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Forum Philosophicum
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2010
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vol. 15
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issue 1
235-238
EN
The article reviews the book Filozofia analityczna. Koncepcje, metody, organiczenia [Analytic Philosophy. Concepts, Methods, Limitations], by Tadeusz Szubka.
EN
In this paper I reconstruct the nature, origins and survivals of the divide between the “analytic” and “continental” traditions – a famous dualism which has affected the development of philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. I also present a theory of it, stressing that its intra-philosophical causes are to be found in the mutual resistance between critical (transcendental) and semantic (logical) approaches in philosophy. I conclude by noting that good philosophers (more or less knowingly) are and have always been sensitive to the transcendental and logical aspects of the philosophical work.
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Analytická a konverzační filosofie

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EN
The aim of Rorty’s article Analytic and conversational philosophy is to replace the distinction between analytic and continental philosophy with a distinction between analytic and conversational philosophy. This is achieved through a perception of the difference between the two types of philosophy that rejects the geographical viewpoint which, though it may provide a certain possibility of distinguishing the specific types of philosophy, is not in Rorty’s view really decisive. The difference consists above all in the distinctive view of philosophy of itself, and of the sense and aim of its endeavour. It consists in the response to the question of whether philosophy can or cannot know something as it really is; whether it can follow the path of science; or whether it should rather perceive itself as a conversation and an opening up of cultural reflection.
CS
Cílem Rortyho článku „Analytická a konverzační filosofie“ je nahrazení distinkce mezi analytickou a kontinentální filosofií rozlišením mezi filosofií analytickou a filosofií konverzační. Tím dojde při nahlížení rozdílu mezi oběma typy filosofie k odstranění geografického hlediska, které, ač samo o sobě poskytuje určitou možnost rozlišit jednotlivé typy filosofů, není dle Rortyho ve skutečnosti určující. Tento rozdíl spočívá především v odlišném náhledu filosofie na sebe samotnou, na smysl a cíle své práce. Spočívá v odpovědi na otázku, zda filosofie může něco poznávat takové, jaké to doopravdy je, či nikoli a zda se může vydat po cestě vědy, či by měla naopak vnímat sebe sama spíše jako konverzaci a rozvíjení kulturního uvažování.
PL
This article shows H. L. A. Hart as a leading representative of the analytic orientation in legal philosophy. Hart proved that the methods of analytic philosophy yield generous implications to law, where they may promote new ideas and innovative solutions. The text emphasizes the linguistic aspect of Hart’s works; his achievements in legal theory are discussed in the context of the principles of ordinary language philosophy.
EN
Between 11–14 February 2021 the first international Philosophical Workshop organized by The Lvov–Warsaw School Research Center (LWSRC) and Kazimierz Twardowski Philosophical Society of Lviv (KTPSL) took place in the on–line version due to the ongoing COVID–19 pandemic. The working languages of the event were Polish, Ukrainian and English. The coordinators’ goal was to refer to the tradition of seminar of Kazimierz Twardowski, who was not only a distinguished philosopher but also a great educator, to stimulate interest and support for the young generation of researchers into the heritage of the Lvov–Warsaw School (LWS). It is claimed that due to Twardowski’s  unprecedented didactical engagement he managed to upbring dozens of Professors like Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz,  Stefan Baley, Leopold Blaustein, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Izydora Dąmbska, Tadeusz Kotarbiński,  tanisław Leśniewski, Jan Łukasiewicz, Władysław Witwicki.
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EN
Logical positivists claim that the whole of human knowledge can be reduced to analytic and synthetic sentences, and this means that the only possible knowledge is provided by science. Metaphysics is thus meaningless, because its sentences do not comply with the rules set forth by logical analysis of language. What, then, is the philosopher’s job? The members of the Vienna Circle answer that his task is to clarify the concepts used within empirical and formal sciences, while analytic philosophers stress instead the importance of ordinary language’s analysis. But the outcome is in both cases clear: philosophy is linguistic analysis. Howeber, by reducing the whole of reality to empirical reality, logical positivists do metaphysics. We do not have the “elimination” of metaphysics, but just the proposal of an empiricist brand of metaphysics.
