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Jak straciliśmy Chiny? Amerykański spór o politykę wobec Chin w latach 1944–1950

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Bartosiński P.

Azja-Pacyfik

2011

issue XIV

211-241

This article deals with the debate on US involvement in China during the end of World War II and the civil war. The main problem of the controversy over US foreign policy toward China was: what position should American policymakers take on the civil war between the Chinese National Party (Guomindang) and the Chinese Communist Party. Mao Zedong’s 1949 seizing of power in China and the collapse of Chiang Kai-Shek’s regime in mainland China was used by the republican opposition as a pretext to attack the foreign policy of president Truman’s administration. Among the main actors taking part in the American internal dispute over foreign policy toward China were: the so called China Lobby (opting for full-range US involvement in the civil war siding with the Guomindang), the military establishment (stressing China’s military significance for US security in East Asia), foreign service members (working in the US embassy in Chongqing) and last but not least members of Truman’s cabinet (who must have been taking electoral requirements into consideration). American involvement was first of all a political one. Since 1944 US representatives in China (ambassador P. Hurley, special presidential envoy gen. G. Marshall) were engaging in fruitless mediatory missions to reconcile the warring parties and to establish a coalition government. Concurrently, Washington was backing Chiang’s regime by granting him loans and military equipment. Due to internal circumstances and public reluctance to have the US involved in a full-scale military assistance for Guomindang, policymakers decided not to implement the doctrine of containment in China. As the failure of Chiang’s regime became more and more evident, Washington made one last effort to secure its interest in China by approaching Chinese communist representatives in the spring of 1949. Ambassador J.L. Stuart’s efforts proved futile because Mao drove a hard bargain and because of the activity of anti-communist hardliners in the USA. Opinions expressed by experts (such as George Kennan) in the Department of State stating that communist rule in China did not automatically mean subservience to the Soviet Union were ignored by policymakers. Joseph MacCarthy’s accusations of American diplomats’ who worked in China in the mid of 1940’s of being disloyal led to a stiffening anti-communist foreign policy and ultimately prevented the US government from granting recognition to the People’s Republic of China.

Współpraca polityczno-wojskowa Japonii i Australii w latach 1990-2009

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Bartosiński P.

Forum Politologiczne

2010

vol. 11 - Chiny i państwa azjatyckie - karty z historii i wyzwania współczesności

395-415

Australia and Japan were called as two anchors of US political and military presence in West Pacific during Cold War. Despite several decades of indirect alliance between these two countries through hub and spokes system, bilateral relations were lacking in intensity and strategic substance before 1990s. Revival of mutual cooperation was marked in 1990 by visit of commander-in-arms of Australian Defence Force in Tokyo and Japanese Defence Minister in Canberra. Breaking animosities brought to regular and broad political and military partnership which began in 1996. Cooperation through UN peace-keeping missions in Cambodia (1992-1993) and East Timor played crucial role in strengthening Japanese-Australian friendship. Canberra and Tokyo worked out beneficial and complementary cooperation (Australia as military factor, Japan as civilian contributor). War on terror since 11th September 2001 and US led operations in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) made a trial of common values and mutual assistance on the battlefield. Trilateral Strategic Dialogue between USA, Japan and Australia established in 2001 has been an attempt to replace hub and spokes system. Some constraints of multilateral relations resulted from different stands on North Korean missile tests, Chinese threats against Taiwan and embargo on arms trade with PRC. Australian „soft" policy towards China which becomes a major trade partner of Canberra weakens trilateral and bilateral partnership. However Japan and Australia stressed the importance of their relations by signing Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2007. For both Tokyo and Canberra this declaration is, next to the treaties with US, first security agreement with foreign country. Future architecture of Asian security is a challenge for both Australia and Japan. This issue developed particularly since Kevin Rudd's presentation of the idea of Asia Pacific Community and Japanese government policy of „Return to Asia" disclosed by new prime minister Yumio Hatoyama in 2009.

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Jak straciliśmy Chiny? Amerykański spór o politykę wobec Chin w latach 1944–1950

Współpraca polityczno-wojskowa Japonii i Australii w latach 1990-2009