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EN
In this article author presents oral history project „Poles on the East” („Polacy na Wschodzie”) of Warsaw based KARTA Center. Since 2006 KARTA has recorded more than 500 biographical interviews with the oldest generation of Poles who after 1945 did not „repatriate” to Poland and remained in the Soviet Union. The interviews were conducted in Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Russia and – besides postsoviet states – in Romania. The author summarizes main themes and plots that appear in three main groups of the recordings: 1) interviews recorded in territories which belonged to Poland before the war; 2) interviews recorded in prewar Lithuania, Latvia, Soviet Ukraine and Belarus; 3) interviews recorded in Siberia and Kazakhstan – places where Poles were deported during Stalin’s repressions in the 30s and during the war. The article also includes information about availability of the collection for researchers and students.
EN
In the 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia underwent a complex process of political, economic and social transformation which coincided with the presidency of Boris Yeltsin. The fast pace of ongoing changes and the FR movement towards democracy inclined Poland to redefine relations with Russia and to seek new opportunities for their development. The expression of these was the visit of President Walesa in Moscow and the signing of Polish-Russian Treaty of Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation on 22 May 1992. Shortly, however, a number of problems in relations with Moscow emerged, e.g. historical occurrences (including Katyn Massacre), Soviet army withdrawal from Poland, compensations and financial settlements, and others, which impeded current relations, despite the fact that presidents Yeltsin and Walesa had made an attempt to open a new chapter in Polish-Russian relations. It soon became apparent that the strategic interests of both countries are completely inconsistent in relation to fundamental matters. Evidently, it revealed conflicting aspirations concerning the entry of Poland to NATO , which resulted in significant cooling in Polish-Russian relations in the years 1994 to 2000. The change of authorities in Kremlin on 31 December 1999, which marked an end of a certain period in Russian history, unexpectedly created favourable conditions for improvement in relations with Poland. It was reflected in President Putin-s visit in Poland in January 2002, which yielded a number of spectacular results. However, the two-year balance of 'detente' of 2002-2003 presented itself rather poorly. Once more, a substantial discrepancy of Polish and Russian interests was exposed during the events of 2004. Polish entry to the EU in May 2004 and the presidential election in Ukraine, where Poland and President A. Kwasniewski played a significant role in the victory of 'the orange revolution'. This resulted in further cooling of Polish-Russian relations. The following years did not provide any improvement. At the end of 2005 the issue of locating elements of American missile defence shield on Polish territory appeared which posed a new problem in Polish-Russian relations. As in the case of NATO enlargement, the Russians employed the method of intimidation to counteract this undertaking. In retaliation for the shield, a number of higher Russian officers and politicians announced that the latest Russian anti-missile systems would be located near Polish border and that mid-range missiles would be aimed at Poland. This best illustrates the significance of East-Central Europe for Moscow.
EN
The article deals with different aspects of the struggle between Joseph Stalin and Anatolii Lunacharskii about the choice of administration means in the cultural and ethnic policy in the years 1917-1929. The author shows this problem as a part the conflict between People’s Commissariat of Education, headed by Lunacharskii, and People’s Commissariat For Nationalities’ Question, headed by Stalin, against the background of the revolution, civil war, and the construction of the Soviet Union. Special attention has been paid to the problems emerging from the contrast between the Bolshevik image of the ideal future and the ethnic-cultural realities, inherited from the past.
EN
The following article discusses chosen examples of Soviet intelligence activities on the African continent during Cold War. It contains events in Angola, Ghana, Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia and Mozambique. The author presented interference of the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) and allied intelligence services in internal and foreign policy of these states.
