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1

Rola statusu tożsamości osobowej w procesie wyboru kariery zawodowej

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Rostowski J.

Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Psychologica

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1998

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issue 02

29-43

2

Skúmanie významu experimentálnej filozofie skrze koncept osobnej identity:

100%

Jirout Košová M.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2020

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vol. 68

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issue 4

581-603

EN

The article introduces experimental philosophy, critiquing it while at the same time deepening our general understanding of it with concrete examples from practice: experimental research in the field of the issues of personal identity. Through this, the author illustrates the methods, development and possible benefits of experimental philosophy while also discussing the critics who have been drawing attention to deficiencies in its methodology, as well as to its inability to reveal precisely defined lay concepts. In response to the critics, the author is called upon to consider the nature of lay concepts, which by their nature are not precisely defined and often serve a specific social function. Although a well-grasped experimental philosophy cannot decide a given philosophical question, it can help us identify and extract essential elements from the specific and, for a person, deeply characteristic conceptual bedrock, while additionally replenishing philosophical research so that it does not lose contact with the world from which it originally arose.

3

Rola statusu tożsamości osobowej w procesie wyboru kariery zawodowej

100%

Rostowski J., Uniwersytet Łódzki W. N. o. W.

Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Psychologica

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1998

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vol. 02

PL

Prace poglądowe

4

Statusy tożsamości osobowej u młodzieży zamieszkującej Polskę oraz mieszkającej na Litwie

100%

Rydz S., Głód A., Uniwersytet Łódzki I. P., sylwiar@uni.lodz.pl

Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Psychologica

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2014

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vol. 18

PL

Tożsamość osobowa jest jednym z podstawowych aspektów jednostki, który daje jej poczucie ciągłości w czasie, spójności i odrębności od innych. Koncepcja tożsamości wywodzi się od Erika Eriksona, następnie została wzbogacona przez Jamesa Marcię oraz Wima Meeusa, gdzie zostały wyodrębnione cztery statusy tożsamości jako cztery sposoby radzenia sobie z problemami tożsamościowymi. Poczucie tożsamości kształtuje się przez całe życie jednostki, jednakże na okres dorastania przypada kryzys tożsamości. To wówczas człowiek stawia sobie podstawowe pytania związane z poczuciem Ja: kim jestem, do czego dążę, co jest dla mnie ważne? To gdzie mieszkamy – czy w ojczyźnie, czy poza nią – wydaje się mieć znaczenie dla kształtowania się tożsamości osobowej. Podjęto próbę porównania statusów tożsamości młodych Polaków mieszkających w Polsce oraz młodych Polaków mieszkających na Litwie. W badaniu zastosowano odrębny pomiar czterech statusów tożsamości dla czterech sfer ważnych z punktu widzenia poszukiwań i wyborów tożsamościowych: sfera relacji z rodzicami, rówieśnikami, szkoła, ideologia. Uzyskano szereg interesujących różnic.

EN

Personal identity is one of the basic aspects of an individual. It gives her/him a sense of continuity, integrity, and individuality. The concept of identity was originated by Eric Erikson and later it was elaborated by James Marcia, who differentiated four statuses of identity based on four methods of coping with identity issues. Additional work with regard to the subject of personal identity was developed by Wim Meeus. The sense of personal identity develops throughout individual life span; however, the main crisis of identity occurs during adolescence. At this time a person asks herself/himself the fundamental questions related to self awareness: Who am I? What are my goals? What is important for me? Where we live, whether in a homeland or not, appears to have a great significance in shaping personal identity. The attempt was undertaken to compare the statuses of identity of young Poles living in Poland and those living in Lithuania. In the research there was employed a distinct measurement of four statuses of identity for four spheres of human functioning: a sphere of the relationships with parents, peers, a school, and an ideology. A range of interesting and varied results was obtained.

5

Spójność, stabilność i otwartość jako wymiary tożsamości osobistej

100%

Brygoła E.

