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EN
The presented work attempts to show a link between business and global responsibility with the Socratic idea of self-knowledge. The today’s ethics discusses the fundamental issues of the man’s place in the world. The human existence is one of the causes of the contemporary crisis. This crisis between man and the world obliges us to raise a radical question of the ethical origins of individual and global responsibility for the quality of life, including also the future human generations. This question requires going back to the historical and ethical considerations about the Socratic project of good life. The starting point for the Socratic ethics is an interpersonal and inner-personal dialogue; the subsequent result of that is man’s practical wisdom of how to build his own life together with others. Socrates argues that the key issue of responsibility is awakening of self-awareness and the way to achieve this objective is dialogue.
2
88%
Avant
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2019
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vol. 10
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issue 2
EN
One distinct interest in self-knowledge is an interest in whether one can know about one’s own mental states and processes, how much, and by what methods. One broad distinction is between accounts that centrally claim that we look inward for self-knowledge (introspective methods) and those that claim that we look outward for self-knowledge (transparency methods). It is here argued that neither method is sufficient, and that we see this as soon as we move beyond questions about knowledge of one’s beliefs, focusing instead on how one distinguishes, for oneself, one’s veridical visual memories from mere (non-veridical) visual images. Given the robust psychological and phenomenal similarities between episodic memories and mere imagery, the following is a genuine question that one might pose to oneself: “Do I actually remember that happening, or am I just imagining it?” After critical analysis of the application of the transparency method (advocated by Byrne [2010], following Evans [1982]) to this latter epistemological question, a brief sketch is offered of a more holistic and inferential method for acquisition of broader self-knowledge (broadly following the interpretive sensory-access account of Carruthers [2011]). In a slogan, knowing more of the mind requires using more of the mind.
EN
This paper on friendship starts with noticing the cultural specificities of the words, “friend” and “friendship”: how they possess rich nuances and meanings in some cultures not available in others. It has then delved into Aristotle’s treatment of friendship in his three ethical treatises with special reference to the relationship between friendship and morality and that between friendship and self-knowledge. Some comments are made on whether friendship is possible between persons of unequal virtues and whether they are capable of attaining self-knowledge. This paper also discusses certain challenges to Aristotle’s claims that friendship is an unalloyed good. The point of these challenges is that friendship can also be a great bad. The paper concludes with the observation how rare has friendship become in the modern world resulting in loneliness, depression and alienation.
EN
The article is a theoretical review of former and actual conceptions of personal identity that after Seymour Epstein (1991) may be concerned from two perspectives: (1) the subjective and (2) the objective. The first one refers to affective manner of self-experiencing and displays in identity senses, such as – for example – sense of self-continuity, sense of distinctiveness from other people, or sense of self-unity (that are more characteristic for traditional identity) and sense of self-openness, sense of inner variability, sense of self-changeability (that are more characteristic for so called fluid identity). The literature gives many elements of subjective identity and one of the aims of this article is to gather these different elements and to propose some kind of grouping them depending on socio-cultural context of individual’s living. The propose of grouping of identity senses is hypothetical and demands empirical verification. In the article the second, objective perspective of personal identity is also presented, and as a conclusion there is a postulate to integrate in research on identity these two perspectives, especially in a context of contemporary world that is very varied, complex and dynamic.
EN
While joining a social debate about self-education, the Author turns attention to the continuity of reflection initiated by the Ancient and undertaken contemporarily by representatives of different divisions of humanities. The Author underlines, that a starting point in a process of self-education is getting to know oneself, which requires engagement of internal attention, thinking, and dialogues with one’s surroundings as well as with oneself. She proposes a thesis, that cultural changes from the turn of the twenty first century – connected with expansion of information technology – foster self-education as long as they are accompanied by self-reflection.