EN
The article explores the possibility of comprehending natural law, together with an alternative to the Schmittean political, through an inquiry into the layers of professional philosophy with a special focus on epistemology and analytic philosophy. The starting point of the research is the controversy surrounding the ideas of Carl Schmitt, in which it is unclear what lies at the origin of law and the political - sovereign decision or the situation (Part I)? The latter possibility directs the inquiry to the conceptual field related to natural law and epistemology. Proceeding via both diachronic and synchronic perspectives, the inquiry further analyses what has happened to natural law in modernity, and what its current status is, theorizing both streams of inquiry under the concept of political exile (Part II). The Schmittean political happens to be very much at home in this context, opening up the coherent ideological framework that may be called modern political ontology, which at first appears to camouflage Schmittean antagonistic political praxis (Part III). However, through inquiry into ideas mostly attributable to analytic philosophy (or philosophy of language), this ontology is also shown to function as an ‘anti-onto’-logy - that is, as a direct (i.e. open, not hidden) ideological basis for modern political praxis. The analysis here also discloses the rivalry inside professional philosophy in relation to ‘anti-onto’-logy, the latter finding its disciplinary origin(s) in language itself. It shows that at the level of professional philosophy there is a general trend that could be helpful in the attempt to revive natural law (Part IV).
EN
The paper presents H. L. A. Hart as a leading exponent of the analytic orientation in legal philosophy. Hart showed that the principles and methods of analytic philosophy yield fruitful implications to law, where they may foster fresh ideas and innovative solutions. The text emphasizes the linguistic aspect of Hart’s works; his achievements in legal theory are discussed in the context of the principles of ordinary language philosophy.
PL
The paper is a critical analysis of fundamental assumptions for the empirical research methodology in the jurisprudence field. It is aimed to compare the profile of empirical methodology with jurisprudence-dominant analytic philosophy. This is archived through a) examining the basic profile of the positivist attitude of a researcher along with assumptions integrating empiricism, which derives from the positivist methodology, into different philosophies of the law which specifically appeal to the naturalism of the legal phenomenon; next b) detailing characteristic features of empirical methods which take jurisprudence specifics into account; and finally c) coming to a set of conclusions concerning the success of research conducted this way in the jurisprudence field.
EN
Not many readers will recognize Disowning Knowledge: Seven Plays of Shakespeare by Stanley Cavell as either a piece of philosophical writing or literary criticism, so it may be useful to ask what method Cavell uses to read literature, what are the main features of his approach, and whether he has a coherent view on what reading literature means. I examine Cavell’s interdisciplinary eclecticism, the feature which makes his work so original, and I describe his moving away from the British and American analytic tradition in which he was trained to other sources of inspiration, especially Thoreau. I also stress the important fact that Cavell does not avoid autobiographical motifs in his writings, the style of which derives to some extent from the Jewish tradition of storytelling. In his writings Cavell declares his adherence to an ahistorical approach, maintaining that in a sense philosophy is trans‑historical. In many of his books the central issue is the challenge that skepticism poses, and he endeavors to make a convincing case against it. Although Cavell’s work covers a broad range of interests, including tragedy and literature, as well as Romantic poetry, Shakespeare, Henry James and Samuel Beckett, I try to answer the question of why his analyses of skepticism in literature focus especially on the works of Shakespeare.
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The Two Cultures in Philosophy

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EN
In this paper I revisit the debate concerning the distinction, which is sometimes made between “analytic” and “continental” philosophy. I look at the historical context in which the distinction came to prominence in the twentieth century, the reasons why it subsequently declined in popularity, and eventually had begun to be undermined. I argue that the distinction possesses intuitive content, which the recent attempts at exposing it as conceptually flawed fail to account for. I suggest that the intuitive content of the distinction provides us with resources to usefully define two different ways philosophical reflection has been approached during the course of the twentieth century. I conclude by suggesting that we can bring these two ways of approaching philosophy into focus by appealing to the idea of philosophical temperament.
