Lucius Annaeus Seneca, called the Younger or Philosopher, is the most important figure of the Roman Imperial Period. This Stoic philosopher made a lasting contribution to Stoicism. Seneca lived during difficult times and he was engaged in politics during the reign of his disciple, Cesar Nero. Seneca agrees with earlier Stoics, that God is corporeal and is a part of the world. Seneca discusses virtue as the ideal of “becoming like God” and thinks, that the virtuous man is an equal to the God. So he claims, that we have to learn virtues. However in this case we have the help of God, who gives us the intellect when we are born. Seneca reminds, that the life is not easy and only the indications of the philosophy concerning virtue preserve from the unjust fortune.
The article discusses popular Stoicism (a modern, simplified, and often commercialized version of ancient Stoicism), which is offered as an answer to the uncertainty of modernity. The financial, political, climate, and health crises have been detrimental to the sense of agency and control over one’s life, leading individuals to seek ways of (subjectively) regaining it. Popular Stoicism can be viewed as an expert system providing individuals with a specific vision of happiness and the good life, in addition to offering practical knowledge on how to define an area of individual agency by negotiating the boundaries between that which is within one’s power and that which is not. Reflections begin with a juxtaposition of ancient and contemporary Stoicism, focusing on their different socio-cultural origins, followed by a synthesis of the principles of ancient Stoicism on happiness and the good life and a detailed interpretation of the ‘offering’ of popular Stoicism in the relevant areas. In the latter context, two chosen Stoic exercises (necessary to achieve happiness and the good life) are discussed-the ability to recognize what things depend/do not depend on us and Stoic emotion work. The practices and techniques recommended as a part of constant work on oneself are also supposed to teach individuals to adapt to their unstable reality. As a result, the popular version of Stoicism perpetuates the mechanisms of the culture of individualism, which holds the individual fully responsible for their life, and the therapeutic and counseling culture (based on one’s readiness to constantly self-improve), which is a new form of disciplining in a neoliberal society. Both are important elements of the everyday life and lifestyle of the middle class. This class is interested in self-fulfillment and is the primary target audience of contemporary Stoic handbooks. The consideration is based on fragments of books on popular Stoicism, mainly written by Polish philosophers, subjected to qualitative content analysis.
This article tackles that question of the place of Nature as an idea and Life in Nature as a reality in the education philosophy of Janusz Korczak. First, we establish the idea that Korczak was a naturalistic philosopher and that nature in its broad cosmic sense serves as the ordering principle of his entire pedagogical legacy. Influenced by Stoic philosophy, Korczak rejects transcendence and sees the human being in the only context possible, nature.Following this paradigm, we establish Korczak's education as a reality guided pedagogy. The nature of the child mandates education and not free unrealistic aspirations. The nature of the child, his family, his biography in its broadest sense also set the limits of what can be achieved through education.At last, we follow Korczak's appreciation of nature and countryside experience as a healing experience for poverty inner city children. There, in nature, in free play, work and sport, they regain their physical and mental health. There Korczak also had his best opportunity to learn the child and to develop his known educational ideas, which he later on implemented in his children houses.
The essay examines the description of virtue as a craft that governs the proper use of possessions in Plato’s Euthydemus and Stoicism. In the first part, I discuss Socrates’ parallel between wisdom and the crafts in the Euthydemus, and the resulting argument concerning the value of external and bodily possessions. I then offer some objections, showing how Socrates’ craft analogy allows one to think of possessions as (qualifiedly) good and ultimately fails to offer a defense of virtue’s sufficiency for happiness. In the second part, I examine the Stoics’ craft analogy and note a number of differences from Socrates’ account in the Euthydemus. These include the Stoic claim that external advantages never make any contribution to happiness, even when properly used, and the claim that, unlike other crafts, wisdom does not require any external possessions in order to be exercised and yield benefit and happiness. I then place these differences against the backdrop of the debate regarding virtue’s sufficiency for happiness and argue that the Stoic craft model of virtue fares better than its Socratic antecedent.
