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EN
Autobiographic writing about the experience of illness is becoming increas- ingly popular in English-language literature. Among many subjects addressed in patographies, the origin and treatment of mental disorders is a recurrent theme. Authors who have received a psychiatric diagnosis analyse the nature of their men- tal suffering, attributing it to biology, upbringing, traumatic life events or cultural stressors. Their opinions make an important contribution to contemporary discus- sions about mental health issues, gender roles and medicalisation of everyday life. The aim of this article is to present various approaches to mental illness and the brain-mind dichotomy voiced in many narratives. Although contemporary psychiatry tends to see mental disorders as brain diseases, some patients find this view reductionist as it robs them of agency. Others, on the other hand, support the biomedical model of madness and seem fascinated with neurological and bio- chemical explanations of their own moods and emotions. The third group com- prises individuals who try to find an eclectic explanation, combining biology and socio-cultural factors.
PL
In this article, I am examining the role of categorization in understanding. The problem arises from well-known distinction between explanation and understanding, which has been for a century pursued in hermeneutic tradition. Categorization belongs to explanatory endeavor and its role in understanding is unclear. In order to delimit the scope of inquiry I am focusing on the weakest kind of categorization, so called categorization ad hoc. I am examining the hypothesis to the effect that categorization plays its role in hermeneutic circle as some sort of pre-understanding. Eventually, however, I reject this hypothesis. It is because it leads to hermeneutic paradox: The notion of pre-understanding has a meaning only in the context of full-fledged understanding, which is an unattainable ideal. Such ideal cannot be used as a personal criterion of the quality of one’s understanding. There is a tension between the feeling of understanding and the scarcity of personal means to justify this feeling. I am suggesting that similar, albeit weaker effect occurs also in more elaborate, scientific categorizations. What is really wrong in the passage from categorization to understanding is some form of self-understanding: We do not know whether we understand better, or at all when we put some categorical order onto our experience. We do not seem to have the required meta-understanding.
EN
Actor-Network Theory has proven to be highly successful, fulfilling much of its early theoretical and methodological promise. Proponents of ANT have argued, among other things, that an acceptance of the specific (techno-)social ontology which assumes consistent relativity of beings and anti-essentialism will enable us to address the aporia that are haunting sociology. The authors argue that, sociological applications of ANT (at least as regards the dominant understanding of the theory) result in a lowbrow methodology leading to a radical cognitive limitation of the discipline. The text finishes with an attempt to sketch an alternative version of ANT, one with a positivistic inclination opening the path for synthetic sociology.
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Normatywne i empiryczne teorie demokracji

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EN
The phenomenon of democracy may be considered either as some desired political project or some kind of political reality. This paper focuses on normative and empirical theories of democracy. They are both essential in the research of it. The main task of normative theories is to deliver the vision of political system based on such values as liberty, equality and dignity of individuals, protecting civil and political freedoms, and making the government accountable to the citizens. Empirical theories describe and explain the mechanisms of such a systems. Without normative theories we lack the knowledge about how should democracy function. Without empirical theories we do not know how and why does it really work. What we really need in order to understand democracy is the uniting of both approaches.
EN
This paper is offered in commemoration of Prof. Edmund Gussmann, who passed away sadly and unexpectedly just a few short weeks before the 41st Poznań Linguistic Meeting, where the paper was presented. The PLM session, Competing Explanations in Phonology, was the type of gathering at which Prof. Gussmann would thrive, advancing his strong theoretical position that phonetics is irrelevant for phonological theory (Gussmann 2004). Prof. Gussmann argued for this view in an animated and sometimes provocative manner, but he always did so with charm and good nature. My own views on the role of speech in phonology differ sharply from Prof. Gussmann's. I am nevertheless quite grateful for his perspective, which has indeed changed the way I think of speech. Under the influence of Government Phonology, I have adopted a phonological view of the acoustic signal, which seeks to challenge phoneticians with new hypotheses about the way speech interacts with grammar. This paper explicates this perspective, and applies it to a recent case, cue vs. prosodic licensing, in which "phonetic" and "phonological" explanations seemed to be at an impasse. Thanks in part to Prof. Gussmann's strong theoretical position, I have developed a new theory of constituency that offers a vehicle with which we may reconcile competing views on the underpinnings of phonological licensing.
