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1
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Etyka w realizmie politycznym

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PL
Klasycy realizmu w polityce nie żywili wątpliwości, że ludzie są jestestwami niespokojnymi1. W związku z tym uważali za czynność jałową pisanie z intencją nawracania na szlachetność istot przeciążonych afektami i zdolnych do kierowania się rozumem przede wszystkim w odniesieniu do sfery własnych interesów; istot popadających prędko w niepoprawne marzycielstwo, gdy tylko sferę własnych interesów opuszczają. Realistów cechuje zatem brak wiary w możliwość radykalnego uracjonalnienia się większości, będącej niewolnikami namiętności, strachu, niepokoju, troski – generalnie wszystkich tych czynników, które wiodą do popełniania błędów, będących skutkiem braku roztropności. 
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PL
Celem opracowania jest odpowiedź na pytanie na ile autora "Lewiatana" można uznać za prekursora myśli liberalnej.
EN
The purpose of this article is to relate doctrinal positions taken by Count Adam Ronikier which were adopted by the Chairman of the Central Welfare Council during the German occupation. Ronikier’s, about whom it can justifiably be claimed that during the night of occupation he made the most significant — of all Poles — contribution to the welfare of the nation, relations with representatives of the Government’s Delegation for Poland remained tense. The aims of the Central Welfare Council — legally bringing help to people suffering and harmed at the hands of the occupying force — conflicted with actions undertaken by the Polish underground state which conducted armed resistance and, by the virtue of this very fact, generated cruel Nazi repressions. Using his relationships with Germans, Ronikier was attempting to mitigate this persecution by directing the activities of the institution he managed in a manner suitable to this purpose. The Chairman of the Central Welfare Council entertained doubts about the sensibility of the armed fight conducted by the Home Army because the losses it generated (Germans adopted a barbaric principle of collective responsibility) surpassed any benefits derived from it. The Warsaw Insurgency was the culmination of the struggle between the Home Army and Hitlerite Germany. Ronikier adopted an emphatically critical position on the uprising. In his opinion, pointless insurgents’ actions which led to the destruction of the most important city in Poland were also erroneous because they struck at the German occupant at the moment when the latter did no longer constitute a deathly threat to Poland. According to Ronikier, at that time the main danger came from the Soviet Union. The promulgation of such viewpoint caused a number of concerns inside the Polish underground; in particular, its members feared that Ronikier may accept a potential German offer of establishing — at the end of the Second World War — a collaboration government the emergence of which would have been a catastrophic mistake, leading to Poland’s exclusion from the winning coalition. It seems that such fears of the Polish underground’s authorities were not completely unfounded. However, since this did not happen, Count Ronikier, still little known in Poland, remains a symbol of a struggle to preserve the biological substance of the Polish nation after the calamitous defeat of September of 1939.
EN
The article aims at explaining why the famous American diplomatist and intriguing political thinker George F. Kennan already in 1944 considered “the Polish cause” as the “all alost cause” and did not believe in the possibility of restitution of Poland as an independent country after World War II. According to Kennan, this was determined primarily by the Russo-German Nonaggression Pact signed in August 1939. Strictly speaking, by the crimes committed on the Polish population by the Soviet police authorities in 1939–1941. Another important factor was the general expansionist nature of the Soviet regime. Even the Warsaw uprising filled with the unprecedented heroism could not change anything in Stalin’s policy towards Poland.
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EN
In the article I put the question whether people with a real sense of responsibility, truly strong political personalities can find a place in modern democratic politics. Following the lead of the classicists of political thought I aim at showing the strong and weaker sides of the democratic system. I come to the conclusion that the very nature of this system – in peaceful times – precludes the possibility of ruling by strong political leaders. These leaders, slow to flatter the demos, are unable to climb to the heights of political power. They appear as politically indolent people.