EN
The main aim of this article is to present a descriptive social-cognitive model of the adaptive self-concept (ASC) which integrates knowledge concerning the relationship between two aspects of the self-self-awareness and self-knowledge-and optimal functioning. We propose that adaptive self-awareness is moderately frequent, non-ruminative, focused on inner states, and motivated by curiosity. Adaptive self-knowledge is defined as accurate, complex, integrated and consisting of easily accessible self-beliefs, both abstract and concrete. The broader context for the ASC model is discussed, including its regulatory and interpersonal functions and factors which influence ASC development. The limitations of the model are discussed and suggestions are made for future investigations. Funding Information: This research was supported by a grant from the National Science Centre (NSC; 2015/19/B/HS6/02216).
EN
While joining a social debate about self-education, the Author turns attention to the continuity of reflection initiated by the Ancient and undertaken contemporarily by representatives of different divisions of humanities. The Author underlines, that a starting point in a process of self-education is getting to know oneself, which requires engagement of internal attention, thinking, and dialogues with one’s surroundings as well as with oneself. She proposes a thesis, that cultural changes from the turn of the twenty first century – connected with expansion of information technology – foster self-education as long as they are accompanied by self-reflection.
EN
This paper deals with validity conditions of admission to an act. We shall look at admission first as a speech act that has a certain gravity as a legal act. We reconstruct Searle’s success condi- tions for admission and supplement them with particular legal conditions in legal acts of admission and pleas. We focus on the preparatory conditions of admission and we show difficulties involved in fulfilling these conditions.
EN
Robert Pilałat’s book is an attempt to confront with the list of self-knowledge’s aporias and variations of possible developments of it. But the book does not promise that it will provide consistently carried out the remedy of these problems (anomalies). The author does not promote the definitive paradigm of self-knowledge and he does not try to convince us to a new phenomenological study of self-consciousness, which would be able to solve all the problem of reflective cogito.
EN
The article presents B. Leśmian as a poet involved in his self-imposed task of promoting a return to primeval nature, but, at the same time, somebody who is fully aware of the utopian character of thus formulated and adopted assumptions. The two contradictory approaches converge in a poetic figure of desire. This particular urge is treated as a model of the imagination of the poet, who creates his poetical world knowing that the ultimate aim is unattainable but constitutes the ideal of poetry and can only be a state of cognitive assurance and self-knowledge or, alternatively, a situation of ontological stability and fulfilment. However, to reach this utmost goal, either on the poetical plane or on the existentialist, epistemological and ontological plane, to fulfill the cherished desires, is not possible within the poetical world created by Leśmian. The raison d’etre of the self manifested by the protagonists of his poems as well as a justification of this poetry is the very striving towards the goal. The article shows the relevant dimensions of that desire as a metapoetical figure, anthropological and existentialist figures and epistemological and ontological figures. It further presents the opposition and the inner conflict within the modern views of the poet, who, consciously inscribes into his project its impracticability. The distance towards the current times and towards the idealistic assumptions of his own poetical programme constitutes the intrinsic originality of Leśmian’s poems.
Ethics in Progress
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2016
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vol. 7
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issue 1
284-298
EN
The aim of  the  paper  is  to  show  the  conditions  of  subjectivity constitution in terms of dialogue and the figure of the Other. The analytical and hermeneutical approach I hold is the foundation of interdisciplinary attempt to describe  possible  concepts  of  shared  relation of the terms: consciousness, subjectivity and identity. The three appear to be recognized only in the ethical situation. It requires taking responsibility for the Other, for giving him the identity which mirrors one’s subjectivity. In this way the subject learns the limits and chances for gaining self-knowledge. The paper also presents a new approach towards redefining the definition of subjectivity, which includes artificially and medically enhanced entities.
