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EN
This article intends to characterize the constructive function that the Indeterminate Duality may have played in Plato’s oral teaching. Far from being in itself – as some testimonia seem to suggest – the primary origin of evil, as origin of multiplicity the Indeterminate Duality can be perceived as intrinsically presupposed by Plato’s identification of the source of being with the supreme Good. The notion of good implicates for Plato namely an unconditioned impulse to relationality, which indicates that the supreme Good is to be considered as supreme origin not only of unity, but also of multiplicity (scil. non-unity) and alterity. In the absence of multiplicity and alterity, no real relation, and, therefore, no real manifestation of the Good could in fact take place. As a consequence (and in accord with the suggestions given by Simplicius), the Indeterminate Duality may be considered as source of that original differentiation as well as of that generativity without which the supreme Good would be discordant with its goodness.
IT
This article intends to characterize the constructive function that the Indeterminate Duality may have played in Plato’s oral teaching. Far from being in itself – as some testimonia seem to suggest – the primary origin of evil, as origin of multiplicity the Indeterminate Duality can be perceived as intrinsically presupposed by Plato’s identification of the source of being with the supreme Good. The notion of good implicates for Plato namely an unconditioned impulse to relationality, which indicates that the supreme Good is to be considered as supreme origin not only of unity, but also of multiplicity (scil. non-unity) and alterity. In the absence of multiplicity and alterity, no real relation, and, therefore, no real manifestation of the Good could in fact take place. As a consequence (and in accord with the suggestions given by Simplicius), the Indeterminate Duality may be considered as source of that original differentiation as well as of that generativity without which the supreme Good would be discordant with its goodness.
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
|
2015
|
vol. 6
|
issue 1
93-112
EN
The aim of this paper is to discuss some features of the doctrines of the agrapha dogmata in Neoplatonism, starting from the reading of an anecdote, presented in the Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, in which Plato dreams that close to death he becomes a swan which hunters are unable to catch. In fact, the dream is an explanation of the development of the Platonic tradition, and, more precisely, it presents a story of several exegetical disagreements that have survived till the present day. Compared to modern interpretation of the Aristotelic testimony on the “so-called unwritten doctrines”, we can state that the late antique interpretations of them focus and depend on what Plato has left us in his written dialogues, which are the best living images of his oral dialogues. This conclusion is, then, a consequence of a study carried out on Ancient and Neoplatonic texts that leads to the acknowledgement of a Platonic philosophical system as well as to an overview of modern secondary bibliography produced by the esoteric interpretation of Plato and various views of scholars who are against this account.
EN
The traditional view of the cause of Plotinus’ death was leprosy. The analysis of the biographical sources, however, point to another hypothesis, that of „Cyprian’s plague”. The last months of Plotinus life and work coincided with the end of this great ancient pandemic and he produced four treatises, focused primarily on ethical problems. The last treatise, On the primal Good (1.7) is a short and concentrated meditation on the First Principle and the soul’s ascent to it.
EN
In this paper I examine a variant of the cosmological argument for the existence of God – the ‘proof from finitude’, and develop Georg W.F. Hegel’s intuitions on this issue. In conclusion, I point out the danger of confusing the cognitive order (the finite as a premise for “proving” the reality of the infinite) with the ontic order (the presumed dependence of the infinite – especially as realised in God – on the finite).
PL
W artykule analizuję pewną odmianę kosmologicznej argumentacji za istnieniem Boga – „dowód ze skończoności”. W punkcie wyjścia opieram się na intuicjach Georga W.F. Hegla, które rozwijam. W swoich heglowskich inspiracjach ograniczam się do Wykładów z filozofii religii (t. 1 i 2). W konkluzji wskazuję na niebezpieczeństwo pomieszania porządku poznawczego (skończone jako przesłanka „dowodzenia” realności nieskończonego) z porządkiem ontycznym (domniemana zależność nieskończoności – w szczególności tej realizującej się w Bogu – od tego, co skończone).
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