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Logic and its Pragmatic Aspects

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EN
A pragmatist conception of logic rejects any kind of logical constructionism, based on the appeal to privileged ontological and epistemological items and to a perfect language supposedly provided by mathematical logic. Even in logic, “pluralism” must be the key-word if one does not want to be locked in the cage of conceptions that become rapidly outdated. Dealing with the dichotomy Absolutism/Relativism in logic, it may be observed that the enterprise of logic can be considered in several - and substantially different - perspectives, among which we find (1) the psychologistic, (2) the Platonistic, and (3) the instrumentalistic viewpoints. According to (1) logic is viewed as fundamentally descriptive, and its task is taken to be that of outlining a “theory of reasoning,” i.e. a systematic account of how we humans proceed when reasoning successufully. According to (3), instead, logic’s task is that of constructing rigorous systems codifying not only actual, but also possible instrumentalities for conducting valid inferences, and these would be available (should someone want to avail himself to them) for adoption as an organon of reasoning, but no empirical claims are made that anyone has (or will) avail himself of this opportunity. The logician devises a tool or instrument for correct reasoning, but does not concern himself about the uses of this instrument. Philosophy and logic cannot be linked so closely, and today the idea that the analytic style of philosophizing is just one style among many others, and not the only possible one, is gaining increasing acceptance.
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A review of: J. Woleński, Wykłady o naturalizmie, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UMK, Toruń 2016, ss. 226.
PL
Recenzja książki: J. Woleński, Wykłady o naturalizmie, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UMK, Toruń 2016, ss. 226.
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Skład towarów anglosaskich

38%
PL
Recenzja książki: Sebastian Tomasz KOŁODZIEJCZYK (red.), Przewodnik po metafizyce, Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków 2011, s. 636.
EN
Review of: Sebastian Tomasz KOŁODZIEJCZYK (red.), Przewodnik po metafizyce, Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków 2011, s. 636.
EN
The article characterizes the main features Bocheński’s conception of Analytic Philosophy. In the first part, we present the difference between Analytic Philosophy and different world-views. Then we discuss the forth rules of analysis, and finally we refer to the practical and social role of Analytic Philosophy pointed out by Bocheński.
EN
As an interdisciplinary field of scholarship, transitional justice is still in its pre-theoretical stage, focusing mainly on the case and comparative studies, supported by general considerations concerning justice in the times of transition. To entrench the field as a distinct area of studies, a theory of transitional justice needs to be formulated. The article explores the possibility of making a step towards such a theoretical basis with the use of the tools of analytical philosophy, methodology and legal theory. First, drawing on Leszek Nowak’s procedure of idealisation, three basic models of responses to a painful past are formulated. Then, distinct transitional justice values are attributed to each of the models. Finally, with the use of Jerzy Kmita’s concept of humanistic interpretation, the article seeks to conceptualize the way in which these values – among other factors, such as the need to uphold the rule of law or to preserve the stability of a democratic system – influence the choice of a model of transitional justice response. Thus, the aim of the presented models – which I described in more detail elsewhere (Krotoszyński 2017) – is to provide a sound theoretical basis for some of the fundamental claims formulated in the field of transitional justice.
EN
In this dissertation, Józef Innocenty Maria Bocheński presented the analytical model of philosophy of industrial enterprise. The model can be also applied to agriculture (as the author points out); with some reservations it could be referred to different kinds of services as well. Thus, it can be called the analytical model of business enterprise. The crucial theses of the paper are: 1. the enterprise should be perceived and analyzed as “a system”; 2. in such a system, the bonding element is the entrepreneur (distinguished from the capitalist) 3. production of goods is the “main immanent goal” of the enterprise. The paper was first presented in German, under the title: Zur Philosophie der industriellen Unternehmung, in the lecture given by the author in Zürich on March 18th 1985; in the following years, the dissertation has had several editions in German and in Polish.