The inclusion of De astrologia in the Lucianic corpus has been disputed for centuries since it appears to defend astrological practices that Lucian elsewhere undercuts. This paper argues for Lucian’s authorship by illustrating its masterful subversion of a captatio benevolentiae and subtle rejection of Stoic astrological practices. The narrator begins the text by blaming phony astrologers and their erroneous predictions for inciting others to “denounce the stars and hate astrology” (ἄστρων τε κατηγοροῦσιν καὶ αὐτὴν στρολογίην μισέουσιν, 2). The narrator assures readers that he, the knowledgeable astrologer, will correct for the “stupidity and laziness” (μαθίῃ καὶ ῥαθυμίῃ, ibid.) that bring about false predictions. The narrator’s credibility quickly decays when he attempts to recast Orpheus, Bellerophon, Icarus, Daedalus, and a host of other mythological figures as Greek astrologers. Lucian’s audience would expect such far-fetched interpretations of myth from the stereotypical Stoic philosopher, a character lampooned elsewhere in the Lucianic corpus.
This article outlines the premises and promises of a modern comeback of Stoicism, particularly the question of reinterpretation of the original doctrine, the contemporary intricacies of the principle of “following nature,” and the foundations that modern Stoicism establishes for global responsibility.
The aim of the article is to show that the so-called “philosophia perennis” is valid for our modern times too. Four philosophical schools of the Hellenistic times remain influential for the following centuries: Plato and Neoplatonism, Aristotle and the Peripatetics, the Stoics and the Epicureans. We are interpreting two, only two, poems from Thomas More and Jacob Balde, and so we see the greatest possible influence of all these four ancient philosophical schools.
Seneca’s philosophical writings concern a virtue, among others also the virtues of justice, temperance (or moderation), fortitude and prudence. They are four virtues from the time of St. Ambrose called cardinal. Seneca gives this definition of the virtue temperantia: cupiditates refrenare – to confine one’s desires. So the temperance is practicing self-control, abstention and moderation. Seneca discuses it very often in a wider context of the different virtues, with which it’s tightly connected according to a stoical idea of the inseparability of the virtues. He claims that we have to learn virtue. Seneca reminds, that the life is not easy and only the indications of the philosophy concerning virtue preserve from the unjust fortune.
RU
Сенека, будучи последователем и представителем философской школы младшей стои, склонялся к эклектике и ставил этику на первый план. Его философские сочинения посвящены вопросам практической морали. Он стремился дать людям утешение посредством житейской мудрости. Цель человека заключается в том, чтобы „жить в согласии с природой”. Сенека учил как жить и поэтому много писал о добродетелях. Философ хотел, чтобы император и каждый человек обладал такими качествами, как: воздержанность, мужество, разумность, справедливость и чтобы знал, что добродетель „следует обуздать желания, подавить боязнь, разумно заботиться о предстоящих делах, раздать всё, что должно быть отдано”. Сенека учил: „Воздержность умеряет наслажденья; одни она с ненавистью изгоняет, другие соразмеряет и сокращает до здорового предела, никогда не приближаясь к ним ради них самих. Она знает, что лучшая мера для всего желанного – взять не сколько хочется, а сколько необходимо”.
The word cosmopolitanism is derived from “cosmos” (universe) and “polites” (citi-zen). The cosmopolite is a citizen of the world. The Stoics elaborate on the theme, using the ideas of oikeiosis and sympathy as its basis, thus drawing from their physics. Partic-ularly, Epictetus defends cosmopolitanism on the assumption that man is akin to God, whereas Marcus Aurelius highlights the common possession of mind (νοῦς) and that man is by nature able for communal life. For the Stoics man is a social being who can be perfected only within the society of other human beings. The brotherhood of men is grounded on the indubitable axiom that the human soul is the source of the unique good, which is virtue. The distinctive parameter for creating a community is virtue, which is an objective for everyone but also an inherent and ecumenical capacity.
