Nietzsche cultivates the Romantic ethos of a genius, a special human being that is not understood by common people. He tries, however, to universalize the problem of understanding that is connected to this ethos. He assumes that what is unique in this ethos, the personal, is something spiritual that one can try to express in one's work. Yet, to read the message in the work, one has to fulfill many conditions - make oneself sensitive to the uniqueness of the author and to the form of his message. It is advisable to transform oneself, in the spirit of such uniqueness that is backed up by creative, spiritual attitude to one's own existence. The fact that Nietzsche's message was not understood is interpreted by him in the perspective of dwarfing the human being overall and diagnosis of the culture of his times. More than often it seems that he tries to justify his non-intelligibility in the ethos that he is creating but he also seems not to give up on the hope to find readers that will discover him posthumously.
The aim of this article is to elucidate Nietzsche’s idea of the necessity of social decadence. It is discussed that the necessity indicates an inevitable or necessary historical process, on the one hand, and the decadent being necessarily produced in society, on the other. Nietzsche presents a seemingly contradictory idea regarding this necessity. While he describes decadence as a necessary part of life, he also demands disposing of a decadent part in society. This article suggests a solution to this problem and argues what should be fought is not decadence itself but its metastasis that risks the health of the whole. Christian morality of equality plays a key role in this metastasis.
Since ancient Greek philosophers like Gorgias, Plato or Aristotle called the art of poetry a (magic) form of fiction that contradicts scientific forms of knowledge, a historical abyss has been introduced between the arts and the sciences, which still haunts us today. It was Nietzsche who first questioned the legitimacy of this distinction by calling the sciences a special form of art. My article will claim that Nietzsche was the philosopher who first assumed that science and philosophy are art-based-research practices. Philosophy is not representing a given truth but has to create it by staging it both, on a conceptual AND a fleshly level. Philosophy on Stage such becomes a post-socratic attempt to perform philosophy as the creation of a certain mode of living rather than a dialectic form of communication for the exchange of scientific arguments.
The poet Rilke and the philosopher Nietzsche have a great deal in common. They have no family, no employment, and no home and for both life and work form a whole. They are nearly exclusively preoccupied with the question of human existence. The similarities or affinities which connect the existential poet and the existential philosopher have been widely discussed. What has been neglected up to now is the fact that only Nietzsche but also Rilke attaches a lot of importance to the role and significance of the mask. That is why this essay focuses on: Rilke and Nietzsche agree on the fact that the mask is an essential and indispensable constituent of a creative personality. The poet and the philosopher create truth whatever mask they wear.
The name of Spinoza appears in the notes of F. Nietzsche from the beginning of the eighties. Basing on information contained in K. Fisher’s History of Philosophy he hails the sage of Haga as his predecessor. In the course of next few years the greatest works of Nietzsche are written and his professional, personal and health matters become very complicated. At the end of his life embittered, lonely and deeply misunderstood Nietzsche pens remarks concerning Spinoza’s writings once again – this time drastically different in style and the judgement of their worthiness. As both of the philosophers use the term of ‘power’, both reject personalised God and propose the reversion of the hierarchy of the moral values, many researchers were inspired by Nietzsche’s notes to investigate the connections of the two philosophies. However, is the connection real, or is it but an illusion, a delusion of a link caused by the use of similar devices and terms in different contexts? How did such a radical change in Nietzsche’s views come to pass – a change of views not only of Spinoza’s philosophy, but of Schopenhauer and Wagner’s musical work as well? The answers to those questions may be sought with use of Jung’s theory of archetypes, as an example. In reference to Nietzsche’s biography it shows one of the possible interpretations of his approach to the persons mentioned.
In his influential series of lectures on Nietzsche in the 1930s and 1940s, Heidegger claimed that Nietzsche had failed to escape metaphysical thinking and had remained a metaphysician despite his own self-understanding. At the centre of Heidegger’s charge is his interpretation of Nietzsche’s doctrine of “the will to power.” The argument in this paper is that Heidegger has misinterpreted what Nietzsche means by a “philosophy of the future,” and that Nietzsche’s revolution in philosophy is, somewhat ironically, much closer to Heidegger’s own attempt to recover the question of the meaning of being.
The author is trying to read Aleksander Swietochowski's 'O powstawaniu praw moralnych' (1877; (On establishing moral laws) by 'establishing language of these laws'. Swietochowski's idea of language that describes and diagnoses ethical concepts and their functions in discourse is essential for understanding the mental capacities and relations between language and ethics. The language of ethics shows coherent explication of his philosophical view on the question of recognizing his own ethical turning point because Swietochowski in his papers tries to describe the space of human experience in the language. Swietochowski was aware that suspicions concerning the language can be transmitted to suspicions concerning the ethics. The article shows also why the author of 'Dumania pesymisty' (1876) - is under the influences of perspectivism of Nietzsche: there were both wanderers in a space of words and paradoxes of aphorisms.