EN
Fundamental methodological problems of geography as a science have been identified by Chojnicki (1999) in the following list: goal of research, separate character of research, expected results, and form of scientific explanation. This article presents methodological standpoints taken be landscape geographers towards the above problems, which proved to be as diverse as in the case of the human geography. The article highlights negative consequences of such state of affairs.
EN
The aim of this article is to explain the presence of prescriptions on the appropriate application of prescriptions in legal texts. I uphold the thesis – submitted many years ago by Józef Nowacki – that if there are two prescriptions resembling one another, one of them can be substituted by the prescription on the appropriate application of prescription. It is necessary to distinguish between the prescription on the appropriate application of prescription and the prescription on the application of prescription. The former is the effect of the condensation of norms, the latter is the result of the fragmentation of a norm. But in many respects these two sorts of prescriptions are similar.
PL
Celem artykułu jest wyjaśnienie obecności przepisów o odpowiednim stosowaniu przepisów w aktach prawodawczych. Bazuję na – wysuniętej wiele lat temu przez Józefa Nowackiego – tezie, że jeśli są dwa zasadniczo podobne do siebie przepisy, to jeden z nich może być zastąpiony przepisem o odpowiednim stosowaniu drugiego. Od przepisu o odpowiednim stosowaniu przepisu trzeba odróżnić przepis o stosowaniu przepisu. O ile bowiem pierwszy jest efektem kondensowania przepisów, o tyle drugi stanowi rezultat rozczłonkowywania przepisu. Jednakże pod wieloma względami oba te rodzaje przepisów są wzajem podobne.
Human Affairs
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2010
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vol. 20
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issue 3
203-209
EN
Recent advances in neuroscience have dramatically improved our understanding of human emotional states. With the help of new technologies and models, scholars are beginning to unravel the "mystery" of emotional life. Confusions in contemporary emotion studies are due to the traditional model of a person as a rational conscious agent. The paper highlights two problematic aspects of this prevailing model: the relation between emotion and reason and the relation between emotion and consciousness. Firstly, it is claimed that the difference between emotions and thoughts does not transcend their mutual interconnectivity. Secondly, conscious content and emotional responses are both products of specialized emotion systems that operate unconsciously. Both claims are supported by experimental findings and clinical practice.
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EN
This paper deals with exchanges and misunderstandings between the German school of social history (most prominently represented by scholars from the University of Bielefeld (such as Hans-Ulrich Wehler) and Anglo-American trends in historical sociology (exemplified by the works of Barrington Moore, Theda Skocpol and Michael Mann). The social historians tended to dismiss historical sociology as too dependent on modernization theory, without taking into account the critique of that tradition by authors who brought processes of state formation and revolutionary change into the debate. On the other side, mainstream historical sociology worked with assumptions that limited its ability to change the terms and directions of sociological discourse, and to assimilate lessons from history. Among these inbuilt biases, organizational realism and materialism - particularly pronounced in the work of Michael Mann - stand out as particularly important. The paper closes with arguments in favour of bringing more history into historical sociology, with particular emphasis on three sets of problems. There is a need for more historical approaches to differentiation, less dependent on functionalist premises than the hitherto prevalent paradigm. A more explicit thematization of temporality in history and society would, among other things, help to clarify issues linked to the notion of path dependency. Finally, a reconsideration of the models and types of explanation in historical sociology would place more emphasis on their interpretive dimension.
EN
All who teach logic are familiar with informal fallacies such as ad ignorantium (appeal to ignorance) and ad populum (appeal to popularity). While it is easy to give clear examples of poor reasoning of this sort, instructors are also cognizant of what might be called “exceptions”: when it is legitimate to appeal to popularity or to an absence of evidence. The view I defend here is that appeals to popularity and ignorance (and some other fallacies) should best be viewed as instances of abductive reasoning, or inferences to the best explanation. Thus, determinations of whether these types of arguments are good ones will rest on the criteria that determine good reasoning for abductive arguments generally.
