The Ran affair – a blunder of Polish secret service in the USSR in 1936In the atmosphere of omnipresent escalating terror Stalin’s state, on May 28th, 1936, a Polish military secret service officer, Stefan Kasperski, was arrested in Moscow. Officially, he worked in the Polish Consulate in Kiev as a clerk named Alfred Ran, and unofficially he ran a secret service unit H5. In the 1930s the so called “Ran affair” was the biggest failure giving away the weaknesses of the Polish intelligence in the Soviet Union. According to colonel Stefan Mayer, head of Branch II of General Staff, “it was a severe blow for Polish secret service network in Russia, concealed within foreign service system”.Lieutenant Kasperski spent two months in two Moscow prisons. After a few days’ interrogation he admitted to working in the consulate under a false name, but did not give away the Polish agents’ network. Having returned to Poland, he gave a detailed report on the causes of the trouble, his stay in prison, and the course of the interrogation. The whole of the 164‑page report can be found in the Central Military Archive. Since access to NKWD materials collected in the Łubianka archive is impossible, Kasperski’s report is highly valuable as it shows ways in which Soviet investigators dealt with spies.Kasperski was released owing to the “blunder” of a Soviet spy in Warsaw, Sokolin. Colonel Stefan Mayer’s lecture, given in London many years after the affair, allows us to find out more about the inner history of the exchange of Ran for Sokolin. Mayer emphasized that it was the first fully successful retortion, and that it strengthened the conviction held by Ministry of Foreign Affairs that those were the best methods of working with Russians. Афера Рана – провал польской разведки в СССР в 1936 годуВ атмосфере заостряющегося всеобщего террора в тоталитарном государстве Сталина, 28 мая 1936 г в Москве был арестован офицер польской военной разведки поручик Стефан Касперский. Официально он работал в консульстве РП в Киеве под именем Альфред Ран, а неофициально управлял разведывательным представительством H.5. В 30‑х гг. прошлого века так называемая афера Рана оказалась самым большим провалом, скомпрометировавшим польскую разведку в СССР. По словам многолетнего шефа 2 отдела Главного Штаба подполковника Стефана Маера это был ≪очень тяжелый удар для польской разведывательной сети в России, конспирировавшейся в дипломатическом корпусе≫.Поручик Касперский провел в двух московских тюрьмах два месяца. После нескольких дней допросов, не выдав сети польской агентуры, все же признался, что он является офицером, работающим в польском консульстве под фальшивой фамилией. После возвращения в страну Касперский очень подробно описал причины своей неудачи, пребывание в московских тюрьмах и ход допросов. Его раппорт (164 страницы) находится в Центральном Военном Архиве в Варшаве. Из‑за недоступности материалов бывшего НКВД, хранящихся в архиве на Лубянке, несомненно, что этот раппорт представляет собой огромную ценность. Частично в нем описываются методы работы советских следователей по отношению к ≪шпионам≫.На освобождение Касперского повлиял провал советского шпиона в Варшаве Соколина. О кулисах дела Соколина и его обмена на Рана можно узнать из лекции полковника Стефана Маера, которую он прочитал в Лондоне. Маер подчеркивал, что это был первый очень удачный ответный удар советской разведке, а министерство иностранных дел убедилось, что при пере‑ говорах с россиянами нужно использовать, собственно говоря, вот такие аргументы.
Po Wielkim Głodzie, w wyniku którego zmarło co najmniej 3,5 mln osób, bolszewicy stanęli przed problemem braku odpowiedniej liczby ludzi do pracy na roli. Postanowiono wobec tego na tereny najbardziej wyludnione z powodu głodu sprowadzić chłopów z Rosji i Białorusi oraz przesiedlić rolników z mniej dotkniętych głodem regionów Ukrainy. Akcja nie zakończyła się sukcesem, bowiem większość chłopów sprowadzonych na opustoszałe tereny wróciła z powrotem. After the Great Famine in Ukraine that killed at least 3.5 million people, the Bolsheviks faced a problem of a lack of resources and people to work on the land. Thus, a decision was made to bring to the most depopulated areas peasants from Russia and Belarus, as well as some farmers from other regions of Ukraine, less affected by the famine. The action did not succeed, as a majority of peasants who were brought to Ukrainian lands devastated by the Holodomor went back to their homes.
