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LOGIKA TEOLOGII OBJAWIONEJ W PISMACH ALBERTA WIELKIEGO I TOMASZA Z AKWINU

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Trepczyński M.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
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2013
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vol. 61
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issue 3
61-76
EN
In this paper the Author presents some remarks and hypotheses concerning the logic of revealed theology according to approach of Saint Albert the Great anf Saint Thomas Aquinas. First of all he shows that in their opinion revealed theology uses logic (as a science of correct reasonings). He also discusses the problem of scientific status of revealed theology on the grounds of the most important methodological fragments from their summas of theology; in this light he analyses if the revealed theology in their view may be interpreted as a kind of axiomatic deductive system. The Author inclines to give a positive answer on this question and presents a couple of arguments for such a hypothesis, however he is aware that the point is not totally clear and — hence — open for dis- cussion. The next topic is a question if we can admit that Thomas adopts one of nonmonotonic logic (understood here as relation of inference or relation of consequence) in some reasonings which we find in his Summa Theologiae. The Author gives a positive answer and confronts his opinion with an opinion of his opponent. In the third set of remarks he wonders if we may adopt that Aquinas accepts some local modifications in logic (this time understood as a some general rules of thinking), such as “the logic of Trinity” or “the Christologic”. Finally the Author invokes a case of the logic of negative theology and a nature of negation adopted according to this approach. However these remarks presented in this article concern the works of Albert and Thomas, the Author tends to affirm that their approach to the Catholic revealed theology is a proper one and—in this light—these conclusions may be valid for contemporary theology.
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W artykule tym przedstawiam kilka spostrzeżeń i hipotez dotyczących logiki teologii w ujęciu św. Alberta Wielkiego i św. Tomasza z Akwinu. Na początku pokazuję, że teologia objawiona korzysta według nich z logiki (jako nauki poprawnego rozumowania). Dyskutuję też problem naukowego statusu teologii objawionej na podstawie najważniejszych metodologicznych fragmentów summ teologii obu autorów; w tym świetle analizuję, czy teologia objawiona w ich ujęciu może być rozumiana jako aksjomatyczny system dedukcyjny. Skłaniam się ku udzieleniu pozytywnej odpowiedzi na to pytanie i podaję kilka argumentów za tą hipotezą, choć jestem świadomy, że zagadnienie to nie jest do końca jasne i – tym samym – pozostaje otwarte do dyskusji. Następną sprawą jest kwestia, czy możemy uznać, że Tomasz przyjmuje jedną z logik niemonotonicznych (rozumianej tu jako relecja inferencji lub relacja konsekwencji) w niektórych rozumowaniach zawartych w jego Summie teologii. Udzielam na to pytanie pozytywnej odpowiedzi i konfrontuję moje stanowisko ze stanowiskiem mojego oponenta. W ramach trzeciej grupy spostrzeżeń zastanawiam się, czy można założyć, że Akwinata przyjmuje pewne lokalne modyfikacje w logice (rozumianej tym razem jako ogólne prawa myślenia), takie jak „logika Trójcy” czy „Chrystologika”. Na koniec przywołuję jeszcze przypadek logiki teologii negatywnej i natury negacji przyjmowanej zgodnie z tym ujęciem. Chociaż spostrzeżenia przedstawione w tym artykule dotyczą pism Alberta i Tomasza, mam wewnętrzne przekonanie, że ich podejście do katolickiej teologii objawionej jest właściwe i – w tym świetle – powyższe wnioski mogą się również odnosić do współcześnie uprawianej teologii.
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Erudycja jako cel szkolnej edukacji filozoficznej

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Trepczyński M.
Forum Pedagogiczne
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2018
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vol. 8
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issue 1
251-271
EN
Erudition can be one of objectives of school philosophical education. Philosophy teachers in secondary schools in Poland who in 2014 took part in a nationwide research on teaching philosophy in lower and upper secondary schools (data were collected from 88% of headmasters from all the schools in Poland where philosophy was taught and 79% of teachers from these schools), asked to assess the importance of several educational objectives within philosophical education (on the scale 0-5), gave a relatively low rating to erudition. Despite this fact teachers to some extent appreciate erudition as a goal of philosophical education, which corresponds with the answers of the headmasters. The interviews conducted with 15 teachers and 15 headmasters show that they appreciate erudition in a deeper meaning, which is not a purely “encyclopedic” knowledge, but refers to a well understood knowledge being a basis for personal development, skills development and a starting point for posing questions.
PL
Erudycja może być jednym z celów szkolnej edukacji filozoficznej. Nauczyciele filozofii, którzy w 2014 roku wzięli udział w ogólnopolskim badaniu nauczania filozofii w gimnazjach i szkołach ponadgimnazjalnych (w którym udało się zebrać dane od 88 proc. dyrektorów wszystkich szkół w Polsce, gdzie nauczano filozofii oraz 79 proc. nauczycieli z tych szkół), poproszeni o wskazanie, jak ważne są ich zdaniem poszczególne cele szkolnej edukacji filozoficznej (w skali 0–5), ocenili erudycję stosunkowo nisko. Mimo to przeanalizowane w artykule wyniki pokazują, że nauczyciele doceniają ją jako cel edukacji filozoficznej, co zbieżne jest z odpowiedziami dyrektorów. Z kolei wywiady pogłębione przeprowadzone z 15 nauczycielami i 15 dyrektorami pokazują, że zarówno jedni, jak i drudzy doceniają erudycję w głębszym sensie: taką, która nie jest wiedzą „encyklopedyczną”, lecz wiedzą dobrze zrozumianą, będącą podstawą dla rozwoju osobistego, rozwijania umiejętności oraz formułowania pytań.
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ZASADA PRAWDY FORMALNEJ W POLSKIM CYWILNYM PRAWIE PROCESOWYM A ROZUMOWANIA NIEMONOTONICZNE