PL
W opracowaniu stawiam pytanie, czy ludzie z prawdziwym poczuciem odpowiedzialności, prawdziwie silne osobowości polityczne mogą znaleźć miejsce we współczesnej polityce demokratycznej. Śledząc za klasykami myśli politycznej silne i słabsze strony systemu demokratycznego, dochodzę do wniosku, że sama natura tego ustroju – w spokojnych czasach – wyklucza możliwość rządzenia przez silnych przywódców politycznych. Przywódcy ci, nieskorzy do schlebiania demosowi, nie są w stanie wspiąć się na szczyty władzy. Jawią się jako ludzie politycznie indolentni.
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Umowa społeczna współcześnie

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EN
The aim of the article is to remind that the concept of the social contract is not an outdated tool for analysing political reality. On the contrary, this liberal concept still retains its im- portance and usefulness. Democratic and liberal order seems to be in danger every time when one of the two parties – the authorities or demos – fails in its duty. Strictly speak- ing, where people will not listen and the political power demonstrates incompetence. Naturally, the parties to the social contract are not and cannot be equal. The authorities take on their shoulders a much heavier burden of responsibility. Therefore one can ven- ture the opinion that riots, revolts and revolution erupt as a result of the unskillfulness of political power, where the authorities – instead of being a stabilising force supporting political reality and the rule of law – allow subversives to question the state and its legal order.
PL
The aim of the article is to describe Klaus Mann’s political and social views, especially two of them – his critique of nationalism and his activity as the spokesman for anti‐fascism. Mann’s anti‐nationalist attitude is connected with his cosmopolitism inspired not only by count Coudenhove‐Kalergi but by the vision of pan‐Europe and pacifism as well. The political standpoint of Mann is influenced strongly by his early political experience. The roots of his leftist way of thinking can be also seen in connection with the influence on him of André Gide. Generally the French impacts on his thought are considerable and reflect in his emphasizing individual freedom as well as in the idea of French‐German alliance because France and Germany constitute “almost Europe.”
PL
Celem artykułu jest analiza porównawcza dwóch odmiennych podejść do problemu migracji. Pierwsze z nich odnosi się do rządu Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej, który wyraził zgodę na przyjęcie kilkunastu tysięcy greckich i macedońskich uchodźców politycznych uciekających z Grecji po przegranej przez stronę komunistyczną wojny domowej. Polityka polskich władz komunistycznych przyniosła sukces w postaci udanego współżycia Greków i Macedończyków z Polakami. Drugie podejście prezentuje obecny polski rząd. Jest to polityka niewpuszczania żadnych migrantów sprowadzonych na granicę polsko-białoruską przez nieprzyjazne Polsce reżimy białoruski i rosyjski. Prezentowane porównanie jest oryginalną próbą wyprowadzenia wniosków dotyczących źródeł tych odmiennych podejść oraz ich politycznych i społecznych konsekwencji. Tematyka podjęta w artykule ma znaczenie nie tylko dla Polski i wschodnich krajów Unii Europejskiej, lecz także dla całej Unii, ponieważ punktem docelowym migrantów nie są takie kraje jak Polska, Litwa czy Łotwa, tylko bogatsze kraje Zachodu.
EN
The aim of the article is to conduct a comparative analysis of two different approaches to the migration problem. The first one refers to the government of the Polish People’s Republic, which agreed to accept several thousand Greek and Macedonian political refugees fleeing from Greece after the communist side lost the civil war. The policy of the Polish communist authorities brought success in the form of successful coexistence between Greeks and Macedonians with Poles. The second approach is presented by the current Polish government. This is a policy of not admitting any migrants brought to the Polish-Belarusian border by the Belarusian and Russian regimes that are hostile to Poland. The presented comparison is an original attempt to draw conclusions regarding the sources of these different approaches and their political and social consequences. The topic discussed in the article is important not only for Poland and the eastern countries of the European Union, but for the entire EU, because the destination of migrants is not countries such as Poland, Lithuania or Latvia, but wealthier Western countries.
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