The present text owes its genesis to an extremely inspiring Pawel Pieniazek's book entitled 'Suwerennosc a nowoczesnosc. Z dziejów poststrukturalistcznej recepcji mysli Nietzschego' (Sovereignty and Modernity. The History of Post-structuralist Reception of Nietzsche). However, the article is neither a classical review nor a polemic with this remarkable work. It is rather an introduction to the main thesis conveyed in the book, according to which Nietzsche's 'failure' to philosophically ground a new 'elite culture' was a condition for French post-structuralist formation to emerge. By deliberately focusing on 'anti-metaphysical' aspects of Nietzsche's thought, post-structuralists 'misread' Nietzsche in that they effaced the properly 'metaphysical' themes alternating his oeuvre. The aim of this article is to target 'moments' or points in which the poststructuralist reading of Nietzsche can be proven to depart from his thought. Several points of this departure are enumerated: total critique/skepticism, individualism, pluralism/relativism, and transgression/extreme experiences. The author follows Pieniazek's critical remarks on poststructuralism in arguing that the French philosophers did not attempt to positively 'overcome' the aporias related with these concepts. They actually endorsed them as if oblivious of their nihilistic and decadent aspects to which Nietzsche was so sensitive. Ultimately, the author echoes Pieniazek's contention that Nietzsche can be seen as a critic 'avant la lettre' of the French post-structuralist formation. Contrary to Pieniazek, however, he is more careful to announce 'superiority' of Nietzsche's insights over post-structuralism. Instead, he asks: did French philosophers betray Nietzsche by abandoning his idea of a new, better culture? Or did they 'overcome' him, perhaps in a strive to rescue Nietzsche from metaphysics? Yet another question comes to mind: which of the two parties does Pieniazek actually sympathize with? Is it Nietzsche, who does not avoid charges of moral-metaphysical reasoning, or is it post-structuralism whose transgressive drive and quest for 'the Other' and 'the Inhuman' has always fascinated Pieniazek? What is Pawel Pieniazek's attitude to metaphysics in the first place?
In this paper, the author responds to Michal Kruszelnicki's polemic with his book 'Nietzsche a nowoczesnosc. He develops the points invoked by Kruszelnicki. They focus mostly on the difference between Nietzsche's philosophy and post-structuralism, that was criticized 'avant la lettre' by Nietzsche in his criticism of decadence and its transgressive structure. He stresses the radicalization of the Dionysian dimension in Nietzsche's thought by post-structuralism and dissociating Nietzsche from the most important thing to him: the culture-creative project in his thought.
This article aims to analyse and elucidate Nietzsche’s concept of decadence, which has often been mentioned in Nietzsche studies and thus feels familiar, but in fact has not been thoroughly analysed. As Nietzsche describes many phenomena in terms of decadence and the extension of the term may be seen as too broad, some would think we cannot construct one picture of decadence from Nietzsche’s various descriptions and consider that it is sufficient to say it has a general meaning of decline or decay. However, this article seeks to combine Nietzsche’s scattered remarks on decadence together into a coherent picture. I argue that the essence or the fundamental principle of decadence is the lack of self in the sense of the loss of the fundamental instinct as the centre within the person. Grasping this principle, we can understand how the various phenomena Nietzsche describe as a decadence belong together; furthermore, we can understand why Nietzsche sees Christians or Socrates, despite their struggle for improvement, as decadents.
In the followig article the basis outlines of terms present in the reflection of 'the godfather' of Russian religious philosopy are shown (Nietzsche). A lot of attention was paid to evaluation of contemporary culture and reasons of is't failure, highlighting his admiration of Ancient Greece and resembling of the idea of superman (upperman) and dionisian creativity. Nikolai Berdaev second of the presented philosophers was the representative of the 'Rusian silver age of philosophy'. In his reflection on European culture we can find influence of the German philosopher what is evidenced in their similiar evaluation of culture or in appeals to creativity. These afterthoughts showing similarities and highlighting differences should show the path through Nietzsche's nihilism to Berdaev's spirit aristocracy as still important message for contemporary Christians as the creators of culture.
The article is concerned with the role of madness in the works of Nietzsche. The German philosopher saw many conceptions and human activities as manifestation of madness. These include: happiness, wisdom, truth, faith in god(s), purity, morality, debauchery, virtues, honesty, live, mercy, compassion, power, wealth, marriage, genius, super humanity, conformism, literary activity, idealism, nobility and some religious-philosophical conception. In the end also reason and will were for him symptoms of madness. According to him culture, art and development of civilization lead people to madness. In fact Nietzsche identifies madness with humanity.
Nietzsche’s famous dictum “Become what you are” is one of the most difficult aspects of his philosophy. Although Nehamas’ (2001) influential interpretation elucidates how we can understand the apparent contradiction between being and becoming inherent in it, it does so only at the price of divorcing the dictum from the larger concerns of Nietzsche’s thought. Therefore, the author will interpret this dictum in the light of Schopenhauer as Educator and its statement that “your true nature lies not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably high above you”. He aims to show that by understanding Nietzsche’s conception of human nature as it appears in the statement above we can grasp “becoming what one is” as inextricably bound together with his concepts of education and nobility and with his project of individual transformation, and thus with the core of his thought.