The study is an analysis and interpretation of a scene from Łukasz Górnicki’s tragedy Troas (1589), a translation of Seneca’s Troades. A comparison to the original as well as the description of changes introduced by the translator serve to capture a special phenomenon of emphasising the analogy between Ulysses’s and a diplomat’s activity. Starting with the main character’s first line, the words: “durae minister sortis” were translated as “Ja, co poselstwo niosę”. The analysis of this issue shows that the role of Ulysses (who does not negotiate with a representative of a sovereign country, but with a captive woman) cannot be equated with the role of an ambassador. Conversely, it combines in itself the features characteristic of diplomatic staff of various ranks, including characters operating on the edge of the law. The consilium ascribed to Ulysses enables to explore the secret of Andromacha by observing physical symptoms of emotions. This makes it possible for Górnicki to define the main character’s ingenuity as “dowcip odwrócony na nice” which, irrespective of Seneca’s original, refers to the terminology used earlier in Dworzanin polski, where dowcip (wit) is the equivalent of ingegno. Among the ethical elements of Ulysses’s speeches one should name, above all, his desire to convince Andromacha to accept the Greek’s line of argumentation. This, in turn, provides good framework for parallelism with the New Testament (Lk 2:35). The last part of the work, devoted to pathos, addresses the problem of a mismatch between the role of Ulysses and diplomacy codes in Górnicki’s times. The main character does not limit himself to conducting well thought-out negotiations, but he also uses direct violence. Similar dissonance in character construction seems to make the representation of diplomatic practices in Górnicki’s translation a problematic task, given the socio-political tensions in Europe in the second half of sixteenth century.
What motivates the voluntary suffering of training for a long-distance run – or any other difficult athletic skill? Long-term pleasure cannot adequately explain this seemingly masochistic activity. On the contrary, I argue that pleasure, or “reinforcement,” is not the only ultimate motivator of behavior. Each of the emotion systems defines its own intrinsic values, including an innate “play” system and an innate “exploratory drive” that is included in what neuropsychologist Jaak Panksepp calls the “SEEKING system” of the emotional brain. Panksepp’s description of the conscious dimension of SEEKING is remarkably similar to Otto Rank’s descriptions of his “love of life” dimension of motivation, which actually conflicts with the pleasure principle. The desire for pleasure is a desire to reduce consummatory drives, which means reducing the energy level of our bodily systems. Complete reduction would be death. If there were no competing motivation in the other direction, there would be nothing to keep us alive. The SEEKING system is what does that. It motivates a higher energy level. In the case of athletic training, we do not have to “force ourselves” to this higher energy level. The SEEKING system is an innate natural drive. If we were to deliberately try to just sit on a couch indefinitely, at some point we would fail.
Seneca’s philosophical writings concern a virtue, among others also the virtues of justice, temperance (or moderation), fortitude and prudence. They are four virtues from the time of St. Ambrose called cardinal. Seneca gives this definition of the virtue temperantia: “cupiditates refrenare” – to confine one’s desires. So the temperance is practising self-control, abstention and moderation. Seneca discuses it very often in a wider context of the different virtues, with which it’s tightly connected according to a stoical idea of the inseparability of the virtues. He claims that we have to learn virtue. Seneca reminds that life is not easy and only the indications of the philosophy concerning virtue preserve from the unjust fortune.
In this paper, I intend to focus on some rhetorical strategies of argumentation which play crucial role in the therapeutic discourse of Roman Stoicism, namely in Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius. Reference is made to Chaim Perelman’s view of ancient rhetoric as an art of inventing arguments. Moreover, it is pointed out that in rhetorical education (cf. Cicero, Ad Herennium, Quintilian, etc.) as well as in therapeutic discourse the concept of “exercise” and constant practice play a crucial role.
Der Gegenstand des Artikels ist die "innere Festung", deren Bau das philosophische Ziel eines stoischen Philosophen war. Sie verband sich mit einem radikalen Wandel des Bewusstseins, der als eine ununterbrochene Arbeit an sich selbst mit dem Ziel, ein freier Mensch zu werden, wahrgenommen wurde. Die Freiheit war nämlich in der stoischen Philosophie nicht die Frage der äußeren Bedingungen, sondern der inneren Einstellung. Die innere Festung gewährt den Bereich der menschlichen Freiheit. Diese Freiheit deckt sich mit drei Bereichen der geistigen Aktivität: der Urteilsfreiheit, der Bedürfnisfreiheit und der Gefühlsfreiheit. Der Stoiker verlangte nach Autarkie in jenen Bereichen, die ihm durch das Schicksal und die menschliche Natur gestattet sind.
