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EN
In the paper author tries to find the source of human nature, human dignity and human rights in contemporary civilisation. That nowadays scientific and technical civilisation seems to be, as never before and apart from the apparent cultural progress, non-human indeed.
EN
The authoress discusses a problem of human rights in the context of Kantian's ethical formalism and Socrates' ethical intellectualism. She refers to Girard's interpretation of Hiob's story according to which this biblical hero is a victim of so called collective mimetism, connected with a totalitarian situation or society created by a soul of crowd. On the contrary to this totalitarian type of community human rights have their origins in the conscience of individual, in reason or a subject. According to her interpretation they mediate between external and internal sphere, between legal and moral sphere (Kant) and also between 'loi' and 'droit' (S.Weil). In this way they give a possibility to establish a really just law which - thanks to the mediation done in a conscience of individual - includes an element of transcendence and rationality, so it isn't a blind force which could destroy an individual. For the authoress Socrates is an adherent of such kind of reflexive attitude - and thanks to his moral autonomy - is also a patron of human rights discours at all.
EN
Christian religious education revolves around the central idea of basic human rights. When learning to remember, for example the Holocaust or Shoah, one is reminded of the fact that it is essential to think about human rights since they are continuously abused. The atrocities committed by the Nazis were not merely an expression of their contempt for other human beings, but rather a complete disregard for and a total abolishment of basic human rights. The focal point of Christian religious education is to remember the crucifixion of Jesus Christ and by rights and dignity of every human being.
EN
The Charter of Fundamental Rights, proclaimed on 7 December 2000, has the nature of an inter-institutional agreement and is not a legally binding document. The strength of the Charter lies in: - its comprehensive approach to the protection of the individual's rights; which extends to all categories of rights and to all persons sojourning within the EU territory, not only EU citizens; - standardization of concepts concerning fundamental rights; - establishing the mechanism for fundamental rights protection within the EU. The flaws of the Charter are as follows: 1. A new controversial typology of fundamental rights. The Charter does not refer to the categories of the individual's rights currently existing in both international law and domestic law of several states. Instead of previously applied typology, it establishes six categories of rights which correspond to its initial six chapters. In consequence, there is little evidence that new standards are introduced and that they have resulted in a relatively uniform meaning of the rights either in a widely understood European law (i.e. that of the European Union and that of the Council of Europe) and domestic law of the EU Member States. 2. The principles are not precisely defined. This new typology overlaps with the distinction between the fundamental rights and principles established by the Charter. The Charter lacks consistency and, contrary to the declaration contained in its title, it refers not only to fundamental rights, but also to principles. However, no distinct group of principles is separated in the Charter, and no such distinction can be derived from its content. 3. The Charter's possibility of stimulating the extension of competences of the EU institutions and organs. The ambiguity of relations between the system of protection provided by the Charter and the national systems of the EU Member States may have dual consequences. Either the EU institutions and organs are competent to decide in all the situations where there are any doubt arises about competence of national organs to deal with such matter, or in the case of any such doubt the ability to decide is granted to the national authorities. The former variant seems more likely to appear, which shall mean a de facto extension of EU competences. 4. The means for protection of rights guaranteed by the Charter are not specified in a sufficient detail.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2015
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vol. 70
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issue 9
759 – 769
EN
The contribution deals with the concept of human rights from a philosophical perspective. It tries to answer the question whether a rationally and universally valid definition of human rights is possible at all. In its first part general characteristics of human rights is offered followed in its second part by the exploration of prevailing ways of justification of human rights in the contemporary philosophy. It is argued that the basis of human rights is defined variously and that due to different values giving the legitimacy to human rights we have various lists of the latter. It is this ambivalent basis of human rights that subverts their moral authority.
EN
The article deals with human rights process issues in Lithuania as the post- -communist country. Human rights, as the subfield of political science studies are not elaborated in Lithuania. This essay explores the two influential factors of human rights process and their impact on such actors of this process as government officials, society and NGO’s. Activity of this actors are contradictory, inconsistent and their interrelations are, sometimes, conflicting. Government official’s human rights policy are influenced more by institutional factor. Society evaluate human rights idea and policy from the cultural perspective. NGO’s have potential to conciliate influence of both factors, but their activity is not yet fully developed.