EN
Applying external scientific knowledge - i.e. knowledge achieved in the field of disciplines and sub-disciplines related to political science - in fulfiling such methodological functions as explanation and prevision (forecasting) is frequently approached in meta-scientific and meta-theoretical considerations as conducted on the ground of the family of scientific disciplines constituted by the sciences of politics. These functions can be ascribed to the purely epistemological aspect of scientific activity, not its institutional and organizational aspects. The dispute regarding the explanatory autonomy of political science is fallacious. From the logical and methodological point of view, the institutional “affiliation” of object knowledge, which constitutes a premise in complex inferences, does not play a role in the fulfilment of the assumed cognitive tasks; what is important instead is its epistemological credibility, as well as the goals of the research strategy selected by a given scholar.
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Superweniencja psychofizyczna

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EN
The aim of this article is two-fold. First, a critical presentation of the concept of supervenience is carried out. In this context, three basic types of supervenience are presented: weak, strong, and global. It is argued that the most useful types of supervenience are its strong, and global versions. Second, a broader analysis of the usefulness of supervenience is undertaken. It is argued that it is a very „flexible” concept, which allows for a variety of different solutions to the philosophical issue of the mind. However, the aforementioned flexibility can be limited by additional philosophical assumptions. Moreover, supervenience allows to augment traditional philosophical investigations concerning the mind with results of empirical findings of such sciences as psychology, or neuroscience. In this context it is argued that supervenience is a „third way” in the philosophical study of the mind.
EN
Presented article offers a general overview of the interpretive approaches in the social and political sciences. The article starts with the definitions and etymology of the term “interpretation” and its synonyms. In the section 1 the author refers to the interpretive methodology of Max Weber and its actuality in the academic disciplines such as ethnography, sociology, history and law. The section 3 explains the usefulness of interpretive methods in doing research within a qualitative methodology in the social and political sciences. Sections 4 and 5 describe the nature of relations between interpretation, understanding and explanation. The last section brings attention on the application of interpretive methodology in the political science and political theory. Instead of a summary the author shares a reflection on the condition of science and a future of interpretative studies.
PL
Celem niniejszego artykułu jest wprowadzenie do teorii interpretacyjnej, próba zarysowania głównych zagadnień i problemów, jakie nasuwa podejście interpretacyjne w naukach społecznych i politycznych. Do głównych zagadnień analizowanych w artykule należą kolejno: kwestie definicyjne, weberowska tradycja metodologiczna, metoda interpretacyjna w badaniach jakościowych, natura relacji między interpretacją a rozumieniem i wyjaśnianiem, znaczenie podejścia interpretacyjnego w nauce o polityce i teorii polityki. Autor podejmuje próbę ustalenia definicji i etymologii pojęcia „interpretacja”, sytuuje je w rodzinie terminów pokrewnych, rozważa istotny problem naukowego statusu badań interpretacyjnych. Wskazuje także czynniki, które mogą się przyczynić do podniesienia efektywności badań interpretacyjnych w procesach wyjaśniania i zrozumienia działań społecznych i politycznych. W zakończeniu sygnalizuje wyzwania stojące przed nauką, dostrzega w nich pole badawcze dla analizy interpretacyjnej.
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Wyjaśnianie powstawania norm

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PL
Powstawanie norm ludzkiego postępowania (obyczajowych i moralnych) wyjaśniają różne modele oparte na założeniu ludzkiej racjonalności. W XX wieku w wyniku rozwoju teorii gier, model wyjaśniania zwany dylematem więźnia zyskał wielu zwolenników (Buchanan, Gauthier, Harsanyi, Nozick, Rawls, Ullmann-Margalit). Jednak pogłębione dociekania pokazują, że zastosowanie dylematu więźnia napotyka na ograniczenia (Ullmann-Margalit, de Jasay), ponieważ matryce dylematu więźnia są zdeterminowane przez normy powstałe w sposób odmienny. W artykule uzasadniane jest stanowisko, wedle którego normy determinujące ludzkie postępowanie mają charakter trójwarstwowy: normy pierwszego rzędu, czyli normy racjonalności, determinujące schematy racjonalnych wyborów w sytuacjach niepewności (dobór zachowań ze względu na cel), utrwalone w procesie ewolucyjnej selekcji grupowej, normy drugiego rzędu - moralne, powstałe w wyniku utrwalania schematów działań (wyborów) opartych na dylemacie więźnia, oraz normy trzeciego rzędu, bazujące na dwóch poprzednich, a utrwalone przez proces selekcji grupowej i krytyczną analizę ich treści i skutków.
