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EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE

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EN
In opinions on evolution of features of human mind one can spot the existence of clear dualism. Some biologists as well as the great majority of philosophers and theologians perceive human being as a creature of completely different nature from other living creatures, including biologically closest relatives of our species. As presenters of such views usually do not deny the process of evolution itself, most often they point to an enormous acceleration of the tempo of Homo sapiens intellectual development which took place 40 thousand years ago that, according to them, once and for all separated man from the rest of the world of nature. However, during last 30 years, at first a large group of biologists and later psychologists became convinced that there was nothing extraordinary about the character of human nature. Proponents of that view perceive evolution of human intellect as a continuum whose individual aspects can be derived from rudimentary animal features. According to them an overriding motivation of human behavior is a maximization of Darwinian fitness. The first serious trial of such a revision of beliefs on human mind was sociobiology created by an entomologist Edward O. Wilson. Because of its radical character, sociobiology has not gained general acceptance and has been criticized both on grounds of methodology of natural sciences and philosophy. However, in recent years there have appeared more and more supporters of evolutionary psychology. They try to explain the development of features of human mind by means of theories and hypotheses borrowed from evolutionary biology and behavioral ecology, e.g. family selection, reciprocated altruism, Good Genes Hypothesis, the Red Queen Principle, and the concept of 'selfish gene'. Although from the point of view of methodology of science the research program of evolutionary biology is correct, at present a significant part of evolutionary psychologists' statements go far beyond still scarce empirical support. Nonetheless, evolutionary psychology will certainly become an important voice in the discussion on sources of human nature, the voice which should be ignored neither by philosophers nor theologians.
EN
In this article the author would like to draw the reader's attention to one of the most interesting conceptions of man, that of Plato. Plato is one of the main sources of the dualist view on the human nature, according to which man consists of the two elements, soul and body; the human soul is non-material and can exist apart from the material body. This statement is controversial because it is not clear how these two distinct entities can exist in one human being. For centuries prominent philosophers considered this to be an issue of prime importance; even now this problem continues to raise deep questions. However, it is worth noting that Plato himself did not formulate one solution to the problem; instead, he tried to describe it in many ways using various metaphors. The author believes that it is more fruitful to see Plato's strategy in this way instead of reducing the relation between the body and the soul to one of its common characteristics, for example, comparing the body to a prison of the soul. It is well known that the core of Plato's conception is knowledge about the soul. The Greek philosopher presents his threefold theory as the central point of reference for his anthropological concept. This is true, but the theory must be put into the proper context. On the one hand, it is bound up with the general conception of the universe, with the macrocosm, to use the Greek term; on the other, it is a basis for both ethical and political considerations. This is also important for the understanding of man. The result is that man is part of the chain of beings, of the rational cosmos. But as a microcosm he/she must imitate an external order in individual, as well as in political life.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2010
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vol. 38
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issue 1
5-17
EN
The main thesis of this article is that thinking about man is rooted in the conception of human nature. From the perspective of the history of ideas, it is clear not only that the nature of man is intertwined with history but that the reaction of the 'essentialist' conception of man was and continues to be stronger than history. The best evidence of this is the discourse on man present in the legacy of Leszek Kolakowski. Kolakowski's faith in Reason and in Man already manifested itself in his 'Individual and Infinity: Freedom and Antinomies of Freedom in the Philosophy of Spinoza', published in 1958. There he sided with the 'figure of lone emancipation' - meaning the individual autonomy granted in Reason. Despite various intellectual tempests, he would remain faithful to that figure. The allure and magnetism of the works of Leszek Kolakowski lie, above all, in the fact that they not only constitute solid and interesting treatises in the field of the history of ideas, but that they are also motivating and inspiring commentaries on contemporary times. It is precisely in the context of those 'figures of lone emancipation' that the concept of the absolute (as is the case with several other philosophical categories) is tantamount to a concept burdened by internal contradiction. As such, it cannot comprise the foundation for anything indubitable; the paradox of relativists and advocates of the absolute stems from the belief that relativists are right for absolutist reasons'.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2019
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vol. 74
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issue 7
511 – 529
EN
The recent, extremely dynamic development of modern methods of biotechnological manipulation of genes, including human germline genes, presents new challenges to philosophers and especially bioethicists with unprecedented urgency. Until recently, many of these issues have been the subject of science fiction, and neither biologists nor bioethicists have expected them to be occurring now rather than in the distant future. It can be assumed that germline gene editing (together with progress in understanding of the human genome) will bring in the near future empirical knowledge, which will put the current philosophical concepts of human nature (based primarily on the speculative philosophical tradition) to the test.
