Search results

1

Civic Education for Democracy During Crisis : Measuring State Media Engagement

100%

Rak J., Rezmer-Płotka K.

The New Educational Review

|

2022

|

vol. 69

82-94

EN

Informed by a research problem of explaining the relationships between the specificity of civic education and public support for authoritarian politicians, this paper aims to propose and test an analytical tool for measuring media engagement in civic education. It contributes methodologically to studies on civic education by delivering a tool that applies to identify and trace state media’s efforts to shape either democratic or autocratic citizenship models. Thereby, it allows monitoring current challenges to civic education for democracy in individual countries. The test contributes empirically to the studies on state-orchestrated civic education by revealing civic education for autocracy in pandemic-driven Poland. It enriches the knowledge of the use of Polish state media by the anti-democratic ruling actors to maintain the status quo.

2

Around 1948: The “Gentle Revolution” and Art History

88%

Markowska A.

Artium Quaestiones

|

2019

|

issue 30

137-160

EN

Just like after World War I Italy experienced a transition from modernism to fascism, after World II Poland experienced a passage from modernism to quasi-communism. The symbol of the first stage of the communist revolution in Poland right after the war, the so-called “gentle revolution,” was Pablo Picasso, whose work was popularized not so much because of its artistic value, but because of his membership in the communist party. The second, repressive stage of the continued came in 1949–1955, to return after the so-called thaw to Picasso and the exemplars of the École de Paris. However, the imagery of the revolution was associated only with the socialist realism connected to the USSR even though actually it was the adaptation of the École de Paris that best expressed the revolution’s victory. In the beginning, its moderate program, strongly emphasizing the national heritage as well as financial promises, made the cultural offer of the communist regime quite attractive not only for the left. Thus, the gentle revolution proved to be a Machiavellian move, disseminating power to centralize it later more effectively. On the other hand, the return to the Paris exemplars resulted in the aestheticization of radical and undemocratic changes. The received idea that the evil regime was visualized only by the ugly socialist realism is a disguise of the Polish dream of innocence and historical purity, while it was the war which gave way to the revolution, and right after the war artists not only played games with the regime, but gladly accepted social comfort guaranteed by authoritarianism. Neither artists, nor art historians started a discussion about the totalizing stain on modernity and the exclusion of the other. Even the folk art was instrumentalized by the state which manipulated folk artists to such an extent that they often lost their original skills. Horrified by the war atrocities and their consequences, art historians limited their activities to the most urgent local tasks, such as making inventories of artworks, reorganization of institutions, and reconstruction. Mass expropriation, a consequence of the revolution, was not perceived by museum personnel as a serious problem, since thanks to it museums acquired more and more exhibits, while architects and restorers could implement their boldest plans. The academic and social neutralization of expropriation favored the birth of a new human being, which was one of the goals of the revolution. Along the ethnic homogenization of society, focusing on Polish art meant getting used to monophony. No cultural opposition to the authoritarian ideas of modernity appeared – neither the École de Paris as a paradigm of the high art, nor the folklore manipulated by the state were able to come up with the ideas of the weak subject or counter-history. Despite the social revolution, the class distinction of ethnography and high art remained unchanged.

3

Wokół roku 1948: „rewolucja łagodna” i historia sztuki

88%

Markowska A.

