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Defining Death: Beyond Biology

100%
Lizza J. P.
Diametros
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2018
|
issue 55
1-19
EN
The debate over whether brain death is death has focused on whether individuals who have sustained total brain failure have satisfied the biological definition of death as “the irreversible loss of the integration of the organism as a whole.” In this paper, I argue that what it means for an organism to be integrated “as a whole” is undefined and vague in the views of those who attempt to define death as the irreversible loss of the integration of the organism as a whole. I show how what it means for a living thing to be integrated as a whole depends on the sortal (kind) concept by which it is identified. Since interests, values, and ontological considerations besides strictly biological ones affect the concepts by which we individuate and identify living things, those non-biological considerations have a bearing on what it means for a particular kind of living thing to exist as a whole and thus what it means for one of us to die. Even if our bodies may remain organically integrated in some sense despite total brain failure, this fact should not lead us to reject brain death as death. Artificially sustained brain-dead human bodies are not human beings, but the remains of them. While such bodies may be alive in some sense, they are not human beings or human persons. They are not one of us.
2
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What Does a Definition of Death Do?

100%
Specker Sullivan L.
Diametros
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2018
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issue 55
63-67
EN
In his article, “Defining Death: Beyond Biology,” John Lizza argues in favor of a civil definition of death, according to which the potential for consciousness and social interaction marks us as the “kind of being that we are.” In this commentary, I critically discuss this approach to the bioethical debate on the definition of death. I question whether Lizza’s account is based on a full recognition of the “practical, moral, religious, philosophical, and cultural considerations” at play in this debate. I further propose that a truly ethical debate on definitions of death ought to concentrate on how different definitions of death are used in diverse contexts – what definitions of death do – and focus less on who has the right definition of death for all situations.
3
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A Biological Theory of Death: Characterization, Justification, and Implications

88%
Nair-Collins M.
Diametros
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2018
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issue 55
27-43
EN
John P. Lizza has long been a major figure in the scholarly literature on criteria for death. His searching and penetrating critiques of the dominant biological paradigm, and his defense of a theory of death of the person as a psychophysical entity, have both significantly advanced the literature. In this special issue, Lizza reinforces his critiques of a strictly biological approach. In my commentary, I take up Lizza’s challenge regarding a biological concept of death. He is certainly right to point out that science is not value-free; however, this does not imply that there cannot be a characterization of biological death that can be shown to be superior to other concepts. After characterizing and justifying such a theory of biological death, I show that patients who meet the diagnostic criteria for brain death are unequivocally biologically alive. However, with respect to concepts of personhood and related ideas (as opposed to biology), I urge the acceptance of a pluralism of such concepts for matters of public policy.
4
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In Defense of Brain Death: Replies to Don Marquis, Michael Nair-Collins, Doyen Nguyen, and Laura Specker Sullivan

63%
Lizza J. P.
Diametros
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2018
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issue 55
68-90
EN
In this paper, I defend brain death as a criterion for determining death against objections raised by Don Marquis, Michael Nair-Collins, Doyen Nguyen, and Laura Specker Sullivan. I argue that any definition of death for beings like us relies on some sortal concept by which we are individuated and identified and that the choice of that concept in a practical context is not determined by strictly biological considerations but involves metaphysical, moral, social, and cultural considerations. This view supports acceptance of a more pluralistic legal definition of death as well as acceptance of brain death as death.
5
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Biologiczna definicja śmierci

63%
Bombik M.
Studia Ecologiae et Bioethicae
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2009
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vol. 7
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issue 2
19-29
DE
In dem Ausatz geht es um die biologischen Todesbegrife, die der Rafael Ferber in dem Buch: Philosophische Grundbegrife, Band 2, Kapitel V: Tod, München 2003, 197-227, behandelt. Die biologische Definition des Todes, die von August Weismann stammt. bildet einen Ausgangspunkt zu weiteren Űberlegungen dieses Problems. Es wurde fest betont der Unterschied zwischen einer Todesdefinition und den Todeskriterien, die in der Medizin, als einer praktischen Disziplin, wichtige Rolle spielen. Man hat herasgehebt folgende Todeskriterien: 1. Herztod, 2. Hirntod, 2.1. Ganzhirntod, 2.2. Teilhirntod und 3. Testverfahren – ob die Kriterien erfüllt sind. Die Todeskrieterien kann man auch in einer formaler Gestalt, als eine Operationsdefinition darstellen. Entscheidend ist an den Bestimmungen des Todeskriteriums, daβ das Eintreten des menschlichen Todes heute auf einer Festsetzung beruht. Deshalb ist in der Gegenwart das Eintreten des Todes häufig keine natürliche oder reale Tatsache mehr, sondern eine institutionelle Tatsache, die durch semantischen Regeln konstituiert wurde. Die biologische Todesdefinition ist keine Menschentodesdefinition.
6
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Problemy etyczne transplantologii. Perspektywa niedoboru narządów do przeszczepu

38%
Nowak P. G.
Diametros
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2014
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issue 42
150-177
PL
Artykuł stanowi krytyczne omówienie polskiej literatury bioetycznej dotyczącej niedoboru narządów do przeszczepu. Problemy związane z tym zagadnieniem w znacznej mierze wiążą się z próbą odpowiedzi na pytanie, jak zwiększyć liczbę dostępnych narządów w etycznie aprobowany sposób. Uwaga polskich autorów skoncentrowała się w tym względzie na analizie oraz ocenie dwóch rozwiązań – systemu pozyskiwania narządów opartego na regulacji sprzeciwu oraz systemu, który dopuszcza rynkowe pozyskiwanie narządów. Obydwa rozwiązania spotkały się z niemalże jednogłośną negatywną oceną. Poza przedstawieniem oraz krytyką stanowiska polskich bioetyków w tej sprawie ważną część tekstu stanowi sprawozdanie z krajowej debaty dotyczącej kryteriów i definicji śmierci – jedynie od martwych dawców można pobierać nieparzyste narządy, takie jak serce. Czytelnik będzie miał możliwość zapoznania się z różnymi propozycjami definicji śmierci, których zastosowanie może wpłynąć na liczbę dostępnych narządów. Poza przeglądem polskiej literatury, w tekście można znaleźć także krótką prezentację najważniejszych zagranicznych publikacji dotyczących zagadnienia niedoboru narządów.
EN
The article provides a critical overview of the Polish bioethics literature concerning the shortage of organs for transplantation. Problems related to this issue bear, to a considerable degree, on the attempt to answer the question how to increase the number of organs available in ethically acceptable ways. Polish authors have focused, in this respect, on the analysis and assessment of two solutions: an opt out system of acquiring organs and a system that allows the aquisition of organs on a “free market”. Both solutions have been almost unanimously negatively assessed. Apart from the presentation and critique of the positions of Polish bioethicists on this matter, an important part of the text is constituted by a report from a debate, held at the national level, on the criteria and definition of death: for it is only from the deceased donors that unpaired bodily organs, such as heart, can be taken.
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