Polskie Forum Psychologiczne

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2013

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vol. 18

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issue 4

400-418

EN

The aim of presented research was to explore of personal identity with regard to its structure and content. On the basis of Seymour Epstein’s theory (1991) the exploration included both the sphere of feeling and thinking subject and the sphere of content, coded in mind and recognized as described the self. After review of specialist literature 16 identity senses were gathered and as a result of conducted research and using of Exploratory Factor Analysis the identity senses were grouped into three dimensions: Coherence, Stability and Openness. These three dimensions are treated as structural characteristics of personal identity and as such they display different levels among individuals. Theoretical and empirical meaning of Coherence, Stability and Openness are described and discussed in the article. There is also conclusion that dimension that is the most intensified in someone’s identity, it is at the same time the rule of organization of his or her identity.

6

The Revival of Substance Dualism

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Robinson H.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

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2021

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vol. 69

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issue 1

33-43

PL

I argue in this essay that Richard Swinburne’s revised version of Descartes’ argument in chapter 5 of his Are We Bodies or Souls? does not quite get him to the conclusion that he requires, but that a modified version of his treatment of personal identity will do the trick. I will also look critically at his argument against epiphenomenalism, where, once again, I share his conclusion but have reservations about the argument.

7

The Dualist Project and the Remote-Control Objection

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Olson E. T.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

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2021

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vol. 69

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issue 1

89-101

PL

Substance dualism says that all thinking beings are immaterial. This sits awkwardly with the fact that thinking requires an intact brain. Many dualists say that bodily activity is causally necessary for thinking. But if a material thing can cause thinking, why can’t it think? No argument for dualism, however convincing, answers this question, leaving dualists with more to explain than their opponents.

8

No Work for a Theory of Personal Identity

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Schwenkler J.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

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2021

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vol. 69

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issue 1

57-65

PL

A main element in Richard Swinburne’s (2019) argument for substance dualism concerns the conditions of a person’s continued existence over time. In this commentary I aim to question two things: first, whether the kind of imaginary cases that Swinburne relies on to make his case should be accorded the kind of weight he supposes; and second, whether philosophers should be concerned to give any substantial theory, of the sort that dualism and its competitors are apparently meant to provide, to explain the conditions of personal identity after all. My suggestion, instead, will be that the concept of a person’s continued existence is better taken as philosophically unanalyzable.

9

Historical preconditions for the development of “the right to a personal identity” in Western philosophy

88%

Jumakova A.

Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica

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2019

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vol. 18

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issue 2

52-67

EN

Any discussion on a person’s right to identity ought to start with a study of the content of a person’s identity. While ascertaining the essence of a person’s identity, the author was inclined to think that the development of a personal identity as a permanent concept was promoted by the genesis of the human dignity, individuality, autonomy and personality of a person. It is human dignity, the manifestation of which, inter alia, is to be found in the person’s identity, which forms the basis of its legal protection, transforming the identity of a person into legal value and, accordingly, creating the right of a person to identity. Thus the article provides a legally philosophical insight into the historical circumstances in which the concept of personal identity arose, and that are essential for a comprehensive modern understanding of the concept.

10

Podmiotowa i przedmiotowa perspektywa tożsamości osobistej we współczesnym świecie

88%

Brygoła E.

Polskie Forum Psychologiczne

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2013

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vol. 18

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issue 3

284-302

EN

The article is a theoretical review of former and actual conceptions of personal identity that after Seymour Epstein (1991) may be concerned from two perspectives: (1) the subjective and (2) the objective. The first one refers to affective manner of self-experiencing and displays in identity senses, such as – for example – sense of self-continuity, sense of distinctiveness from other people, or sense of self-unity (that are more characteristic for traditional identity) and sense of self-openness, sense of inner variability, sense of self-changeability (that are more characteristic for so called fluid identity). The literature gives many elements of subjective identity and one of the aims of this article is to gather these different elements and to propose some kind of grouping them depending on socio-cultural context of individual’s living. The propose of grouping of identity senses is hypothetical and demands empirical verification. In the article the second, objective perspective of personal identity is also presented, and as a conclusion there is a postulate to integrate in research on identity these two perspectives, especially in a context of contemporary world that is very varied, complex and dynamic.

11

Czy termin „osoba” jest niekompletny semantycznie? Krytyka stanowiska Christiana Kanziana

88%

Ziemowit G.