EN
The subject matter focuses on the "inner fortress", the erection of which represented the Stoics’ philosophical goal . This involved a radical transformation of consciousness, perceived as a continuous effort to become a free man. For freedom in Stoic philosophy was a matter of internal mindset rather than an outcome of external conditions. The inner fortress secures the domains of human freedom covering three areas of man’s spiritual activity: the freedom of judgement, aspiration and emotions. The stoic aspires to autarkia in areas, where it is allowed by destiny and human nature.
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu jest „warownia wewnętrzna”, której budowa była filozoficznym celem stoickiego filozofa. Wiązała się ona z radykalną przemianą świadomości, pojmowaną jako nieustanna praca nad sobą, aby uczynić się człowiekiem wolnym. Wolność bowiem nie była w filozofii stoickiej kwestią zewnętrznych uwarunkowań, lecz wewnętrznego nastawienia. Warownia wewnętrzna zabezpiecza obszar wolności człowieka. A wolność ta pokrywa się z trzema obszarami aktywności duchowej: wolnością osądu, wolnością pragnienia i wolnością emocji. Stoik pragnął autarkii - w tych obszarach, na które pozwala mu przeznaczenie i ludzka natura.
The present paper investigates the relevance of structural and intertextual information for an interpretation of Votum z Seneki dla Jegomości Pana Chorążego Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego by Jan Andrzej Morsztyn. Placing both the structural and intertextual properties of the text against a wider context of the literary practices of the period, of the contemporaneous philosophical discussions and tendencies, as well as philological discussions of relevant hypotexts, allows one, it is argued, to uncover at least two distinct, although closely intertwined, layers of irony and scepticism in Morsztyn’s piece.
According to Renan, the day of Marcus Aurelius’ death could be considered as the decisive moment in the downfall of the ancient civilization. He, thus, wonders: “If Marcus Aurelius, the unique emperor-philosopher, did not succeed in saving the world, who else, then, could have saved it?” He notes that the emperor’s death was followed by the succession to the throne of his corrupted son, Commodus, and his friends, who all were all ignorant. Renan observes that the emperor’s kindness could not have prevented the unfortunate fate that befell the Roman Empire after his death. What we have here is the perennial problem, already established in Plato, regarding the role of the philosopher-king in establishing a good state and educating good citizens. However, the case of Marcus Aurelius, as demonstrated by Renan in his book, shows the inability of philosophy to serve the real needs, which ultimately leads to disastrous and irreparable consequences. The present paper attempts to reconstruct the reasons for the unsuccessful application of philosophy, especially the philosophy of the Hellenistic era, to the administrative system of the Roman Empire. It is argued that the failure is mainly due to political, religious and cultural problems.
It is argued that the Senecan concept of physics, indebted as it is to earlier Stoic writings, allows the Roman philosopher to think of the respective inquiry in terms of ultimate science, a lore that brings humans closer to the divine, but also possesses profound ethical consequences. The understanding of universal law becomes mandatory, but also sufficient for ethical progress, while the notion of cosmic balance is employed to reject the excess and lack of measure so characteristic of vice. Under the guise of discussing very particular physical questions, Seneca inquires into the eternal, immutable Law, thus indicating the way for human betterment and achievement of perfection.