Artium Quaestiones

|

2019

|

issue 30

367-391

PL

Just like after World War I Italy experienced a transition from modernism to fascism, after World War II Poland experienced a passage from modernism to quasi-communism. The symbol of the first stage of the communist revolution in Poland right after the war, the so-called “gentle revolution,” was Pablo Picasso, whose work was popularized not so much because of its artistic value, but because of his membership in the communist party. The second, repressive stage of the continued came in 1949–1955, to return after the so-called thaw to Picasso and the exemplars of the École de Paris. However, the imagery of the revolution was associated only with the socialist realism connected to the USSR even though actually it was the adaptation of the École de Paris that best expressed the revolution’s victory. In the beginning, its moderate program, strongly emphasizing the national heritage as well as financial promises, made the cultural offer of the communist regime quite attractive not only for the left. Thus, the gentle revolution proved to be a Machiavellian move, disseminating power to centralize it later more effectively. On the other hand, the return to the Paris exemplars resulted in the aestheticization of radical and undemocratic changes. The received idea that the evil regime was visualized only by the ugly socialist realism is a disguise of the Polish dream of innocence and historical purity, while it was the war which gave way to the revolution, and right after the war artists not only played games with the regime, but gladly accepted social comfort guaranteed by authoritarianism. Neither artists, nor art historians started a discussion about the totalizing stain on modernity and the exclusion of the other. Even the folk art was instrumentalized by the state which manipulated folk artists to such an extent that they often lost their original skills. Horrified by the war atrocities and their consequences, art historians limited their activities to the most urgent local tasks, such as making inventories of artworks, reorganization of institutions, and reconstruction. Mass expropriation, a consequence of the revolution, was not perceived by museum personnel as a serious problem, since thanks to it museums acquired more and more exhibits, while architects and restorers could implement their boldest plans. The academic and social neutralization of expropriation favored the birth of a new human being, which was one of the goals of the revolution. Along the ethnic homogenization of society, focusing on Polish art meant getting used to monophony. No cultural opposition to the authoritarian ideas of modernity appeared – neither the École de Paris as a paradigm of the high art, nor the folklore manipulated by the state were able to come up with the ideas of the weak subject or counter-history. Despite the social revolution, the class distinction of ethnography and high art remained unchanged.

4

Polish Interwar [Non]Democracy from the View-Point of Julije Benešić

87%

Pieniążek-Marković K.

Poznańskie Studia Slawistyczne

|

2019

|

issue 17

191-207

PL

In the article, the image of Polish democracy/autocracy during the Second Republic has been reconstructed. The subject of the analysis were the autobiographical notes entitled Osam godina u Varšavi written by Julije Benešić who stayed in Warsaw in the years 1930–1938 as a delegate of the Yugoslavian Department of Eductaion and Science. From his currently updated notes, a picture of Poland emerged as a state in which the basic civil rights were regularly broken including those guaranteed by the Constitution. The most glaring examples of the non-democratic actions regarded the problems of the national minorities (specifically the Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Jewish relationships) as well as the prisons for the political opponents (Bereza Kartuska and Brześć). What is more, the observations made by the Croatian translator, writer and linguist illuminate in the form of interesting conotations the Polish mentality.

5

Становлення інституту губернаторської влади на Волині (кінець XVIII – друга половина XІX ст.)

75%

Бортніков В.

