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1

INTENTIONAL OBJECTS AND CAUSAL SEMANTICS

100%

Chrudzimski A.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2008

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vol. 36

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issue 2

25-35

EN

The central thesis of the theory of intentional objects, as developed by Brentano and Ingarden, is that to be in an intentional state consists basically in having before one's mind a special intentional object. Such an intentional object encodes certain identifying properties that in turn must be exemplified by any entity which is intended to play the role of the reference object of the intentional state in question. This means that the theory of intentional objects operates within the framework of the so-called 'identifying description theory of intentionality'. The partisans of this view claim that an intentional reference always consists in employing a certain 'identifying description' of a putative reference object. Every adept of philosophy knows today that after the seminal works by Kripke and Putnam this approach is generally regarded to be highly implausible. It has been argued that neither the semantics of (i) demonstrative pronouns, nor that of (ii) proper names or (iii) so-called natural kind terms can be explained in terms of the identifying description theory of intentionality. In this paper the author wants to show that the theory of intentional objects can deal with this critique. It turns out that all the above points (i-iii) can be explained if we make a certain extension of the theory. It consists basically in the assumption that an intentional object can encode not only so-called 'purely qualitative' properties but also 'relational' ones.

2

(MOCK-)THINKING ABOUT THE SAME

100%

Voltolini A.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2017

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vol. 24

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issue 3

282 - 307

EN

In this paper, the author wants to address once more the venerable problem of intentional identity, the problem of how different thoughts can be about the same thing even if this thing does not exist. First, he will try to show that antirealist approaches to this problem are doomed to fail. For they ultimately share a problematic assumption, namely that thinking about something involves identifying it. Second, he will claim that once one rejects this assumption and holds instead that thoughts are constituted either by what they are about, their intentional objects, or by what determines their proposition - like intentional contents, one can address the problem of intentional identity in a different way. One can indeed provide a new solution to it that basically relies on two factors: a) what sort of metaphysical nature intentional objects effectively possess, once they are conceived as schematic objects à la Crane (2001, 2013); b) whether such objects really belong to the overall ontological inventory of what there is. According to this solution, two thoughts are about the same non-existent intentional object if i) that object satisfies the identity criterion for objects of that metaphysical kind and ii) objects of that kind belong to the overall ontological inventory of what there is, independently of whether they exist (in a suitable first-order sense of existence). As such, this solution is neither realist nor antirealist: only if condition ii) is satisfied, different thoughts can be about the same non-existent intentional; otherwise, they are simply constituted by the same intentional content (provided that this content is not equated with that intentional). Third, armed with this solution, he will hold that one can find a suitable treatment of the specific and related problem of whether different people may mock-think about the same thing, even if there really is no such thing. Finally, he will try to show that this treatment can be also applied to the case in which different thoughts are, according to phenomenology, about the same intentional and yet this intentional is of a kind such that there really are no things of that kind. For in this case, such thoughts are about the same intentional only fictionally.

3

TRANSLATING INTRANSLATABILITIES: SEMIOTIC PROBLEM AND PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD (Perekladannia neperekladadnostei: semiotychna problema i filosofs'kyi metod)

88%

Vasylchenko A.

Філософська Думка

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2010

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issue 3

138-147

EN

The article deals with the analysis of untraslatability in terms of modal logic with identity. In the centre of the approach is the idea that generic names in natural languages have at least three functions: predication, description and identification. Untranslatability is considered, following Lotman, as a problem of linguistic communication. A structural similarity is stated between the semiotic problem of untranslatability and Jean Laplanche's psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious as inexpressible. The author introduces logic of name identifications with variable domain of objects, plural names and two kinds of designators. This logic combines the main features of Priest's modal theory of identity with elements of the Lesniewski's Ontology. The logic of name identification is applied to the analysis of untraslatabilities and of the problem of identification of intentional objects. The article ends with discussing the translation of untranslatables as a specific method of philosophical enquiry.

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1 Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

1 Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

1 Філософська Думка

1 Chrudzimski A.

1 Vasylchenko A.

1 Voltolini A.

1 2017

1 2010

1 2008

INTENTIONAL OBJECTS AND CAUSAL SEMANTICS

(MOCK-)THINKING ABOUT THE SAME

TRANSLATING INTRANSLATABILITIES: SEMIOTIC PROBLEM AND PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD (Perekladannia neperekladadnostei: semiotychna problema i filosofs'kyi metod)