Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 12

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  Ingarden
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
In the paper the ontology of information about an enterprise (OIE ) is presented. The ontology helps to analyse the information about the examined enterprise. The aim of analysis is to isolate information about an enterprise found in business and financial press articles (news items ) in order to define the strategic position of the company. This information is “relative propriety” in the terminology of the Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden’s formal ontology. The author proposes the OIE ontology of information about an enterprise (company ) based on the theory of individual objects by Roman Ingarden. Analysis of information from press news will provide a method for automatic gathering of data on the current state of an enterprise.
PL
W artykule przedstawiono ontologię wiadomości o przedsiębiorstwie OWF. Ontologia ta pozwala na analizę wiadomości prasowych dotyczących określonego przedsiębiorstwa. Celem tej analizy jest ustalenie jednej cechy, np. „przedsiębiorstwo jest liderem w branży”. Cecha ta, w terminologii ontologii formalnej polskiego filozofa Romana Ingardena, jest tzw. „własnością względną”. Autor konstruuje ontologię wiadomości OWF poprzez analogię do teorii przedmiotu indywidualnego, wykorzystując definicję formy „stosunku dwuczłonowego”. Analiza tekstów prasowych pozwoli na automatyczne pozyskiwanie informacji o aktualnym stanie przedsiębiorstwa w zakresie głównych zamierzeń strategicznych, co jest bardzo istotne dla potencjalnych inwestorów.
EN
In this paper, the author maintains that the term “ideal border”, used by Roman Ingarden several times in his writing on musical perception, has more to offer than its face value suggests. The notion can have multiple meanings and at fi rst it may seem that it only underlines incoherence of the philosopher’s concept. However, the author of this paper thinks that the notion of “ideal border” points towards diffi culties impossible to overcome in defi ning a musical work — provided that the notion is taken seriously, i.e. as a vital element of Ingarden’s theory, and not as a fi tting metaphor. The notion of “ideal border” in relation to a musical work and its perception, as the author believes, refl ects an ambiguous state of the ontological grounding of a musical work, while confi rming the proposed character of Ingarden’s overall theory in an inspiring way.
3
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

O odbiorze dzieła literackiego

87%
EN
The article is an attempt to answer the question: what happens to a literary work – understood as Ingarden’s purely intentional objects – from the recipient’s perspective? And also: how do the images of objects arise in the minds of the audience and what are their properties? Transferring purely intentional objects to the recipient’s perspective changes their status: mental images of objects are subject to numerous fluctuations (based on emotions and cognitive processes). In this way they are transformed into forms that are non-permanent reflections of objects belonging to a literary work. Referring to Ingarden’s terminology, one might say that they become purely intentional reflections (or reflections of purely intentional objects). The article is an attempt to characterize and stratify them.
Studia Humana
|
2015
|
vol. 4
|
issue 1
12-25
EN
The purpose of the paper is demonstrate the thesis that Ingarden's ontological system allows a better understanding of the “part-whole” problem then previous theories. Especially, if we take into account the existential ontology of Ingarden, which refers to Husserl “part-whole” theory, we can see that development of terms made by Ingarden sheds new light on old problems. In this context, particularly important is to distinguish between two existential moments: contingancy/inseparatness, because thanks to them we can talk about many different types of relationships and hence many types of objects.
EN
Półtawski, while criticizing the tradition of modern empiricism and Cartesian dualism, creates a realistic and dynamic interpretation of the human being. Experience, sense impression, is neither an inferior variant of cognition nor simply an operation of providing mere elements or building blocks, but a distinct mode of being in the world, of symbiotic contact with the surroundings, a form of life. He radically parts ways with a Brentanian-Husserlian approach to the consciousness as a set of acts, not as a body of content. Półtawski contrasts this model with his model of noematic phenomenology. We are unable to perceive how noemats (the content of consciousness) are created, since this is not the work of consciousness alone, neither at the level of sensory experience, where the world is already primordially “given” as if “from below”, nor at the higher plane of conscious functioning in the world, where the world (model of the world) is already given as if “from above”. The model of the world is not to be found in the currently present consciousness, but rather behind the scenes, making possible the human conscient being in the world. An ontology elaborated on the ground of the simplest mode of human existence, i.e. one which reduces being human to perception, is unable to truly grasp and understand the realness of the world in general, and the realness of values in particular. Only a holistic and dynamic conception of man can do justice to the crucial role of values, and it is sought by Półtawski in his confrontation with the views of Ingarden, Strasser and Wojtyła.