EN
The aim of the article is to draw attention to a frequent mistake made by western religious experts and civilization researches who are inclined to treat Islam in the same way as while analyzing any other religion, i. e. as a specific sphere of human life which is their sacrum of contacts with God. The author of the article proves that Islam is first of all a complete social system and its religious aspect plays an auxiliary role. The Islamic vision of the world is not a function of human relations with God's transcendence, as it happens in case of Christianity, but has a ummatic dimension, i. e. makes man's will limits dependent on the will of the whole Muslim community. An individual is not limited by the dimensions of a human being with their personal soul and individual ethics constitutes an immanent part of the whole society. So human freedom is obviously limited by the social interest and every human activity is assessed and punished from this point of view. The result of the ummatic vision of the world is a specific definition of human rights in Islam which was formally reflected in the so called Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam (1991) being a former answer to the UN Declaration of Human Rights. The author's analysis is textual and refers to the most important statements made in the Cairo Declaration.
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EN
In contemporary Europe the concept of human rights plays an undisputed role of a specific basis of all legal relations or even more: of all social relations. It does not mean the concept is free from any criticism. Particularly, it is questioned for its heterogenous character, and first of all it is criticized for extending the catalog of human rights too much, which may cause their inflation”. The author of the article discusses three issues. Firstly, he presents the heterogeneity of rights included in the catalog of human rights. Secondly, he describes criticism towards the rights in order to better formulate their legal peculiarity. Thirdly, he attempts toanswer the question, what is and what should be the role of human rights from the point of view of jurisprudence and social needs?
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
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issue 1
36 – 47
EN
The paper deals with Suzy Killmister’s approach to the concept of human dignity. The author analyses her view and argues that the concept offered by her is relativistic to the degree in which the idea of universal human rights is susceptible to collapse, even though she seems to wish to uphold it. The author points to several problems in Killmister’s theory and concludes that, besides its inspiring nature, there is not a safe enough ground for its endorsement.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2023
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vol. 78
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issue 8
634 – 648
EN
The subject of this article is an analysis of the basic ideas of Nussbaum’s capability theory. In spite of the advantages of this approach, some authors have raised objections to the capability theory. The aim of this article is to analyse and discuss some selected objections. In particular, the study focuses on five objections that relate to the problem of paternalism, the impossibility of reaching a minimum threshold of individual capabilities, the impossibility of justifying civil and political rights, and the non-hierarchical nature of the list of capabilities. The article also develops a critique of the theory of capabilities in terms of a political approach to human rights.
EN
The text critically reflects the use of human dignity in the reasoning of court decisions. The author concludes that an increase in the tendency to include everything in dignity as an objective value may lead to the notion of a moral order of society, which in fact leads to a restriction of the subjective freedom of each individual.
EN
Typical of the human rights law doctrine is considerable definitional confusion and terminological diversity, fully confirmed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and Poland's Consititution. Despite some difference, the two documents are the normative sources of human rights. If, however, a creative function in the sphere of constitutional freemdoms, rights and obligations may be attributed to Poland's Constitution, no such functions may be attributed to the Charter. This results from the limitations on the application of the Charter as well as the reference to external sources of fundamental rights. Those sources include: common constitutional traditions of Member States, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Additional Protocols along with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Treaties establishing the European Community. Human rights may be divided into three categories: Treaty rights, conventional rights and constitutional rights. This division is founded on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. One may also indicate divisions common to the two documents. Both the Charter and the constitution, apart from specifying the rights of subjective nature also proclaim policies (programme norms), which indicate only 'aim and direction of conduct' to the obliged parties. However, in addition to absolute rights and freedoms. there are also relatively protected rights and freedoms. The two catalogues of rights and freedoms are also extensively diversified in relation to their subjects, but they are deeply rooted in the right of each human being to be treated as subject rather object. This attribute should be associated with human dignity which both the Charter and Poland's Constitution invoke. Nevertheless, the Constitution of the Republic of Poland gives it expressly the status of a source of human rights, while the Charter considers it as one of universal and inalienable values and treats it as as a foundation of human rights. The above-mentioned values constitute the criteria of functional division of fundamental rights. The Charter, therefore, does not refer to objective classification of rights and freedoms whic are appealed to in Poland's Consitution. The catalogue of rights and freedons is complemented by measures for their defence, which actually determine the position and function of a document proclaiming human rights and the real scope of their protection. These measures, including the right to court, are plainly specified in Poland's Constitution where they form a particular list, but there is no such a list in the Charter, which fact may indicate a limitation on its creative function in the field of fundamental rights.
