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1

Polish Diplomacy and an Attempt at Recreating the Powers Directorate in 1933

100%
Zukowski P. M.
Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej
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2004
|
vol. 39
123-135
EN
When in November 1933 Józef Beck was taking over the post of the Minister of Foreign Affairs his tasks entailed primarily retaining the prewar status quo and the alliances signed for this purpose, as well as securing the country against the encroachment of two strong neighbours. Against this background, it is not surprising that Polish diplomacy strongly opposed the proposal made by Benito Mussolini on 18 March 1933, commonly known as the Pact of the Four. The original project, rather enthusiastically welcomed in Berlin and London, was recognised in Warsaw as a blow dealt against Polish sovereignty. From the spring to the late summer of that year Polish diplomacy embarked upon assorted forms of activity in accordance with the 'nothing about us without us' principle, for the purpose of annihilating a bloc composed of West European powers. In addition, the Pact of the Four was regarded as aimed against the prestige and status of the Polish State, and was acknowledged as such in the official stand of the Polish authorities. The attitude of political factors towards the suggestion of reviving the directorate was not lucid. The first steps were made against the particular participants of the bloc, especially France and Italy. For various reasons, it proved impossible to create a joint bloc of states hostile towards the Pact of the Four, although there were sufficient occasions to do so. For almost half a year the struggle waged against plans of creating an alliance of four partners absorbed the attention of Polish diplomats. The assessment of those endeavours is left to the reader. Nonetheless, it is simply impossible to dismiss the conviction that a Polish veto would be ignored in face of the willingness to sign such a pact, shown by London, Paris, Berlin and Rome.
2

THE SOVIET UNION IN REPORTS BY STANISLAW PATEK (ZSRR w raportach Stanislawa Patka)

80%
Gmurczyk-Wronska M.
Dzieje Najnowsze
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2008
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issue 4
159-174
EN
Stanislaw Patek (1866-1944) fulfilled the function of envoy to Moscow in the years 1927-1932, a period reflected in his copious documentation. The documents in question comprise an extremely interesting and valuable source for the history of Polish diplomacy, the history of the Soviet Union, Soviet studies, and international relations. Stanislaw Patek was proposed for the post of the Polish envoy by Marshal Józef Pilsudski, minister of foreign affairs in the cabinet of Kazimierz Bartel. True, after the May 1926 coup d'etat the minister of foreign affairs was August Zaleski, but the department was, for all practical purposes, steered by Pilsudski. Patek was entrusted not only with the mission of conducting a normalisation of Polish-Soviet relations, including a non-aggression pact, but also a Promethean campaign, i. e. supporting the decentralisation tendencies among nations comprising the Russian federation. The fact that Stanislaw Patek was an extremely careful observer of Soviet Russia stemmed from his duties as a diplomat and personal experiences in relations with the Russians, dating from tsarist times. He understood both Soviet policies and the tactics applied by the Russians in diplomacy and international relations. He also did not trust the sincerity of the disarmament campaigns undertaken by the Soviet diplomats. Although Patek appreciated the efforts made by Maxim Litvinov, the people's commissar for foreign relations, he did not harbour any illusions as regards his assurances concerning the peace policy of the Soviet Union. He was also deeply disappointed in the people's commissar Georgiy Chicherin, and his reports proposed a wide panorama of the domestic situation in the Soviet Union, including Stalin's struggle against the opposition in 1927. Patek analysed the Soviet system and policy in Europe and the world, and a crucial place in his reports is occupied by Polish-Soviet relations and the signing of the non-aggression pact of 25 July 1932, all presented within the wider context of international relations.
3

THE CO-OPERATION OF THE CONSULAR SERVICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND WITH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

80%
Skóra W.
Dzieje Najnowsze
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2004
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issue 1
21-43
EN
The inter-war period witnessed the development of two basic forms of co-operation between the consular service and Polish military Intelligence. The first consisted of entrusting espionage to consular officials, who carried them out on the margin of their work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, conducting 'white Intelligence' and realizing the simplest counter-Intelligence tasks.The second, more advanced and intensive form of co-operation exploited the official structures of the consulates for concealing full-time Intelligence officers. it appears that the Intelligence of the Second Republic - both shallow and strategic - benefited to a considerable degree from the support rendered by the consular service. In the basic trends of the reconnaissance performed by the Second Department of the Supreme Staff, i. e. in Germany and the Soviet Union, the participation of consulates in the organisation of Intelligence was so extensive that we may speak about a certain norm and a fragment of official pragmatic. During the 1930s Polish Intelligence networks in those countries were based on consular outposts and in order to avoid conflicts several conventions signed at the beginning of the 1920s regulated the co-operation between the consulates and the Intelligence employees. The fundamental convention, completed in January 1922, remained in force until the end of the 1930s. After the May 1926 coup d'etat that swerved Poland onto a path of building an authoritarian system of power dominated by the military, the heads of Polish Intelligence paid increasingly less attention to the opinions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a stand rendered possible by the influx of officers into the Ministry. In 1931 the Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs found itself in the hands of former Intelligence officers. As a consequence, the significance of Intelligence officers working in consulates increased: they exerted a large impact upon the personnel policy, enjoyed independence, and to a certain extent controlled the work carried out by the consulates. This situation produced multiple conflicts, ultimately eliminated by the encroaching war.
4

Polacy w opinii przedstawicieli władz tureckich podczas pierwszej wojny światowej. Sprawozdanie Olgierda Górki z pobytu w Turcji w 1917 r.

80%
Miśkiewicz A.
Studia Podlaskie
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2013
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vol. 21
217-228
EN
The article was based on Prof. Olgierd Górka’s report. Górka was a historian, a diplomat and a representative of the Regency Council in Turkey, where he stayed to learn about the political situation and the attitude of Osman Dynasty to Poland. Górka was also interested in a situation of national minorities, for example Greeks and Jews. He discerned the sympathy of Turkish authorities to Poland, what gave hope for friendly Polish-Turkish relations after the end of the First World War.
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