PL
 The article presents an in-depth and detailed reflection on the concept of „integral interpretation” put forward by the Polish musicologist Mieczysław Tomaszewski. The problematics of interpretation has for many years been the focus of Tomaszewski’s attention and interest, as evidenced by his numerous publications devoted to it. They culminate in the formulation of this concept, described by the author as the method of an adequate interpretation of a musical work. In contrast to many contemporary approaches to the issue of the scope of musicology’s subject area, for Tomaszewski the concept of a musical work is central to the discipline, and he poses questions concerning its ontology and understanding in the spirit of Roman Ingarden’s theory of musical work, to which he frequently refers. Tomaszewski regards the process of interpretation as a kind of „rising” to the level of the work, the meaning of which (intentio operis), often identified with the authorial meaning (intentio auctoris), stands at the highest point in the hierarchy of meanings ascribed - from this point of view - to the work. In turn, the work itself functions in different phases, existing as a score, a performance, a result of the processes of perception and as its reception within a culture. In my article I attempt not only to present Tomaszewski’s method, but above all to argue against its anachronicity and limitations resulting from a lack of reference both to contemporary artistic practice and contemporary research methodology in the humanities and in musicology.
Diametros
|
2017
|
issue 52
107-126
PL
Artykuł jest kontynuacją tekstu Odniesienie intencjonalne i jego przedmiot w perspektywie transcendentalnego idealizmu Husserla (Diametros 50). Zawiera uzupełniające rozważania dotyczące kwestii satysfakcjonującego rozumienia Husserlowskiego pojęcia noematu, przy czym zmierzam nie tyle do samej interpretacji tekstu Husserla, ile do uchwycenia rzeczowej kwestii: co jest intencjonalnym odniesieniem świadomości. W zgodzie z niektórymi enuncjacjami Husserla staram się bronić stanowiska, że noemat, sens i przedmiot intencjonalny są w zasadzie tożsame. Przy takiej interpretacji pojęcie przedmiotu nie może oczywiście zachować swego zwykłego sensu. Na przykładzie Ingardenowskiej koncepcji przedmiotu czysto intencjonalnego pokazuję trudności, jakie powoduje uznanie, że noemat jest przedmiotem odrębnym od świadomości, choć od niej egzystencjalnie zależnym. Podejmuję też w związku z analizą pojęcia rdzenia noematycznego kwestię roli powszechników w Husserlowskiej teorii świadomości.
EN
The paper develops the argument presented in my earlier article, Intentional Reference and Its Object in Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism (Diametros 50). It contains further considerations on the proper understanding of Husserl’s notion of noema. My aim is not only to present an interpretation of Husserl’s text, but primarily to understand what constitutes an intentional reference of an act of consciousness. I agree with some of Husserl’s claims in Ideas, Book I, that noema, sense and intentional object are basically the same. This standpoint implies, however, a drastic reinterpretation of the notion of an object. I refer to Ingarden’s conception of a purely intentional object to show the difficulties connected with regarding noema as an object separate from consciousness but still existentially dependent on it. Analyzing Husserlian notion of a noematic core I emphasize the relevance of universals for Husserl’s theory of consciousness.
EN
The aim of this article is to juxtapose two attitudes towards music ontology – the original theory of Roman Ingarden (1893–1970),  Polish philosopher and student of Edmund Husserl, and the polemic of Zofia Lissa (1908–1980), Polish musicologist and founder of the Institute of Musicology at the University of Warsaw. Although they belonged to different generations, they had common experiences while living in Lviv before WW2. The outlooks of both scholars are recapitulated with particular regard to the differences between their musical backgrounds. While Ingarden tends to build universal theory, abstracting from particular cases in musical repertoire, Lissa finds counterexamples which cannot be embraced by his concept. The case of electroacoustic music demonstrates how difficult it was for Lissa and Ingarden to find common ground in their discussion. The article points out that the main problem was the rift between their methodologies. The last part of the article summarizes the critical reception of the Ingarden–Lissa polemic in Polish music scholarship.
