The current legal categorisation of animals as property has its historical roots in Roman Law. The long history of this status prompts one to wonder whether it reflects modern community attitudes. It is, however, difficult to answer this question, as there is a dearth of empirical data on attitudes towards the legal status of animals. In light of the widely-accepted relationship between law and community attitudes, particularly in democratic societies, this paper highlights the need for empirical examinations of social attitudes towards the legal status of animals. It is suggested that such empirical exercises can help scholars and lawmakers more accurately understand whether a change in the legal status of some or all animals is politically achievable. Empirical studies of community attitudes can also provide direction to scholars, who theorise legal frameworks to define the legal status of animals, and animal advocacy groups, which seek to educate the community about the legal status of animals.
While more than ever we are discussing animal rights and considering the possibility to extend the circle of our moral consideration, we are also more than ever inflicting suffering on more animals than in any time in history. This is especially the case for farm animals. This article aims to demonstrate that introducing animal-based measures into the legal system can be a practical and realistic step towards changing the familiar perspective of farm animals as mere commodities into the sentient beings they are. Currently, legislation on farm animals builds on what are called resource-based measures. These measures are not based on the animals but on their environment and the conditions in which the animals are living. They are very compatible with the legal system being relatively easy to assess, less subjective and highly repeatable. However, compliance with resource-based measures does not always mean good animal welfare, since these measures are generally considered to be less well correlated to the experiences of the animal. Animal-based measures, on the other hand, measure the state of the animal based on the actual animal, its behaviour (e.g. repetitive behaviour, human-animal relationship) and/or appearance (posture, facial expression, body condition). A change where laws on animals actually require looking at the animals has the potential to improve the relationship to the animals and is an essential shift towards farm animals being regarded as someone and not something. By acknowledging animals as whole sentient beings, we do not just see a complex system of ‘behaviours’ (e.g. walking), but first and foremost we see a “behaver”, a dynamic living being, whose movements are always meaningful and psychological expressive. In conclusion, animal-based measures force us to look at animals and recognize that they are able to feel pain, love, joy, loneliness and fear. Implementing animal-based measures for farm animals makes us, in a practical and realistic way, take those animals that are mostly considered as mere commodities, into our moral consideration, and unveils aspects of their sentience, which are currently hidden by the law.
Non-human entities exist on the borderline of moral concepts. Some philosophers and ethicists give them a strong moral status, while others denying them any kind of moral status at all. This disparity of thought gives rise to a philosophical question: what place should animals have in an acceptable moral system? The question of moral rights of non-human entities is an issue presented in philosophy from the beginning. This article is not giving the answer but want to present various ideas on that issue.
In this article the author undertakes the issues regarding „the animal studies” and the undertaken attempts to grant animals „the personal” rights pari passu the human rights. In this analysis he takes into account both the difficulties connected with the d definition of the ontological status of living beings, as well as the question of identity and the difference between animals and humans. Historical applications illustrate constant attempts to define the place of a human being among living beings. Finally, the author stands in the position that biology itself will not serve, nor will the ecological movements based on the idea of elimination of the unique status of a human being. The author favors the approach to the animal rights protection in accordance with the anthropocentric philosophy. A full understandingof the human being’s place in the world eliminates the attitude of mindless exploitation of nature and the actions resulting in ecological catastrophes. The proposals of the animal rightsprotection and natural environment protection voiced by Christian theologians and lawyers fit into the worldwide ecological aspirations.
This article explores the possibilities offered by theories of recognition and identity politics for a better understanding of religious – in this case, Christian – environmentalism. Insights related to recognition are gleaned from literature in ecological theology. Themes for further research and possibilities for practical adaptation are explored. It is argued that theories of recognition help to understand the dynamics related to processes where a certain group asks for more recognition of nature. Identity questions and developments in environmentalism are clarified by an understanding of what happens when partial recognition is granted. The role of mutuality as a basis for recognition is widened by Arto Laitinen’s proposal for recognition as “adequate regard” for something, i.e. for an ecosystem. The complex relations between humans and non-human nature are explored through such themes as reciprocity and the question of “voices” of nature. Creaturely difference and the role of seeing a “face” in nature are discussed in relation to recognition. The significance of place and environmental conditions for recognition are probed. Special attention is given to Andrew Dobson’s application of Nancy Frazer’s theory of transformative recognition to environmental matters, which offers new ways of understanding the role of non-human nature in politics, ethics and discussions on justice.