Studia Politologica Ucraino-Polona

|

2016

|

vol. 6

192-199

EN

Many scientific works are lack the specific historical material, but complex, multidimensional processes of Ukrainian state are often considered after simplified traditional schemes, without taking into account regional specificity, due to the prolonged stay of Ukrainian lands in the structure of other state formations. The process of the institution establishment of the provincial government attached from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth territories is stipulated by the policy of the tsarist government aimed at strengthening of the centralized management of the Russian Empire. It acquired the concentrated shape in the «theory of official nationality», which envisaged the integration of autocracy, orthodoxy and nation into the «united and indivisible» Russia. The policy of the central authorities was determined as well by the struggle for spheres of influence between the «Russian imperialism» and by the Polish landowners’ elite, the attempt to tear the Ukrainian population from the Polish revolutionary movement. Catherine II considered each province as a governorship, and therefore at each of them appointed “the sovereign’s Viceroy or the Governor-General and subordinate to him «the ruler of the governorship or the Governor». Later, «the Governor of province or Governor became to be known as civil Governor. The latter had subordinated for the management of economic affairs «the Lieutenant Governor or Vice-Governor”. As a rule, the Governors-General were as well commanders of military districts. On the outskirts of the Empire, the Governor-General are not so much watched, but rather directed the state policy in a certain direction, as a kind of «repeater» of the cultural activities of the state, and in some places its founder. In the North-Western and South-Western region governors-General primarily pursued political goals: «to prevent the possibility of an armed uprising and to tighten the connection of the land with the Empire». The direct management of the province was exercised by civil governors. An important step in determining their place and role in the hierarchy of the higher ranks of the Empire, and a careful regulation of their activities was the «General instructions of the civil governors» (1837) Nicholas I. The order clearly defined the legal status of these governors primarily as «security guards inviolability of the supreme rights of the autocracy.» At the same time they had no right t to «make regulations..., install, taxes or charges», and they are not allowed to change court verdicts or to assume the functions of judges. The order stated the provisions of the welfare of the inhabitants of the province, their protection from unlawful harassment. One of the powerful levers of state policy in the Russian Empire was the Orthodox Church and faith; it is no accident that the civil Governor was given the responsibility in the ensuring favorable conditions for strengthening, protection from the split, the influence of heretical doctrines and facts of the proselytism. At the heart of the provincial institutions there was the principle of their division into administrative, judicial and financial. Full executive power belonged to the provincial government, headed by the civil Governor. The Job title of the provincial Prosecutor, the provincial solicitors for criminal and civil cases, provincial land surveyor, architect, etc. had been founded. Beside the provincial board, the Governor headed a significant part of other provincial agencies. The Governor, who was appointed by the Emperor at his discretion or on the proposal of the Ministry of internal affairs, was formally the head of the local provincial administration. He was the highest representative of the administrative and police authorities in the province, had broad administrative and supervisory credentials.

6

„Absolutyzm” versus „polonizm” Bismarck, panslawizm a powstanie styczniowe

75%

Kopczyński M.

Historia i Polityka

|

2013

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issue 10(17)

45-74

EN

The aim of this article is to analyze attitude of the Prussian Prime-Minister – considered as the Architect of German Unification – Otto von Bismarck – towards the phenomenon of social rebellion, which in Polish history became known as the January Uprising. The intention of the Author is not to focus on issues related with wide-ranging diplomatic action of the prospective “Iron Chancellor”, which was crowned with Alsvenlabena Convention. Bismarck was in the limelight not like as well-known „real politician”, but as a political thinker whom he also was. Author analyzes a highly specific conceptual nomenclature of Bismarck, and his attitude towards the Poles, Russians, Pan-Slavism and autocracy. Introduction to the subject is an overview of the evaluations of the insurrection, which was permanently established in Polish intellectual environments, including its traditional divisions between the right wing and the left wing.

7

The Shameless Official in an Aggressive State: Educational Consequences

63%

Kobylarek A., Madej M., Máhrik T.

Journal of Education Culture and Society

|

2023

|

vol. 14

|

issue 2

7-13

EN

Modern democracy in the Polish State, as well as respect for minorities of all kinds and women themselves, is collapsing in favour of a particularly close affiliation between the State and the Church. The separation of these two institutions is becoming negligible, if it still exists, and the state and the church have become allies of each other with any educated and/or intelligent element that does not support such a practice. The medieval practices, the stigmatisation of individual groups, patriarchy and the lack of respect for the constitution oppress societies, oppress the rights of citizens and show their place in the ranks. More and more rights are granted only to privileged groups, while others, such as women, LGBTQA+, migrants, the disabled, political opponents, or anyone else who does not support the current actions of the most influential institutions, remain ignored or muddled, vis-à-vis potential voters of the ruling party. Meanwhile, influential citizens can afford to do almost anything. At present, the lord and master decides the fate of all his subjects irrespective of how many protests and on what issues take place in the state, the utter shamelessness of the official can be observed here. Those who invoke God do not seem to believe in Him and, moreover, they act contrary to His principles. What stands out most in their actions is their total ignorance, their hatred of anyone who is against them and their lack of thought for the consequences that will come to them once they lose their power. The only hope seems to be for future voters with full civic awareness.

8

Democratization and federalization. A comparative perspective between Russia’s and Spain’s early forays into a federal system

63%

Suárez A. P.