EN
Jurgen Habermas is trying to face the ethical problems of biotechnology development. He notes that today we should consider setting the border in research. The laws of nature are being routinely violated in laboratories.. Scientists for instance are able to create hybrids, grow human skin and breed the hormones. We intuitively know the difference between “what was born”, and “what was made”, but words “natural”, and “unnatural” lose own meaning. Habermas alarms – manipulation of human genome is dangerous and immoral. While describing this immorality he refers to the categorical imperatives of Immanuel Kant. What’s interesting, when he criticizes biotechnologies, he doesn’t use catholic arguments about sanctity of life. In his opinion, human genetic engineering: firstly, would take away possibility to be themselves, and create their own biography, secondly, interpersonal relationship would be disturb, and finally freedom of genetically-modified person would be open to question. Individual whose biography would be outlined before its birth will be destined to some kind of a plan. Its illusory free decisions actually will be determined. If human doesn’t have a right of making independent decisions, then he can’t be responsible for them, and this situation creates a lot of issues. Besides, someone who has been artificially created, can’t be equal in relation to its Creators. And equality is the base of human relationships, which can be moral, or not moral. Habermas alerts, if we won’t sensitize to these issues, then people would be bred, like animals. Unborn children would be a product in this new reality. They will be treated like merchandises, which someone can buy. Parents will decide about talents, character and the look of their own baby. And their choices will be limited only by their wealth.
EN
The explanation of the human nature exclusively from the perspective of the biological evolution (as for example in sociobiology) faces two paradoxes. The core of the first one can be summarized as follows: The characteristics of the specifically human behavior, such as symbolic thinking, intentional and planned activity, cooperative work distribution, creation of the cultural artifacts and the social institutions, needed an incommensurable shorter time to develop when compared with the changes effected by the selection of the random mutations. The second paradox says: Although the cultural accumulation of Homo sapiens sapiens grew exponentially during the last 10 000 years, the capacity of the human brain remained unchanged. What were the mental pre-adaptations, which made these rapid changes possible? The paper discusses the psychological researches, which aim at contributing to the explanation of these paradoxes.
EN
This article is an attempt to refute the accusation of hostility towards intellect and rationalism to Burke, which is also mentioned by MacIntyre. It is questionable that Burke was falsifying English history for his own benefits. It was ideological conviction connected with French Revolution judged as seditious and 'metaphysical', not conformism, that made him strive for split in his own party. Also in this context he warned of retreating to some founding state, of raising society from the beginning, of starting reforms with act of establishment's breakage. He was convinced that old-time social life, such as human cities and political communities, can't be forced in new political and legal constructions without a great waste and damage of prolonged evolution of human institutions and companionship. Burke's well known belief that to govern we need through knowledge of state's nature and spirit, which is complex and delicate, does not confirm his anti-intellectual attitude. Burke's view of power was probably a public service, in the interest of the nation. MacIntyre, who defends the values of tradition, owes more to Burke than he wants to admit. Nevertheless Burke in his attack on theoretical abstractions goes too far. There is a kind of reflexivity elimination form the practice. Practice without autocratic debates (as MacIntyre exposed) as well as axiological references, which are enabled by theory (as Leo Strauss exposed) would lead to lethal stagnation, but it was not really realized by Burke.