Edukacja Filozoficzna

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2017

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issue 63

59-74

XX

In my paper I aim to show that Christian Kanzian’s conception of the semantic character of a term “person” is false. According to Kanzian, the term “person” is an incomplete general term which needs to be combined with another general term, namely “Homo sapiens” or “human being”. Unlike the former, the latter terms give us clear criteria for identification of the entities they denote. Given that, we can comprehend how the term “person” is used for both synchronic and diachronic identification. After presenting the Kanzian’s proposal, I move on to my critique. In a nutshell, I show that his conception rules out non-human persons a priori and that the term “person” is: (i) general, (ii) semantically incomplete, (iii) non-sortal and (iv) phasic.

12

Проблематизация свободы как фактора личностных идентификационных практик в эпоху глобализации

88%

Михеева И. Б., Середа Ю. П.

Prosopon. Europejskie Studia Społeczno-Humanistyczne

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2011

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issue 1(1)

89-102

EN

In the article specificity of the qualitative transformation of the contemporary personal identification practices and strategies in the context of actualization of positive and negative freedom is analyzed. The attempt to reveal ambiguity and discrepancy of the subject’s self-identification process which in modern conditions gets a «plastic» character of active functioning is made. The thesis that phenomenon «freedom» in it actual representations, which actively participating in formation and development of personal identity «plastics», opens in the macro social scale the possibilities of reflective and responsible formation by the individual her or his identity in the structure of diverse social practices is proved.

13

Dimensions of the Threat to the Self Posed by Deep Brain Stimulation: Personal Identity, Authenticity, and Autonomy

88%

Zawadzki P.

Diametros

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2021

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vol. 18

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issue 69

28

EN

Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is an invasive therapeutic method involving the implantation of electrodes and the electrical stimulation of specific areas of the brain to modulate their activity. DBS brings therapeutic benefits, but can also have adverse side effects. Recently, neuroethicists have recognized that DBS poses a threat to the very fabric of human existence, namely, to the selves of patients. This article provides a review of the neuroethical literature examining this issue, and identifies the crucial dimensions related to the self which DBS may endanger—personal identity, authenticity, and autonomy. The most influential theories accounting for these dimensions are analyzed herein, and it is argued that most of these theories require further refinement. This paper also demonstrates the interrelation between personal identity, authenticity, and autonomy, and concludes that one can only fully understand the impact of DBS on the self when all of these factors are taken into account.

14

Filosofie a literatura: čtení přes překážky

88%

Koťátko P.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2017

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vol. 65

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issue 3

341-360

EN

The author attempts to show that philosophy and literature can – in an equally radical, destructive and yet productive way – intervene in the running of our conceptual apparatus, schemes of imagination and patterns of interpretation. He focuses on three philosophical and two literary examples of this kind: 1) In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes, in a most dynamic (and “physically” evocative) way, the movement performed by thought which strives to articulate a speculative content in the traditional subject-predicate form (based on a fixed substance-attribute opposition). 2) The externalist thought experiments (H. Putnam, T. Burge and others) have an equally radical effect: they subvert our intuitions concerning the contents of thoughts and communicative acts and the “natural” assumption that these contents are located in our heads. 3) The Gricean semantics with its well-known regresses leads to the conclusion that any act of “meaning something by something” expands (in its intentional structure) in infinitum: this is a radical challenge for our intuitions concerning the nature of communicative attitudes and communicative acts. 4) The narrator in Beckett’s Trilogy (in particular in The Unnamable) describes his mind as a space for the interventions of other, more assertive and more efficient, minds. Moreover, he concludes that even this thought should be ascribed to them, the same holds for this conclusion etc. in infinitum: in this way, the narrator’s subject collapses in an infinite regress. This corresponds to the externalist revision of the internal nature of our thought (cf. 2) as well as the Gricean regresses affecting any attempts to identify the position from which we “mean something by something” (cf. 3). The resulting collapse of the referential role of the first person pronoun, as well as other examples of Beckettian destruction of basic language functions, provide a literary analogy to Hegel’s revision of the traditional sentence form (cf. 3). Another contribution to this confrontation is to be found in Borges’ Pierre Menard story.

15

Response to Essays on Are We Bodies or Souls?

