In this paper, I reflect on Descartes' employment of the meditational genre in the weaving of the text of the Meditations. In the first part, the possible influences behind Descartes' choice of the meditational genre are examined. The second part of the paper attempts to spell out the significance of Descartes' use of the meditational form. The claim advanced here is that Descartes adopted this unique genre ultimately to further his radical philosophical project of a subject-centred theory of knowledge and a new metaphysical Weltbild, with the self (res cogitans) catapulted to the central stage and the physical world (res extensa) reduced to an object of the subject's act of representation.
The paper presents a pluralistic solution to the epistemological problem of the value of knowledge. In the first part, the starting points for the discussion on the value of knowledge are mapped out, including the key assumptions that knowledge is valu- able (1) distinctively, (2) universally and (3) necessarily. It then summarizes the most important routes to take towards solving this problem, which, however, bump up against an inability to satisfy all three of these assumptions at the same time. The second part of the paper presents an alternative pluralistic view of the value of knowledge, which is inspired by M. Weiner’s concept of knowledge as a “Swiss Army Knife”. Paradoxically, however, this approach simultaneously denies all three assumptions about the value of knowledge, which it explains as a variable and contextual quality of knowledge. However, as it ultimately turns out, this explanation might be fully in accordance with common intuitions about why knowledge is valuable.
According to Ricoeur, phenomenology is “for a good part the history of Husserlian heresies.” In this paper, I argue that, at the crossroads between a possible “topography of heresies” and a potential “geography of horizons,” phenomenology of evidence takes “the road to renewal” in pursuit of knowledge of knowledge and truth about truth. In doing so, I suggest that phenomenology of evidence is not “heresy” against “orthodox” or “analytical” theory of knowledge. Rather, in so far as it is required by a phenome-nological description of knowledge, phenomenology of evidence represents critical heterodoxy in the face of dogmatic orthodoxy. As such, it serves as a first step on “the road to renewal” of reflection on truth. Thus phenomenology of evidence emerges as one of “the many faces of contemporary phenomenology,” and as a very bright one indeed. In support of this position, I present arguments in the form of ten lessons from phenomenology of evidence for contemporary theory of knowledge.
The main thesis of this essay is that practice is superior to a "theoretical vs. practical" distinction. In this sense, every sort of knowledge is essentially "practical"; so-called "theoretical" knowledge is an historically overemphasised borderline example of the practical. Based mostly on Wittgenstein's view, I shall gradually refine an opposition between theoretical and practical knowledge by analysing some related dualisms on an active, processual, communicative and applicative concept of knowledge. Then I will provide some arguments as to why knowledge as a practical matter in this sense should be seen as, both logically and temporally, prior to the distinction.
The paper discusses with critical intent Marek J. Siemek’s conception of transcen-dental philosophy. Firstly, theory of knowledge does not belong to the epistemic level of reflection (Siemek’s stance) but it is precisely the other way around; namely, it is due to transcendental philosophy (critique of cognitive faculties) that it was possible to distinguish metaphysical, ontological and epistemological questions. Secondly, tran-scendental philosophy enables us to discriminate between the ontological and epistemo-logical questions (Emil Lask, Edmund Husserl) and, as a result, to take up within its scope traditional epistemological questions such as adequacy of cognition. Thirdly, Siemek’s Fichtean interpretation of transcendental philosophy is untenable. It overesti-mates the role of spontaneity and practical moment in the constitution of the world and underestimates the receptive moment in cognition. It seems that more plausible way of understanding transcendental philosophy can be found in the writings of the Marburg School of neo-Kantianism where within the field of transcendental consciousness more objectified meanings and subject as such are being constituted.
A new version of the incompatibilist argument is developed. Knowledge is (at least) justified true belief. If God’s divine knowledge must be justified knowledge, then humans cannot have the “alternative possibilities” type of free will. This incompatibilist argument is immunized against the application of the hard-soft fact distinction. If divine knowledge is justified, then the only kind of facts that God can know are hard facts, permitting this incompatibilist argument to succeed.
In the text I argue that Holocaust studies, to an extent, are part of the global trend within contemporary human studies to include issues such as body of the author, corporeal aspect of a narrative, and autobiographical context etc. in its theory. This trend, however in the case of Holocaust studies remains in close correlation with the paradox inscribed in the genre of a (Holocaust) testimony as the main model for any Holocaust text: being “in” and “out” of it, conveying the “objective” truth and confirming it by virtue of a witness “who was there”. Based on this observation and after quoting examples of Holocaust writing in disciplines such as historiography or literary studies, (considered as specific genres of Holocaust writing, nevertheless governed by narrative rules equal to those present within genres such as diary, novel etc.) I come to the conclusion that the paradox has become the core feature of the discipline which aims to define its own boundaries by creating a separate, yet familiar methodology and language corresponding to the paradoxical ontology of the texts it analyses.
