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Ethiopian foreign policy in the Horn of Africa: Informal relations with Somaliland and their possible future development

100%
Rudincová K.
Politeja : Pismo Wydziału Studiów Miedzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
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2016
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issue 42
213-226
EN
The paper deals with the foreign policy of Ethiopia toward Somalia and issues connected to the informal relations with Somaliland and its possible international recognition in particular. Somaliland is de facto state which declared its independence unilaterally as a response to the outbreak of the Somali civil war in 1991. Even though it managed to promote peace and stability in its territory, it has not been recognized by any state of international community yet. However, it has developed strategic partnerships and relations with European and African countries. The most important ally or partner of Somaliland in the Horn of Africa is Ethiopia. It cooperates with Somaliland in the field of economy, politics and security. However, due to certain political and geopolitical factors, Ethiopia is not willing to recognize Somaliland de iure and is dedicated to the idea of united Somalia. Therefore, the strategies Ethiopia uses when dealing with this de facto state and also the geopolitical factors why Ethiopia is still not willing to recognize Somaliland de jure will be analysed in this paper. The possibilities of future development of Ethiopia‑Somaliland relations will be evaluated considering geopolitical and political factors.
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Jerzy Zdanowski, Slavery in the Gulf in the First Half of the 20th Century: A Study Based on Records from the British Archives.Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Askon, 2008, 231 pp.

100%
Rubinkowska-Anioł H.
Studies in African Languages and Cultures
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2009
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issue 43
133-136
EN
A review of a book by Jerzy Zdanowski "Slavery in the Gulf in the First Half of the 20th Century: A Study Based on Records from the British Archives".
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Islam i władza polityczna w Rogu Afryki

100%
Gemechu D.
Forum Politologiczne
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2006
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vol. 4 - Islam we współczesnej Afryce
223-234
EN
This article tries to show the spread of Islam to the Horn of Africa and its relations with the political system of the countries in the region. The analysis mainly focuses on the political situations within the context of Islam in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan. The first contact of Islam with Ethiopia began in 615 AD, when the early followers of Islam were encouraged by Prophet Mohammed to flee Arabia because of persecution and sent to Ethiopia to seek protection from King Armah of Axum (North - Eastern part of modern Ethiopia). Among the group of refugees, there were Prophet Mohammed's wife and his cousin. Islam reached the Horn of Africa from across the Red Sea, mainly by Muslim traders. The spread of Islam can also be defined by the logic of the nearness of geographical location of the Horn of Africa to Arabia, the birth place of Islam, relatively easy for the transnational relations and cultural interaction. Today the vast majority of the people of the Horn of Africa are Muslims. During the colonial period in Somalia and Sudan Islam had played a unifying role to strengthen the struggle for freedom. In the Muslim countries of the Horn of Africa, such as Somalia and Sudan, Islam and political power is not separated. The imposition of sharia as the state law in Sudan in 1993 was the major factor of conflict between the North and the South in which more than two million people have lost their lives, and millions left their home as refugees.
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Seceding but not Succeeding: African International Relations and Somaliland’s lacking international recognition

88%
Pijović N.
Croatian International Relations Review
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2013
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vol. 19
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issue 68
73-105
EN
Somaliland, the northern region of Somalia, declared independence in 1991 and has for the past two decades functioned as an independent political entity with important state-like structures. However, notwithstanding its relatively high accomplishment (especially as compared to Somalia) in state-building, it remains without any international political recognition. This article attempts to expose the politics behind Somaliland’s (non) recognition by analysing key African players and their roles in Somaliland’s international recognition game. The main arguments made are that some continental African states and Somaliland’s neighbours seem to be content keeping the status quo, and Somaliland’s international recognition is not a pressing issue for anyone but Somaliland. The fact that no African country seems to be ready to be the first to recognize Somaliland (while many are happy to be the second) may yet prove the most considerable obstacle for Somaliland’s recognition in the foreseeable future.
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The Development of China’s Economic Cooperation in the Horn of Africa: Special Reference to the Belt and Road Initiative

88%
Bharti M. S.
African Journal of Economics, Politics and Social Studies
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2022
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issue 1
17-30
EN
The study deals with China’s trade and Economic cooperation in the Horn of Africa. This research aims to focus on infrastructural development in the region under China’s Belt and Road Initiative framework. Further, the central purpose of this research is to discuss Chinese investment in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya and Somalia. The research uses a qualitative analysis approach to discuss the research problems and tries to find out core findings. The following question deals with this study, how does China expand its trade and investment in the Horn of Africa? To what extent has China developed ties with the Horn of African countries in the context of BRI projects? As a result, China has developed a strong stance in the Horn of Africa in the context of trade and investment. This study concludes that China has enormous challenges within these countries to manage interstate issues for security purposes that are necessary for the success of infrastructure development and other BRI-related projects.
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Současné politické konflikty Afrického rohu