EN
After the attacks of 9.11 many countries, including Poland and Germany, introduced regulations allowing to shoot down a civilian airplane used by terrorists to conduct an air attack. In Germany the corresponding regulation was subject to a constitutional complaint and to the decision of the 'Bundesverfassungsgericht', which on 15th February 2006 ruled that the law was an infringement of basic human rights. The very same conclusion was reached by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal on the issue of the legality of a similar Polish act. Analogous arguments given in both decisions show that allowing to shoot down a hijacked, civilian plane with passengers on board constitutes the breach of their right to life and to human dignity. A state may not deprive those individuals of its protection, especially it is not allowed to compare the value of the life of individuals endangered by the potential terrorist attack and those on board of the plane. Such a comparison may not be made neither based on the time, that the passengers have left to live, nor on the number of individuals, that would have to be killed and the number of ones rescued on the ground. The right of citizens to have their life protected by the state authorities serves them until the very end and the state may not deprive them of such a protection. The passengers may neither be treated as a part of a 'weapon' used against the terrorists.
EN
In my article I presented conception of the fourth generation worked out by Catholic ethics. Mentioned conception according to Catholic ethics should be the law’s standard in international system of protection of human rights. I tried to explained a sense of this conception from the philosophy perspective linking to the basic law’s acts.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2020
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vol. 75
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issue 7
513 – 526
EN
Human rights are currently the subject of several complex questions that are political, social, or legal in its nature. In order to address these problems meaningfully, we must take also into account a more general philosophical context and we should have a clearer idea of what human rights are and on what foundations they are based. In the study, we discuss whether we currently have a fully philosophically based conception of the foundation and legitimization of human rights. We present various current approaches that are candidates for solving this problem and we offer their critical evaluation. The starting point for us is the idea of human rights as obvious truths and approaches derived from it based on rational or emotional evidence. We also deal with the possibility of establishment of human rights utilizing concept of natural law, utilitarian approaches, and conceptions based on the idea of dignity. Some other related theories and historical contexts of the analysed conceptions are also briefly mentioned. We wrap up the text with conclusion that a completely satisfactory philosophical theory of human rights is still not available, and we also put forward our recommendations for solving the presented problems of the investigated theories.
EN
Many states have not national anti- terror laws until September 11, 2001. Political violence was dealt with by the ordinary criminal law. Since then was passed a lot of new anti- terror statutes in the world (for instance in the five years following September 11, Australia enacted 37 new federal laws), which primary objective and task is to ensure that police and other agencies have the sufficient powers they need to protect the community. This complicated social phenomenon is possible to understand better only by analysis of the aspects of terrorism as the key factors, to find the effective forms of fight against the terrorism, the receiving of effective measures to prevent the creation of terrorism not only on the national level but also on the international level and also by co-operation among the individual countries of world. Based on the fact of evolving counter-terrorism legislation, the contribution seeks to answer the question: what is the range in which it is possible to respect fundamental criminal law principles and fundamental human rights as such in this relatively sensitive area. In this context the contribution pointed to a specific group of criminal legal tools that are used more often in the area of combating terrorism. Content of this contribution is to bring information on new felonies of the terrorism under Criminal Code in Slovak and Czech Republic. In first part is describes basic legislative bases, that are necessary if we want serious dealt by this problem. Additional parts suggest the actual state and the last stage analyse manners fight against terrorism in both republic.