Metaphor can manifest itself in a variety of form including the visual one, which can be an extremely expressive means of communication. That is why visual metaphors are widely used by marketers and advertisers thus becoming a topical object of linguistic research programmes. The study of visual metaphor is tightly related to the study of conceptual metaphor as the target message delivered by a picture is derived from a certain source field that is employed for metaphorical representation. Another type of metaphor commonly used in visual representation is a multimodal metaphor. The present research dwells upon the study of metaphor use in animal rights protection advertisements. The hypothesis of the study is that visual metaphors present strong content that can activate emotions and contribute to the marketers’ desire to influence the audience.
The article seeks to evaluate the use of animals for educational and entertainment purposes in terms of theology and morality. After a synthetic presentation of the multifaceted concept of animal rights, an attempt is made to formulate, in an analogical way, an evaluation of the selected forms of using animals: from establishing zoological parks and organizing sports competitions to fights involving animals. Among those animal uses, the most serious objections are made to animal fights among animals themselves or against men, as they cause the suffering of living creatures that cannot be justified by a mere wish to provide entertainment for a specific social group.
The article concerns a new educational theory based on the idea of animal rights. It was presented and developed by the American ethicist Tom Regan, which drifted its axiological base and was the initiator of socio-educational movement called Animal Rights Movement, to which joined other ethicists, educators, layers, veterinarians, and even theologians. The article contains analysis of Tom Regan's views on the issue of moral status of non-human beings, and consists of two parts. The first part concerns the criticism of ethical theories based on the idea of direct and indirect moral duties to animals. In the second part are discussed the main concepts and principles of a new way of thinking such as: inherent value, a subject of a life criterion, the respect principle and its derivatives.
A special response to the various manifestations of posthumanistic idea may be the sense of scandal. It may be related to the lack of acceptance of the idea of non-human entity and therefore, its broad definition, and the act of inviting an entity to become creations of different ontological status. However, it appears that the scandal may have a reciprocal nature. Shocking may be both a definition formed from the anthropocentric point of view (for posthumanists) as well as from posthuman perspective, when followers of the rhetoric of openness to the “other” can manifest their disagreement over narrow vision of subjectivity. Thus the shape of the subject relations comes under an intensive discoursivisation in the sphere of social and cultural activity, which I would like to survey in this text. The article aims to show the intricate circumstances of a scandal that might arise in the discussion about subjectivity. I will demonstrate how scandal manifests itself within the three areas: interspecies relations, technological and information areas, by analyzing selected case studies within each of the areas.
In 2016, the South African Constitutional Court recognised that the guaranteed human right to the environment, as contained in the Constitution, includes animal welfare. In its judgment, the court stated that the suffering of individual animals is correctly linked to conservation and that this “illustrates the extent to which showing respect and concern for individual animals reinforces broader environmental protections. Animal welfare and animal conservation together reflect two intertwined values”. Although the effect of the statement by the highest court in the land is yet to be fully realised, the court unambiguously demonstrated in its ruling the clear link between human rights and animal interests. These interests are not only to be interpreted in the broad sense relating to species-conservation, but rather the interests and welfare of individual animals. Building on from this approach and the rationale provided by the court, this Paper looks to explore more broadly the interaction and linkages between human and animal rights and interests. More particularly, it attempts to illustrate how these concepts may reinforce and enrich one another and how this relationship may be better reflected in law and policy. It will argue that sophisticated democracies and movements require an integrational approach. By expanding the scope and interpretation of certain human rights to include animal interests; and through coordinated, targeted efforts – we ensure notion of justice is achieved, for all who require it.
Over the past decade, the fifty state legislatures of the United States have been adopting legislation for the benefit of the group of animals known as companion animals (pets). When considered together as a set, these laws create an initial set of legal rights for that group of animals. To explore that conclusion, the definition of a legal right and the particular statutes, such as new divorce laws, are considered.