EN
The domestic situation in the Soviet Union, the policy pursued by the Kremlin towards the Central-Eastern and Western Europe and the whole world, as well as predictions associated with the political elites in Moscow comprised the most important issues which focused the attention of the émigré circles in 'Polish London' in the years 1945-1953. Apparently, the most involved in preparing expert opinions and political commentaries were politicians from the government circles and journalists. The best known among the 'Soviet studies' experts who had emerged among the 'Polish London' milieu were Aleksander Bregman, Zygmunt Szemplinski (who signed his texts as Stanislw Klinga), Jerzy Niezbrzycki (who used the pen name of Ryszard Wraga), Stanislaw Kodz and Stefan Lochtin. Distinguished politicians included Waclaw Grzybowski, the former Polish ambassador in Moscow, and General Wladyslaw Anders, who personally met Stalin and observed the events in the Soviet Union prior to, and in the course of the second world war. Polish émigrés were interested primarily in political and economic questions. In 1952-1953, i. e. from the Nineteenth Congress of the Soviet communist party to the death of Stalin, they acquainted Poles living abroad with the Kremlin policy towards Poland, Europe and the rest of the word. Their analyses also took into account the daily life of the Soviet citizens, and presented prognoses connected with the hierarchy of the Kremlin elite of power. After Stalin's death the Polish press in Great Britain held an extensive discussion in which almost all the participants indicated the commencement of the Malenkov era. On the other hand, it is worth stressing that the debate also pointed to the fact that not only Malenkov, but all the remaining Soviet dignitaries played a role distant from that of the 'Red tsar', i. e. Stalin.
EN
The study analyses circumstances, conditions and progress of radical reappraisal of the Soviet Union's foreign policy at the end of 1933 and its connections with no-less dramatic change of the Communist International's (CI) policy two years later. Transformation of the Comintern's policy, which resulted in creation of people's fronts, is connected with J. Dimitrov. Dimitrov was rescued from a German prison by J. V. Stalin, who put him in charge of the Communist International and discussed all issues concerning changes of the Comintern's policy with him. These changes are documented in decrees issued by top CI's organs, which regard the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia between 1933 and 1935.
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Historia Polaka z Żytomierszczyzny

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EN
The text is transcription of interview done with Zygmunt Wenglowski who was born in 1925 in Sorochyn. Memories says about education in Polish Autonomous Districts in interwar period and fighting as a soldier of the Polish First Army (Berling’s Army) during the second world war.
EN
The study analyses main evolutionary tendencies in Russia in the first half of the 20th century, their significance in modernisation of the country and Russia's transformation into a great power. It pays particular attention to political and social-economical expansion and puts it in a broad context of Soviet Union's advancement and international situation.
EN
The so-called 'Great Purge' taking place in the Soviet Union in 1936-1938 stirred great interest in the Polish press, which published assorted interpretations of the origin of Stalinist terror. One of its interpretation perceived Soviet terror as the outcome of Stalin's intentional steps towards the realisation of select targets. The majority of the journalists drew attention to the fact that the heart of the matter involved predominantly the organisation of an apparatus of power in order to safeguard the authority enjoyed by Stalin and to expand its range. This was the reason for the elimination of those who posed a threat to the dictator. Others indicated that repressions served as a tool for attaining further reaching objectives: the construction of a totalistic-bureaucratic centralised state ( perceived as a symptom of Thermidor, the end of the revolution) or a nationalisation or, more precisely, Russification of Bolshevism. According to the deterministic interpretations of the sources of terror it was to have been a product of the specific social, political and historical conditions prevailing in the Soviet Union. The Catholic press frequently indicated that Stalinist terror constituted a logical consequence of the implementation of the premises of Marxism-Leninism. On the other hand, the democratic press maintained that the bloody events in the Soviet Union sprung from the dictator-totalitarian nature of the local authorities. Another characteristic feature of the Polish press was interpreting the terror of 1936-1938 as an outcome of the impact exerted by Russian political tradition.