PL
W artykule bronię tezy głoszącej, że nauka o Zagładzie jako dyscyplina wytwarza szczególne napięcie pomiędzy autorem tekstów należących do tej dziedziny (badaczem) i obiektem jego narracji (badań). To napięcie, w pewnym stopniu obecne także w innych dziedzinach humanistycznych pod postacią rewaloryzacji autobiografizmu, narracji somatycznych itp., w przypadku badań nad Zagładą pozostaje w ścisłym związku z zasadniczą modalnością-gatunkiem tego rodzaju pisarstwa – świadectwem – i jego paradoksalnym wymogiem narracyjnego umieszczenia się wewnątrz własnej narracji (obecność zaświadczająca) i pozostawania poza nią (zakładana zdolność narratora do spójnej i bezstronnej opowieści). Próbując udowodnić powszechność tego paradoksu w holocaustowych narracjach historiograficznych, literaturoznawczych i innych, dochodzę do wniosku, że staje się on quasi-gatunkowym wyznacznikiem tej dyscypliny, która opierając się na wspomnianym paradoksie (sygnalizowanym m.in. poprzez proliferację kategorii takich jak np. niewypowiadalność) dąży do ustanowienia własnego badawczego języka i własnej metodologii. Choć jest to często metodologia i terminologia zbieżna z powszechnie stosowanymi narzędziami badań historiograficznych, literaturoznawczych i innych, to w ramach omawianej dziedziny zyskuje ona status narzędzi osobnych, właściwych jedynie dziedzinie Holocaust studies.
This review study is concerned with the recently published second edition of the philosophical work Anschauung und Begriff. Grundzüge eines Systems der Begriffsbildung, the authors of which are members of the “narrow” Prague Circle: Max Brod and Felix Weltsch. They themselves characterise their work as a “monograph about vague ideas”. A salient feature of their theory is the attempt to determine afresh the relation between intuition and concept, reflecting the ideas of the time in philosophy and experimental psychology. The authors are of the opinion that in the sphere of the vague and uncertain, there appear certain observable connecting links: these are intuitive concepts which lack any role in the formation of a scientific concept as it is understood in the neo-Kantian tradition. Study of this work contributes to our understanding of the historical reception of Brentanism in the context of the intellectual milieu of Prague at the time, which was characterised by an overt interplay between Prague German philosophy and literature.
DE
Die vorliegende Rezensionsstudie ist der aktuellen zweiten Ausgabe des philosophischen Werks Anschauung und Begriff. Grundzüge eines Systems der Begriffsbildung gewidmet, dessen Autoren, Max Brod und Felix Weltsch, Mitglieder des engeren Prager Kreises waren. Diese bezeichneten ihr Werk selbst als „Monographie über verschwommene Vorstellungen“. Ein wichtiger Grundzug ihrer Theorie ist die Bemühung um eine neue Bestimmung der Beziehung von Anschauung und Begriff, in der zeitgenössische Denkströmungen der Philosophie und der experimentellen Psychologie reflektiert werden. Die Autoren vermuten, dass in der Sphäre des Vagen und Unbestimmten gewisse beobachtbare Zwischenglieder entstehen, d. h. Meinungsbegriffe, die nicht im Zusammenhang mit der Bildung des wissenschaftlichen Begriffs stehen, so wie er im Neukantismus aufgefasst wird. Interessant ist ein Studium dieses Werks hinsichtlich der Rezeptionsgeschichte des Brentanismus im Kontext des damaligen intellektuellen Umfelds Prags, in den nachweislichen Beziehungen zwischen der deutschen Philosophie und Literatur in Prag bestanden.
The study examines Zuzana Parusniková’s book David Hume, Sceptic. It first examines how the book situates Hume’s philosophy in between radical scepticism resulting from the scrutiny of human knowledge and natural belief that cannot be shaken by sceptical doubts. Hume accepts radical scepticism and the limits it sets for human understanding. However, a practicable philosophy must submit itself to belief in the common world and offer a useful examination into the principles of moral and social behavior and common life. This finally results in philosophy becoming a guide for a happy life. In the second part, the study employs Hume’s concept of the love of truth to show a deeper link between several functions of philosophy, and, by interpreting Hume’s view of the relation between abstruse and easy philosophy, it criticizes Parusnikova’s interpretation of abstruse philosophy.
