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1

Uczestnictwo w polityce jako moralna powinność obywatela

100%

Sobuś P. B.

Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym

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2008

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vol. 11

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issue 2

217-224

EN

According to the Aristotelian definition, politics is a co-formation of social life within human capacity in the conditions of freedom and equality, while under specific authority. In a more narrow sense, it is understood as the art of administration. In a broader sense, it denotes any care for public life. Every citizen, as a member of a community, takes advantage of goods it has produced. Their participation cannot resemble the situation of a person subjected to a transfusion; instead, it must manifest itself in their contribution to the development of society. One of the aspects of the commitment to social life is political activity. It should not limit itself to the activity of politicians themselves, but, to a greater or lesser extent, it should engage all citizens. It is by their participation in political elections that citizens undertake an effort of shaping reality. The formation of the young generation’s attitudes is another manner in which parents and teachers manifest their care for social life.

2

Pomoc materialna – analiza powinności

100%

Sosenko K.

Prakseologia

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2012

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issue 153

31-42

EN

The aim of this paper is to search for an answer to the question whether an ethical person should aid others or whether it is a moral duty. The postulate of assistance follows from concern for the good of another person, which is a characteristic of morality. However, not all contemporary ethical conceptions postulate the moral value of assistance. In particular, the ethics of Nietzsche and libertarians question its moral importance. The question of whether assistance has moral value depends on how we understand morality and the compulsoriness of its principles. Providing material assistance is a human act and the value of that act is inﬂuenced by its circumstances. Depending on the circumstances, the moral obligation of aid varies from permission to requirement. There are also praxeological conditions of the value of material assistance, connected with a negative evaluation of wastefulness and inefﬁciency. If people should help, how strong is the obligation to do so? The answer depends on the source of duty; unfortunately, deontological ethics cannot clearly differentiate situations in which material assistance is a duty from situations in which it as supererogatory act. We are therefore left to our own moral sensitivity.

3

Moralny obowiązek ochrony środowiska naturalnego według ks. prof. Tadeusza Ślipko

88%

Konstańczak S.

Studia Ecologiae et Bioethicae

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2014

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vol. 12

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issue 1

9-28

EN

In his paper, the author makes an attempt at reconstructing one of the first propositions in Poland to start a philosophical discourse on ecological problems. The author of this proposition is priest Tadeusz Ślipko. According to this author the problems of the moral aspects of natural environmental protection are also bioethical problems. Therefore, we can see that he does not consider ethics of the environment as an individual philosophical discipline. The article concentrates on presenting the sources and the range of moral duties of humankind towards the natural environment. Tadeusz Ślipko does not approve of the anthropocentric or biocentric standpoints in the issues of natural environmental protection. He offers his own idea of anthropopriorism, which takes the middle ground between these two extreme concepts. In conclusion, the author underlines that there is still a strong need for ethical reflection over the state of the natural environment along the lines of Ślipko’s stance.

4

O moralnych obowiązkach ludzi wobec zwierząt. Etyka Gary’ego Francione

63%

Probucka D.

Studia Ecologiae et Bioethicae

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2015

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vol. 13

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issue 2

93-106

EN

The purpose of my article is to present and analyze the ethical views of Gary Francione – the leading, contemporary representative of Animal Rights Movement. He built his theory by criticizing the views of two other supporters of the idea of animal liberation: Peter Singer and Tom Regan. In his opinion, neither of these philosophers did not escape from the anthropocentric paradigm binding the moral obligations to animals with the primacy of human interest. Singer believed that only humans have the ability to plan their own future, and only they want to live and extend their own existence. While according to Regan, in conflict situations, respect for human interest should be dominant. Francione agrees that only people understand a deeper meaning of their own existence, but it does not follow that only they want to live and do not want to die. The need to preserve and continue the life is not the result of mental states, but it is a consequence of sensitivity – the biological trait which aims to safeguard and continuation of life. According to Francione, if every sensitive creature has an interest in preserving his own life and avoiding of suffering it they also have a moral right to life and not being treated in a cruel manner.

5

Wojtyła’s view on Kant’s formalism and Scheler’s material ethics of value, or the ethics of material duty

63%

Merecki J.

Logos i Ethos

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2023

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vol. 61

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issue 1

57-70

PL

Artykuł przedstawia koncepcję etyki opracowaną przez Karola Wojtyłę w jego polemice z systemami etycznymi Immanuela Kanta oraz Maksa Schelera. Wojtyła negatywnie ocenia system Schelera jako narzędzie do naukowej interpretacji etyki chrześcijańskiej, a zarazem jako narzędzie interpretacji doświadczenia moralności jako takiego. Nie ocenia jednak negatywnie samej metody fenomenologicznej, która w jego opinii stanowi niezbędne narzędzie w analizie faktów moralnych. Co więcej, Wojtyła postuluje, aby metodę tę stosować jeszcze bardziej konsekwentnie niż czynił to sam Scheler. W swojej częściowo uzasadnionej polemice z Kantem, Scheler posunął się bowiem zbyt daleko, wykluczając moment normatywny z doświadczenia moralności. Wojtyła stwierdził, że sama fenomenologiczna analiza doświadczenia - przede wszystkim sądów sumienia - pokazuje, że normatywność dana jest w źródłowym doświadczeniu moralności.

EN

The article presents the concept of ethics developed by Karol Wojtyła in his polemic against the ethical systems of Immanuel Kant and Max Scheler. Wojtyła negatively evaluates Scheler’s system as a tool for scientific interpretation of the Christian ethics, and at the same time as a tool for interpreting the experience of morality as such. However, he does not negatively evaluate the phenomenological method itself, which, in his opinion, is an indispensable tool in the analysis of moral facts. Moreover, Wojtyła proposes that this method should be applied even more consistently than Scheler himself did. This is because in his – partly justified – polemic with Kant, Scheler went too far in excluding the normative moment from the experience of morality. Wojtyła argues that the very phenomenological analysis of experience – above all, the judgments of conscience – shows that normativity is given in the originary experience of morality.

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1 Merecki J.

1 Probucka D.

1 Sobuś P. B.

1 Sosenko K.

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Uczestnictwo w polityce jako moralna powinność obywatela

Pomoc materialna – analiza powinności

Moralny obowiązek ochrony środowiska naturalnego według ks. prof. Tadeusza Ślipko

O moralnych obowiązkach ludzi wobec zwierząt. Etyka Gary’ego Francione

Wojtyła’s view on Kant’s formalism and Scheler’s material ethics of value, or the ethics of material duty