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1

„Idea prawa” w normatywistycznej teorii Szymona Rundsteina

100%

Marszał M.

Przegląd Sejmowy

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2020

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issue 5(160)

83-95

EN

The doctrine of normativism initiated by German lawyer Hans Kelsen was very popular in the interwar period. One of the Polish continuators and propagators of normativism was professor of law Szymon Rundstein. He was in favor of studying the law in its pure form, without taking into account the influence of sociological, psychological, historical or political factors. The subject of Rundstein’s study was the law analyzed “formally and schematically”, regardless of the criterion of its validity. The novelty of the Warsaw lawyer’s theory was that he modified the theory of Hans Kelsen. He replaced the concept of Grundnorm with the concept of “the idea of law”, which was an expression of a phenomenological approach to law. Rundstein’s theory of law became an inspiration for many of today’s theoreticians of state and law.

2

Schmitt v. (?) Kelsen: The Total State of Exception Posited for the Total Regulation of Life

86%

Berkmanas T.

Baltic Journal of Law & Politics

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2010

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vol. 3

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issue 2

98-118

EN

Firstly, the article focuses on the ideologies of Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt, which are, as a matter of stereotype, considered as being in opposition to each other. By revealing the logics of Kelsenian normativism and the conception of law presupposed therein, the paper aims at re-constructing the opposition into a generative affinity of two ideologies and showing that these two great ideological adversaries of the first half of the twentieth century could be considered co-authors of the same ideological construct. The construct could be called the total state of exception, with the inherent political holism and legal nihilism.The second main aim of the article is to widen the scope of this insight by relating it to the applied ideas that frame our modern political world. The ideas are those of democracy and human rights, the former appearing as the form of the total state, the latter as the one possible de-former of the total state. However, the foundation - i.e. natural law - of the de-former appears to be inconceivable and, therefore, lost to the modern mind. In the end, the article attempts to show that Schmitt might have reflected on this much more fundamental aspect of legal nihilism. This reflection provides for the possibility of dissonances in his basically anthropocentric decisionism and the centralization of the problem of natural law.

3

Between Normativism and Phenomenology: on the Influence of Adolf Reinach’s Concept of Social Acts on Szymon Rundstein’s Theory of Law

72%

Tkacz S., Wentkowska A.

Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Iuridica

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2022

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vol. 100

127-135

PL

Szymon Runstein był czołowym polskim przedstawicielem normatywizmu okresu międzywojennego. Pozostawał on także pod wpływem koncepcji fenomenologicznej Adolfa Reinacha. Opracowanie zostało poświęcone problematyce wpływu koncepcji aktów społecznych Adolfa Reinacha na teorię prawa Szymona Rundsteina. W szczególności autorzy zadają pytanie, czy poglądy Adolfa Reinacha wpłynęły na pojmowanie przez Szymona Rundsteina kelsenowskiej „normy podstawowej” (Grundnorm). W toku badań okazało się również, że autorzy wywodzący się z różnej tradycji filozoficznoprawnej, poddając analizie właściwości prawa, wskazują na konieczny element komunikacji społecznej. Każe to zadać pytanie o możliwość uzasadnienia prawa, czy charakterystyki pewnych jego właściwości, bez odwołania się do praktyki aktów społecznych. Artykuł ma na celu przypomnienie często pomijanych we współczesnych pracach poglądów Szymona Rundsteina oraz Adolfa Reinacha. Tekst został przygotowany, dla upamiętnienia zmarłego Profesora Tomasza Bekrychta, który koncepcjom fenomenologicznym Adolfa Reinacha poświęcił swoje najważniejsze prace.

EN

This text is devoted to commemorating Professor Tomasz Bekrycht, who was an eminent expert in the phenomenology of law. His interests focused particularly on the analysis of the philosophical and legal views of Adolf Reinach. The undoubted achievement of Professor Tomasz Bekrycht is that he restored the works of Adolf Reinach to Polish theory and philosophy of law. This study focuses on the references to A. Reinach’s concept of social acts in the indicated work by Szymon Rundstein, who does not ignore the concept of social acts in his considerations, but treats it as an interesting theoretical and legal suggestion. While analysing the influence of phenomenological concepts on Rundstein’s theory, an important conclusion was made: as a normativist, Rundstein accepts the concept of the “basic norm” (Grundnorm), suggested by Hans Kelsen, which legitimises law (the validity of other legal norms within the system).

4

Sedno idei pozytywizmu prawniczego

72%

Paulson S. J., Romanowicz M.

Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej

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2012

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vol. 2(5)

20-35

PL

Much in recent discussions on legal positivism suggests that the controversy surrounding the notion turns on the distinction between inclusive and exclusive legal positivism. As a point of departure in distinguishing them, the separation principle is helpful. The separation principle counts as the contradictory of the morality principle, according to which there is “necessary overlap” between the law and morality. What the legal positivist’s denial of the morality principle comes to can be refined, we are told, by appealing to the distinction between inclusive and exclusive legal positivism. One can acquire a broader perspective by opening up the field in order to cover not only inclusive and exclusive legal positivism but also non-positivism, represented by the defence of the morality principle, that is the view that there is necessary overlap between the law and morality. Say what you will about inclusive versus exclusive legal positivism – some defend the distinction, others dismiss inclusive legal positivism as a non-starter. In any case, I want to argue that a far more fundamental distinction within the positivist camp lies elsewhere. The distinction I have in mind is that between legal positivism qua naturalism (J. Austin) and legal positivism without naturalism (H. Kelsen). For reasons institutional in nature, legal positivism has largely been discussed in a vacuum, there is a standing presumption to the effect that there are ties between legal positivism and ‘positivism writ large’ in the greater philosophical tradition – or, as it would be put in present-day philosophical circles, ties between legal positivism and naturalism.

5

Przemoc jako konstytutywny element teorii polityczności. Carl Schmitt a tzw. kwestia żydowska

58%

Slováček P., Rubisz L., Uniwersytet Śląski w Opawie, Opolski U.

Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris

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2016

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vol. 34 (3)

EN

Article deals with the relationship between Carl Schmitt’’s political theory and political theology, which inherently works with the violence assumption, and the so called jewish question. Author shows the way the enemy of the political is gradually constructed on the basis of textual and doctrinal analysis. The core of Schmitt’s enemy construction depends on the refusal of the philosophical tradition, which assume that all man are equal as far as they are participating in one common nature or are in actual or potential possesion of reason. This refusal is the basis on which the criticism of normativism, for Schmitt in the inter-war period represented especially by jewish thinkers such as Hans Kelsen, is built to be after 1933 used in open attack on Jews as such.

6

Czesława Martyniaka krytyka normatywizmu Hansa Kelsena

58%

Stochmal M. P.

Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica

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2020

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vol. 19

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issue 2

97-118

EN

The article aims to present a critique of Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law by Czesław Martyniak and to present a “positive’ solution. Martyniak reduced his criticism of Kelsen’s normativism to three issues: 1) the uniformity of its philosophical foundations, 2) the force of applicable law, and 3) natural law. Martyniak’s critique of Kelsen’s concept of law shows two extremely different attitudes regarding the separation of the sphere of being and duty in the field of law made by I. Kant. Kelsen is an extreme supporter of the separation of Sein and Sollen, while Martyniak, on the contrary, assumes the coexistence and connection of these spheres. According to Martyniak, a mutual separation of the spheres of being and duty results with many absurd consequences on the basis of law and its theory. Martyniak’s critique of normativism remains close to Thomistic doctrine and is clearly inspired by the thoughts of Thomas Aquinas. However, it should be considered as a creative adaptation of Thomas ideas. It is debatable to what extent Czesław Martyniak’s criticism of Kelsen’s normativism is only of a historical value or could be considered timeless. It probably depends on the importance and “eternity” of the problems we take under our consideration, moreover, whether one is capable to work out their original solutions.

PL

Artykuł ma na celu przedstawienie krytyki czystej teorii prawa Hansa Kelsena dokonaną przez Czesława Martyniaka i zaprezentowanie “pozytywnego” rozwiązania. Martyniak sprowadził krytykę normatywizmu Kelsena do trzech kwestii: 1) jednolitości jego podstaw filozoficznych; 2) mocy obowiązującej prawa i 3) prawa naturalnego. Krytyka koncepcji prawa Kelsena przeprowadzona przez Martyniaka jest starciem się dwu stanowisk odnośnie Kantowskiego rozdziału sfery bytu i powinności w dziedzinie prawa. Kelsen jest skrajnym zwolennikiem rozdziału Sein i Sollen, natomiast Martyniak wprost przeciwnie: afirmuje współistnienie i łączność tych sfer. Opowiedzenie się za wzajemną separacją sfery bytu i powinności rodzi – wg Martyniaka – wiele absurdalnych konsekwencji na gruncie prawa i jego teorii. Krytyka normatywizmu przebiega po linii tomistycznej. Martyniak jest wyraźnie inspirowany myślą Tomasza z Akwinu, ale jest to jej twórcza adaptacja. Po przeprowadzeniu krytyki Martyniak proponuje “tomistyczne” rozwiązanie kwestii: mocy obowiązującej prawa i prawa naturalnego. Ta propozycja Martyniaka dopełnia krytykę. Jest dyskusyjne na ile krytyka normatywizmu Hansa Kelsena dokonana przez Czasława Martyniaka ma walor tylko historyczny, a na ile ponadczasowy. Zależy to chyba od wagi stawianych problemów i ich “odwieczności” oraz niebanalnych rozwiązań.