EN
In his attempt to analyze the problem of realism, Ingarden started from the Husserlian distinction between the world and 'pure consciousness'. Nevertheless, he rejected all the ontological - or rather metaphysical - features attributed to consciousness by Husserl, while at the same time he was convinced of the indubitability of our knowledge of the basic characteristics of it as a sort of being existent inside the human person. If he had resigned from this epistemological feature of a privileged access, he would have had to grant that we do not need to seek a proof of the existence of the world at all. Other ways in which Ingarden tried to elucidate the problem of being - in the first place the problem of human nature - led him to the sphere of free persons. Understanding our knowledge of this sphere demands an understanding of the human senses in a dynamic and holistic way and the acceptance of a personal model of the world as the basis of our knowledge. The 'primary data' of our experience are, in fact, human persons; they are the paradigm of independent being and full realism means accepting them as similar to us, as free creatures.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2021
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vol. 76
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issue 1
46 – 58
EN
This paper presents and analyses the moral-normative sources of human rights. In this article, we analyse the philosophical sources of human rights that relate to the question of why human beings should be holders of human rights, regardless of whether specific legal claims can be derived from them at the legal level. The paper addresses three main normative sources of human rights: (a) secular claims of human dignity; (b) claims based on human needs and human nature; and (c) transcendental claims. The article points out the limitations of these philosophical resources and suggests why it may be suitable to accept human rights based on a pluralistic notion of human nature.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2019
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vol. 74
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issue 4
318 – 333
EN
The paper deals with the concept of “human nature” and focuses on the question of what is the place of this concept, not only in the history of philosophy but also in the contemporary philosophical and scientific thought. The author aims to describe the concept of human nature by a historical overview of philosophical attempts to characterize it. The only way to construct philosophy for life, for future, for continuation of human history is a philosophical and scientific investigation. However, a strange thing is happening in modern philosophy: many philosophers do not seem to believe that there is such a thing as human nature. What makes this strange is that not only does the new attitude run counter to much of the history of philosophy but – despite loud claims to the contrary – it also goes against the findings of modern science.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2008
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vol. 63
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issue 9
741-749
EN
More often than not, Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche are considered to be antagonists. For K. Marx the analysis of the material conditions of life provides the key to the interpretation of human history. F. Nietzsche sees the analysis of values as the key to the understanding of the development of societal forms. Marx defends egalitarianism; Nietzsche is an enthusiastic advocate of hierarchies. They both differentiate between an authentic and alienated form of life; however, their ideas of authenticity are fundamentally different. In spite of the discrepancies in their understandings of the existence of a society, their analyses of political life of modern society are organized around the metaphor of the theatre. The metaphor of the theatre makes it possible to grasp the difference between an authentic and an alienated form of human life.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2014
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vol. 69
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issue 6
493 – 502
EN
Nietzsche’s famous dictum “Become what you are” is one of the most difficult aspects of his philosophy. Although Nehamas’ (2001) influential interpretation elucidates how we can understand the apparent contradiction between being and becoming inherent in it, it does so only at the price of divorcing the dictum from the larger concerns of Nietzsche’s thought. Therefore, the author will interpret this dictum in the light of Schopenhauer as Educator and its statement that “your true nature lies not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably high above you”. He aims to show that by understanding Nietzsche’s conception of human nature as it appears in the statement above we can grasp “becoming what one is” as inextricably bound together with his concepts of education and nobility and with his project of individual transformation, and thus with the core of his thought.
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POST-DOG TALES ABOUT HUMAN EXTINCTION

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World Literature Studies
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2021
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vol. 13
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issue 1
18 - 30
EN
Clifford D. Simak’s fixup novella City (1952) should be re-read as one of the first pieces of post-humanist science-fiction writing. This article argues that naming the book after the first story, and not after the fourth one, “Desertion”, was misleading because the book is not one of the “urban science-fiction stories”. City rather explores what would happen if people had the opportunity of instantly entering paradise (Nick Bostrom’s “post-human mode of being”), even at the cost of deserting the human body. A further hypothesis suggested here is that John W. Campbell, the founding father of the Golden Age of Science Fiction, initially refused to publish “Desertion” and never published City’s final story, “The Simple Way”, in his iconic Astounding Science Fiction magazine, because the post-humanist character of these stories contradicted his “classical” view of science fiction.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 5
449-460
EN
The paper offers a discussion of the concept of common sense in T. Reid's philosophy. Reid criticizes Hume's scepticism, which is in conflict with common sense, as a 'deadlock of philosophy'. Reid's criticism thus might be seen as naive and 'un-philosophical', and therefore missing the point. The author argues, however, that common sense, as used by Reid, is a metaphysical concept. In his view common sense and its principles delimit all plausible philosophizing. He also sees a remarkable affinity between Reid's philosophy and later Wittgenstein's considerations of 'the image of the world'. Reid's philosophy of common sense is an original philosophical resolution of the problem, which the philosophy 'in a deadlock' is facing, as well as an effective criticism of scepticism.
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EN
The paper is focused on the issue of connecting the minimum freedom and human nature in the ideas of Isaiah Berlin. Its content is conceived as an attempt to express the position of minimal freedom in the Berlin concept and as analysis of the typology of human nature using the concept of R. A. Kocis. Since Berlin does not define the essence of human nature in his work, the aim of this study is to search for out a potential explanation of what can be understood under the concept of human nature and what role it fulfils in the need to secure an inviolable part of human freedom. For Berlin, the minimum freedom is a key aspect of promoting the idea of securing an area that no one has the right to interfere with. This is because the loss of this component would destroy human personality.