75%
Kumsa A.
Historická sociologie (Historical Sociology)
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2012
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vol. 1-2
49-74
EN
Violent conflict is very old in human society. The development of military technology brought with itself the worst tragedies loss of human live and material devastation in the second half of 20th century in the Horn of Africa. This region is one of the centers of various political violent conflicts in the world, according to length of these violent conflicts, the number of death of people, mainly civilian, refugees and internal displaced persons (IDP). This study elucidates the root causes of long wars in the Horn of Africa focusing mainly on South Sudan and Somalia. It also illustrates how the Super Powers during the Cold War helped their client states to prolong the suffering of people in the region. When Socialist system disappeared from Eastern Europe, Mengistu Haile Mariam's and Siyad Barre's regime ignominiously collapsed. In Ethiopia Amhara power elite, who ruled the Empire state from 1889 to 1991 lost their state power and Tigrian guerrilla fighters captured it through the power of the gun, Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia, South Sudan is emerging from long heinous war to independence. The violent conflict in Somalia transformed after the old regime demise in 1991 and the new leaders unable to build new central government. Somalia is fragmented and became the good example of failed state in the theory of contemporary political sociology. The paper tries to explain these complex violent conflicts in this part of Africa.
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GRAND ETHIOPIAN RENAISSANCE DAM AND THE RISK OF A WAR IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

51%
Popescu A. I. C.
Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem
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2017
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vol. 2(9) Security Issues in Sub-Saharan Africa
121-145
EN
In the climate change context, controlling water sources is one of the most explosive challenges to the stability of the security environment. In its quasitotality, human civilization was born in the basins of the great rivers, which provided humans with both the basic survival and development resources and natural protection against invasions. Such a watercourse is the Nile, in whose basin the great Egyptian, Nubian and Ethiopian civilizations were born. If, until recently, Egypt was the main beneficiary of the Nile's ”gifts“, Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project, still in construction on the Blue Nile, will radically change the status quo in region. How will GERD going to influence the regional hydro-policy? Is there any risk for a regional war outbreak? And, if the answer to the previous question is a positive one, what could be the impact of an Egyptian-Ethiopian conflict on regional security?
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Wsparcie sił pokojowych czy zamorska ekspansja? Chińska baza morska w Rogu Afryki

51%
Kubiak K.
Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka
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2018
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issue 3
177-192
EN
During the last two decades the People’s Republic of China has been extensively developing its naval forces. The fleet characteristic for the Mao Zedong era – which consists of very numerous, but de facto deprived of serious combat capabilities, small ships and craft, has definitely become a thing of the past, as well as the strategic concept that the navy will lead a „people war” on coastal waters. Currently, the Middle Kingdom is evidently building an „anti-access fleet” whose main task is to deprive the potential opponent (US Navy is being deployed) of the possibility of effective operation in the northwestern part of the Pacific (primarily within the so-called „first chain of islands” from the northern Borneo, through Taiwan and Okinawa, to the southern island of Japanese „mainland”, or Kyushu). In addition to expanding its naval forces, Beijing is not limited to the waters adjacent to the Chinese coasts. In January 2009, Beijing, making great use of the pretext of threats posed to Chinese ships and sailors by Somali pirates, began maintaining a team of ships in the western Indian Ocean. The Middle Kingdom decided to take a substantially different course: in January 2016 it was announced that China would build an „installation of logistic support” in Djibouti. The paper discusses a wide spectrum of consequences of this decision.
PL
Chińska Republika Ludowa od co najmniej dwóch dziesięcioleci intensywnie rozwija swoje siły morskie. Charakterystyczny dla epoki Mao Zedonga obraz floty składającej się z bardzo licznych, ale de facto pozbawionych większych możliwości bojowych zespołów lekkich okrętów odszedł zdecydowanie w przeszłość, podobnie jak strategiczna koncepcja zakładająca prowadzenie przez marynarkę „wojny ludowej” na wodach przybrzeżnych. Obecnie Państwo Środka buduje ewidentnie „flotę antydostępową”, której zasadniczym zadaniem jest odebranie potencjalnemu przeciwnikowi (w tej roli obsadzana jest US Navy) możliwości skutecznego działania w północno-zachodniej części Pacyfiku, przede wszystkim w obrębie „pierwszego łańcucha wysp” (od północnego Borneo, przez Tajwan i Okinawę, do południowej wyspy japońskiego „mainlandu”, czyli Kiusiu). Rozbudowując swoje siły morskie, Pekin nie ogranicza się bynajmniej do wód przylegających do chińskich wybrzeży. W styczniu 2009 r., nader udatnie wykorzystując pretekst zagrożenia stwarzanego dla chińskich statków przez piratów somalijskich, Pekin rozpoczął utrzymywanie zespołu okrętów w zachodniej części Oceanu Indyjskiego. Państwo Środka zdecydowało się więc na przyjęcie zasadniczo innego kursu – w styczniu 2016 r. ogłoszono, że Chiny zbudują „instalację wsparcia logistycznego” w Dżibuti. Tekst omawia szerokie spectrum następstw tej decyzji.
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The Interests of the Gulf Monarchies in the Horn of Africa