PL
Celem artykułu jest ukazanie warunków konstytucji podmiotów w zakresie dialogu i postaci Innego. Stosowane przeze mnie podejście analityczne i hermeneutyczne stanowi zakres interdyscyplinarnej próby opisywania relacji między różnymi terminami relacji: tożsamości, podmiotów i tożsamości. Te trzy przedstawione są rozpoznawane tylko w etycznej sytuacji. Wymaga wzięcia udziału w Innym, nadania mu tożsamości z uwzględnieniem jego podmiotowości. W ten sposób podmiot poznaje granice i szanse na zdobycie samowiedzy. Artykuł przedstawia także nowe podejście do przedefiniowania jednostek podmiotowych , które obejmują zastosowanie sztucznej i medycznie wzmocnionej.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2016
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vol. 5
|
issue 1
179-194
EN
Charmides is a dialogue highly indicative of the importance that the prologues to Plato’s works have for our understanding of the whole spirit and philosophical content of each dialogue as a whole. It is representative of the Platonic tendency to always combine philosophical content with dramatic form through narrative and drama, in order to enhance the reader’s and audience’s insight into the inquiries of his philosophical work. Following this line of presentation, the prologue of Charmides prefigures the understanding of the central themes of the dialogue; focusing on the depiction of Socrates as a therapist and of Dialectic as a therapy or a kind of remedy, which through the process of dialectical engagement and interaction reestablishes the relation of each interlocutor to his own self. The Apollonian ideal of self-knowledge (know thyself) is construed as a “greeting” of the god to worshipers who enter the temple, not as a moral counsel or as a piece of advice. This distinction implies the difference between a knowledge conveyed from without and a knowledge discovered by insightful inner search of one’s self. Within the passages 165c to 175a, sōphrosunē is presented and examined as “the knowledge of what one knows and what one does not know.” It has been claimed that in this part of the dialogue, the Socratic model of self-knowledge is subjected by Plato to the Socratic elenchus, where he attempts to make a criticism of it. I believe that this section of the dialogue is an extended excursus, aimed towards introducing and examining a model of self-knowledge different from that of Socrates, Critias’ model of self-knowledge. This model of self-knowledge poses a whole series of philosophical problems; the relation between the subject and the object of knowledge, the possibility of their identification or the distinction between them, the possibility of the existence of an internal and external object of knowledge, the relation of this model of self-knowledge with other kinds or domains of knowledge, and the question whether external knowledge or knowledge of other knowledges is a constituent of knowledge of knowledge. The question of the possibility of knowledge of knowledge is not definitely rejected, especially if we consider that in all of this discussion there is a hint towards the way in which philosophy works and relates to other kinds of knowledge. I believe, however, that in the last part of the dialogue, where the knowledge of good and bad emerges, Plato again meets Socrates and becomes reconciled with him. The only knowledge that is useful and beneficial is knowledge of good and bad. In this way Plato chooses to put forward a self-conscious model of self-knowledge, which does not presuppose, as Critias’ model does, the critical examination of knowledge or the critical distance from knowledge. This self-conscious model of self-knowledge is connected with the knowledge of good and bad. On the one hand doing of good presupposes knowledge of good and bad and on the other, “doing one’s own things” presupposes self-knowledge. The possibility of knowing good and bad is ensured by each person, either through looking deep within himself or by orientating towards the Idea of the Good itself.
EN
The discovery of mirror neurons and the characterization of their response properties is certainly an important achievement in neurophysiology and cognitive neuroscience. The reference to the role of mirror neurons in ‘reading’ the intentions of other creatures and in the learning process fulfils an explanatory function in understanding many cognitive phenomena beginning from imitating, towards understanding, and finishing with complex social interactions. The focus of this paper is to review selected approaches to the role of mirror neurons in mental activity as understanding, and to conclude with some possible implications for researches on mirror neurons for philosophical theories of understanding.
