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EN
The article is a brief survey and evaluation of historical research on Poznań 1956 protests, the political change in October 1956, and the year in general. An important gap was filled by the publication of Piotr Grzelczak’s book on the long-term consequences of the Poznań protests, and the conflict over its remembrance between government representatives and local inhabitants of the region, since the protests were one of the defining moments in recent history of Poznań. The article also includes a summary of the controversy between historians over the importance of 1956 as a watershed in Polish history, with some historians arguing that a more liberal image of the communist system in Poland was formed in 1956, while others argued that the communist dictatorship was stabilized by winning wider social support. The author has indicated an increasing separation between narratives about the Poznań protests in June and the political transformations in October, which has consequences and threats related to polarized perception of history, leading to meagre and simplified understanding of social realities of the Polish People’s Republic after 1956.
PL
The article is a brief survey and evaluation of historical research on Poznań 1956 protests, the political change in October 1956, and the year in general. An important gap was filled by the publication of Piotr Grzelczak’s book on the long-term consequences of the Poznań protests, and the conflict over its remembrance between government representatives and local inhabitants of the region, since the protests were one of the defining moments in recent history of Poznań. The article also includes a summary of the controversy between historians over the importance of 1956 as a watershed in Polish history, with some historians arguing that a more liberal image of the communist system in Poland was formed in 1956, while others argued that the communist dictatorship was stabilized by winning wider social support. The author has indicated an increasing separation between narratives about the Poznań protests in June and the political transformations in October, which has consequences and threats related to polarized perception of history, leading to meagre and simplified understanding of social realities of the Polish People’s Republic after 1956.
EN
This article attempts to present the attitudes of Warsaw workers between 1955 and 1957 and the functioning of party organisations in the industry during crisis time. The source base for the study, apart from the literature on the subject, was the archival material of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) of various levels, from factory units to voivodeship ones, mainly of ten large Warsaw factories (kept in the State Archives in Warsaw, branch at Milanówek). The subject of research was the behaviour and opinions of workers and the functioning of basic party cells and their evolution in the wake of the most important political events. The analysis also focused on the factors shaping the situation in Warsaw factories, the main stages of the crisis and the post-October ‘normalisation’ of workplace party cells, and the main models of attitudes of their members. The bottom-up perspective also made it possible to formulate conclusions about the sources of the crisis inside the PZPR, the course of factional fights, and the post-October PZPR leadership policy.
PL
Artykuł jest próbą przedstawienia postaw warszawskich robotników w latach 1955– 1957 oraz funkcjonowania organizacji partyjnych w przemyśle w momencie kryzysu. Podstawę źródłową badań, oprócz literatury przedmiotu, stanowiły materiały archiwalne PZPR różnych szczebli od zakładowego po wojewódzki, głównie dziesięciu dużych warszawskich przedsiębiorstw (są przechowywane w Archiwum Państwowym w Warszawie, ekspozytura w Milanówku). Przedmiotem badań były zachowania i opinie robotników oraz funkcjonowanie podstawowych organizacji partyjnych i ich ewolucja w rytm wyznaczany przez najważniejsze wydarzenia polityczne. Przedmiotem analizy były także czynniki kształtujące sytuację w warszawskich fabrykach, najważniejsze etapy kryzysu i popaździernikowej „normalizacji” zakładowych organizacji partyjnych, główne modele postaw ich członków. Oddolna perspektywa pozwoliła też na sformułowanie wniosków co do źródeł kryzysu wewnątrz PZPR, przebiegu walk frakcyjnych i polityki popaździernikowego kierownictwa PZPR.