EN
Since the second half of the 20th century, the game theory, and particularly the Prisoner's Dilemma, has been widely used to explain the emergence of norms (Buchanan, Gauthier, Harsanyi, Nozick, Rawls, Ullmann-Margalit). Nevertheless, in light of deeper analyses, it has been demonstrated that the Prisoner's Dilemma is not enough, since its matrix itself is determined by norms which could not be explained in its own terms (Ullmann-Margalit, de Jasay). Following E. Ullmann-Margalit, the author argues that the explanation of norms involves three normative levels: norms of rational decision making, solidified in the process of group selection; moral norms based on the action patterns determined by the rational decision making of the Prisoner's Dilemma structure; and finally norms designed and selected in the process of group selection and critical assessment of their meaning and consequences.
Turyzm
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2019
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vol. 29
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issue 2
1-18
EN
The article presents the essence as well as various models of academic explanation and the explanatory value of understanding, indicating their usability and limitations as regards understanding why and how tourism functions. Particular attention has been paid to the epistemological dimension of tourism research, as well as its new directions. The author has referred to two models concerning the epistemological aspects of tourism research where the focal point is the category of ‘truth about tourism’. These have been presented in two articles by John Tribe.
PL
Dwie ostatnie dekady są okresem kryzysowych przeobrażeń w tych obszarach nauk społecznych, w których dokonuje się jakościowych, interpretatywnych analiz kultur. W ramach rozpowszechnionej tendencji do nieskrępowanego łączenia paradygmatów z czasem pojawił się także, częściowo opozycyjny wobec niego, nurt zmierzający do łączenia elementów humanistyki i nauk przyrodniczych, w szczególności rozumienia i wyjaśniania. Nie reprezentuje on jednak znanej z historii tendencji do podporządkowania humanitas wymogom scientia, lecz szuka nowej równowagi pomiędzy nimi i teoretycznych podstaw do integracji pozwalającej na wytwarzanie bardziej ugruntowanej wiedzy, a także umożliwiającej lepsze przewidywanie i refleksyjną kontrolę życia społecznego. Jest to zadanie szczególnie istotne w sytuacji późnonowoczesnego dynamicznego rozrostu coraz bardziej złożonych systemów społeczno-technologiczno-ekologicznych generujących nowe ryzyka i możliwości. W eseju, za pomocą narzędzi z obszaru analizy dyskursu i socjologii oraz filozofii wiedzy, zostaje podjęta analiza kilku kluczowych teoretycznych założeń, na których może być ufundowana integracja. Przedstawiono również propozycję połączenia procedury interpretacji i wyjaśniania w koncepcji „maksymalnej interpretacji”, a także próbę wyjaśnienia tendencji, która ją zrodziła i jej interpretacji w kategoriach teorii kulturowej Mary Douglas.
EN
For the two last decades cultural social sciences have been facing critical methodological transformation. The widespread tendency in qualitative research to mingling and synthesizing differing interpretive paradigms has been recently confronted with a venture to integration of science and the humanities. This current is not a plain revitalization of historical tendency to submit interpretive methods to scientific explanation of social life, but is seeking a new theoretical base to establish a balance between hermeneutic and causal analysis. This essay discusses different theoretical concepts of the relationship between hermeneutic interpretation and causal explanation. It introduces a concept of “maximal interpretation” devised inside the strong program of cultural sociology as a procedure of unified interpretive-causal analysis of historical events, and analyzes this innovation with theoretical lenses of grid-group theory.
EN
The proposition I elucidates and defend in this paper is that the Transcendent can be an object of genuine knowledge and that the knowledge the philosophical mystic claims of it is symbolic in nature. In my endeavor to achieve this aim I rely on Małgorzata Czarnocka’s conception of symbolic truth as a model of explanation. I am inclined to think that, as a model of explanation, this conception sheds ample light on the possibil- ity of having a cognitive experience of the Transcendent. The paper is composed of four parts. The first part raises the question of the Transcendent as an object of knowledge. The second part advances a brief analysis of the main elements of Czarnozka’s concep- tion of symbolic truth with special emphasis on her view of human nature. The third part explicates the sense in which the conception of symbolic truth functions as a model of explanation. The fourth part analyzes the conditions under which the Transcendent can be an object of knowledge.