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Swinburne R.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

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2021

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vol. 69

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issue 1

119-138

PL

This paper consists of my responses to the comments by nine commentators on my book Are we Bodies or Souls? It makes twelve separate points, each one relevant to the comments of one or more of the commentators, as follows: (1) I defend my understanding of “knowing the essence” of an object as knowing a set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions for an object to be that object; (2) I claim that there cannot be thoughts without a thinker; (3) I argue that my distinction of “mental” from “physical” events in terms of whether anyone has privileged access to whether or not they occur, is a clear one; (4) and (5) I defend my account of metaphysical modality and its role in defending my account of personal identity; (6) I defend my view that Descartes’s argument in favor of the view that humans are essentially souls fails, but that my amended version of that argument succeeds; (7) I claim that my theory acknowledges the closeness of the connection in an earthly life between a human soul and its body; (8) I argue that my Cartesian theory of the soul-body relation is preferable to Aquinas’s theory of that; (9) I argue that a material thing cannot have mental properties; (10) I argue that any set of logically necessary conditions for an object to be the object it is, which together form a logically sufficient condition for this, mutually entails any other such set; (11) I deny that a dualist needs to provide an explanation of how the soul has the capacities that it has; and finally (12) I defend my view that souls have thisness, and claim that that is not a difficulty for the view that God determines which persons will exist.

16

O STATUSIE OSOBY. UTYLITARYZM ETYCZNY W PISMACH NIEMIECKOJĘZYCZNYCH FILOZOFÓW

75%

Czekajewska J.

Colloquium Wydziału Nauk Humanistycznych i Społecznych AMW

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2016

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issue 4

5-18

EN

Deliberations of German utilitarians about the personal sameness are based on the Anglo-Saxon concept. Views John Locke until today are performing the important part in the forming of contemporary German bioethics. This philosopher as one of the most important representatives of the British empiricism kept dissertations about the mind of the man. He proved that the personal identity wasn't dependent on financial substance, but only the criterion of the continuity and the cohesion of the memory that is the self-awareness is deciding on the humanity. Currently discussions about the status of the person are very popular. Kipke Roland, Dieter Birnbacher, Norbert Hurster, Helga Kuse and Klaus Steigleder are backing the concept up J. Locke and humanities agree with the statement that fixing one's attention on biological properties of a human being cannot to be an indisputable foundation. In this article I present not only the thought of German utilitarians, but also pay attention to the views that have been borrowed from the Anglo-Saxon philosophers. In conclusion, the present implications for learning arising from such understanding of humanity.

17

KOLOR JAKO ELEMENT KSZTAŁTOWANIA TOŻSAMOŚCI JEDNOSTKOWEJ I ZBIOROWEJ

75%

Jurek K.

Zeszyty Naukowe KUL

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2014

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vol. 57

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issue 4

55-66

EN

The aim of this article is an attempt to analyze the function of color involving the shaping of personal and collective identity. Psychologists believe that colors emphasize human personality. Colors allow to express emotions and promote shared values. Symbols of color unite people, facilitate communication, strengthen social bonds and motivate to action. The author assumes that we live in a culture of images and color is one of the tools and methods of cognition of the social reality.

PL

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest próba analizy jednej z funkcji koloru, jaką jest konstruowanie tożsamości osobistej oraz tożsamości zbiorowej. Psychologowie dowodzą, że kolor podkreśla osobowość człowieka, pozwala na wyrażanie swoich emocji, upowszechnianie uznawanych wartości. Symbolika koloru jednoczy ludzi, ułatwia komunikację, wzmacnia więzi społeczne, stanowi czynnik motywujący do działania. Autor zakłada, że żyjemy w kulturze obrazu, a kolor jako jego element staje się jednym z narzędzi i sposobów poznania życia społecznego.

18

Swinburne on Physicalism and Personal Identity

75%

Snowdon P.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

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2021

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vol. 69

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issue 1

11-21

PL

In chapter 2 Swinburne rejects physicalism for two reason. The first is that it is committed to entailments that do not exist. It is suggested that this reason is questionable both because there is no persuasive reason to deny there are such entailments, and also no reason to think that physicalism has such entailments. The second reason is that the mental involves privileged access by the subject and physical features do not allow privileged access. It is proposed that the physical does in fact permit privileged access. In chapter 3 Swinburne defends the Simple View of personal identity. The reasoning is very complex and rich, but it is proposed that Swinburne has not really shown that a reductionist account cannot be correct.