51%
Cherkas B., Novytska N.
Przegląd Politologiczny
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2023
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issue 2
67-84
PL
Celem niniejszego artykułu jest analiza polityki monarchii Zatoki Perskiej w Rogu Afryki. Bliskie więzy historyczne między dwoma regionami dały początek głębokiej współpracy między państwami afrykańskimi i arabskimi. Monarchie Zatoki Perskiej przez długi czas rywalizowały o pogłębienie swojego wpływu politycznego, gospodarczego i bezpieczeństwa w regionie. Wzmocnienie więzi gospodarczych z Rogiem Afryki pomogło zwiększyć bezpieczeństwo żywnościowe w Zatoce Perskiej. Inwestycje arabskich monarchii w modernizację portów w Sudanie, Erytrei, Somalii i Dżibuti pomagają poprawić infrastrukturę logistyczną w północno-wschodniej Afryce. Jednocześnie szybka militaryzacja regionu spowodowana utworzeniem wielu baz wojskowych państw Zatoki Perskiej w Rogu Afryki zwiększa poziom konfliktów generowanych w regionie. Zarówno Morze Czerwone, jak i Zatoka Adeńska mają strategiczne znaczenie dla zbrojnego wsparcia kampanii wojskowej koalicji Arabii Saudyjskiej i Zjednoczonych Emiratów Arabskich w Jemenie. Dlatego też Róg Afryki również zyskał strategiczne znaczenie ze względu na konflikt w Jemenie, a ambitne państwa Zatoki Perskiej coraz bardziej angażują się w regionalną geopolitykę. Arabia Saudyjska i Zjednoczone Emiraty Arabskie, jako główny sojusznik Rijadu w Zatoce Perskiej, coraz częściej postrzegają Róg Afryki jako swoją „zachodnią flankę bezpieczeństwa”. Łączy je chęć zapobieżenia rosnącym wpływom Turcji, Iranu i Kataru w tej części świata. Rywalizacja między Arabią Saudyjską, Zjednoczonymi Emiratami Arabskimi, Katarem i Iranem pomaga przyciągnąć inwestycje, utrzymać ogólną stabilność i poprawić sytuację bezpieczeństwa w Rogu Afryki. Mediacja w konfliktach i gromadzenie aktywów w Rogu Afryki umożliwiły Arabii Saudyjskiej, ZEA i Katarowi ustanowienie wpływów politycznych w regionie. Państwa Zatoki Perskiej wykorzystują swoje rosnące wpływy gospodarcze, bezpieczeństwa i dyplomatyczne w Afryce, aby zmniejszyć wpływy konkurentów i uzyskać międzynarodowe poparcie na arenie światowej.
EN
The aim of this article is to analyze the policy of the Gulf monarchies in the Horn of Africa. Close historical ties between two regions have given rise to deep cooperation between African and Arab states nowadays. Gulf monarchies competed for a long time to deepen their political, economic and security impact in the region. Strengthening economic ties with the Horn of Africa has helped increase food security in the Persian Gulf. Investments by Arab monarchies in modernizing ports in Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti are helping to improve logistics infrastructure in the Northeast Africa. At the same time, the rapid militarization of the region due to the establishment of a number of Gulf states military bases in the Horn of Africa is increasing the level of conflict-generating in the region. The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden both have strategic importance for the armed support for the military campaign of the Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates coalition in Yemen. That is why the Horn of Africa has also gained strategic importance due to the conflict in Yemen, and therefore the ambitious Gulf states have become increasingly have become increasingly involved in the regional geopolitics. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as the main ally of Riyadh in the Persian Gulf, are increasingly seeing the Horn of Africa as their “western flank of security.” They are united by the desire to prevent the growing influence of Turkey, Iran and Qatar in this part of the world. The competition between Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar and Iran helps to attract investments, maintain general stability and improve the security situation in the Horn of Africa. Conflict mediation and asset build-up in the Horn of Africa have enabled Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar to establish political influence in the region. The Gulf states are using their growing economic, security and diplomatic influence in Africa to reduce the influence of competitors and gain international support on the world stage.
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