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1

Fałszerstwo z Piltdown a racjonalność nauki K. Poppera i socjologiczny redukcjonizm Szkoły Edynburskiej

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Abdank-Kozubski A.

Studia Ecologiae et Bioethicae

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2004

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vol. 2

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issue 1

373-380

EN

Historically evidenced faulty scientific theories undoubtedly influenced the formation of particular concepts of science. The paleoanthropological case known as a discovery of Piltdown Human illustrates this statement. In this context, the persistent tendency for rescuing questioned hypotheses or theories is a characteristic feature of science. Despite natural expectations, it is just the feature that guarantees the correct development of science. The statement corresponds to the K. R. Popper concept of the rationality of science, as well as to some particular postulates of the Edinburgh School.

2

Zarys realistyczno-krytycystycznej koncepcji socjologicznej analizy literatury

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Jabłoński A.

Roczniki Nauk Społecznych

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2017

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vol. 9(45)

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issue 4

67-95

PL

Celem tego artykułu jest prezentacja perspektywy teoretyczno-analitycznej, która może stanowić dodatkowe uzasadnienie badań na tekstem literackim prowadzonych w ramach socjologii. Autor skupia się zwłaszcza na konsekwencjach ustaleń racjonalizmu krytycznego Karla R. Poppera oraz osiągnięciach realizmu krytycznego uprawianego w ramach socjologii.

EN

The purpose of the article is to present a theoretical and analytical perspective that may provide additional justification for research on a literary text conducted in sociology. The author focuses particularly on the consequences of the critical rationality arrangements of Karl R. Popper and the achievements of critical realism cultivated in the context of sociology.

3

Idea demokracji w filozofii społecznej Karla R. Poppera – racjonalistyczny mit nowoczesnej Europy

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Jasiński B.

Sztuka i Dokumentacja

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2017

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issue 16

7-27

EN

The article presents a sketch of Karl Popper’s philosophical opinions. Popper belongs to those philosophers who came to strictly philosophical questions from problems concerned with the natural sciences. This development of their thought has particular consequences for their philosophical style. On the one band – as one can note in Popper – their philosophy is one which is low on poetic turns of phrase and high on logical rigor. On the other hand, their thought is characterized by a greater dose of certainly, of an apodictic tendency even, than is that of those philosophers who, educated in the traditions of the humanities, are more burdened by the weight of tradition. Such an attitude has perhaps two consequences: it leads either to the trivial repetition of other people’s insights or to a certain unquestionable originality. The author maintains that, in the case of Popper, we are dealing with the second eventuality. In the article he presents chosen elements illustrative of the originality of Popper’s thought. In Popper philosophy the rational is always contradicted by the irrational. And the ‘despair of reason’, as he states, always leads to limitation of freedom and closed society. So the alternative is based on dramatic choice: ‘reason or violence’ or/and ‘reason or revolution’. The reason for Popper is - in fact - the same as humanities. Historicism, the way of thinking in historical categories, is exempt from thinking because it is based on firm rules and thus its result is totalitarianism. Here is the focal point of Popper’s thinking - his a priori established faith in reason implies a certain type of humanism; the one who believes in the unlimited possibilities of man whose chief weapon becomes reason. We believe in reason – that is a dogma. And reason enables criticism (critical rationalism), that is a falsification of (any) theory. That’s why the social science has an inevitable conjectural character. Popper’s methodological individualism that is based on belief in his own reason is a dogma as well. The only way out to deprive reason of its irrationality is to place it in the horizontal and not the vertical perspective, on the level of practical life, in between individual men. After the Holocaust there is nothing ‘above’ or ‘beyond’. Our decisions are rooted in already reason-guided life, and so are the political institutions – not in a meta-level rationalism.

4

Kritický racionalismus a reliabilismus ve sporu o neplatnost indukce

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Sloup O.

Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)

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2016

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vol. 38

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issue 2

177-203

EN

Based on analysis of the issue of how we learn from experience (if not by using induction), the study presents a problem of induction as formulated by Hume, thus showing its roots in unjustifiability of the principle of uniformity of nature. Popper's solution to the problem, consisting of the complete rejection of inductive reasoning, is exposed. Popper's solution is then subjected to comparison with David Papineau's reliabilism - a notion that knowledge is a true belief generated by a reliable method. The main objective of this study is to reopen a debate over the topic of invalidity of induction. A secondary objective is to illustrate the possible intersection between critical rationalism with its emphasis on delegitimisation of knowledge and reliabilist criteria of certainty.

