapitalistycznym modernizmem). Zarzewiem zaistniałego konfliktu jest próba stworzenia nowej „tożsamości afrykańskiej" przez zdeterminowanych adeptów Boko Haram, promujących radykalną odnowę islamu w Czarnej Afryce - zmagającej się z wieloaspektowym kryzysem politycznym, ekonomicznym i społeczno-obyczajowym. Walka ze zmilitaryzowaną muzułmańską organizacją Boko Haram nie przynosi oczekiwanych rezultatów. Pomimo powszechnego potępienia jej działalności przez opinię międzynarodową, żadne operacje wojskowe na wielką skalę nie zostały podjęte. Solidarność wspólnot lokalnych i międzynarodowych okazuje się bezsilna wobec „świętej wojny" wypowiedzianej niewinnej ludności przez Boko Haram.
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