PL
Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie modelu eksplanacyjnego dla ugruntowania w prawie. Ugruntowanie, rozumiane w ostatnich latach jako metafizyczna determinacja, okazało się być dość owocnym przedmiotem dociekań teoretyków prawa, próbujących eksplikować w kategoriach metafizycznych tezę o relacji między faktami społecznymi a faktami prawnymi. Jednakże w debacie dotyczącej wykorzystania pojęcia ugruntowania w filozofii prawa brakuje namysłu nad różnymi założeniami leżącymi u podstaw możliwości wykorzystania tego pojęcia związanego z debatą dotyczącą ugruntowania która odbywa się we współczesnej filozofii. Niniejszy artykuł oferuje nową perspektywę analizy debaty na temat ugruntowania faktów prawnych oraz interpretację centralnych dla tej debaty terminów w świetle najnowszych debat metafizycznych.
EN
The objective of this article is to provide an explanatory framework for legal grounding. Grounding, understood in recent years as a metaphysical determination, has proved to be a fruitful object of inquiry for legal theorists trying to explain the thesis about the relationship between social facts and legal facts in metaphysical terms. However, the debate on the use of the notion of grounding in the philosophy of law lacks a concise and precise differentiation of the various assumptions behind grounding that philosophers have recently discussed. This article offers a prospect for analysis of a debate about grounding of legal facts and an interpretation of focal terms in light of recent metaphysical debates.
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Przepisy o stosowaniu przepisów

51%
EN
The aim of this article is to elucidate the presence of prescriptions on the application of prescriptions in legal texts. Such explanation is structural in nature, rather than nomological-deductive. A typical prescription pertaining to application consists of three parts. Firstly, it fixes applied prescription. Next, it has the phrase 'applies' as a pivotal fragment. At the end it determines the area of application. However, occasionally some parts of prescriptions on the application of prescriptions are eliminated or arranged in another manner. In some legal texts several prescriptions on the application of prescriptions are joined in one collective prescription of this sort. Prescriptions on the application of prescriptions are the result of the fragmentation of norms.
PL
Celem artykułu jest wyjaśnienia obecności przepisów o stosowaniu przepisów w aktach prawnych. Takie wyjaśnienie ma charakter strukturalny i nie jest wyjaśnieniem nomologiczno-dedukcyjnym. Typowy przepis o stosowaniu przepisu składa się z trzech części. Najpierw wskazuje on stosowany przepis. Następnie zawiera zwrot „stosuje się” odgrywający kluczową rolę. Na końcu wyznacza on obszar zastosowania. Lecz czasami pewne części przepisów o stosowaniu przepisów są usuwane lub ustawiane w odmiennej kolejności. W niektórych aktach prawnych szereg przepisów o stosowaniu przepisów łączy się w zbiorcze przepisy tego rodzaju. Przepisy o stosowaniu przepisów są efektem rozdrabniania norm.