CS
Text studie analyzuje knihu Zuzany Parsunikové David Hume, Sceptic, jež klade filosofii Davida Huma do rozporu mezi radikální skepsí plynoucí z reflexe lidského poznání a přirozenou vírou, jejíž genezi nedokáží skeptické pochybnosti narušit. Hume přijímá radikální skepsi i meze, které stanovuje lidskému rozumu. Praktikovatelná filosofie se však musí podřídit víře ve společný svět a prospěšně zkoumat principy lidského jednání a soužití ve společensko-morální oblasti. Vposledu se filosofie stává návodem ke šťastnému životu. Ve své druhé části zde předkládaná studie využívá Humovu koncepci lásky k pravdě, aby ukázala hlubší souvislost mezi funkcemi filosofie u Huma, a na základě výkladu Humova pojetí vztahu obtížné a snadné filosofie kritizuje autorčin výklad epistemologické funkce obtížné filosofie.
This historically oriented study is dedicated to the German naturalist, mathematician and philosopher Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus (1651–1708) and aims to introduce his main philosophical-logical work, Medicina mentis. After a biographical overview, from which important connections emerge, the article sets out and comments upon his four empirical principles, which provide an overview of the philosophical theory of knowledge. The key theme of his main work is the art of invention (ars inveniendi) and the concept of science as applied algebra, which was an obvious influence on Tschirnhaus’s epistemology and logic. The thinking of this philosopher engages with the work of Descartes, Spinoza, Geulincx and Gassendi, with which – like Leibniz – he tries to harmonize. Although Tschirnhaus’s approach is in many regards dependent on other thinkers, he stands out for his appreciation of the controlled imagination in science and experimentation. The four empirical principles, then, emphasize inner experience and an a posteriori approach.
CS
Tato historicky zaměřená studie je věnována německému přírodovědci, matematikovi a filosofovi Ehrenfriedu Waltheru von Tschirnhausovi (1651–1708) s cílem představit jeho hlavní filosoficko-logické dílo Medicina mentis. Po biografickém přehledu, z něhož vyplývají důležité souvislosti, jsou vyloženy a komentovány jeho čtyři empirické principy, které poskytují průřez filosofovou teorií poznání. Klíčovým tématem tohoto spisu je umění objevovat (ars inveniendi) a pojetí vědy jako aplikované algebry, které přirozeně ovlivnilo Tschirnhausovu epistemologii i logiku. Myšlení tohoto filosofa zpracovává podněty z díla Descarta, Spinozy, Geulincxe a Gassendiho, které se – podobně jako Leibniz – snaží harmonizovat. Přestože je Tschirnhausova koncepce v mnohém závislá na jiných myslitelích, vyniká oceněním kontrolované obrazotvornosti v oblasti vědy a experimentu. Čtyři empirické principy pak kladou důraz na vnitřní zkušenost a přístup a posteriori.
It is argued that the Senecan concept of physics, indebted as it is to earlier Stoic writings, allows the Roman philosopher to think of the respective inquiry in terms of ultimate science, a lore that brings humans closer to the divine, but also possesses profound ethical consequences. The understanding of universal law becomes mandatory, but also sufficient for ethical progress, while the notion of cosmic balance is employed to reject the excess and lack of measure so characteristic of vice. Under the guise of discussing very particular physical questions, Seneca inquires into the eternal, immutable Law, thus indicating the way for human betterment and achievement of perfection.
Suárez’s theory of knowledge, worked out in his On the Soul (1621), presents a significant philosophical addition to the famous Metaphysical Disputations (1597). Even if On the Soul was published posthumously, its basic thoughts were developed, by Suárez himself, as early as in the first half of the 1570’s. For this reason this work of pure philosophy provides the indispensable context for Suárez’s metaphysical reflections. The article presents the fundamental characteristics of Suárez’s theory of knowledge, with emphasis on knowledge of reason, and with a view to its critical relation to Thomist theory. It is above all Thomist theory which Suárez was addressing. Next to the brief presentation of the historical context of the work and a sketch of the basic anthropological tendencies connected with Suárez’s particular form of dualism with regard to the question of the soul and body, the author presents four basic characteristics of Suárez’s theory of knowledge. 1) Suárez’s theory of knowledge is characterised as a doctrine that puts emphasis on the vital nature of knowledge. The whole principle of knowledge cannot be considered without the factor of the attentive soul; passive reason, as really identical with active reason, cannot be treated as passive primary matter; the intentional species represent extramental objects only in an embryonic way; intentional connections of the knowing subject with the known thing can be understood as, at most, an accidental one. All these theses are clearly signs of non-Thomism. 2) Suárez’s theory of knowledge is characterised by direct cognitive realism. The rejection of the expressed species (species expressa) really distinct from the cognitive act and the rejection of the definition of a formal concept as that in which (id in quo) we grasp extramental things, shows that Suárez unequivocably advocates a conception of direct realism. He views Thomist theory as approaching too closely to an undesirable representationalism. 3) Suárez’s teaching is further characterised by a theory of the sympathy of cognitive potencies having their root in a common soul. It is this theory – widely accepted in Renaissance philosophy – which understands the relation between sensory and rational knowledge acausally. Suárez conceives it in contrast to the Thomist theory which works with a causal understanding of this relation. 4) In the final part of the study Suárez’s epistemological theory of the direct rational knowledge of material individuals is presented. Thomist teaching on the reflexive rational knowledge of individuals is rejected by Suárez for the same reason as Thomist theory on the real distinction between the concept and cognitive act: both offend against direct realism and thus also against the objectivity of our knowledge. The author comes to the negative conclusion that Suárez’s theory of knowledge is positively not primarily inspired by Thomist theory. The main influence – one which the author does not attempt to elaborate – seems to be the Augustinian-Franciscan tradition. At the same time attention is drawn to some of Suárez’s themes that are taken up by modern philosophy, such as occasionalism, innate ideas, predetermined harmony and the unity of apperception – these bring Suárez close to the conceptions of early modern rationalists.