Can western human society apply its definition of the term “animal” on itself? Is it possible that a “person” is not only human? In this article, I explore and analyze various and interdisciplinary doctrines and approaches towards nonhuman animals in order to question the current status-quo regarding nonhuman animals. Throughout history, as Man developed self-awareness and the ability to empathize with others, hunters were associated with wolves and began to domesticate them and other animals. With the introduction of different religions and beliefs into human society, Man was given the lead in the food chain, and the status of the nonhuman animals became objectified and subject of the property of human animals. Common modern taxonomy identified and described approximately 1.9 million different species. Some estimate the total number of species on earth in 8.7 million. The Human is just one of 5,416 other species in the Mammal class and shares a place of honour among hundreds of other Primates and Great Apes. It appears to be commonly and scientifically accepted that humans are animals. Humans, as other nonhuman animals, all meet the definitions of the term. However, it seems that there is a wide gap between the human-generated definitions (HGDs) and the human social practice that created a distinct line between humans and “animals”. This alienation is best illustrated by the commonly mistaken equivalence between the terms “human” and “person”, as at least some nonhuman animals answer to many other HGDs. In this article I try to show that a rational and logical interpretation of these definitions’ nonhuman animals (at least some), should be regarded as persons and to suggest an approach to implement in the future.
Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1860–1935) was one of the most productive American writers of the turn of the century. She was an author of novels, short stories, non-fiction essays and poems, well known as an activist fighting for women's rights and a precursor of feminism. Gilman proposed a redefinition of the roles in domestic life and society, with women taking more prominence. The writer rejected the male dominant role prevailing in patriarchal society and supported other emancipation movements. Using the affinity of man and animals, Gilman initiated an ecofeminist discourse by presenting a different vision, and proposing new views on the assumptions that underpin her contemporary culture. In her feminist work on the equality of women, Gilman has repeatedly drawn attention to the overt display of cruelty against animals. While addressing their rights and freedoms, the writer emphasized the similarities between women and animals in the patriarchal system, both being treated in subhuman disregard against the privileged position of men. However, her attitude towards animals is not precise and the writer repeatedly formulates conclusions that are surprisingly contradictory to her own views. In her utopian novels, the writer emphasized the potential threat from animals to humans and even questioned the animals’ overall significance. Gilman's views often clash with veiled anthropocentrism, and her ambivalent attitude to the issue of human-animal dependencies makes it impossible to reduce her views to one particular attitude. Her radical feminist views, focused primarily on women's empowerment and the fight against patriarchy, aimed for the overall transformation of society. However, the lack of consistency in Gilman’s views is also manifested in her ambivalent attitude to the overall issue of equality. As she focused on improving the situation of women, Gilman simultaneously ignored the problems of other marginalized social groups, with an undercurrent of racism, class prejudice and xenophobia showing through her writings.
The discussion about the rights of animals is always up-to-date. The dichotomy division into philoanimalists and philohominists, although reasonable, is not satisfactory to everyone. It is too strongly associated with the division into people and things in Roman law. To avoid this association in the context of biocentric trends in ecological ethics, accomplishments of evolutionary psychology and the concept of animal welfare, it is suggested that a third moral dimension dealing with creatures with highly developed nervous system be introduced between moral objectivity of creatures with high perception and moral subjectivity of people - creatures characterized by self-awareness and reflexive awareness. Human beings on the one hand are responsible for recognizing their rights given by nature and on the other hand, they are obliged to create a law to protect themselves.
The paper reviews the recent book edited by Dorota Probucka, entitled The Ethical Condemnation of Hunting (in Polish: Etyczne potępienie myślistwa), Universitas Press, Kraków 2020, pp. 426. Probucka is one of the most prominent Polish experts in animal studies, especially in applied ethics and the field of animal rights (e.g., Probucka 2018a, 2018b, 2017). The discussed monograph encompasses the contributions of 19 authors representing 9 universities from Poland and abroad. Their core issue of consideration was the topical problem of hunting, examined from various perspectives: ethical and legal, psychological, social and cultural, both on the theoretical level and in relation to the practice of hunting. This review focuses on the core arguments against hunting and discusses them in detail.The Ethics in Progress journal had the honour of contributing to the media patronage of Dorota Probucka’s et al. edition.
