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EN
The village in Polesie: Transformations of the 1930s in the view of Józef ObrębskiThe article deals with political and social themes of Józef Obrębski's texts, which were written in the second half of the 1930s and were devoted to Polesie. Obrębski made his ethnosociological research in 1934-1937. It was the last phase of the great depression. Obrębski noted changes in political consciousness of inhabitants of the Polesie village. He described the consequences of the implementation of Polish-language education. He perceived the role and nature of communist influence. He wrote very critically about the attitude and role of local administration representatives. He did not limit himself to listing these problems. Instead, he tried to formulate proposals for activities that would have changed the attitude of inhabitants of Polesie voievodship towards the Polish State. Wieś poleska doby przemian lat trzydziestych XX wieku w ujęciu Józefa ObrębskiegoArtykuł jest poświęcony polityczno-społecznym wątkom tekstów Józefa Obrębskiego, które powstały w drugiej połowie lat trzydziestych i odnoszą się do Polesia. Obrębski prowadził swoje badania etnosocjologiczne w latach 1934-1937. Była to ostatnia faza wielkiego kryzysu. Odnotował przemiany świadomości politycznej mieszkańców poleskiej wsi. Opisywał konsekwencje implementacji polskojęzycznej oświaty. Dostrzegał rolę i charakter wpływów komunistycznych. Bardzo krytycznie wypowiadał się o postawie i roli przedstawicieli lokalnej administracji. Nie ograniczał się do rejestracji tych zjawisk. Próbował formułować propozycje działań, które zmieniłyby stosunek ludności Polesia do państwa polskiego.
Society Register
|
2021
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vol. 5
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issue 1
159-172
PL
Radykalne ruchy polskiej prawicy mają zasadniczo męski charakter i grupują wielu młodych mężczyzn. Przestrzeganie podziału ról płciowych, egzaltacja męską siłą, homospołeczność, braterstwo, fizyczna sprawność podporządkowanie kobiet jako rodzicielek i gospodyń domowych to powszechne wśród "wściekłych młodych mężczyzn" nastawienie tak globalne, jak i specyficznie polskiej. Ta uogólniona charakterystyka ma swoje lokalne warianty, trajektorie i osobliwości. Artykuł stanowi próbę wyjaśnienia fenomenu popularności polskich ruchów prawicowych w lokalnym kontekściez uwzględnieniem czynników społecznych, kulturowych i ekonomicznych. Szczególną uwagę poświęcono Marszowi Niepodległości - cyklicznemu świętu radykałów i dyskursowi męskości, jaki przy okazji tej celebracji jest upowszechniany. W pierwszej części przedstawiam społeczne i ekonomiczne tło procesu radykalizacji, odtwarzam poglądy i maskulinistyczną ideologię polskich "wściekłych mężczyzn". W drugiej części uwaga kieruje się ku kulturowemu i historycznemu kodowaniu "zawiedzionego poczucia uprzywilejowania" (Kimmel, 2013). Część trzecia sięga do koncepcji "męskości spektakularnej" (Garlick, 2016, 163 - 193) i analizuje sposób, w jaki nowoczesna technologia wpływa na konstruowanie męskości przez uczestników Marszów Niepodległości. 
EN
Radical movements of the Polish far-right consist, as elsewhere, mainly of young men. The strict gender binarism, the exaltation of men’s power, homosociality, brotherhood, physical strength and subordination of women are omnipresent among 'angry white men' everywhere, Poland included. However, these general characteristics have always its local variants, trajectories, and particularities. This article is an attempt to explain the phenomenon of Polish radical right movements in its local context: cultural, social, economic. The article focuses on ‘The March of Independence’ – a cyclical celebration for radical groups, which proliferates the discourses of far-right radical masculinity. In the first part, the author focuses on the social and economic background, worldview and ‘masculinist’ ideology of Polish' angry white men’ (Kimmel 2013). The second part focuses on the historical and cultural coding of their 'aggrieved entitlement' (Kimmel 2013). The third part of the essay draws on Steve's Garlick (Garlick 2016: 163−193) concept of ‘spectacular masculinity’. It analyzes how modern technology contributes to the construction of ‘spectacular’ masculinity among the participants of the march/members of radical groups.