EN
The pragmatist approach, as stated in this essay, takes into account two features of knowledge, both having an enormous potential of growth: the scope of science, whose frontiers can be infinitely advanced, while firmness of its propositions grows with consolidating once attained frontiers. An opposite view may be called limitativist as it conservatively sticks to some a priori limiting principles which do not allow progressing in certain directions. Some of them influence science from outside, like ideological constraints, others are found inside science itself. The latter can be exemplified by principles like these: (1) there can be no action at a distance; (2) there are no necessary truths; (3) there are no abstract objects. The first might have happened to limit physics with rejecting the theory of gravitation. The second entails that arithmetical propositions are either devoid of (clasical) truth or are not necessary; this would limit its role to being a mere calculating machine, without giving any insights into reality. The third, for instance, limits logic to the first-order level (since in the second-order variables range over abstract sets). The history of ideas shows that such limiting principles, had they been obeyed, would have hindered some great achievements of science. This is why we should not acknowledge them as necessarily true, that is, winning in confrontation with any view contrary to them. Such principles should compete with other ones on equal terms in obtaining as high degree of epistemic necessity as they may prove worth of. To the core of the pragmatist approach there belongs treating epistemic necessity as a gradable attribute of propositions. In accordance with ordinary usage, "necessary" is a gradable adjective, having a comparative form. The degree of epistemic necessity of a scientific statement depends on how much it is needed for the rest of the field of knowledge (Quine's metaphor). The greater damage for knowledge would be caused by getting rid of the point in question, the greater is its epistemic necessity. At the top of such a hierarchy are laws of logic and arithmetic. Among physical laws at a very high level there is the law of gravitation, owing both to its universality, that is, a colossal scope of possible applications (advancement of frontiers), and its having been empirically confirmed with innumerable cases (consolidation of frontiers). Such a success has proved possible owing to the bold transgression of the limiting principle 1 (see above), and this has resulted in so high a degree of unavoidability.
PL
Jak to wyrażamy w prezentowanym tekście, w ramach ujęcia pragmatycznego bierze się pod uwagę dwie charakterystyczne cechy wiedzy, przy czym obydwie mają ogromną możliwość wzrostu: zasięg nauki, której granice mogą się przesuwać w nieskończoność i stanowczość jej sądów, która wzrasta razem z umocnieniem granic osiągniętych. Przeciwnym podejściem, które można nazwać limitywistycznym, jest takie, w którym konserwatywnie a priori formułuje się limitacyjne (lepiej: limitujące)zasady nie pozwalające na postęp w niektórych kierunkach. Niektóre z takich zasad wpływają na naukę z zewnątrz, np. wymogi ontologiczne, inne możemy znaleźć w samej nauce. Przykładami tych ostatnich mogą być takie zasady jak: (1) nie ma ruchu bez odległości,(2) nie istnieją prawdy konieczne, (3) nie ma obiektów abstrakcyjnych. Pierwsza z wymienionych zasad być może została sformułowania w celu ograniczenia fizyki, w której odrzuca się teorię grawitacji. Druga z nich pociąga za sobą koncepcję, zgodnie z którą twierdzenia arytmetyczne są bądź pozbawione prawdy w sensie klasycznym, bądź nie są konieczne. Trzecia z wymienionych zasad ogranicza logikę do logiki pierwszego rzędu (ponieważ w rzędzie drugim zmienne przebiegają abstrakcyjne zbiory). Historia idei pokazuje nam, że tego rodzaju zasady limitacyjne (limitujące),którym były owe idee podporządkowane, utrudniały niektóre ważne osiągnięcia naukowe(lepiej: stały na przeszkodzie w realizacji niektórych przedsięwzięć naukowych). Z tego też powodu nie powinniśmy ich uznawać jako koniecznie prawdziwe tj. jako zwyciężające w konfrontacji z każdym przeciwnym względem nich poglądem. Tego rodzaju zasady powinny na równi rywalizować z innymi co do przyznania im tak wysokiego stopnia epistemicznej konieczności, jak pozwala na to ich uzasadnienie. Do istoty podejścia pragmatycznego należy traktowanie epistemicznej konieczności jako stopniowalnego atrybutu sądów. W zgodzie z potocznym użyciem „konieczny”jest przymiotnikiem stopniowalnym, wobec tego że ma formę względną (porównawczą). Stopień epistemicznej konieczności twierdzenia naukowego zależy od tego, jak bardzo jest ono niezbędne w ramach danego zakresu wiedzy (metafora Quine’a). Tym większą szkodą dla wiedzy byłoby porzucenie takiego punktu widzenia, im wyższa jest owa epistemiczna konieczność. Na szczycie tego rodzaju hierarchii są prawa logiki i arytmetyki. Do fizycznych praw na wysokim poziomie (epistemicznej konieczności)zaliczylibyśmy prawo grawitacji, w związku zarówno z jego uniwersalnością, tj. kolosalnym zakresem możliwych aplikacji (przesuwanie granic) jak i faktem, iż jest ono empirycznie potwierdzone przez niezliczone przypadki (zcalenie granic).
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