EN
In the paper, I propose a new perspective on the philosophy of David Hume, different from its current psychological interpretation. I begin with the interpretation of the concept of human nature and Hume’s notion of feelings. I analyze several examples which show the cultural dimension of Hume’s moral philosophy and the primary socialization. This allows of an anti-psychological interpretation of the philosophy of David Hume.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
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issue 9
665 – 679
EN
Naturalism as a general philosophical strategy became a popular topic of philosophical debates during the last half of century, however, its roots go deeper into the history of philosophical thought. One of the authors in whose works some elements of philosophical naturalism are undoubtedly identifiable is David Hume. The aim of the paper is to shed light on some naturalistic tendencies in Humeʼs philosophy, which, as I will argue, can be considered as inspiring even today. Such is his approach to his “new science of man”, within which his inclination towards methodological naturalism can be found. Naturalistic tendencies can be identified in Humeʼs views regarding knowledge and understanding, especially with regard to the problem of scepticism. The study outlines also a possible naturalistic interpretation of Humeʼs moral philosophy.
EN
Pascal described human beings as 'thinking reeds', weak in flesh but magnificent in mind. While it is a poetic image, it is also an ambivalent one and may suggest inappropriately Dualist view of human nature. It is important to realize that not only we are thinking reeds but that we are thinking because we are reeds. In fact, rationality is reed-like itself, very much of a kind with the rest of human nature. It is now more than two and half centuries since David Hume first pointed out the lack of an argument that would fully justify claims about matters of fact. Being neither made evident by our observations nor arising out of the mere consideration of relations of ideas, claims such as that turkey will be fed dinner tomorrow - rather that being had for dinner (to use Russel's famous example) have remained problematic ever since. Many attempts have been made to show something of the beauty and certainty of reasoning about relations of ideas could be recaptured in our dealings with matters of fact, but all attempts have remained mere shadows of what we tried to grasp. Hume's argument stands. An infinite being might watch countless sunsets and yet should witness each new sunrise with surprise, always withholding its judgment regarding what will follow.
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EN
Martin Luther is generally considered a stark critic of Aristotle and, even more so, the medieval Aristotelianism of his age. Our article explores the development of Luther’s appraisal of Aristotle’s thought throughout his career with a special emphasis on the topic of theological anthropology. We will distinguish between the fundamental anthropological paradigms based on their situatedness – vertically, coram Deo, and horizontally, coram hominibus. The imago dei (Greek: eikon tou theou) doctrine will be closely examined as Luther’s essential component of his doctrine of the human being, and ethical as well as social implications will be drawn from his emphases. Aristotle’s philosophical heritage will be contrasted with Luther’s views on human will, conscience, sin, concupiscence, and divine grace. Our thesis is that, owing to Luther’s excessive reliance on God’s sovereignty and omnipotence, innate human capacities are diminished to the point of insignificance. This makes Luther’s anthropology pessimistic in regards to human capacities to do well. Questions of moral responsibility, the goodness of creation (including human reason), and the meaningfulness of human moral struggles are examined in the last section of our paper.
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FOREIGNERS TO HUMAN NATURE

70%
Annales Scientia Politica
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2019
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vol. 8
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issue 1
5 – 26
EN
Is there a relation between wealth and human nature? Can the Delphic maxim "know thyself” (γνῶθι σεαυτὸν) help us decide whether or not to be affluent and wealthy? And if so: how rich? Human beings, says Aristotle, can only use and benefit from a limited amount of goods and services. The very rich have more than they need; the poor are in need because they have the minimum required to live, or even less. Only in the ‘middle’ do we find those who enjoy ‘true wealth’. Any society should search to increase the number of persons who possess enough and therefore are ‘truly wealthy’. Every human being should have what one needs. To achieve a ‘truly rich’ ‘middle class’ (Aristotle) rather than aspiring to increase its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), per capita GDP or income equality in terms of a normal distribution a country must solve the welfare problem of its population. That means it must end with the food, health, education, employment, and other such gaps. This paper argues that the hierarchical stratification of the contemporary Mexican society that favours an outrageously rich minority could renew its social order with the understanding of two Aristotelian categories: attainment of ‘real wealth’ for large ‘middle class’. This would allow Mexico to become a member of the developed world by turning into a mostly middle class country.
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