Krakowskie Studia Małopolskie

|

2023

|

vol. 2(38)

51-61

EN

Undoubtedly, Russia occupies a distinct position within the political landscape, differentiating it from Western democracies that themselves exhibit considerable variation. This uniqueness can be attributed, in part, to Russia’s geographic characteristics, encompassing diverse subdivisions characterized by variations in population, natural resources, territorial expanse, and distance from the central authority. However, what truly distinguishes Russia is its contemporary history and recent experiences with federalization- a framework that has defined its operations since it became the Russian Federation following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The objective of this paper is to analyze the distinctive features of Russian federalism in its early stages, employing a comparative perspective against the Spanish case, in order to ascertain the consequences of the legal, organizational, and territorial arrangements established during Russia’s early democratization period. The focus is to evaluate the implications of these changes on the establishment of a legally-binding democracy and a well-functioning federation, ultimately questioning whether Russia genuinely qualifies for either of these classifications.

9

Zrewidowany paradygmat systemowy. Wyjaśnienia i dodatkowe elementy w świetle doświadczeń państw postsocjalistycznych – część trzecia

51%

Kornai J.

Zarządzanie Publiczne / Public Governance

|

2018

|

issue 1(43)

7-18

PL

Termin paradygmat został wprowadzony do filozofii nauki przez Thomasa Kuhna, który posłużył się nim do określenia specyficznego podejścia wykorzystanego przez daną szkołę badawczą do analizowania przedmiotu badań. Badacze używając tego samego paradygmatu, szukają odpowiedzi na podobne pytania badawcze i wykorzystują zbliżone metody i podejścia. W pracy opublikowanej w 2000 roku autor tego eseju wprowadził termin paradygmatu systemowego (system paradigm), który odnosi się do systemów funkcjonujących w społeczeństwie. Niniejsze studium rozwija teoretyczne zagadnienia zarysowane we wcześniejszym artykule, uwzględniając doświadczenia z transformacji państw postsocjalistycznych. Pierwsza część jest porównaniem systemu socjalistycznego i kapitalistycznego, autor opisuje ich główne cechy i konkluduje, że system kapitalistyczny został wprowadzony w państwach poprzednio socjalistycznych z wyjątkiem Korei Północnej i Kuby. Część druga to analiza różnych postaci kapitalizmu na podstawie typologii zbudowanej na dominujących formach polityki i rządów. Wyróżnione zostały trzy istotnie różniące się między sobą typy kapitalizmu: demokratyczny, autokratyczny i dyktatorski. Huntington pisał o „trzeciej fali” demokratyzacji. Studium to kończyła konkluzja, że trzecia fala dobiegła kresu (has dried up): tylko w jednej dziesiątej z 47 państw postsocjalistycznych społeczeństwa żyją w ustroju demokratycznym, podczas gdy we wszystkich pozostałych państwach tej grupy przeważają autokratyzm i dyktatura. W trzeciej części eseju autor podejmuje wątki aparatu konceptualnego i analitycznego w odniesieniu do Węgier, gdzie funkcjonuje kapitalizm, natomiast przeważającą formą w polityce i rządzeniu jest autokratyzm – tu można znaleźć ważne cechy wspólne dla Węgier i innych państw kapitalistycznych czy innych ustrojów autokratycznych. Taki rezultat jest zgodny z obserwacją, że istnieją mniej fundamentalne cechy typowe dla Węgier („hungarica”), które odróżniają się od cech innych państw.