EN
Oparte o obszerne kwerendy archiwalne, prasowe i literaturę przedmiotu studium polityki prasowej partii komunistycznej i sytuacji w środowisku dziennikarskim w latach 1953– 1955/1956, uwzględniające odmienną perspektywę centrum i peryferii, na tle przemian politycznych i kulturalnych. W pierwszej fazie destalinizacji polityka prasowa PZPR była rezultatem bardziej pragmatycznego kursu wyznaczonego przez ZSRR w krajach bloku po 1953 r. Gdy „odwilż” w Polsce nabrała własnej dynamiki, rozdźwięk w elicie PZPR i niespójna polityka sprzyjała poszerzaniu marginesu swobody prasy, zwłaszcza w stolicy. U progu 1956 r. część środowiska dziennikarzy, głównie młodych, buntowała się przeciwko modelowi prasy dyspozycyjnej, ograniczonej do roli narzędzia partyjnej propagandy. History of a two-front fight. The authorities – the press – journalists 1953–55/56The main purpose of the article is to analyse the press policy conducted by the communist party and the relationship between the authorities and journalists in 1953– 55/56 against the background of political and cultural changes in Poland. The analysis is based on the broad research in archives and press releases as well as literature on the subject; the subject is presented both from the national and local perspective. In the first phase of changes after Stalin’s death the press policy of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) was a result of more pragmatic line set by the Soviet Union in the communist block after 1953. When, at the end of 1954, the Thaw in Poland found its own dynamic, a growing discrepancy in the Party’s elite and incoherent policy contributed to the expanding margin of freedom of journalists, especially in the capital city of Warsaw. The press policy of the PUWP was the fruit of difference of opinion between the Party’s leaders, the Political Bureau, and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The Political Bureau was slamming the brakes. For the first time in April 1955, when in a letter to the central committees of voivodeships and districts they in fact reinterpreted the decisions of the post-Thaw Third Plenum of the Central Committee. For the second time, when at the end of 1955 they criticised the Trybuna Ludu (People’s Tribune) daily and Nowe Drogi (New Ways) monthly, and undertook a failed attempt to launch an ideological offensive. Jerzy Morawski, who was put in charge on behalf of the Central Committee Secretariat, represented this part of the Party’s elite who supported cautious changes and encouraged the press to criticize economic and social pathologies, regarding it as a necessary safety valve. An analysis of Morawski’s statements reveals that, in general, he supported the press in a role of critical observer. In January 1956 the Central Committee secretary explicitly distances himself from recent decisions of the Political Bureau on the Trybuna Ludu and presented himself as the advocate of liberalisation. Ambiguous signals from the centre of power fomented unrest and frustration of the journalist circles in Warsaw, who at the turn of 1956 in their large part rebelled against the model of press seen as a tool of party propaganda. On the other hand, however, signals sent from the centre exerted pressure and were resented by the central and local structures of the Stalinist party-state apparatus. Under these unstable circumstances the explosion was triggered by Moscow, where the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was beginning.
PL
The breakthrough of 1956 in Poland has so far been analysed mainly from the perspective of politics. Jerzy Kochanowski has described selected social, economic and cultural aspects and consequences of the radical social change of 1956–57. The present article places Kochanowski’s study against a background of the existing literature on the subject, with the reviewer presenting its main theses and formulating some polemical remarks. The most important among them points to a risk of distorting the picture of the 1956 crisis caused by the fact that the author underestimates the impact of the political context of social processes.
EN
The article presents the social characteristics of the Żerań Passenger Car Factory (PCF) staff in 1956 against the background of the nationwide working class. Their profile was similar to the ‘old’ industrial centres. The staff composition, made up of a relatively large number of workers of the proletarian productive type, cultivating traditional values and capable of collective action in defence of their interests, could have had a significant impact on the attitude of the PCF workers (both those belonging to the party and non-party staff) in 1956. This was reflected in the election, against informal guidelines, of a young worker, Lechosław Goździk, as secretary of the PCF Works Committee, and in the rejection of official trade unions and support for the ‘Żerań’ project to create a workers’ self-government.
PL
Artykuł przedstawia społeczną charakterystykę załogi FSO na Żeraniu w 1956 r. na tle ogólnopolskiego środowiska robotniczego. Jej profil był zbliżony do „starych” ośrodków przemysłowych. Skład załogi, złożonej z relatywnie dużej liczby robotników typu proletariacko-produktywnego, pielęgnujących tradycyjne wartości i zdolnych do działań zbiorowych w obronie swoich interesów, mógł mieć duże znaczenie dla postawy robotników FSO (partyjnych i bezpartyjnych) w 1956 r. Jej przejawem był wybór na sekretarza Komitetu Zakładowego FSO, wbrew nieformalnym wytycznym, młodego robotnika Lechosława Goździka oraz odrzucenie oficjalnych związków zawodowych i poparcie „żerańskiego” projektu utworzenia samorządu robotniczego.
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