EN
This paper presents Michael Heller’s notion of “philosophy in science” and re-introduces Michael Heller’s classical text that first presented this concept of philosophy entitled How is “philosophy in science” possible?. The paper discusses the historical context of Heller’s idea as it emerged from the discussions and works of the Krakow philosophical scene and discusses the basic tenants of this philosophy, its analytic character, the role of intellectual tradition in the development of this philosophy, and the critical role played by an interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy, science, and theology. Despite the idea of philosophy in science having emerged about 40 years ago, this concept still inspires and fuels innovative research. The notion of “philosophy in science” lies at the foundations of the philosophy published in two journals: Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) and Philosophy in Science.
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The Michael Heller’s article entitled “How is philosophy in science possible?” was originally published in Polish in 1986 (see Heller, 1986) and then translated into English by Bartosz Brożek and Aeddan Shaw and published in 2011 in the collection of essays entitled Philosophy in Science. Methods and Applications (Heller, 2011). This seminal paper has founded further growth of the ‘philosophy in science’ and become the reference point in the methodological discussions, especially in Poland. On the 40th anniversary of Philosophical Problems in Science we wanted to make this paper freely available to the international public by reprinting its English version. In this issue it is followed by two additional articles-commentaries (by Paweł Polak and Kamil Trombik).
EN
Legal theorists or philosophers have noted that if we are talking about the interpretation and application of law, then moral reasoning also plays a role, often a significant one. For example, Pierluigi Chiassoni openly admits that in some cases it depends on the evaluation of the judge as a person which of the possible interpretations he chooses. As we know, there are several methods of interpretation, on the basis of which the interpreter may reach different conclusions in some cases. In such a case, the judge’s moral evaluation sometimes plays a crucial role. This fact may lead us to the fact that we should also deal with the issue of moral reasoning and justification when discussing the interpretation and application of law. After briefly outlining why the question of moral intuitions is relevant in law, the question of whether we (or rather judges) can reach a rational decision in these cases despite this will be explored, where we will seek to show that this is possible. Although it may not seem so at first glance. To answer this question we will use analytic philosophy, in particular the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wilfrid Sellars and Robert B. Brandom, which we will support with the findings of cognitive science. We conclude with the implications of our investigation for law. We will see that it is very important that decisions be properly reasoned and that complex cases be decided by multiple judges who have different views on some issues, and we will also indicate why dissenting opinions are important and useful.
CS
Právní teoretikové či filosofové si všímají toho, že pokud hovoříme o interpretaci a aplikaci práva, pak svou roli, a to mnohdy nezanedbatelnou, hraje i morální uvažování. Například Pierluigi Chiassoni otevřeně přiznává, že v některých případech záleží na evaluaci soudce jako osoby, kterou z možných interpretací zvolí. Jak totiž víme, existuje několik interpretačních metod, na jejichž základě může interpret dospět v některých případech k různým závěrům. V takovém případě pak někdy hraje zásadní roli i morální hodnocení soudcem. Tato skutečnost nás může dovést k tomu, že bychom se měli i při diskuzích o interpretaci a aplikaci práva zabývat problematikou morálního uvažování a zdůvodňování. Potom, co bude stručně uvedeno, proč je otázka morálních intuic v právu relevantní, bude zkoumána otázka, zda i přes to můžeme (tedy spíše soudci) dospět v těchto případech k racionálnímu rozhodnutí. Budeme se snažit ukázat, že to možné je, byť se to tak na první pohled nemusí zdát. K tomu, abychom tuto otázku zodpověděli, využijeme analytickou filosofii, zejména filosofii Ludwiga Wittgensteina, Wilfrida Sellarse a Roberta B. Brandoma, kterou podpoříme poznatky kognitivní vědy. Na závěr uvedeme implikace tohoto našeho zkoumání pro právo. Uvidíme, že je velice důležité, aby byla rozhodnutí řádně odůvodněna a aby byly složité případy rozhodovány více soudci, kteří mají na některé otázky rozdílné názory, a rovněž uvedeme, proč jsou důležitá a užitečná odlišná stanoviska.
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