The problem of the moral status of animals holds an important place in contemporaryethical debates. Usually the intensity of ongoing discussions focuses on sentience(the ability to sense pain and/or pleasure) as criterion of moral status, which wasfirst introduced by Peter Singer. This article aims to show difficulties in his understandingof moral status like the argument of substitutability. It also supplementsutilitarian arguments on behalf of the animal’s interest with the notion of potentialityand postulate that the moral status should not only be attributed to the beingsthat are currently capable of feeling pain and/or pleasure, but also: 1) to beingswho currently do not have this capacity but are in the process of its development (eg. fetus), 2) beings that temporarily lack this characteristic they once had, but willregain at some point in the future (eg. human/animal in a coma), and 3) consciousbeings that are not capable of feeling pain (eg. patients with congenital analgesia)but that meet other morally relevant criteria (they are self-conscious, they are partof the family). This introduced viewpoint recognizes our obligation to not causeany suffering in animals (unless absolutely necessary) but also that in the majorityof the cases killing them should not take place.
In this paper, I present Christine Korsgaard’s style of building a conception of animal rights protection based on a concept of Kantian provenance, namely “end in itself”. Considering that an end in itself in Immanuel Kant’s philosophy includes only human beings, the American philosopher needed to modify (extend) the meaning of the abovementioned concept. This study aims at showing this change of the meaning in categories derived from Fregean semantics (sense and reference). Moreover, I will attempt to prove that by broadening the extension of “end in itself” Korsgaard uses a strategy called ethical extensionism and situates the revised (naturalized) categorical imperative ipso facto within environmental ethics. I start with elucidating Korsgaard’s views on the meaning of “end in itself” before she took interest in animal rights (set out mainly in Kant’s Formula of Humanity and The Sources of Normativity) and then I synthetically describe her animal rights philosophy with a special regard to the category of “natural good”. The second part of the article explains the methodology used in the paper, while the last part is intended to be an interpretation of Korsgaard’s thought.
The article deals with the analysis of animals’ legal status via examples of Polish and Ukrainian legislation. The examples of inaccurate usage of legal terminology is this sphere (concerning subjects and objects) are analyzed. Legislative attempts to assign the status of subjects of law to animals in Ukraine and Poland are discovered. Remarkable examples from world judicial practice are revealed. Historical parallels are shown. Conclusion of possible solutions taking into account present understanding of nature of law and the aim of proposed changes in legal regulation is made.
PL
W artykule przeprowadzono analizę statusu prawnego zwierząt w ustawodawstwie ukraińskim i polskim. uwzględniono przypadki niewłaściwego posługiwania się terminologią prawniczą w zakresie rozgraniczenia pojęć przedmiotu i podmiotu prawa. Podkreślono, że w obu porządkach prawnych ustawodawca przyjmuje rozwiązania zmierzające do nadania zwierzęciu statusu podmiotu prawa. na tle powyższych rozważań przedstawiono możliwości rozwiązań tego problemu, biorąc pod uwagę charakter prawa i cel przyznania zwierzętom statusu podmiotu prawa. W opracowaniu zamieszczono także analizę adekwatnych dla podjętego tematu przykładów pochodzących z innych porządków prawnych oraz badania prawno-porównawcze w perspektywie historycznej.
The aim of the article is to reflect on the issue of shechita slaughter and regulations by law concerning it. After a synthetic presentation of the right to freedom of religion and the animal rights in the analogous meaning (I.) the principles are discussed of shechita slaughter and its two forms are distinguished: traditional and industrial (II.). The article is concluded with a moral assessment of the law that is binding in the Republic of Poland (III.). It is stated that introducing a ban on slaughter on an industrial scale, with at the same time ensuring the possibility of getting meat for their own use for religious communities does not infringe the fundamental right to freedom of religion and satisfies the demands of protection of animals.
PL
Celem artykułu jest podjęcie teologicznomoralnej refleksji nad zagadnieniem uboju rytualnego i dotyczących jego regulacji prawnych. Po syntetycznym przedstawieniu prawa do wolności religijnej oraz praw zwierząt w sensie analogicznym (I), dokonano omówienia zasad prowadzenia uboju rytualnego i wyróżniono jego dwie formy: tradycyjną i przemysłową (II). Zwieńczeniem jest moralna ocena obowiązującego obecnie na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej prawa (III). Stwierdzono, że wprowadzenie zakazu uboju na skalę przemysłową, przy równoczesnym zapewnieniu wspólnotom wyznaniowym możliwości pozyskiwania mięsa na własny użytek, nie stanowi naruszenia fundamentalnego prawa do wolności religijnej i odpowiada słusznym postulatom ochrony zwierząt.
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