EN
Te problem of minorities in the social sciences and humanities appears relatively late, only afer the Second World War. In common literature I do not fnd to this day historical or monographic work devoted to minorities, although there are many fragmentary works treating this problem selectively. Ten suddenly, when it became clear that the declarations of human rights and civil rights (“French” of 1789) and the common of 1948 failed to notice the diversity of multi-faith society, including multicultural, and society itself as a conglomerate of diferent styles of life, at the end of various sexual orientations … the minority issue appeared with an unexpected power as a signum temporis of the postmodern era. It appeared, but it still fails to explain how to separate minoriies, which are separated in every society diferently. Te purpose of this article is the initial attempt to answer this question in the historical and contemporary context.
EN
The author examines the arguments for applicability of the limitation clause which specifies the requirements for limitation of constitutional freedoms and rights (Article 31 para. 3 of the Constitution) to the right to protection of life (Article 38). Even if there is almost a general acceptance of such applicability, this approach does not hold up to criticism based on the rule existing in the Polish legal order that treaty commitments concerning human rights have supremacy over national statutory regulations. Due to an international pattern which does not provide application of the limitation clause to the right to life protection, despite the recognition - at the level of a constitutional standard - of applicability of the clause of Article 31 para. 3 to Article 38, and to protection of life in general, this will be made impossible at any attempt to formulate a statutory standard. He also points out the defectiveness of the reasoning leading to acceptance of certain limitations of a particular value (e.g. life) on the basis of the ex definitione exemptions existing in the international standard to the assumption of applicability of the limitation clause when shaping statutory standards in the Polish legal system. The discussed issues are related to the question of interpretation of the inviolability of human rights. This term takes different meaning in the context of: 1) inviolability of all human rights understood in abstracto as normative structures of a general and abstract nature; 2) right protecting certain values with no exception; 3) rights to which an application of the limitation clause is forbidden; 4) rights not subject to derogation; 5) inviolability of understood in concreto, as that is (here and now) due to the subject of dignity; 6) inviolable essence of freedoms and rights. One should also clearly distinguish between (7) the descriptive and (8) the normative meaning of inviolability.
EN
The article provides an analysis of the European Court of Human Rights judgments in the case of (http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/resources/hudoc/lautsi_and_others_v__italy.pdf) Lautsi v. Italy (application no. 30814/06), also known as the Italian crucifix case. The applicant claimed that displaying crucifixes in the Italian State-school classrooms attended by her children was contrary to the principle of secularism, by which she wished to bring up her children, and therefore infringed her right to ensure their education and teaching in conformity with her religious and philosophical convictions, and also breached her freedom of conviction and religion, as protected by Article 9 of the Convention. In its judgment of November 3, 2009, the seven-judge Chamber declared that there had been a violation of Article 2 (right to education) of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights taken together with Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion) of the Convention. The judgment was given unanimously and none of the judges appended a separate opinion. The Italian Government asked for the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber by virtue of Article 43 of the Convention. In the judgment of the Grand Chamber, delivered on March 18, 2011, the Court held, by fifteen votes to two (and with separate opinions of six judges), that there had been no violation of Protocol No. 1 and no violation of the Convention itself. The analysis in the article is focused on selected principal factors determining the Court's decision. It shows that the proposal for the Court to recognize secular convictions as those protected by Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 or Article 9 of the Convention has no sufficient basis in the Convention itself and in earlier Court's case-law and, even, may be considered as promotion of religious intolerance, threatening the freedom to publicly manifest a religion or belief, as guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 4
318 – 328
EN
On the background of three related books, the article deals with the concept of humans rights as well as the key conceptual controversies concerning the latter. Three main aspects of human rights are underlined: philosophical, juridical and political ones. The relevance of the concepts of a person, human dignity and an autonomous subject appears clearly in the author's considerations. Further, postulating the universality of human rights unveils the vice of the liberal conception of human rights. Considered is also the tension between the idea of human rights, their institutional background and warranties in international context, where they are often purpose built and power-politically instrumentalized.
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