EN
These until now unknown documents from the Soviet archives illustrate the imprisonment of the civil population of Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Germany, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in 1944-1945, in the last period of World War II and after the end of the war. Men between 17 and 45, women between 18 and 30 were to be deported to work in the Soviet Union that had a great need of work force after World War II. Not only ethnic Germans but Hungarians, Slovaks etc. were imprisoned during this action. Due to the bad circumstances, tens of thousands of these civil prisoners of war died during this time. In 1950, the German prisoners working in Soviet mines began a great strike. It was not until 1955 that all civil prisoners were allowed to leave for their country, in some cases some of them returned to Germany with their children born in the Soviet Union.
EN
A discussion of the evolving stand of the German anti-Nazi émigrés towards the 'great purge' in the Soviet Union in 1936-1939 is presented. To the mid-1930s the Soviet 'experiment' enjoyed the interest of leftist and liberal groups among the German intelligentsia. The achievements of the Soviet Union were confronted with the economic breakdown in the West and the growing political crisis in the Weimar Republic. After the NSDAP came to power, the German opponents of Hitler placed their hope in a change in the foreign policy of the Kremlin. Particular expectations were inspired by the conception of 'people's fronts', formally accepted at a Comintern Congress in 1935. Due to the above mentioned tendencies the political trials held in the Soviet Union became for the German refugees a test of ethical and world outlook stances. Many émigrés failed to tackle the moral challenge. In the name of preserving an illusory unity of the refugee milieu its members either avoided an open criticism of Soviet reality (Thomas Mann) or directly ( Bertolt Brecht, Heinrich Mann) or indirectly (Lion Feuchtwanger) defended the official interpretation of the trials. Another frequent stand was passive observation of the undertakings pursued by the Kremlin (Klaus Mann). The critics of the Soviet 'purge' (Leopold Schwarzschild), who regarded the events in Russia to be a confirmation of the impossibility of cooperating with émigré members of the German Communist Party, found themselves in a minority. Even communist dissidents (Arthur Koestler, Manes Sperber) did not openly criticise the Soviet Union until the signing of the Stalin-Hitler pact, i. e. after 23 August 1939.
EN
To the beginning of June 1934 Czechoslovakia did not de iure recognise the Soviet Union despite the fact that a Soviet diplomatic mission had existed in Prague since 1922, and a Czechoslovak one - in Moscow. The attitude represented by the government in Prague was influenced by fears of a deterioration of relations with the Small Entente allies and Yugoslavia, and the anti-Soviet campaign conducted by the National Democrats as well as by a negative attitude among other parties towards the recognition of the Soviet authorities. On the other hand, the interests demonstrated by Czech industrialists in the establishment of trade contacts with the Soviet Union became the reason why both the government in Prague and a major part of the Czech parties supported diplomatic relations with the authorities in Moscow. At the same time, slightly more attention was devoted to Polish-Soviet relations under the impact of the interest shown by the Soviet government in a non-aggression pact with Poland, which was perceived as a reinforcement of the international position of the Polish state. An eventual improvement of relations between Warsaw and Moscow could have become for the Czech authorities and some of the local political groups an additional argument in favour of inaugurating trade relations and a de iure recognition of the Soviet Union. At the end of the 1920s the National Democrats were skeptical about the possibility of improving the relations between Poland and her eastern neighbour and did not attach greater attention to the Polish-Soviet nonaggression pact signed in 1932. A change in Soviet foreign policy, which took place in 1933, increased the interests of the Czech authorities and certain politicians not only in a de iure recognition of the Soviet Union and the commencement of cooperation. This was also the period of an onset of pro-Soviet sympathies, cultivated not only by the communists but also by the Social Democrats and peasant parties. The accompanying negative opinion about the Polish policy towards the Soviet Union was expressed predominantly by journalists associated with the 'Hrad' group. The Czechoslovak-Soviet mutual assistance pact signed on 16 May 1935 increased pro-Soviet sympathies among the majority of the Czech political circles. The hopes connected with the alliance proved to be unfounded: the authorities in Moscow did not intend to become embroiled in a war conducted far from Soviet borders.