EN

The term paradigm was introduced to the philosophy of science by Thomas Kuhn – he used this term to denote the specific approach applied by a school of research to examine its subject matter. Using the same paradigm, researchers seek answers to similar questions, and employ similar methods and concepts. In an article published in 2000, the author of this essay introduced the term system paradigm, which focuses on the systems functioning in a society. This study develops the theoretical considerations outlined in that earlier article on the basis of experience of post-socialist transition. The first part compares the socialist and capitalist systems, describing their main characteristics, and concludes that the capitalist system has become established in former socialist countries, except for North Korea and Cuba. The second part analyzes varieties of capitalism within a typology which classifies prevailing forms of politics and government. Three markedly different types are identified: democracy, autocracy, and dictatorship. Huntington wrote about the “third wave” of democratization. This study concludes the third wave has dried up: for the 47 postsocialist countries, only a tenth of the population live in democracies, while autocracy or dictatorship prevails in all other countries in this group. The third part of this essay applies the conceptual and analytical apparatus to Hungary, where capitalism exists, and autocracy is the prevailing politico-governmental form – here we can find important characteristics common to other capitalist countries or other autocracies. This finding is compatible with the observation that there are some less fundamental characteristics unique to Hungary, or “Hungarica”, which differ from the characteristics of all other countries.

10

Zrewidowany paradygmat systemowy. Wyjaśnienia i dodatkowe elementy w świetle doświadczeń państw postsocjalistycznych – część druga

51%

Kornai J.

Zarządzanie Publiczne / Public Governance

|

2017

|

issue 4(42)

7-22

PL

Termin paradygmat został wprowadzony do filozofii nauki przez Thomasa Kuhna, który posłużył się nim do określenia specyficznego podejścia wykorzystanego przez daną szkołę badawczą do analizowania przedmiotu badań. Badacze używając tego samego paradygmatu, szukają odpowiedzi na podobne pytania badawcze i wykorzystują zbliżone metody i podejścia. W pracy opublikowanej w 2000 roku autor tego eseju wprowadził termin paradygmatu systemowego (system paradigm), który odnosi się do systemów funkcjonujących w społeczeństwie. Niniejsze studium rozwija teoretyczne zagadnienia zarysowane we wcześniejszym artykule, uwzględniając doświadczenia z transformacji państw postsocjalistycznych. Pierwsza część jest porównaniem systemu socjalistycznego i kapitalistycznego, autor opisuje ich główne cechy i konkluduje, że system kapitalistyczny został wprowadzony w państwach poprzednio socjalistycznych z wyjątkiem Korei Północnej i Kuby. Część druga to analiza różnych postaci kapitalizmu na podstawie typologii zbudowanej na dominujących formach polityki i rządów. Wyróżnione zostały trzy istotnie różniące się między sobą typy kapitalizmu: demokratyczny, autokratyczny i dyktatorski. Huntington pisał o „trzeciej fali” demokratyzacji. Studium to kończyła konkluzja, że trzecia fala dobiegła kresu (has dried up): tylko w jednej dziesiątej z 47 państw postsocjalistycznych społeczeństwa żyją w ustroju demokratycznym, podczas gdy we wszystkich pozostałych państwach tej grupy przeważają autokratyzm i dyktatura. W trzeciej części eseju autor podejmuje wątki aparatu konceptualnego i analitycznego w odniesieniu do Węgier, gdzie funkcjonuje kapitalizm, natomiast przeważającą formą w polityce i rządzeniu jest autokratyzm – tu można znaleźć ważne cechy wspólne dla Węgier i innych państw kapitalistycznych czy innych ustrojów autokratycznych. Taki rezultat jest zgodny z obserwacją, że istnieją mniej fundamentalne cechy typowe dla Węgier („hungarica”), które odróżniają się od cech innych państw.

EN

The term paradigm was introduced to the philosophy of science by Thomas Kuhn – he used this term to denote the specific approach applied by a school of research to examine its subject matter. Using the same paradigm, researchers seek answers to similar questions, and employ similar methods and concepts. In an article published in 2000, the author of this essay introduced the term system paradigm, which focuses on the systems functioning in a society. This study develops the theoretical considerations outlined in that earlier article on the basis of experience of post-socialist transition. The first part compares the socialist and capitalist systems, describing their main characteristics, and concludes that the capitalist system has become established in former socialist countries, except for North Korea and Cuba. The second part analyzes varieties of capitalism within a typology which classifies prevailing forms of politics and government. Three markedly different types are identified: democracy, autocracy, and dictatorship. Huntington wrote about the “third wave” of democratization. This study concludes the third wave has dried up: for the 47 postsocialist countries, only a tenth of the population live in democracies, while autocracy or dictatorship prevails in all other countries in this group. The third part of this essay applies the conceptual and analytical apparatus to Hungary, where capitalism exists, and autocracy is the prevailing politico-governmental form – here we can find important characteristics common to other capitalist countries or other autocracies. This finding is compatible with the observation that there are some less fundamental characteristics unique to Hungary, or “Hungarica”, which differ from the characteristics of all other countries.