Rzymska Stoa była już ostatnim (trzecim) etapem istnienia stoicyzmu, pisma jej przedstawicieli stanowią jednak źródła do poznania doktryny tej szkoły filozoficznej. W refleksji stoickiej nad tożsamością obywatelską zwracają uwagę pisma filozofów-polityków, Seneki Młodszego (I w. n.e.), a zwłaszcza Marka Aureliusza – cesarza (II w. n.e.). Rzym i poczucie „rzymskości” jest wyraźnie zaznaczone w ich pismach, zarazem jednak w ich myśli filozoficznej wybija się jeszcze mocniej stoicki pogląd, przejęty już przez Zenona z Kitio (założyciela Stoi) od cyników, o byciu obywatelem świata, kosmopolitą. Podstawową zasadą stoików było życie zgodnie z boską i rozumną naturą. Teoria, rozmyślanie łączyło się z praktyką, działaniem. Człowiek ma dbać o swój rozum (wspólny mu z bóstwem) i w duchu sympatii trudzić się dla wspólnego dobra, a zarazem swojego. Szczęśliwe życie znajduje się w każdym miejscu, najwyższym państwem człowieka bowiem jest świat. Rzym jest mniejszym państwem, częścią wielkiego, kosmicznego państwa. Cały ród ludzki tworzy jeden organizm państwowy, kierowany jednym prawem natury, rozumnej i dla każdego dobrej. Wszystko jest nawzajem powiązane świętym węzłem. Rozum świata kształtuje go harmonijnie. Stanowi również o jedności, o wspólnocie istot rozumnych. Rozum i służba obywatelska są z sobą ściśle złączone, dlatego trzeba się trudzić całym swym życiem dla ogółu, każdy ma zawsze kierować swe dążenia jedynie ku wspólnemu dobru, stosownie do potrzeb społeczeństwa. Wszyscy współdziałają dla jednego celu, pomagając sobie wzajemnie. Postępowanie zaś przeciwne, niesprawiedliwe jest objawem oderwania się od natury, rozrywa ono życie i niszczy powszechną jedność, szkodzi również samemu człowiekowi. Bóg daje jednak możliwość ponownego zjednoczenia i ponownego zajęcia miejsca członka społeczeństwa. Co jest odpowiednie dla całości, jest piękne i dokonuje się w stosownej porze, jest dobre dla jednostki. I odwrotnie: co zdarza się każdemu z osobna, jest pożyteczne dla całości wszechświata. Społeczeństwo i jego jednostki są jak ciało i poszczególne jego członki oraz jak drzewo i gałęzie ściśle złączone przez naturę.
EN
Stoic doctrine was popular in the Roman Empire. It was the last period of this philosophical school but it is very important to know its history. Roman texts of the Late Stoa are sources of all Stoicism. Seneca the Younger, Roman politician, and Marcus Aurelius, Roman Emperor, are most interesting representatives of the Late Stoa. These Roman authors describe civic identity, but they refer to the Greek idea of the Cynics and Zeno of Citium, who was a founder of the Stoic school. They teach about „citizen of the world” (Greek kosmopolitês). The basic principle of the Stoic doctrine was a force in accordance with the divine and intelligent nature. The Stoic theory, meditations closely connected to the practice of life. Every human being has to take care of your mind (common to him with the deity) and in the spirit of sympathy to toil for the common good, and also his. A happy life is in every place, because the highest state of man is the world. Rome is a smaller state, part of the great cosmic state. The whole human family creates one state, has one law of rational and good for everyone nature. Everything is linked to other by a sacred bond. Reason of the world shapes it harmoniously and creates the unity and the community of rational beings. This reason and civic service are closely united, so man have to go to the trouble his whole life to the public, everyone has always directed his efforts only toward the common good, according to the needs of society. All work together for one goal, helping each other. Other behavior is unfair and is a symptom of detachment from nature, it disrupts lives and destroys common unity, harm the man himself. God, however, gives the opportunity to reunite and re-occupy the place in society. What is appropriate for the whole, is beautiful and made in time, it is good for the individual. Conversely, what happens to each individual, it is beneficial for the whole universe. Society and individuals are like the body and its individual members as well as tree branches and closely united by nature.
W artykule przedstawiono filozoficzne i językowe tło ponicejskich debat teologicznych dotyczących relacji między Ojcem i Synem. Starano się zwłaszcza uwypuklić następujące zagadnienia: pochodzenie terminu hipostaza, filozoficzne i gramatyczne rozumienie określeń hypokeimenon i ousia oraz stoickie definicje: „element oznaczający” i „rzecz oznaczana”. W artykule przedstawiono nowe aspekty antyeunomiańskiej polemiki Ojców Kapadockich, które wynikają na skutek porównania pojęć teologicznych z greckimi teoriami językowymi i gramatycznymi. Takie porównanie ukazuje metodologiczny i techniczny aspekt argumentacji teologicznej Ojców Kapadockich, a także ich bliskość z metodologią egzegetyczną Orygenesa.