Studia Historica Nitriensia
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2017
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vol. 21
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issue 2
450 – 458
EN
A. D. Ponomaryov, member of the 40th cavalry guards regiment volunteered for a reconaissance mission on 28th March 1945 on the outskirts of village Úľany nad Žitavou in southwestern Slovakia. He failed to complete his task since German defenders of the 357th infantry division captured him. They had probably tried to interrogate him, but after a short time they poured petrol on him and burnt him. On the next day, when Soviet division occupied the village, Cossacks found his body presuming he was dead. But soon after that, when burial platoon started to collect bodies, they had found out, he was still alive. Ponomaryov thus got to the hospital and in spite of his burns, he survived. His regimental commander, not knowing about that, made a proposal to award Ponomaryov a Hero of the Soviet Union in memoriam, which was accepted and executed on the 15th May 1946! Even the supreme commander of cavalry-mechanized group, general Pliev, did know nothing about Ponomaryov’s survival and wrote about his presumed deathe in his memoirs in 1971.
EN
Syndicalists were one of the first circles brought to life by conspirational structures in occupied Poland. Apart from the established in October 1939 Polish Syndicalist Association, from 1940, there existed, a significantly smaller in number, Syndicalist Organisation 'Freedom'. In the first years of the War, PSA as well as SOF occupied a principally anti-Soviet and anticommunist position. Polish syndicalists perceived the USRR as an imperialist country pertaining to the worst tsarism traditions, also in relation to the solutions adopted in the country-s internal policy. Local communists were accused of being dependent on Moscow, and the communist ideology was perceived as containing numerous errors. On establishing military objectives for Poland, it was pointed that only the implementation of the federation idea could offer a chance of survival for the nations of East-Central Europe between Germany and Russia. Along with the changing situation on the fronts of WW II, but also in the context of transformations occurring within the syndicalist movement, the anti-Soviet and anticommunist attitude of the community weakened. By the end of the War, not only in SOF, but also in PSA, emerged, torpedoed by the activists who viewed themselves as inheritors of the tradition of Polish irredenta, clear tendencies to achieve compromise with political forces oriented on Moscow and grounded in PKWN Manifesto. However, the disputes in syndicalist circles of that time presented no practical significance. On the threshold of Polish People-s Republic, the community disintegrated and did not play any further political role.
Vojenská história
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2016
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vol. 20
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issue 3
48 - 73
EN
In the study, the author deals with the issue of origins, from which the Slovaks – members of the Czechoslovak army in the Soviet Union in 1942 – 1944 came from. Majority of the sources in processing the topic comprised the archival documents from the funds of the Military Central Archive in Prague, Military Historical Archive in Bratislava and Russian State Military Archive (RGVA) in Moscow. Based on the analysis thereof, the author declares that the most significant area, from which Slovaks as volunteers were arriving to this Army in the reporting period were the prisoners of the Slovak and Hungarian Army deployed on the Eastern frontline.
EN
The fundamental changes taking place in Russian historiography after the fall of the Communist regime are dealt with and analyzed. The authoress concentrates primarily on highly delicate issues, namely the outbreak and the events during the first years of World War II. Although the Russian archives have been made available to the public and a number of document editions and new publications have appeared, this topic continues to be a hot problem of modern Russian history. Attention was mostly paid to the period of 1939-1941 and to the circumstances of the attack on the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany. Therefore, this period and its events continue attracting the attention of Russian historians, while the gap in the debate between the two main streams existing in today's Russian historiography, the 'Conservatives' and the 'Liberals', is deepening. Traditionally, most attention is paid to military operations, while some hot topics have not been adequately studied yet, such as the situation in the rear of the Soviet side, repressive measures against Soviet citizens, expulsion of whole ethnic groups to harsh regions in Siberia, logistic problems with supplies for the Soviet Army, causes of failure of a number of military operations, etc. Thus, the Russian historiography of modern history still faces many complex tasks to cope with in a responsible way.