11

Zrewidowany paradygmat systemowy. Wyjaśnienia i dodatkowe elementy w świetle doświadczeń państw postsocjalistycznych – część pierwsza

51%

Kornai J.

Zarządzanie Publiczne / Public Governance

|

2017

|

issue 3(41)

7-18

PL

Termin paradygmat został wprowadzony do filozofii nauki przez Thomasa Kuhna, który posłużył się nim do określenia specyficznego podejścia wykorzystanego przez daną szkołę badawczą do analizowania przedmiotu badań. Badacze używając tego samego paradygmatu, szukają odpowiedzi na podobne pytania badawcze i wykorzystują zbliżone metody i podejścia. W pracy opublikowanej w 2000 roku autor tego eseju wprowadził termin paradygmatu systemowego (system paradigm), który odnosi się do systemów funkcjonujących w społeczeństwie. Niniejsze studium rozwija teoretyczne zagadnienia zarysowane we wcześniejszym artykule, uwzględniając doświadczenia z transformacji państw postsocjalistycznych. Pierwsza część jest porównaniem systemu socjalistycznego i kapitalistycznego, autor opisuje ich główne cechy i konkluduje, że system kapitalistyczny został wprowadzony w państwach poprzednio socjalistycznych z wyjątkiem Korei Północnej i Kuby. Część druga to analiza różnych postaci kapitalizmu na podstawie typologii zbudowanej na dominujących formach polityki i rządów. Wyróżnione zostały trzy istotnie różniące się między sobą typy kapitalizmu: demokratyczny, autokratyczny i dyktatorski. Huntington pisał o „trzeciej fali” demokratyzacji. Studium to kończyła konkluzja, że trzecia fala dobiegła kresu (has dried up): tylko w jednej dziesiątej z 47 państw postsocjalistycznych społeczeństwa żyją w ustroju demokratycznym, podczas gdy we wszystkich pozostałych państwach tej grupy przeważają autokratyzm i dyktatura. W trzeciej części eseju autor podejmuje wątki aparatu konceptualnego i analitycznego w odniesieniu do Węgier, gdzie funkcjonuje kapitalizm, natomiast przeważającą formą w polityce i rządzeniu jest autokratyzm – tu można znaleźć ważne cechy wspólne dla Węgier i innych państw kapitalistycznych czy innych ustrojów autokratycznych. Taki rezultat jest zgodny z obserwacją, że istnieją mniej fundamentalne cechy typowe dla Węgier („hungarica”), które odróżniają się od cech innych państw.

EN

The term paradigm was introduced to the philosophy of science by Thomas Kuhn – he used this term to denote the specific approach applied by a school of research to examine its subject matter. Using the same paradigm, researchers seek answers to similar questions, and employ similar methods and concepts. In an article published in 2000, the author of this essay introduced the term system paradigm, which focuses on the systems functioning in a society. This study develops the theoretical considerations outlined in that earlier article on the basis of experience of post-socialist transition. The first part compares the socialist and capitalist systems, describing their main characteristics, and concludes that the capitalist system has become established in former socialist countries, except for North Korea and Cuba. The second part analyzes varieties of capitalism within a typology which classifies prevailing forms of politics and government. Three markedly different types are identified: democracy, autocracy, and dictatorship. Huntington wrote about the “third wave” of democratization. This study concludes the third wave has dried up: for the 47 postsocialist countries, only a tenth of the population live in democracies, while autocracy or dictatorship prevails in all other countries in this group. The third part of this essay applies the conceptual and analytical apparatus to Hungary, where capitalism exists, and autocracy is the prevailing politico-governmental form – here we can find important characteristics common to other capitalist countries or other autocracies. This finding is compatible with the observation that there are some less fundamental characteristics unique to Hungary, or “Hungarica”, which differ from the characteristics of all other countries.

