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ESPES
|
2020
|
vol. 9
|
issue 2
32 – 48
EN
A recent version of the mental file framework argues that the antirealist theory of fictional objects can be reconciled with the claim that fictional utterances involving character names express propositions that are true in the real world. This hybrid view rests on the following three claims: (i) character names lack referents but express a mode of presentation, (ii) fictional utterances introduce oblique contexts where character names refer to their modes of presentation, and (iii) modes of presentation are mental files. In this critical paper, I will argue that the proposed view runs into a number of theory-internal problems. These problems arise partly from the unclarities inherent in the notion of mental file, and partly from a mistaken semantics for character names. I will also argue that adherents of fictional realism can make use of the notion of mental file without encountering similar difficulties.
EN
Propositions about fiction pose a number of problems for referential semantics. They are caused by the underlying contention that can be named existential monism. In the paper the author presents some solutions for the problem of denoting the names of fictional objects, e.g. the rigid designation of names and the possible worlds framework. These approaches are nevertheless unsatisfactory because they were introduced to achieve two goals that cannot be realized at the same time: to solve the problem of the existence of the objects that the words refer to and to explain the understanding of language. In the paper he argues that the proper solution consists in distinguishing between existential ontology, e.g. that proposed by Roman Ingarden, and a theory of language that explains the phenomenon of understanding without any ontological commitments, e.g. Donald Davidson theory of meaning.
EN
The article investigates actions directed towards fictional objects (actions de simulacro). This is a separate class of actions, to be considered along with actions directed towards real objects (actions de re) and actions directed towards the properties of real objects (actions de dicto). In particular, the article studies logical characteristics of practical reasoning that justifies actions de simulacro, as well as corresponding psychological factors. Fictional objects are considered from the standpoint of structural psychoanalysis, as emotionally loaded meaningful formations that fix personal experience and constitute the basis of what can be called individual ontology. Taking into account the role of personal ontology and subjective creation of meaning in the development of intentional action provides a ground of questioning the Wittgensteinian thesis of the impossibility of personal language.
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