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Crítica de la mentira emotiva

100%

Vera Vega P.

Forum for Contemporary Issues in Language and Literature

2022

issue 3

29-42

Una de las facetas más relevantes de nuestro presente es el supuesto auge de la posverdad. Sin comprometernos con su existencia, podemos, desde la Filosofía, pensar, como mínimo, alguna de sus facetas. Y la faceta que sobre la que aquí reflexionaremos es la de la posverdad como mentira emotiva. Sin embargo, dado que “mentira emotiva” intuitivamente significa poco, justificaré que lo que la mentira emotiva privilegiadamente significa puede deducir de la teoría filosófica de la bullshit a partir del desarrollo de (1) la carga emocional que puede implicar la bullshit, (2) la clarificación de los requisitos de la institución de la aserción, y (3) la transición coerente del bullshitter al bullshitee.

One of the most relevant facets of our time is the supposed rise of post–truth. Without committing ourselves to its existence, we can, from Philosophy, think, at least, about some of its facets. And the facet that we will reflect on here is that of post–truth as an emotional lie. However, given that "emotional lying" meaning is not clear, I will justify that what emotional lying privilegedly means can be deduced from the philosophical theory of bullshit. That deduction comes from the development of (1) the emotion which bullshit can imply, (2) the clarification of the requirements of the institution of the assertion, and (3) the coherent transition from bullshitter to bullshitee.

O współczesnych problemach z prawdą. Refleksje w świetle eseju Harry’ego G. Frankfurta O wciskaniu kitu (On Bullshit)

62%

Warzyński S.

Collectanea Theologica

2017

vol. 87

issue 3

135-162

This article is an attempt to present one of the vital features of modernculture, namely indifference to truth. In the context of proclaiming the expression “post-truth” the Word of the Year 2016, the author shows how thismodern indifference should be understood. It is explained by recalling theessay of Harry G. Frankfurt entitled On Bullshit. This short text presentsa certain characteristic trait of modern times, that is, a certain attitudeto truth typical of the contemporary man. What is interesting is that it isconvergent with the meaning of the very expression that has recently madesuch a spectacular career and became the Word of the Year.In the first part of the article the author presents the history of the term“post-truth”, its basic meaning and the context in which it was created andis now used. The term “bullshit” is then treated in a similar way. In the thirdpart of the article the main thoughts of Frankfurt’s essay are referred to. It ispointed out that this short essay, written already in the 1980s, proves to bestill valid up until today. For in his essay Frankfurt does not describe anypolitical reality, social or medial one, saturated with dishonesty, disinformation, lies and manipulation. He does not attempt to present various types of examples of “bullshit”. Instead, as befits a philosopher, he goes deeper and attempts to reach the essence of this phenomenon. In this way he draws an unusually accurate image of the modern man for whom truth has lost its significance, for whom there has grown between truth and lies – contrary to any logic – a whole sphere of bullshit, or otherwise post-truth. In the fourth part of the article the author points out the sources of such a situation. He talks about the rejection of the realistic, classical way of understanding truth and, in relation to it, about turning away from reality, that is from facts.In the last part the author explains that in modern times in place ofreality (as an important point of reference) the criterion of coherence anddemocratic consensus has been introduced, or – what fits well into theculture of “bullshit” – the criterion of practicality and usefulness. Insteadof thinking in terms of objective order, it is therefore proposed that oneshould think and act in terms of subjectively perceived advantages. At thispoint the author refers to Richard Rorty’s philosophical conception andshows that Rorty’s end of philosophy, the abandonment of the search forthe ultimate foundations of cognition, for the discovery of truth, for thedominant idea of „contingency” and usefulness, and his „language games”are all excellent illustrations of what a man of the era of post-truth, the eraof indifference to truth, nourishes.

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1 Collectanea Theologica

1 Forum for Contemporary Issues in Language and Literature

1 Vera Vega P.

1 Warzyński S.

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Crítica de la mentira emotiva

O współczesnych problemach z prawdą. Refleksje w świetle eseju Harry’ego G. Frankfurta O wciskaniu kitu (On Bullshit)