EN
The radical actions of the Kremlin, which led to the annexation of the Crimea and the support of the separatists in the East of Ukraine, were conditioned by fundamental changes in Russia’s domestic and foreign policy, which began much earlier and were connected with the historically determined irrational aspirations of Russians to territorial expansion. The turning point of radical changes in Russia’s domestic and foreign policy can be considered the famous speech of Putin, which he spoke at the Munich Security Conference on February 10, 2007, and openly said that he «really thinks about the problems of international security.» The main points of this report are the following: the unacceptability and impossibility for a modern world of a unipolar model of international relations; the need to find a reasonable balance between the interests of all actors in international politics; the inadmissibility of the invasion of the United States of America in all spheres of world development and the imposition of rules of the game to other states; the admissibility of the use of military force as the last argument only on the basis of the UN Charter; termination of the provocative NATO expansion to the East as reducing the level of mutual trust in the world; the hopelessness of the West’s economic policy towards the Third World countries; stopping the process of transforming the OSCE into a tool for securing the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries relative to other countries; the formation of a just, democratic world order capable of ensuring prosperity not only for the elected but for all. Putin’s speech served as an occasion for controversy in the Western political circles to restore the «cold» war. By the Russian side, the Munich speech of Putin was seen as a further program of foreign policy of Russia in the late 2000’s - early 2010’s. External causes of radical change in the course of the Russian Federation: 1) the enlargement of NATO and the EU to the east in 2004, which took place without taking into account the interests of the Russian Federation, and this is against the backdrop of the intensified declaration of Putin after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 supporting the American strategy to combat terrorism; 2) «color revolutions» that took place in 2003-2005 in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, and were actively supported by the United States and the leading European countries. The conservative part of the Russian elite perceived them as an offensive against Russia’s interests in the post-Soviet space. Internal reasons: 1) the rise in oil prices on the world market since the early 2000’s, accompanied by a surge of foreign direct investment and a cessation of capital outflow. In conjunction with the dependence of European countries on the supply of Russian energy resources, all this generated in the higher political elite a sense of Russia’s new status as an «energy superpower» and claims to restore its role in world politics; 2) the defeat of the big business (Berezovsky, Khodorkovsky) in the struggle for power in the Russian Federation and the growing influence of the federal bureaucracy and security forces, which led by Putin to gain mass support in the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2003-2004. After Munich in Russia, a whole series of conceptual, legislative, structural changes and organizational measures aimed at adapting state institutions and politics under new conditions was launched. The preparation and conduct of the presidential elections in Russia, which resulted in the «return» of Putin to a senior position in the state, finally severed the Kremlin, even with the possibility of establishing a pragmatic cooperation with the West, which attempts were made during the reign of D. Medvedev within the framework of the «reboot» from the United States and «Partnership for Modernization» programs with Germany and the EU. Thus, the evolution of the domestic and foreign policy of the Russian Federation in 2007-2014 is largely due to the imperial essence of the state and society of this country, due to all its historical historical development. In addition, the subjective factor associated with the activities of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin and his oligarchic leadership headed by his desire for personal enrichment and indivisible domination in the post-Soviet geopolitical space, played a role in changing the country’s political course. Accordingly, Russian aggression against Ukraine, which began in February 2014, should be considered a natural result of the expansionist aspirations of the ruling class in Russia.
EN
When criticizing the principles of liberal democracy, radical parties, both leftand right, take advantage of this particular type of democracy by participating in local and nationwide elections. They take part in each subsequent election under their flag or by putting up candidates on the lists of other electoral committees. The major aim of the parties when participating in elections is to promote their political appeal and reaching the biggest number of local communities possible. Under the mechanisms of local democracy, including local government elections, radical parties can join in the decision-making system by investing relatively little resources.
PL
Poprzez krytyczne odniesienie się do demokracji liberalnej partie radykalnej lewicy i prawicy zyskują przewagę w tym konkretnym typie demokracji na drodze uczestnictwa w wyborach samorządowych, parlamentarnych i prezydenckich. Partie te biorą udział w każdych kolejnych wyborach pod swoją banderą lub poprzez umieszczanie kandydatów na listach innych komitetów wyborczych. Głównym celem tych partii podczas udziału w wyborach jest promocja ich własnych poglądów politycznych oraz dotarcie do największej możliwej liczby lokalnych społeczności. W ramach funkcjonowania mechanizmów lokalnej demokracji, w tym wyborach samorządowych, partie radykalne mogą zyskać udział w procesach decyzyjnych, inwestując relatywnie niewiele zasobów.
PL
Przygotowania do Okrągłego Stołu i negocjacje między stroną społeczną (Solidarnością) a rządową (PZPR) w 1989 r. wywoływały różne krytyczne oceny w kręgach opozycji demokratycznej. Okrągły Stół przez wiele lat był punktem spornym debat historycznych i politycznych. Artykuł prezentuje sposoby argumentacji politycznych przeciwników Okrągłego Stołu – radykałów, którzy w latach 1988–1989 kontestowali linię działania Lecha Wałęsy i jego otoczenia.
EN
The Round Table (February – April 1989) has been a thorny issue for many years, igniting debates among historians and politicians of the Third Polish Republic, and opinions about it – favourable or unfavourable – corresponded with the opinions of general achievements of the transformation of the Polish political system. Already during the negotiations, the Round Table talks caused controversies and deepened personal and ideological divisions within Solidarność and the opposition. The end of 1988 brought about the emergence of a tendency to contest the line of action of Wałęsa and his circle, and especially rejected the need of Round Table talks with the communist government. The tendency was shared by political groups originating from Solidarność and newly formed political parties, numerous but weak, existing on the margin. The article presents the most important arguments of political opponents of the Round Table talks – the radicals of the crucial time of changes in 1988 and 1989. The author answers the question whether it is right to use the term “radicalism” and attempts to determine the scope of a social base of radicals; he points out that many arguments put forward by the opponents of the negotiations were also presented by journalists and oppositionists supporting Lech Wałęsa. He thus advances a thesis that it was not political concepts that distinguished radicals from the rest of the opposition, but their specific psychological attitude; this, however, requires further study.
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