PL
This article presents Karol Wojtyła’s thinking on consciousness and its possible distortion called the ‘emotionalization of consciousness’. In consciousness two functions can be distinguished, namely a receptive function and an experiencing/interiorizing function. When the emotionalization of this dual structure takes place, consciousness is weakened in registering emotional facts (in their cognitive aspect) as well as in their proper experiencing (i.e. in referring them to the interiority of the subject). Wojtyła concentrates on self-knowledge as a power, which can contribute to limiting or eliminating the emotionalization of consciousness. However, he does not mention how to strengthen self-knowledge and make it more adequate for the job. Hence, in the paper, the author underlines the role of understanding and command of language, which can make self-knowledge a more efficient tool.
EN
The article compares the understanding of self-knowledge of the mind in Tibetan Buddhism (in the schools of Mahamudra and Dzogchen) with the ancient, PlatonicChristian philosophy. It argues that in both traditions there are two aspects of the experience of self-knowledge: the impossibility of grasping the mind as an object and theceaseless, unavoidable awareness of the mind’s cognitive activity. The fi rst of those aspects is called by the Tibetan tradition “emptiness”, while the second – lucidity ofthe mind’s nature. In Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine of Hippo we can see a diff erence of accent in terms of the signifi cance of those two motifs, but it seems that bothphilosophers understand self-knowledge in a very similar way. Recognizing those two aspects is what brings the Buddhist and the Western traditions close to each other,while a fundamental diff erence between them lies in the fact that in the latter, selfknowledge of the mind opens a path to the experience of the infi nite mind of God, ofwhich the fi rst is an image, while in Buddhism the concept of God does not appear at all. Individual self-knowledge is treated as the experience of the nature of one, universaland absolute mind.
PL
Samowiedza to jeden z ważnych czynników regulujących relacje międzyludzkie. Stanowi efekt zainteresowania własną osobą, wynikającego nie z egoizmu, lecz poszukiwania i odkrywania samego siebie, określania własnego miejsca w otaczającym świecie, uświadamiania sobie własnych odczuć i czynów, podejmowania decyzji, działań oraz przezwyciężania przeszkód. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie wyników badań nad samowiedzą osób w okresie wczesnej dorosłości, z dysfunkcją wzroku, z niepełnosprawnością ruchową i z niepełnosprawnością intelektualną.
EN
Self-knowledge is one of the important factors regulating interpersonal relations. It constitutes the effect of self-interest resulting not from egotism but from searching and discovering one’s self, from determining one’s own place in the surrounding world, realizing one’s own feelings and actions, from taking decisions and actions as well as from overcoming obstacles. The aim of this article is to present the outcomes of the research on self-knowledge of young adults with diagnosed visual impairment and motor or intellectual disability.
EN
The ten-year duration of the new century, moving away from the end of the twentieth century, inspire to reflection on the impact of modern thought on the shape of the life of modern societies. It pressing for the question, important from the standpoint of philosophy, if the ordinary mind reflects the knowledge, manifested in the way that they live in the community? In short, the issue will be about human self-understanding as it is developed through anthropological reflection of contemporary life and its shape. In my essay I’m trying to show the consequences of the new approach of understanding of the concept of the body, which was developed in the twentieth century. This approach is reflected in the ethical kind of demands. For this purpose, I use both Nietzsche’s, Merleau-Ponty’s and Sartre’s concept of bodiness and reflections on the future of humanity developed by Arendt. My conclusion is that the desubstantialisation of the body is associated with the ethical postulate of concern for the world.