KK-tezę wyrazić można jako następujące twierdzenie: "Jeżeli podmiot wie, że p, to zawsze jest w stanie wiedzy o tym, że wie, że p". Teza ta w historii filozofii przyjmowana była jako pewnik, jednakże we współczesnej epistemologii budzi ona liczne kontrowersje i jest istotnym elementem sporu dotyczącego modelu wiedzy. Jednym ze znaczących głosów przeciwko KK-tezie jest argument Timothy'ego Williamsona, opierający się na zaproponowanej przez niego zasadzie bezpieczeństwa wiedzy. Przedstawiona niżej polemika z argumentacją Williamsona składa się z dwóch części - w pierwszej pokazuję, że zasada bezpieczeństwa wiedzy jest niezgodna z modelem wiedzy Freda Dretskego. W drugiej wskazuję natomiast na nieścisłość zaproponowanego przez Williamsona sformułowania zasady bezpieczeństwa wiedzy, która pozwala na podważenie tezy, według której implikuje ona fałszywość KK -tezy.
EN
The KK-principle can be defined as follows: “For any subject x: if x knows that p, then she is always in a position to know that she knows that p”. This principle has been widely accepted in the history of philosophy. However, in contemporary epistemology it is considered controversial and regarded as an important part of the debate concerning the nature of knowledge. One of the arguments against the KK-principle has been presented by Timothy Williamson and it involves the so-called “safety principle”. In this paper, I argue against this account. My argument consists of two parts: in the first part, it is argued that the safety principle presented by Williamson contradicts Dretske’s account of knowledge. In the second part, I claim that the safety principle, as defined by Williamson, is not precise enough, which enables one to argue that it does not contradict the KK-principle.
The paper puts forth an interpretation of Popper’s early theory of knowledge that is found in the work Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie. It mainly, however, focuses on his original and surprisingly detailed interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism. Popper is inspired by Kant in many things: he, for example, makes use of Kant’s transcendental method of inquiry and also the discovery that all knowledge of reality lies in the existence of laws. At the same time, however, he criticizes Kant because of the circular reasoning of transcendental idealism by means of transcendental deduction, which additionally leads Popper to exchange the epistemological and psychological aspects of knowledge. Although Popper distinguishes between the theory of knowledge and the psychology of knowledge, he does not recognize formal apriorism in the epistemological sense but only genetic apriorism in the cognitive psychological sense. Popper’s interpretation of Kant is not however free from certain misunderstandings as it ignores the difference between “pure natural science” and “empirical physics.”.
CS
Stať se zaměřuje na výklad Popperovy rané teorie poznání v díle Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie. Soustředí se přitom především na jeho originální a překvapivě podrobné interpretace Kantova transcendentálního idealismu. Popper se nechává Kantem v mnohém inspirovat: využívá například jeho transcendentální způsob tázání a také myšlenku, že každé poznání skutečnosti spočívá v existenci zákonitostí. Zároveň Kanta na druhé straně kritizuje kvůli kruhovému zdůvodnění transcendentálního idealismu prostřednictvím transcendentální dedukce, jež navíc Poppera dovádí až ke kritice zaměňování epistemologických a psychologických aspektů poznání u Kanta. Popper totiž rozlišuje teorii poznání a psychologii poznání, přičemž neuznává formální apriorismus v epistemologickém smyslu, nýbrž pouze genetický apriorismus ve smyslu kognitivně psychologickém. Popperova interpretace Kanta nicméně není prosta určitých nedorozumění, především opomíjí rozdíl mezi „čistou přírodní vědou“ a „empirickou fyzikou“.
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