PL
Artykuł stanowi krytyczną rekonstrukcję polemiki muzykolożki Zofii Lissy z filozofem Romanem Ingardenem z 1966 roku dotyczącą ontologii dzieła muzycznego. Autorzy przedstawiają lwowski kontekst znajomości obojga badaczy, przypominają główne tezy teorii dzieła muzycznego Ingardena, a także podsumowują krytyczne uwagi Lissy i udzielone na nie odpowiedzi Ingardena. Prezentacja ta pozwala na zrozumienie odmiennych celów, które przyświecały rozważaniom filozofa i recepcji jego poglądów przez muzykolożkę. Podczas gdy Ingarden starał się zrozumieć specyficzny sposób istnienia dzieł muzycznych, Lissa zgłaszała potrzebę przemyślenia ontologii muzyki w przypadku tych rodzajów i tradycji muzycznych, do których nie przystaje kategoria dzieła. Na zakończenie autorzy podsumowują recepcję omawianej polemiki w tekstach polskich filozofów, muzykologów i teoretyków muzyki, zauważając, że metodologiczne różnice wciąż skłaniają badaczy do przyznawania racji jednej ze stron sporu. Aby produktywnie rozwinąć myśl filozofa w kierunku wskazanym wątpliwościami Lissy, trzeba najpierw zrozumieć, na czym polegało ich nieporozumienie.
EN
The article deals with the theoretical-literary problem of the (im)possibility of “a poetic representation of concretisation”, as Michał Głowiński described Cyprian Kamil Norwid’s Epos-nasza. Referring to selected assumptions of phenomenological philosophy (Ingarden’s aesthetic concretisation and Husserl’s “presenting”) and to the findings of Norwidologists regarding the specificity of his poetry, a conclusion was presented and justified that Norwid’s poem constituted a concretisation impression, formally being a memory, and moreover, a memory devoid of an ironic tinge.
PL
W artykule podjęto teoretycznoliteracki problem (nie)możliwości „poetyckiego zapisu konkretyzacji”, jak Michał Głowiński określił Epos-naszą Cypriana Norwida. Odnosząc się do wybranych założeń filozofii fenomenologicznej (konkretyzacji estetycznej Ingardena i „uobecniania” Husserla) oraz do ustaleń norwidologów dotyczących specyfiki jego poezji, przedstawiono i uargumentowano wniosek o stanowieniu przez poemat Norwida konkretyzacyjnej impresji, formalnie będącej wspomnieniem, ponadto zaś – wspomnieniem pozbawionym ironicznego zabarwienia.
XX
Many of contemporary philosophers argue against metaphysics putting forward a thesis that metaphysical claims are deflationary. This way of thinking seems to be not only persuasive but above all it rightly expresses a main difficulty of metaphysical inquires. In this paper I am trying to shed a little light on the problem of deflation of metaphysical judgments. In the first section I refer to some Wittgenstein's ideas from Tractatus logico-philosophicus and I focus on the phenomenon of manifestation as a possible source of deflation of metaphysics. The second section is devoted to the Wittgenstein's concepts of language games on the one hand and rules on the other; both of them are a key to understanding of the deepest dimensions of deflationary metaphysics. The third section is an elaboration of three models of deflation of metaphysical expressions: 1. deflation in regard to the informative status of metaphysical judgments; 2. deflation in regard to the metasemantic properties of judgments about the world, and 3. deflation in regard to the semantic ground of ontological judgments. The fourth and last part of the paper is an exposition of two crucial problems which metaphysics has to face with. I call the first of them 'a problem with conceptualization of the metaphysical experience', whereas the second one is labeled 'a problem with semantic inclusion of metaphysical expressions into judgments about facts'.
PL
W artykule – dzięki zestawieniu głównych pojęć obiektywności w sensie ontycznym – odpowiadam na pytanie, co się składa na obiektywnie istniejącą rzeczywistość. Odwołując się do pojęcia transcendencji strukturalnej, wskazuję również, gdzie (i jak) przebiega granica między ontyczną obiektywnością a ontyczną subiektywnością. Na koniec, sięgając do pojęcia obiektywności w sensie epistemologicznym, próbuję wyklarować relację pomiędzy obiektywnością i subiektywnością z jednej strony, a prawdziwością i fałszywością z drugiej.
EN
In the paper – thanks to the ontic sense of the objectivity concept – I answer the question what objectively existing reality consists of. Appealing to the concept of the structural transcendence, I indicate also where (and how) the boundary between the ontic objectivity and the ontic subjectivity runs. Finally, I try to clarify relations between objectivity and subjectivity as well as veracity and falseness.
EN
The subject of this article are three remarks which were not raised in previous publications concerning the semantic theory of knowledge of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. The first one pertains to the contradistinction of two basic questions which are hidden under the name “semantic theory of knowledge”. The second one pertains to the relation, and rather its lack, between Ajdukiewicz’s semantic theory of knowledge and Tarski’s semantic theory of truth. The third one pertains to the relation between Husserl’s intentional theory of language and Ajdukiewicz’s semantic theory of knowledge understood as a metaepistemological project.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.