7

Pozitivismus vs. iusnaturalismus : opravdu jen přeceňovaný pseudoproblém, nebo spíše úhelný kámen řešení otázky legitimity práva?

44%

Kosinka J. P.

Právník. Teoretický časopis pro otázky státu a práva (The Lawyer - Scientific Review for Problems of State and Law)

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2019

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vol. 158

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issue 5

489-502

EN

Nowadays, it is possible to encounter, with increasing frequency, allegations that the distinction between the positive and the natural law concepts is not very beneficial in practice. There are, of course, opposite voices, even from the top experts in the field, such as Professor Alexy, as Pavel Holländer reminds us.The author of the present paper does not share the belief that differences between the two basic concepts of law are not important. He also does not share conviction of the gradual blending of both basic approaches (at least in the theoretical field). In my text The Metaphysical Assumptions of Human Rights, I have already highlighted one of the aspects arising from the difference between the two perspectives of the concept of law, which is that if theories based on nominalistic concept (positivism) are consistently drawn into their logical conclusions, they regularly lead to the conclusion about the fictitiousness even of normativism itself. I have already pointed out another problematic aspect connected with the positivist concept in my diploma thesis by referring to Ota Weinberger’s quotation, which rejects the sanctioning theory of the legal norm on the grounds that it introduces the concept of a person who is adequately behaving only under the threat of repression. The third major difference between the concept of natural law and the positivistic one will be offered in this work. I am convinced that it is the implication of the idea of retroactive making of law within the positivist perspective.

CS

V dnešní době se lze s čím dál větší frekvencí setkat s tvrzeními, že rozlišování mezi pozitivní a přirozenoprávní koncepcí práva není v praxi příliš přínosné. Ozývají se samozřejmě i opačné hlasy, a to i z úst špiček v oboru, jako např. profesora Alexyho, jak to připomíná Pavel Holländer. Ani autor předkládané stati nesdílí přesvědčení o nevýznamnosti rozdílů obou základních koncepcí pojetí práva. Nesdílí rovněž ani přesvědčení o postupném splývání obou základních přístupů (minimálně v teoretické oblasti). Již dříve jsem ve svém textu Metafyzické předpoklady lidských práv upozornil na jeden z aspektů vyplývající z odlišnosti obou perspektiv pojetí práva, který spočívá v tom, že pokud jsou na nominalismu založené teorie (pozitivismus) dovedeny důsledně do svých logických závěrů, potom se pravidelně dospívá k závěru o fiktivnosti dokonce samotné normativity. Na další problematický aspekt spojený s pozitivistickým pojetím jsem poukazoval již ve své diplomové práci odkazem na citát Oty Weinbergera, který sankční teorii právní normy odmítá z toho důvodu, že navozuje představu člověka jako toho, kdo se adekvátně chová jen pod hrozbou represe. Třetímu podstatnému rozdílu mezi pojetím iusnaturalistickým a pozitivistickým bych se chtěl věnovat v této práci. Domnívám se, že jím je implikace představy retroaktivního normování v rámci pozitivistické perspektivy.

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1 Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Iuridica

1 Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej

1 Baltic Journal of Law & Politics

1 Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris

1 Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica

1 Przegląd Sejmowy

1 Právník. Teoretický časopis pro otázky státu a práva (The Lawyer - Scientific Review for Problems of State and Law)

1 Berkmanas T.

1 Kosinka J. P.

1 Marszał M.

1 Opolski U.

1 Paulson S. J.

1 Romanowicz M.

1 Rubisz L.

1 Slováček P.

1 Stochmal M. P.

1 Tkacz S.

1 Uniwersytet Śląski w Opawie

1 Wentkowska A.

1 2023

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1 2019

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1 2012