19

How Sense-Phenomenal Theory of Personal Identity Might Legitimize Racism

75%

Enyimba M.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2021

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issue 1

177-190

EN

The major concern of the problem of personal identity gravitates around the question of whether a person’s identity is located in the mind or in the body. Scholars have developed different theories such as survivalist and physicalist criteria among others in response to this question. In this paper, I engage with the theory of sense-phenomenalism as an aspect of the physicalist criterion of personal identity to show how it might legitimize racism and colour-branding. Sense-phenomenalism is a body-only model of personal identity that holds that an individual’s identity is determined by the physical features sensually perceptible by other humans in the society. I argue that sensephenomenalism by reposing a person’s identity on his/her bodily traits might foster social discrimination, deepen the dichotomy between the self and the other and enhance the fabrication of justifications for the denial of individual’s rights.

20

Implikacje narracyjnej koncepcji tożsamości Paula Ricoeura

63%

Huzarek T.

Studia Gdańskie

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2017

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issue 40

189-201

PL

Narracyjna koncepcja tożsamości, którą prezentuje Paul Ricoeur, ujmuje zdecydowanie szerszą perspektywę niż tylko perspektywa takożsamości osób w czasie rozumiana jako identyczność podmiotu x w czasie t1 i czasie t2. Koncepcja ta bowiem mówi nie tylko o byciu tym samym czy takim samym, ale również o byciu sobą. Bycie sobą to charakterystyczne jedynie dla człowieka wyzwanie rzucone czasowi, gdzie podmiot – mimo towarzyszących mu zmian – pozostaje sobą. Z myśli Ricoeura można jednak wydobyć jeszcze więcej, gdzie bycie sobą jest realizacją własnego, niepowtarzalnego etosu danego w ustanowieniu w byciu. To ustanowienie w byciu obejmuje kontekst zakorzenienia w historii, tradycji, kulturze, ale również najbardziej zindywidualizowane odniesienie do Boga.

EN

The narrative concept of identity presented by Paul Ricoeur places embraces a far wider perspective than the perspective of people’s identity in time alone, understood as the subject’s identity in time t1 and time t2. For Ricouer’s conception speaks not only of being the same or being exactly the same but also of being oneself. Being oneself is a challenge characteristic only of human beings, a challenge thrown down against time, by which the subject – despite the changes that accompany him or her – remains itself. Yet it is possible to take Ricoeur’s thought even further, and to say that being oneself is a realisation of a personal, unique ethos given in an enactment in being. This enactment in being includes the background of roots in history, tradition, culture and also, most of all, individualised reference to God.

Refine search results

Rola statusu tożsamości osobowej w procesie wyboru kariery zawodowej

Skúmanie významu experimentálnej filozofie skrze koncept osobnej identity:

Rola statusu tożsamości osobowej w procesie wyboru kariery zawodowej

Statusy tożsamości osobowej u młodzieży zamieszkującej Polskę oraz mieszkającej na Litwie

Spójność, stabilność i otwartość jako wymiary tożsamości osobistej

The Revival of Substance Dualism

The Dualist Project and the Remote-Control Objection

No Work for a Theory of Personal Identity

Historical preconditions for the development of “the right to a personal identity” in Western philosophy

Podmiotowa i przedmiotowa perspektywa tożsamości osobistej we współczesnym świecie

Czy termin „osoba” jest niekompletny semantycznie? Krytyka stanowiska Christiana Kanziana

Проблематизация свободы как фактора личностных идентификационных практик в эпоху глобализации

Dimensions of the Threat to the Self Posed by Deep Brain Stimulation: Personal Identity, Authenticity, and Autonomy

Filosofie a literatura: čtení přes překážky

Response to Essays on Are We Bodies or Souls?

O STATUSIE OSOBY. UTYLITARYZM ETYCZNY W PISMACH NIEMIECKOJĘZYCZNYCH FILOZOFÓW

KOLOR JAKO ELEMENT KSZTAŁTOWANIA TOŻSAMOŚCI JEDNOSTKOWEJ I ZBIOROWEJ

Swinburne on Physicalism and Personal Identity

How Sense-Phenomenal Theory of Personal Identity Might Legitimize Racism

Implikacje narracyjnej koncepcji tożsamości Paula Ricoeura