EN
The article outlines the philosophical and linguistic background of the Post- Nicene theological debates concerning the relationship between the Father and the Son. A sharp focus dwells of the provenance of the term hypostasis, the philosophical and grammatical understanding of the terms hypokeimenon and ousia and the Stoic definition of the signifier and thing signified. The article shows new aspects of the anti-Eunomian polemics of the Cappadocian fathers, which come into sight due to comparison of theological concepts with Hellenic linguistic and grammatical theories. In such a way, the comparison demonstrates methodological and technical strand of the theological argumentation of the Cappadocian fathers and their affinity for the exegetic methodology of Origen.
In the article the author interprets 1 Thess 5:23 from the point of view of stoic philosophy. This interpretation claims to answer two questions: Why is St. Paul referring to the tripartite constitution of human being from spirit, soul and body instead of the dualistic constitution of soul and body? What is the exact meaning of the term spirit (πνεῦμα) used in 1 Thess 5:23 as the key term? The usual exegesis understands the term spirit (πνεῦμα) in New Testament as theological description of the Holy Spirit. The interpretation of 1 Thess 5:23 from such a point of view is hardly possibly because it would mean a conflict with the dualistic (Plato, Aristotle) anthropology used by St. Paul in his writings. Moreover it could be interpreted as a pantheistic and monistic explanation of a human being. The proposed answer stems from the interpretation of the term spirit (πνεῦμα) in its philosophical source in stoic philosophy. St. Paul was educated in Hellenistic Tarsus and could have had contact with the stoic thinking taught traditionally in this city. Such an interpretation sufficiently explains the sense of the formula “your whole spirit and soul and body” but it does not mean that St. Paul understood the human being according to a materialistic interpretation of stoic spirit and soul. It means an adoption of the stoic anthropological formula for the expression of the totality of a human being needed in the theological description of the end (παρουσία) in 1 Thessalonians.
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu jest interpretacja 1 Tes 5,23 z perspektywy filozofii stoickiej. Ta interpretacja chce dać odpowiedź na dwa następujące pytania: Po pierwsze, dlaczego Paweł z Tarsu odnosi się do trialistycznej konstytucji ludzkiego bytu złożonego z ducha, duszy i ciała, zamiast do dualistycznej konstytucji opartej o złożenie z duszy i z ciała. Po drugie, jakie jest znaczenie terminu „duch” (πνεῦμα) zastosowanego w 1 Tes 5,23. Dotychczasowa egzegeza tego fragmentu wyjaśnia ten termin przede wszystkim w odniesieniu do teologicznego opisu Ducha Świętego, który odzwierciedla hebrajski termin ruah. Taka egzegeza 1 Tes 5,23 wydaje się stać w konflikcie z dualistyczną antropologią (Platon, Arystoteles) stosowaną zwykle przez Pawła w jego listach (napięcie między duchem i ciałem). Ponadto taka interpretacja może być rozumiana jako panteistyczne i monistyczne wyjaśnienie ludzkiego bytu. Zaproponowana w tym artykule odpowiedź jest zakorzeniona w interpretacji terminu πνεῦμα w jego filozoficznych źródłach stoickich. Paweł z Tarsu był bowiem ukształtowany w hellenistycznym Tarsie i mógł mieć kontakt ze stoicką filozofią, która była tradycyjnie nauczana w tym mieście. Taka interpretacja wyjaśnia w wystarczający sposób sens formuły „duch wasz (τὸ πνεῦμα), dusza (ἡ ψυχὴ) i ciało (τὸ σῶμα)”, co jednak nie oznacza, że jej autor rozumiał ludzki byt w świetle materialistycznej interpretacji ducha i duszy filozofii stoickiej. Oznacza jedynie zastosowanie stoickiej formuły antropologicznej dla wyrażenia totalności ludzkiego bytu, która była Pawłowi potrzebna w teologicznym opisie końca (παρουσία) w Pierwszym Liście do Tesaloniczan.
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