The article presents an analysis of the Ukrainian countryside after the Great Famine of 1932–1933. In 1934, hunger continued, although on a much smaller scale than in 1933. The mid-1934 brought a relative stabilisation, but it did not mean that the standard of living resembled that of the period of the New Economic Policy.
PL
W artykule przeanalizowano sytuację wsi ukraińskiej po Wielkim Głodzie z lat 1932–1933. W 1934 r. nadal występował głód, oczywiście w znacznie mniejszych proporcjach aniżeli w 1933 r. Od połowy 1934 r. sytuacja zaczęła się względnie stabilizować, choć poziom życia nie przypominał ten z czasów NEP-u.
The article presents the activity of Jan Karszo-Siedlewski for the benefit of the Catholic Church in Kiev from 1935 to 1937 based on materials disclosed for the first time from the surveillance of the Polish diplomat by the Soviet military counterintelligence.
PL
Na podstawie po raz pierwszy ujawnionych materiałów z inwigilacji przez sowiecki kontrwywiad wojskowy Jana Karszo-Siedlewskiego przedstawiona została działalność polskiego dyplomaty na rzecz Kościoła katolickiego w Kijowie w latach 1935–1937.
In this article, I discuss the unknown in the historiography case of establishing cooperation between the Polish military intelligence and its course with Hans Wieser, working in the Soviet Union German engineer and a ballistics expert, who, as it turned out later, was a Soviet agent. Cooperation with Wieser took the code name the “Projectile” Affair. Thanks to Wieser, the Soviet counterintelligence caught in the act of a Polish military intelligence agent, Lieutenant Stefan Kasperski aka Albert Ran, after he had received spy materials. The Ran affair was the biggest failure giving away the weaknesses of the Polish intelligence in the Soviet Union in the 1930s.
PL
Poniższy artykuł ukazuje nieznaną w historiografii historię nawiązania przez polski wywiad wojskowy współpracy oraz jej przebiegu z Hansem Wieserem – niemieckim inżynierem, balistykiem pracującym w Związku Sowieckim, który okazał się sowieckim agentem. Współpraca z Wieserem przybrała kryptonim „Pocisk”. Dzięki Wieserowi sowiecki kontrwywiad przyłapał na gorącym uczynku polskiego agenta wywiadu wojskowego, por. Stefana Kasperskiego (Alberta Rana), w momencie odbierania przezeń materiału szpiegowskiego. W ten sposób doszło do największej wpadki polskiego wywiadu wojskowego operującego w Związku Sowieckim w latach trzydziestych XX w.
Victimizing Poles in the USSR in the 1930st is quite well described in historiography. However, the situation is much worse when an answer is searched for to the question about the attitude of the Polish Government and the diplomats of the Second Polish Republic to the repressive measures taken against Poles in the Soviet Union at that period. After an analysis had been made of the documents of the Polish Foreign Ministry and of the Division II of the Polish General Staff (military intelligence and counterintelligence, colloquially known as “Dwójka” – “Two”) that had been unknown until now we may state that representatives of the Second Polish Republic not only did attempt to support Catholic churches and parishes, but also aided common Poles who were persecuted. The attitude shown by the Head of the Polish Consulate in Kiev, Jan Karszo-Siedlewski, is an example here. When news reached him about the use of terror against Poles, about arrests and deportations, he was able to mention this question to the relevant authorities of the Ukraine in 1935, and finally even to meet the Head of the NKVD Wsewołod Balicki on 31st March 1935. The fact of the meeting between the Polish diplomat and such a high Soviet official is completely unknown in historiography. And this is why the present article aims at showing and introducing into history some new, until now unknown facts proving the involvement of Polish diplomats in defending Poles who were Soviet citizens against mass persecutions. However, despite the actions taken on the consular level the issue of the persecutions of Poles was not important for the Polish Government. Polish policies towards the Soviets were determined by the Non-Aggression Pact of 1932, prolonged in 1934. Hence the Polish authorities, trying to maintain good relations with the Bolsheviks, did not want to interfere in the issue of the persecuted Poles, treating it as an internal affair of the USSR.