EN
In the wake of the annexation of the Polish eastern territories by the Red Army in 1939, and the establishment of temporary councils, 'national property' was entrusted to the 'protection' of the new authorities. Already during the first stage of the occupation republican Party and administrative bodies of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic and the Byelorussian Socialist Soviet Republic prepared lists of enterprises to be nationalised. 'Sessions' held by the People's Assemblies of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia (the end of October 1939) announced that all land, forests, rivers and lakes were to become state property. They also proclaimed a nationalisation of banks, large industry, mines and the railway. For all practical purposes, the nationalisation of factories and enterprises had been inaugurated already at the end of September 1939 and lasted until the spring of 1940. Nationalisation encompassed all, not only 'large' enterprises, including communal ones, and thus was much wider than the range indicated 'by the will of the people' expressed in the resolutions passed by the People's Assemblies. Alltold, some 4 000 industrial enterprises were nationalised. Cooperatives and the crafts were gradually included into the system of the Soviet artels. State and cooperative banks were taken over just as rapidly. The liquidation of private trade was carried out gradually, to the spring of 1941, and was associated with a simultaneous creation of a state trade network. Finally, nationalisation also embraced the health service, insurance companies, the railway and communication. The same model of nationalisation was applied in the region of Vilno, annexed by the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940. Political decisions made 'at the top' led to the appropriation of property in the occupied territories of the Second Republic by resorting to administrative methods, repression and various forms of pressure used in relation to private owners. Nationalisation proved to be rather uncomplicated since in contrast to other parts of the country the Polish eastern territories did not represent concentrated economic potential. The value of the appropriated (lost) property is inestimable.
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Hnutí a instituce: Analýza kolapsu Sovětského svazu

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EN
This article combines institutional and social movement analysis to investigate how elite structures and mass mobilisation operated under Perestroika. We utilise the social movement theories of political opportunity, political currency and political stages in order to do so. By examining the roles of three separate periods in Soviet life, we demonstrate that these factors each had a determining role, depending on the period so chosen. The worlds of institutional structure and mass mobilisation were unconnected, at first, but then they became related in complex ways. This process saw the transformation of institutions, mass mobilisation and demobilisation within a short five year period. The result was not a transition towards democracy but the break up of a federal state.
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2019
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vol. 67
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issue 1
103 - 125
EN
The study focuses on the reactions of the Slovak cultural community to the Soviet campaign against so-called formalism in the arts between the years 1936 and 1938. The paper analyses public reactions to the fabricated political trials and the subsequent persecutions and wide-ranging arrests of Soviet artists and intellectuals in the Slovak cultural journals. While the discussions among communist and Ľudák intellectuals about Stalin ́s terror in the thirties have been the subjects of several historical studies, the opinions of Slovak liberal and democratic writers and intellectuals are barely known. Many of these writers shared communist ideas about the liberalization and democratization of the Soviet Union, although this cannot be completely generalized and depends on specific authors. The study wants to emphasize that the illusions and unrealistic ideas remained among them during the whole period of the thirties and also after the Second World War during the last part of the Stalin epoch.
EN
The system of interrelations between the center and the regions in the Soviet Union from the 1920s to the early 1930s is analyzed in the study. Concrete cases are used to describe the development of relations and mutual interactions between the center and the regions in the USSR as well as the factors determining them. The tools used and the attempts made by the center, where the decisive power was concentrating in J. V. Stalin's hands, to centralize state power and limit the influence of Party elite at the regional level are explained. The latter had, however, strong positions in the Central Committee of the Bolshevist Party and were able to enforce the interests of their particular regions, and thus protect and strengthen their own positions within the Party system. It appears that not only geographical factors and insufficient control of the provinces played some role in the development of interrelations between the center and the regions; of great importance was also the ethnic policy and later also, in particular, the start of radical modernization of the country by means of forced collectivization and industrialization. Both of these processes strengthened dramatically Moscow's centralization efforts; on the other hand, however, they created new opportunities for the regional elite to increase their influence and strengthen their positions.
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