CS

Na základě analýzy otázky, jak se učíme ze zkušenosti (pokud ne za použití indukce) představuje studie problém indukce nejprve tak, jak byl formulován Humem skrze jeho příčinu v nezdůvodnitelnosti principu uniformity přírody. Následně ukazuje Popperovo řešení problému spočívající v naprostém odmítnutí induktivního usuzování. Popperův přístup je podroben srovnání s reliabilistickou pozicí Davida Papineau - stanoviskem, že poznání je pravdivým přesvědčením generovaným spolehlivou metodou. Hlavním cílem textu je znovuotevření diskuze nad tématem neplatnosti indukce a možná redukce námitek vůči její logické neplatnosti na základě nahlédnutí reliabilistického stanoviska. Vedlejším záměrem je pak ilustrovat možné styčné body mezi kritickým racionalismem s jeho důrazem na delegitimizaci vědění a reliabilistickým kritériem spolehlivosti.

5

"Tańczący z Popperem". Dembski o sprawdzalności

80%

Elsberry W. R.

Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy

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2011

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vol. 8

179-188

PL

W odniesieniu do sporu o naukowość darwinowskiej teorii ewolucji oraz teorii inteligentnego projektu Autor dokonuje przeglądu kluczowych pojęć filozofii Karla Poppera, jak falsyfikowalność, sprawdzalność czy obalalność teorii. Ma to na celu sprawdzenie poprawności stosowania tych pojęć w argumentacji Williama Dembskiego, który jest zwolennikiem teorii inteligentnego projektu. Dembski w swoich wywodach na temat obalalności tej teorii powołuje się właśnie na Poppera, Autor wykazuje jednak, że Dembski zniekształca Popperowską koncepcję falsyfikowalności. Zwraca ponadto uwagę, że Dembski błędnie zarzuca darwinizmowi nieobalalność, i dowodzi, że nawet w świetle własnych kryteriów Dembskiego teoria inteligentnego projektu okazuje się niefalsyfikowalna.

EN

Referring to the controversy over scientific status of Darwinian theory of evolution and intelligent design theory, author reviews the key notions in the philosophy of Karl Popper, such as falsifiability, testability or refutability of a theory. His aim is to check the accuracy of the use of these notion in the argumentation of William Dembski who is a proponent of intelligent design theory. Dembski invokes Popper in his argumentation regarding refutability of this theory, but author shows that Dembski distorts Popperian concept of falsifiability. He indicates also that Dembski’s objection that Darwinism is unrefutable is mistaken and proofs that even in the light of Dembski’s own criterions the theory of intelligent design turns out to be unfalsifiable.

6

Kantovské nuance Popperovy rané teorie poznání:

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Paitlová J.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2020

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vol. 68

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issue 5

717-735

EN

The paper puts forth an interpretation of Popper’s early theory of knowledge that is found in the work Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie. It mainly, however, focuses on his original and surprisingly detailed interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism. Popper is inspired by Kant in many things: he, for example, makes use of Kant’s transcendental method of inquiry and also the discovery that all knowledge of reality lies in the existence of laws. At the same time, however, he criticizes Kant because of the circular reasoning of transcendental idealism by means of transcendental deduction, which additionally leads Popper to exchange the epistemological and psychological aspects of knowledge. Although Popper distinguishes between the theory of knowledge and the psychology of knowledge, he does not recognize formal apriorism in the epistemological sense but only genetic apriorism in the cognitive psychological sense. Popper’s interpretation of Kant is not however free from certain misunderstandings as it ignores the difference between “pure natural science” and “empirical physics.”.

CS

Stať se zaměřuje na výklad Popperovy rané teorie poznání v díle Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie. Soustředí se přitom především na jeho originální a překvapivě podrobné interpretace Kantova transcendentálního idealismu. Popper se nechává Kantem v mnohém inspirovat: využívá například jeho transcendentální způsob tázání a také myšlenku, že každé poznání skutečnosti spočívá v existenci zákonitostí. Zároveň Kanta na druhé straně kritizuje kvůli kruhovému zdůvodnění transcendentálního idealismu prostřednictvím transcendentální dedukce, jež navíc Poppera dovádí až ke kritice zaměňování epistemologických a psychologických aspektů poznání u Kanta. Popper totiž rozlišuje teorii poznání a psychologii poznání, přičemž neuznává formální apriorismus v epistemologickém smyslu, nýbrž pouze genetický apriorismus ve smyslu kognitivně psychologickém. Popperova interpretace Kanta nicméně není prosta určitých nedorozumění, především opomíjí rozdíl mezi „čistou přírodní vědou“ a „empirickou fyzikou“.

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1 Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

1 Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy

1 Roczniki Nauk Społecznych

1 Studia Ecologiae et Bioethicae

1 Sztuka i Dokumentacja

1 Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)

1 Abdank-Kozubski A.

1 Elsberry W. R.

1 Jabłoński A.

1 Jasiński B.

1 Paitlová J.

1 Sloup O.

1 2020

2 2017

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