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EN
 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: The purpose of my article is to present the notion of cultural memory as applied to both the English society as well as the English sense of humour, and to examine these in relation to WW2 by means of the cognitive integration theory, aka blending. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: The presented research problem hinges around the term of memory, specifically the collective memory of the English, as perceived with regard to its multimodal conceptualization with the culture, together with its inextricable link with the English sense of humour. All this has been scrutinised by a linguistic method, i.e. conceptual integration theory, and the references to the literature in question. THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: Having defined the goal of my paper, and the basic concepts pertaining to it (memory, collective memory, English sense of humour), I proceed to the brief explanation of the linguistic paradigm, i.e. blending theory, which is employed within this study. Then, I present the analysis of the English humour tackling the subject of the Second World War, which is performed with the aid of the blending theory. RESEARCH RESULTS: The result of this argumentation is the preservation of the glorious memories of the British past via the English sense of humour, which helps to deal with the trauma and the not‑so‑glarious moments of the English history. CONCLUSIONS, INNOVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: This analysis confirmed that conceptual integration theory can be utilized as a tool with which to analyse the collective memory of the English and their sense of humour. It also proved that the English nation employs their humour into the processing of the historical past, which softens the blow of the horrendous events, and makes it possible for the English to glorify and idealise their role within the world’s arena.
EN
The contemporary western political discourse is dominated by the conviction of the equality of cultures. This conviction is treated as a recent accomplishment of the leftist liberal trend of western societies. The following text indicates that this conviction may in certain cases be invalid. The person who shattered this concept was John Bagot Glubb. This British officer serving the British Empire in the Middle East since 1921 was the chief commander of the Jordan army in the period between 1939 and 1956. J. B. Glubb was a conservative member of an old noble family from the south of England and at the same time he was passionate about the Arabic culture – in particular about the life of the Bedouin. In contrast to many contemporary supporters of political correctness, he did not depreciate his own culture, but he showed genuine recognition of many features of the Arabic culture. He spent his whole life working to bring the West and the Arabs closer. Now one may accuse J.B. Glubb of numerous political mistakes, e.g., typically British paternalism, but nonetheless his life indicates that it was possible for an activist representing the conservative trend in the European culture to be a proponent of bringing cultures together
PL
W latach 1946–1948 doszło do konfliktu między społecznością arabską i żydowską w Palestynie. Starcie to zakończyło się zwycięstwem strony żydowskiej i utworzeniem Państwa Izrael. Ważną rolę w tych wydarzeniach odgrywały władze brytyjskie. To decyzje Londynu rozstrzygały o losach Palestyny aż do połowy maja 1948 r. Dlatego warto poznać poglądy elity brytyjskiej na temat społeczności żydowskiej i arabskiej. Szczególnie uważnie należałoby prześledzić jej opinie dotyczące siły politycznej obu przeciwników. Na podstawie dokumentów brytyjskich, zwłaszcza raportów dowódcy armii transjordańskiej J.B. Glubba, można tę sprawę częściowo wyjaśnić. Należy stwierdzić, że elity imperium liczyły się wprawdzie z siłą polityczną społeczności żydowskiej, ale zdecydowanie nie doceniały jej możliwości militarnych. Jednocześnie w Londynie przeceniano wojskowe umiejętności Arabów. Zupełnie też nie rozumiano motywów ruchu syjonistycznego i poziomu jego determinacji. Ten stan świadomości przyczynił się do wytworzenia wśród wojskowych i cywilnych elit brytyjskich anachronicznego obrazu obu stron sporu. To zaś prawdopodobnie ułatwiło Londynowi podjęcie fatalnej decyzji o wycofaniu się z Palestyny w maju 1948 r. Było to równoznaczne ze zgodą na wojnę w tej krainie. Wiele poszlak wskazuje, że Brytyjczycy liczyli na możliwość powrotu swych sił jako oddziałów ratujących słabszą grupę żydowską. Tymczasem wynik starcia zadał decydujący cios brytyjskiemu systemowi dominacji w regionie.
EN
In the years 1946–1948 a conflict between the Arab and the Jewish communities took place in Palestine. The struggle ended in the victory of the Jewish side and formation of the State of Israel. In the period in questions the British authorities played an important role in these events. It was the decisions of London that determined, until May 1948, the situation in Palestine. Therefore, it is worth petting to know the opinions of British elites on the subject of Jewish and Arab communities. In particular, its opinions on the topic of the political power of the two enemies should be recognised. This issue can be partially explained on the basis of British documents and, in particular, on the basis of reports of the commander of the Transjordan Army, J. B. Glubb. It needs to be stated that the Empire elites did in fact recognise political strength of the Jewish community, but they did not recognise its military potential. Simultaneously, London overrated the military potential of Arabs. The motives of the Zionist movement and the level of its determination were not understood at all. Such a state of awareness contributed to the creation, among the British military and civil elites, of an anachronistic image of both sides of the conflict. Probably in consequence this helped London to make the disastrous decision to withdraw from Palestine in May 1948. This was tantamount to consent for war in this region. Numerous traces of evidence indicate that the British hoped for the possibility of the return of their forces as troops rescuing the weaker Jewish side, however the result of the conflict dealt a decisive blow to British dominance in the region.
PL
Haszymidzkie Królestwo Transjordanii uzyskało formalną niepodległość w 1946 r. Jego poprzednikiem był Emirat Transjordanii. W latach 1946–1956 Brytyjczycy nadal wywierali silny wpływ na elity królestwa. W tekście przedstawiono poglądy urzędników i doradców brytyjskich w kwestii odrębności państwowej Jordanii. W latach 1946–1957 brytyjscy oficerowie i urzędnicy uznawali państwo haszymidzkie za twór sztuczny i przewidywali, że dość szybko roztopi się on w większej arabskiej federacji.Formally, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan became an independent state in 1946, preceded by the Emirate of Transjordan. In 1946–1956 the British still exerted great influence on the elites of the Kingdom. The study presents opinions of British officials and advisors on the question of state autonomy of Jordan. Principally, in 1946–1957 British officers and officials recognised the Hashemite state as an artificial construct and predicted that fairly soon it would melt within a larger Arab federation.
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