12

Filozofia wolności i władzy w piśmiennictwie Filareta Drozdowa

51%

Mazuś M.

Slavia Orientalis

|

2017

|

vol. LXVI

|

issue 3

13

Etnokratyczno-klanowy wymiar reżimu politycznego Tatarstanu

38%

Bodio T., Zuzankiewicz P.

Studia Politologiczne

|

2014

|

vol. 33

313-332

PL

W artykule podjęto próbę opisu i wyjaśnienia specyfiki reżimu politycznego Tatarstanu – podmiotu Federacji Rosyjskiej, kładąc nacisk na jego wymiar etnokratyczny. Diagnozowany jest reżim polityczny Rosji, wyjaśnione źródła i konsekwencje asymetrii reżimu federalnego z regionalnymi reżimami politycznymi. Z diagnozy generalnie wynika, że istniejący kształt reżimu federalnego i reżimów regionalnych jest kryzosogenny i wymaga daleko idącej modernizacji. Autorzy artykułu przejęli założenie, że etnopolityka jest istotnym składnikiem reżimu politycznego państw etnopolitycznych. Szczegółowo uzasadniają ten pogląd badając etnokratyczne wymiary reżimu politycznego Tatarstanu. Dochodzą do wniosku, że w tatarstańskim reżimie ujawnia się swoista symbioza etatyzmu, etnokratyzmu, paternalizmu i trybalizmu. Definiują ten reżim jako autorytarno-etnokratyczny budowany na bazie korporatywizmu klanowo-politycznego, w którym szczególna pozycję zajmuje przywódca.

XX

This article attempts to describe and explain the specificity of the political regime of Tatarstan, a federal subject of the Russian Federation, with emphasis on its ethnocratic dimension. The subject of diagnosis is the Russian political system, as well as sources and consequences of asymmetry between the federal regime and regional political regimes. The diagnosis generally indicates that the existing form of the federal and regional regimes causes the political crises and requires a far-reaching modernization. The authors took an assumption that in the ethnopolitical countries the ethnopolitics is an essential component of the political regimes. They justify this thesis by examining ethnocratic dimensions of the political regime of Tatarstan. They come to a conclusion that the Tatarstani regime reveals a peculiar symbiosis of etatism, ethnocratism, paternalism and tribalism. This regime is defined as authoritarian and ethnocratic, built on the basis of the clannish and political corporatism, with a particular position held by the leader.

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Civic Education for Democracy During Crisis : Measuring State Media Engagement

Around 1948: The “Gentle Revolution” and Art History

Wokół roku 1948: „rewolucja łagodna” i historia sztuki

Polish Interwar [Non]Democracy from the View-Point of Julije Benešić

Становлення інституту губернаторської влади на Волині (кінець XVIII – друга половина XІX ст.)

„Absolutyzm” versus „polonizm” Bismarck, panslawizm a powstanie styczniowe

The Shameless Official in an Aggressive State: Educational Consequences

Democratization and federalization. A comparative perspective between Russia’s and Spain’s early forays into a federal system

Zrewidowany paradygmat systemowy. Wyjaśnienia i dodatkowe elementy w świetle doświadczeń państw postsocjalistycznych – część trzecia

Zrewidowany paradygmat systemowy. Wyjaśnienia i dodatkowe elementy w świetle doświadczeń państw postsocjalistycznych – część druga

Zrewidowany paradygmat systemowy. Wyjaśnienia i dodatkowe elementy w świetle doświadczeń państw postsocjalistycznych – część pierwsza

Filozofia wolności i władzy w piśmiennictwie Filareta Drozdowa

Etnokratyczno-klanowy wymiar reżimu politycznego Tatarstanu