PL
Refleksyjność jest cechą każdego człowieka, kompetencją umysłową, zdolnością człowieka do bycia dla siebie zarówno przedmiotem, jak również podmiotem poznania. Jest to rodzaj wewnętrznego dialogu, który przejawia się w konkretnych działaniach podejmowanych przez osobę. To skłonność do refleksji, zastanawiania się, rozważania, analizowania. Człowiek podejmując wysiłek myślenia nabywa zdolności do refleksyjności. Wydaje się, że współczesna edukacja kładzie punkt ciężkości na kształcenie, pomijając aspekty wychowania i samowychowania. A przecież bezrefleksyjne, schematyczne wychowanie niesie z sobą wiele zagrożeń. W procesie wychowania, trwającym przez całe życie człowieka, refleksyjność jest bardzo istotna i konieczna. W związku z tym przedmiotem badań podjętych w niniejszym tekście jest refleksyjność w kontekście procesu wychowania. Dlatego, w aspekcie teoretycznym, zostanie przedstawiona refleksyjność jako kategoria pedagogiczna. Następnie omówione zostaną podstawowe koncepcje refleksyjności przedstawione przez Johna Deweya, Jürgena Habermasa, Davida Kolba i Donalda Schöna. Ukazana będzie również refleksyjność w perspektywie procesu poznawania samego siebie. Tak ujmowana refleksyjność stanowi dla teorii pedagogicznej oraz edukacji istotny punkt odniesienia, bowiem dotyczy kluczowego problemu podmiotu i zachodzącego w nim procesu stawania się.
EN
Reflexivity is a characteristic of every human being, the mental competence and human ability to be both a subject and object of cognition. It is a kind of internal dialogue that manifests itself in the concrete actions undertaken by the person. It is prone to reflection, thinking about something, analysis. Man, when he makes the effort to think, acquires the ability to reflect. It seems that modern education puts the focus on education aside from aspects of upbringing and self-education and yet an unreflective, schematic education brings with it many risks. In the process of upbringing, which lasts throughout human life, reflection is very important and necessary. Consequently, the subject of research of this paper is reflection in the context of the process of education. Therefore, in the theoretical aspect, reflections will be presented as a pedagogical category. Then we will discuss the basic concepts of reflexivity presented by John Dewey, Jürgen Habermas, David Kolb and Donald Schön. It will also show reflexivity from the perspective of the process of self-knowledge. Such reflectivity is a crucial point for pedagogical theory and education as it deals with the key problem of the subject and the process of becoming involved in it.
RU
Предметом анализа в предлагаемой статье является протестное отношение поколения next к действительности, базирующей на идеях потребления. Контекстом для оспаривающих тенденций является американская субкультура битников. Критическое отношение к консьюмеризму приводит молодых людей к поискам альтернативного стиля жизни - прежде всего он сводится к бродяжничеству как возможности познания собственного «я» и другого человека. Важной составляющей альтернативных форм экзистенции является контакт с природой и обращение к восточному мистицизму. Бунт молодого поколения имеет прежде всего психологический (расширение собственного сознания) и социальный (изменение социальных идеалов) характер.
EN
This paper examines Russia’s “next” generation and its expressions of anti-consu- merist protest, which stem from a fascination with the american beat Generation. Criticism of the consumerist lifestyle prompts the protagonists of bogatyreva’s prose to seek an alternative, especially through hitchhiking, which provides the opportunity to become closer to oneself and others. Communion with nature and a turn towards Eastern Mysticism become important elements of these new styles of existence. The nature of the rebellion of the “next” generation is primarily psy- chological, with an emphasis on expanding one’s own awareness, as well as social, underpinned by the dream of creating a society based on anti-capitalist ideals.
EN
The aim of the paper is the analysis of Martha Nussbaum’s views on the problem of love, namely, its proper recognition. Nussbaum describes love as a spe-cific type of knowledge, which involves undeniable impression of particular be-auty of another person, followed by its moral acceptance and devotion to it. At the same time, she argues that one of the most fundamental features of love is its vulnerability to suffering, denial and self-deception. Therefore, she seeks for a criterium that would allow to discern loving from not loving. In the paper, first, the problem of love as knowledge in Nussbaum’s philosophy is analysed. In the second part, Nussbaum’s view on the limits and boundaries of love is discussed. Finally, consideration of possible enhancements that could be introduced to Nuss-baum’s thought about love is made, with reference to views of another thinkers, such as Aquinas, I. Kant or E. Levinas.
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