Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 3

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

System rządów zgromadzenia w konstytucji Turcji z 1921 r.

100%
Kryszeń G.
Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica
|
2019
|
vol. 18
|
issue 1
71-90
PL
Celem artykułu jest przeprowadzenie analizy przepisów Konstytucji Turcji z 1921 r. pod kątem ukazania specyfiki przyjętego w niej systemu rządów. Analiza ta prowadzi do konstatacji, iż wspomniany dokument, czyniący podstawą ustroju konstytucyjnego Turcji zasadę suwerenności narodu i zasadę jedności władzy skupionej w parlamencie, kształtował system rządów zgromadzenia we wzorcowej, „czystej” i „podręcznikowej” jego postaci, znanej z koncepcji J.J. Rousseau i historii rewolucji francuskiej. W artykule są ukazane również historyczne uwarunkowania podjęcia decyzji o wdrożeniu takiego systemu rządów, a także jej wyznaczniki doktrynalne i teoretyczne.
EN
The aim of the article is to analyze the provisions of the Constitution of Turkey of 1921 with respect to the specific system of governance adopted in it. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the document, making the constitutional system of Turkey based on the principle of the sovereignty of the nation and the principle of unity of power concentrated in the hands of the parliament, provided for the system of governance of the assembly in its model, the “pure” and “classic” form, known from J.J. Rousseau’s concept and the story of the French Revolution. The article also shows the historical, doctrinal and theoretical determinants of the decision to implement such a system of power.
2
Content available remote

Ewolucja formowania składu Rady Federacji Zgromadzenia Federalnego Federacji Rosyjskiej

100%
Kryszeń G.
Przegląd Sejmowy
|
2013
|
issue 6(119)
53-74
EN
The Constitution of the Russian Federation of 5 December 1993, establishing a bicameral parliament (the Federal Assembly), does not provide specifi c rules for determining the composition of the upper chamber — the Council of the Federation. The authors of the Constitution restrict themselves to declaration that this authority shall consist of includes two representatives from each subject of the Russian Federation (one from the legislative and one from the executive body of state authority), while the adoption of the procedure for its selection has been left for federal laws. The solutions established so far in this respect have proved to be unstable. The Federal Law of December 5, 2012, adopted the current procedure for creating the composition of the Council of Federation, the fourth since its inception. All the solutions so far existing which are presented chronologically in the article refl ected different concepts of representation of the Federation’s subjects and were usually dictated by current policy goals. They were of a unique character in comparison to the methods used for creating compositions of second chambers in other federal countries. Moreover, they were subject of permanent and lively disputes between the Russian constitutional law and political science theorists, also described in the article.
3
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Instytucja referendum w Nowej Zelandii

100%
Kryszeń G.
Studia Wyborcze
|
2013
|
vol. XVI
93-111
EN
New Zealand is known as one of the most democratic countries of the world, especially thanks to the adopted institutional model of direct democracy. This model primarily consists of three types of national referendums: a constitutional referendum, a referendum initiated by the Government and since 1993 citizens initiated referendum (CIR). Among the five referendums on the constitutional nature which were carried out previously, two of them were related to the length of the term of office of the Parliament (1967 and 1990), and three of them electoral reform (1992, 1993 and 2011). A very large group in the second listed category of referendums, managed at the initiative of the Government, in the years 1911-1987 were to vote on alcohol licensing, which accompanied almost all then parliamentary elections. There had also been in the Government's initiative ordered five other referendums (three in 1949 and one in 1967 and 1997). The practice of using CIR is not so common. So far, four such referendums were held (one in 1995 and 2009, two – in 1999).We should seek causes of this fairly modest practice in imperfection of CIR regulation, as well as non-legislative factors. The institution of the referendum, despite not often used, seems to be, however, a permanent part of the constitutional law in New Zealand, with the strong support of the vast majority of citizens.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.