Reading philosophy through the figuration of the grotesque might provide us with an ontology that embraces change, fluidity, and disorder. In the author ś estimation, such ontological framework gives rise to an epistemology that stands out for incapacity to represent and be represented via classical tools of philosophy. She will argue that Nietzsche conceived of philosophy precisely in this fashion. Viewing Nietzsche through the lens of the grotesque, thus, holds the promise for enhancing our understanding of his style, outlook, and overall philosophy. More specifically, insights may be gleaned on different features of his work by comparing them to facets of a ‘grotesque theory,’ as the latter presents philosophy the way Nietzsche sought: as exceeding, ambiguous, unstable, eclectic, and heterogeneous. Everything that is profound loves the mask. (Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche1)
The starting point for reflections on the paradoxes of Christian culture is Nietzsche’s announcement of the “death of God” and an increasingly common belief that European culture has ceased to seek its inspiration in Christianity. It seems, however, that the paradoxical tension between continuity and break is part of the very essence of Christianity with its constant oscillation between, to use H.R. Niebuhr’s terminology, the poles of Christ and culture. The coming together of the ambivalent symbols of the root and the salt, mentioned in the title, culminates in the figure of the cross embodying the seemingly contradictory but in fact inseparable relations of culture and Christianity: rootedness and uprootedness. Biblical, early Christian (The Epistle to Diognetus) and contemporary (Simone Weil) texts, read in the context of 20th-century missionary testimonies (Trappist monks of Tibhirine), reveal a possibility of once again making the Christian demand for universalism part of the postmodern, multicultural world.
The study deals with Machiavelli’s and Friedrich Nietzsche’s understanding of secularization from a comparative perspective. It sheds light on the differences and similarities in their view. They have had a very distinct understanding of secularization. Although there are four centuries between the two philosophers, the estimation of the nature and consequences of mass secularization is very similar. For both of them, secularization gives rise to secular substitutes for traditional religions, especially political substitutes. But even secularized societies would necessarily remain “religious”. This study also shows differences in the analysis of the phenomenon of secularization. Machiavelli relied on his knowledge of politics and the nature of mankind. Nietzsche, on the other hand, focused on the world around him.
Through the texts of philosophers and philosophizing artists, musicians and writers, the study opens up the problem of the relationship between philosophy and art, science and philosophy, using atypical ways of inquiring about life, man and his times, not only through reason, but also through the heart. An important moment in the search for intersections and connections is the history – the topos of that which was – as captured in the works, correspondence and conversations of selected giants of European culture. The intention of the study is to highlight the fact that behind an artistic, philosophical or scientific work, which we may nowadays already consider as a classic, an unproblematic “thing at our disposal,” there is often hidden a life experience of a tragic existence. And even in turbulent times of crises, it is important to remember, as Ortega y Gasset reminds us, that to lose illusions is not to lose hope.
The aim of the study is to explore the basic paradoxes of Nietzsche’s conception of freedom in Beyond Good and Evil from the perspective of Kant’s philosophy of freedom. The analysis of selected aphorisms shows that Nietzsche’s ambivalent statements regarding will and freedom are not expressions of inconsistency, but rather they outline a philosophy of freedom that takes the form of a liberating deconstruction of the idea of free will. At the same time, it turns out that in this philosophy one can read a radicalization of some Kantian motifs. These are scientist criticism, the autonomy of human being and the ethos of free self-determination stemming from it. On the other hand, Nietzsche transcends Kant by rejecting two strictly distinct spheres, as well as by emphasizing the legitimate plurality of speech acts regarding freedom. As a result, he succeeds in thinking freedom as an expression of human being in this world. Nietzsche’s philosophy of the will is often interpreted in a strictly naturalistic way. However, an interpretation of these Kantian features reveals the insufficiency of naturalistic interpretation of Nietzsche.
In the article I discuss the post-structuralist ethics in relation to Nietzsche’s thought. The point of view of some French post-structuralists seems to be situated far away from Nietzsche’s ethical ideas, at the most reaching the camel’s and lion’s stage. Lyotard and Derrida opt for a relational ethics while Foucault chooses the strategy of local resistance to the symbolic violence. Paradoxically, Lacan turns out to be closest to Nietzsche, with his theory of exceeding the phantasm in the direction of the Real Order.
The article presents the first part of the research on the links between the psychoanalysis, F. Nietzsche's philosophy and some aspects of his biography. In this part, the author demonstrates that not only Nietzsche named himself a philosopher of suspicion, a psychologist and a physician of culture, but he also created his own version of 'psychological analysis'. The author draws attention to the similarity between the several crucial concepts of Nietzsche's philosophy and different types of psychoanalysis (Freudian, Jungian, Adlerian). He also tries to observe, how this sort of 'congeniality' with psychoanalysis appeared in Nietzsche's attitude towards philosophy. Like a therapist, Nietzsche not only described the history of Western philosophical thought in terms of a disease (philosophy as a symptom, as a symbol of degeneration, as a compensation for the fundamental inferiority of the philosophers and a disguised manifestation of their will to power), but also prescribed to the philosophers a comprehensive course of treatment, which involved such aspects of well-being, as nourishment, climatic conditions, physical activity and so on.
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