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The relationship between natural and statutory law in ancient and medieval conceptions

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Maciejewski M.

Opolskie Studia Administracyjno-Prawne

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2014

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vol. XII

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issue 3

101-115

EN

The author presents the process of formation of the relation between natural law (lex naturalis) and codified law (ius civile) in the European political and legal concepts in a antiquity and in the Middle Ages. In the article, he submits for particular analysis views held by sophists, Aristotle, stoics, St. Augustine of Hippo and St. Thomas Aquinas, in order to point to regularities relating to this problem area on their basis. In the course of the studies, he comes to the conclusion that in the period under analysis, there dominated the conviction that law codified by the state authority (positive law) ought not to be inconsistent with natural law (and sometimes even with divine law) as a higher legal order. Codified law witch is incompatible with this higher law was generally considered not to have the power of being in force and for this reason not to understood as a virtue ordering to give everybody they due – were to result simply from natural law. To Christian thinker, the creator of those rules was the very God himself and therefore the law which came from him was placed by them the highest within the system of legal norms. They regarded natural law as a reflection of it. In turn, human-made law should reflect principles of natural law. It is only in the case of such an agreement within the hierarchy of legal systems that a harmony of social and political relations was possible.

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Ius et lex, czyli rozważania świętego Tomasza z Akwinu nad prawem

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Łuszczyńska M.

Rocznik Tomistyczny

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2023

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vol. 2

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issue 12

129-147

EN

The purpose of this article is to analyse the legal doctrine of St Thomas Aquinas in the context of law understood as ius and legal standards taken as lex. The term ius indicates the subjective character of law and thus refers to norms that define the right(s) of a given subject in relation to a given thing or the right(s) of that subject to act in a certain way. Law in the lex sense is the text of a normative act. Lex verbalises a pattern of behaviour consistent with natural law. This brings us to the issue of the binding force of law. The nominal definition of law taken as lex is analysed. The characteristic feature of Thomas Aquinas’s legal doctrine is rationalism. Furthermore, the legal doctrine is characterised by a clearly defined objective of the common good. Law is presented in the article as a guarantor of social order. Its educational function is pointed out. The legal doctrine of Thomas of Aquino focuses on the process of lawmaking and the validity of law. The aspect of the application of legal norms is of lesser importance in the context of the article’s subject matter. It is inextricably linked to the problem of authority.

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Czesława Martyniaka krytyka normatywizmu Hansa Kelsena

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Stochmal M. P.

Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica

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2020

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vol. 19

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issue 2

97-118

EN

The article aims to present a critique of Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law by Czesław Martyniak and to present a “positive’ solution. Martyniak reduced his criticism of Kelsen’s normativism to three issues: 1) the uniformity of its philosophical foundations, 2) the force of applicable law, and 3) natural law. Martyniak’s critique of Kelsen’s concept of law shows two extremely different attitudes regarding the separation of the sphere of being and duty in the field of law made by I. Kant. Kelsen is an extreme supporter of the separation of Sein and Sollen, while Martyniak, on the contrary, assumes the coexistence and connection of these spheres. According to Martyniak, a mutual separation of the spheres of being and duty results with many absurd consequences on the basis of law and its theory. Martyniak’s critique of normativism remains close to Thomistic doctrine and is clearly inspired by the thoughts of Thomas Aquinas. However, it should be considered as a creative adaptation of Thomas ideas. It is debatable to what extent Czesław Martyniak’s criticism of Kelsen’s normativism is only of a historical value or could be considered timeless. It probably depends on the importance and “eternity” of the problems we take under our consideration, moreover, whether one is capable to work out their original solutions.

PL

Artykuł ma na celu przedstawienie krytyki czystej teorii prawa Hansa Kelsena dokonaną przez Czesława Martyniaka i zaprezentowanie “pozytywnego” rozwiązania. Martyniak sprowadził krytykę normatywizmu Kelsena do trzech kwestii: 1) jednolitości jego podstaw filozoficznych; 2) mocy obowiązującej prawa i 3) prawa naturalnego. Krytyka koncepcji prawa Kelsena przeprowadzona przez Martyniaka jest starciem się dwu stanowisk odnośnie Kantowskiego rozdziału sfery bytu i powinności w dziedzinie prawa. Kelsen jest skrajnym zwolennikiem rozdziału Sein i Sollen, natomiast Martyniak wprost przeciwnie: afirmuje współistnienie i łączność tych sfer. Opowiedzenie się za wzajemną separacją sfery bytu i powinności rodzi – wg Martyniaka – wiele absurdalnych konsekwencji na gruncie prawa i jego teorii. Krytyka normatywizmu przebiega po linii tomistycznej. Martyniak jest wyraźnie inspirowany myślą Tomasza z Akwinu, ale jest to jej twórcza adaptacja. Po przeprowadzeniu krytyki Martyniak proponuje “tomistyczne” rozwiązanie kwestii: mocy obowiązującej prawa i prawa naturalnego. Ta propozycja Martyniaka dopełnia krytykę. Jest dyskusyjne na ile krytyka normatywizmu Hansa Kelsena dokonana przez Czasława Martyniaka ma walor tylko historyczny, a na ile ponadczasowy. Zależy to chyba od wagi stawianych problemów i ich “odwieczności” oraz niebanalnych rozwiązań.

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The relationship between natural and statutory law in ancient and medieval conceptions

Ius et lex, czyli rozważania świętego Tomasza z Akwinu nad prawem

Czesława Martyniaka krytyka normatywizmu Hansa Kelsena