Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 4

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  G
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

The Poet of Decay and Psychic Entropy: The Intersection of Surrealism and Science in J. G. Ballard’s Fiction

100%
Tereszewski M.
Academic Journal of Modern Philology
|
2021
|
issue 14
337–346
EN
Images of decay, both psychological and physical, permeate much of J.G. Ballard’s fiction, creating in effect a unique aesthetic that has acquired the eponymous description “ballardian.” This imagery, stemming from the surrealist tradition, is more than aesthetic affectation; it is, as this article argues, the manifestation of an eschatological theme underlying much of New Wave science fiction. This article also addresses how scientific discourse, especially references to entropy, and surrealist aesthetics intersect in his novels (High-Rise and The Drowned World) to provide a metaphor for Ballard’s frequent use of decay imagery. Though the surrealist component of his imagination has been well documented, what still invites closer scrutiny are the ideological assumptions linking Ballard’s incorporation of surrealism with the work of other surrealists and the way Ballard develops this theme for his own purposes.
2

Positivism Buried Alive? In Defence of Inclusive Legal Positivism

67%
Dyrda A.
Studia Prawnicze
|
2010
|
issue 2(184)
5-36
EN
The efforts taken by the "soft" (inclusive) positivists (H.L.A. Hart's followers, ie. J. Coleman, W. Waluchow, M. Kramer, K. E. Himma) to defend the legal positivist position (the separability thesis, the social sources thesis) are combined with theoretical references to the moral arguments which are present in judicial practice. Therefore, the inclusive positivists treat the relationship between law and morality as a contingent relationship and try to justify it on the basis of the system’s overriding rule of recognition. This position, as an attempt to find the "golden mean" in theory of law, is criticized both by non-positivists and "hard" positivists. For instance, R. Dworkin or L. Morawski claim that, despite its declarations, soft positivism actually does not respond to the requirements of modern legal practice and is a "degenerated" and stagnant research program. On the other hand, J. Raz contends that due to the incorporation of morality, soft positivism is no longer a real positivism. The article presents a defense of soft positivism, especially against its non-positivistic critics, as well as a version of soft positivism, which can be called a "constructive" one (V. Villa). It also shows that soft positivism, as being consistent with the "spirit" of positivism and complying with the requirements of the present judicial practice, may be justified by reference to postmodern thinking.
3
Content available remote

Główne typy metafizyki analitycznej

59%
Szubka T.
Filo-Sofija
|
2011
|
vol. 11
|
issue 4(15)
849-864
EN
In a widespread general view about analytic philosophy it is often emphasized the supposed animosity or mistrust of that movement towards metaphysics. That opinion is in many respects one-sided and incorrect. First, one cannot find that animosity towards metaphysics in the works of G.E. Moore and B. Russell, the founders of modern analytic philosophy. Of course, they criticized the speculative, Hegelian metaphysics of their idealistic predecessors, but they did it in order to defend metaphysics of a different kind, more careful, empirical, and realist one. Moreover, even if it is to some extent true that over a few decades analytic philosophy was dominated by the attitude of mistrust towards more theoretical and comprehensive metaphysical investigations, it should be stressed that that attitude has almost completely disappeared in the last fifty years. Metaphysics has again regained the status of central and vigorously pursued philosophical discipline. One of the main originators of that metaphysical turn in contemporary analytic philosophy was Sir P.F. Strawson, the Oxford philosopher, who in 1959 forcefully articulated the idea of descriptive metaphysics. A somewhat similar way of doing metaphysics was later developed in the writings of D. Davidson, M. Dummett, and – in certain respects – H. Putnam. One may say that all those thinkers have attempted to identify the basic structure of reality by describing and elucidating the basic structural features of our thought and talk. Since in such a method of doing metaphysics one can discern some characteristic marks of Kantian transcendental arguments, there is a point to call it analytic-transcendental metaphysics. In a completely different way metaphysics has been pursued by those analytic thinkers who are under heavy influence of the conception of philosophy put forward by W.V. Quine. For Quine philosophy, including metaphysics, is continuous with science, and, to be more precise, constitutes the theoretical end of science. Among many followers of that kind of metaphysics, that may be called analytic-naturalistic one, there are D.M. Armstrong and D. Lewis. The paper presents those two varieties of analytic metaphysics, and succinctly discusses their main difficulties. Subsequently, it mentions those examples of contemporary analytic metaphysics that, for one reason or another, do not belong to either of those two varieties. The paper ends with a brief appendix discussing the most recent revival of metaphysics within the analytic movement and a critical response toit from the deflationary point of view.
4
Content available remote

Współczesne postaci ontologii. Od Hegla do Quine’a

51%
Paź B.
Filo-Sofija
|
2012
|
vol. 12
|
issue 1(16)
9-38
PL
The article presents some prominent figures of modern ontology from Hegel to nowadays. It takes into account the diverse forms of ontology in three distinct trends of philosophy: Hegelianism, phenomenology and analytical philosophy. Each of these trends has its own subject, aim and method of ontology. The subject of Hegel’s ontology is understood as something originally undefined, being on the border of nonentity. When presented this way, the subject presupposes a dialectic method of ontology, which the German philosopher defines as “the consciousness of the form of the inner self-movement of the content of logic.” It is based on reflection, which, according to Hegel, is both a tool and medium to knowledge, though in his Phenomenology of spirit he identifies it as being by itself. Thus understood ontology is to be found both in the works of Hegel’s students and his critics (S. Kierkegaard, M. Heidegger, J.-P. Sartre). In Husserl’s phenomenology it is not reflection but eidetic intuition (Wesensschau) that is the main method of ontology, and its subject is not just being, but the essence – a correlate to the eidetic intuition. To Husserl’s phenomenological presumptions referred, among others, N. Hartman and R. Ingarden, who understood ontology as eidetic analysis of ideas. Though Heidegger saw the problem differently: the goal of ontology is defining the meaning of Being (Sinn vom Sein), its method is phenomenological. In none of the approaches was the subject of ontology understood in a classic way as Being, but rather as a certain form of its representation, as the content of consciousness (ideas), or as a certain sense for a definite subject. A different approach to ontology is observable within analytic philosophy, which involved lots of different personalities and different traditions, such as the new positivism, scholastics (J.M. Bocheński, E. Nieznański), Leibnizian rationalism (A. Plantinga), empiricism and pragmatism (W.O. Quine, P. Strawson). Remarkable achievements in ontology belong to some Polish logicians, representatives of the Polish school of analytic philosophy, such as S. Leśniewski and T. Kotarbiński. Leśniewski was the founder of formal ontology – logical calculus of names, while Kotarbiński discovered nominalistic and materialistic ontology – reism (from Latin: res ‘thing’) based on Leśniewski’s ontology. The main thesis of reism was the claim that “every object is a body.”
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.