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Trepczyński M.
Zeszyty Prawnicze
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2016
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vol. 16
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issue 2
37-60
PL
The Principle of Formal Truth in the Polish Civil Procedural Law and Non-monotonic Reasoning Summary This paper analyses the implementation of the formal truth principle in the Polish civil procedural code in the light of non-monotonic reasoning. The author starts by presenting the concept and applications of non-monotonic reasoning, and the formal truth principle and its place in Polish civil procedure. Next he examines the conditions in which non-monotonicity is admissible in civil court reasoning. While legal reasoning may generally be regarded as non-monotonic due to the assumptions it employs and treats as defensible, the author’s observations on the basis of selected civil law cases lead him to the conclusion that the use of the formal truth principle as a viable instrument in law simply forces courts to make non-monotonic inferences. In other words, adopting this principle means accepting non-monotonic reasoning, or even more: if the court keeps to the formal truth principle it is using one of the types of non-monotonic logic.
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Thomas Aquinas Non-monotonically

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Trepczyński M.
Filozofia Nauki
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2011
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vol. 19
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issue 2
115-121
PL
Non-monotonic logics has been popular for recent 15 years. However, it occurs that they are useful to describe some reasonings presented by… Thomas Aquinas. In this paper I show four examples of reasonings where Thomas abandons the principle of monotonicity, all taken from two questions of Summa theologiae concerning God. In each of them Aquinas adds some new premises to the previous set of premises and then draws a conclusion contrary to the previous one, what is impossible under the classical inference. In the next step I present some conclusions, primarily: that for sure we cannot state that these reasonings are just entimematic; that Thomas appears as a superintelligent observer having a holistic view and hence may seem to use in his reasonings rather reduction than deduction; and that we should not call his logic „default”, but rather talk about „the logic of theoria” or „contemplative/speculative logic”. Finally, I try to find the goal (or the meaning) of using by Thomas one of non-monotonic logics, taking into account that his inferential and interpretive rules serve to organise and clarify some theses (which are very instructive from the perspective of hermeneutics). Perhaps we may find this goal in… education. Well, after all, the Summa is a textbook. As we can see - not only of theology.
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The Question about Non-monotonicity in Theology

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Trepczyński M.
Filozofia Nauki
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2012
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vol. 20
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issue 2
135-141
PL
Does Thomas Aquinas use non-monotonical reasonings? In my recent paper Thomas Aquinas Non-monotonically I argued that he does. However Patryk Pogoda has opposed to my statement. In this paper I try to disarm his arguments. What is more this polemic became for me an occasion to develop some crucial problems concerning non-monotonicity. Before all while answering to some arguments of my opponent I had an opportunity to show that non-monotonical reasoning is a proper way of inferention in theology. The main causes of this fact are: the plurality of meanings in theology, the process of deeper and deeper penetrating the revelation and the fact that information studied in theology is given not by a human, but by God. These three causes create a specific situation for the theologian who cannot translate a revealed information which looks as it was metaphorical to some simple unequivocal sentences. In the starting point he does not know the status of this information and should first trust to God’s word to became aquainted with it, so he has to accept it as it is and on this basis infere what he can. But if he (or another theologian) get some other premises he may dismiss the former correct inference - and this is exactly what we call non-monotonical reasoning.
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The Aquinas’s paths of thinking about predestination in the Summa Theologiae

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Trepczyński M.
Rocznik Tomistyczny
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2019
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vol. 8
103-122
EN
This paper is devoted to Saint Thomas Aquinas’s considerations on predestination. However this is not meant to be another work presenting his teaching on the subject. The aim of this article is to reconstruct and analyse “paths of thinking” which Doctor Angelicus designed when discussed the topic of predestination. In this paper I would like to refer to the approach sketched in the book The paths of thinking of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, according to which a path of thinking is a way a thought of certain thinker runs.
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Numer 70/2020 „Edukacji Filozoficznej” poświęcony Józefowi Marii Bocheńskiemu

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Trepczyński M.
Rocznik Tomistyczny
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2020
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vol. 1
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issue 9
503-506
PL
Informacja o artykułach poświęconych Bocheńskiemu w czasopiśmie „Edukacja Filozoficzna” 70/2020
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A Non-monotonic Logic as a Pattern of Reasoning in the Unfavorable Conditions

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Wójtowicz A., Trepczyński M.
Filozofia Nauki
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2011
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vol. 19
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issue 2
99-103
PL
A non-monotonic logic is a formal calculus where the consequence relation is not monotonic. Intuitively, nonmonotonicity of the consequence relation indicates that obtaining a new piece of information can reduce the set of the accepted sentences. In particular, it allows us to draw conclusions on the basis of „the lack of evidence to the contrary”. The purpose of the paper is to present the basic notions of nonmonotonic logic, which will be needed in two papers in this volume.
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