Search results

1

Povznášející teologie: rortyánské úvahy o filosofii náboženství

100%

Madzia R.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2012

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vol. 60

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issue 6

833-848

EN

The article concerns itself with an interpretation of the philosophy of R. Rorty from the point of view of post-modern philosophy of religion. In the first part the author gives a detailed account of the context in which Rorty’s philosophy developed, and describes the groundplan of the basic epistemological and philosophico-social sources of his writings. In part two it is argued that, despite the fact that Rorty’s philosophy can be interpreted as thoroughly secular, or even atheistic, it can be brought into harmony with some conceptions of post-modern Christianity. On the basis of an analysis of some of Rorty’s (especially later) texts and thoughts, it can be shown that his view of the problematic of objectivity is not only in keeping with a certain, increasingly prominent, conception of religiosity, but that we are presented with a perspective which we can treat as a further building of bridges between the cultural and intellectual traditions, so typical of Rorty’s thought. The author attempts to demonstrate that Rorty’s final vision of society – in the conceptual framework of which a central role is played by such concepts as solidarity, romance and hope – is in certain important respects similar to the vision presented by such authors as G. Vattimo and J. D. Caputo.

CS

Článek se zabývá interpretací filosofie Richarda Rortyho z pohledu postmoderní filosofie náboženství. V první části se autor blíže věnuje kontextu, v němž se Rortyho filosofie vyvíjela, a mapuje základní epistemologická a filosoficko-sociální východiska jeho tvorby. Argumentační linie části druhé naproti tomu směřuje k prokázání skutečnosti, že byť může být Rortyho filosofie interpretována jako veskrze sekulární, až ateistická, je uveditelná do souladu s některými koncepcemi postmoderního křesťanství. Na pozadí analýzy některých (zejména pozdějších) Rortyho textů a myšlenek lze totiž dokázat, že je jeho pohled na předmětnou problematiku nejen slučitelný s určitým, stále výrazněji se prosazujícím pojetím religiozity, ale že se jedná o perspektivu, kterou můžeme nahlížet jako další rortyovské stavění mostů mezi kulturními a intelektuálními tradicemi. Autor se snaží prokázat, že Rortyho konečná vize společnosti, v jejímž konceptuálním rámci sehrávají centrální úlohu takové pojmy, jako jsou solidarita, romance či naděje, se v nosných momentech podobá té, kterou prezentují autoři jako Gianni Vattimo či John D. Caputo.

2

Rortyho „Zrcadlo“ konečně v českém střihu

100%

Šíp R.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2012

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vol. 60

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issue 6

849-867

EN

This article is a review study of Rorty’s book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, which was recently translated into Czech. In the first part, the reviewer compares the Slovak and Czech translations and draws attention to the qualities of the Czech. In the second part, the main structural points in Rorty’s argument are described – from the genealogical stress on the arbitrariness of modern conceptions of representation and the explanation of the reasons for the primacy of epistemology above ontology, to the critical deconstruction of this thought and to Rorty’s proposal of a new conception and new function of philosophy. In the following part, by the way of a response to T. Marvan, an inconsistency in Rorty’s work is drawn attention to – that is its continuing attachment to the modern tradition of thinking, something which detracts from the consistency of his anti-representationalism. In the final part of the article, a hope is expressed that the reading of the Mirror will be an inspiration for further reading of less fashionable, but rather ostracised, works and authors.

CS

Předložený text je recenzní studií Rortyho knihy Filosofie a zrcadlo přírody, jež byla nedávno převedena do českého jazyka. V první části recenzent porovnává slovenský a český překlad a upozorňuje na kvality toho českého. V druhé části přibližuje hlavní strukturní momenty Rortyho argumentu – od genealogického zvýraznění nahodilosti novověké představy reprezentace a vysvětlení důvodů k nadřazení epistemologie nad ontologii až ke kritické dekonstrukci této myšlenky a k Rortyho návrhu na nové pojetí a novou funkci filosofie. V následující části prostřednictvím odpovědi T. Marvanovi poukazuje na nekonzistentnost v Rortyho díle – na jeho přetrvávající příslušnost k novověké tradici myšlení, jež devalvuje jeho důsledný antireprezentacionalismus. V poslední části textu vyjadřuje naději, že se četba Zrcadla stane inspirací k četbě dalších – méně módních, ale přesto stejně ostrakizovaných – děl a autorů.

3

Analytická a konverzační filosofie

80%

Rorty R.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2012

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vol. 60

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issue 6

803-814

EN

The aim of Rorty’s article Analytic and conversational philosophy is to replace the distinction between analytic and continental philosophy with a distinction between analytic and conversational philosophy. This is achieved through a perception of the difference between the two types of philosophy that rejects the geographical viewpoint which, though it may provide a certain possibility of distinguishing the specific types of philosophy, is not in Rorty’s view really decisive. The difference consists above all in the distinctive view of philosophy of itself, and of the sense and aim of its endeavour. It consists in the response to the question of whether philosophy can or cannot know something as it really is; whether it can follow the path of science; or whether it should rather perceive itself as a conversation and an opening up of cultural reflection.

CS

Cílem Rortyho článku „Analytická a konverzační filosofie“ je nahrazení distinkce mezi analytickou a kontinentální filosofií rozlišením mezi filosofií analytickou a filosofií konverzační. Tím dojde při nahlížení rozdílu mezi oběma typy filosofie k odstranění geografického hlediska, které, ač samo o sobě poskytuje určitou možnost rozlišit jednotlivé typy filosofů, není dle Rortyho ve skutečnosti určující. Tento rozdíl spočívá především v odlišném náhledu filosofie na sebe samotnou, na smysl a cíle své práce. Spočívá v odpovědi na otázku, zda filosofie může něco poznávat takové, jaké to doopravdy je, či nikoli a zda se může vydat po cestě vědy, či by měla naopak vnímat sebe sama spíše jako konverzaci a rozvíjení kulturního uvažování.

4

Filosofie přírodních věd a filosofie člověka u Richarda Rortyho: nová potřeba pojmu „transcendence“?

80%

Cvek B.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2012

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vol. 60

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issue 6

815-832

EN

Richard Rorty, American philosopher (1931-2007) is considered to be one of the most influential thinkers of recent times. His main thesis centres on a critique of representationalism – of the ambition of classical modern philosophy to comprehend nature in the mirror of the human mind. From here Rorty then moves through the area of knowing, and also of a social critique of bigotry, to the work of John Dewey, whom he understands in a fundamentally relativistic way. The aim of this article is to determine the limits of Rorty’s relativism, and to show how we might preserve Rorty’s original critique of representationalism despite these limits. Mention is made of the intensive debates between the late-Rorty and his critics, especially in the area of the philosophy of natural science which, in Rorty’s work, is tellingly left to one side. The article offers, as a way out of Rortian relativism, the concept of “open authority” and a new philosophical view, still in the tradition of American pragmatism, of human rationality.

CS

Richard Rorty, americký filosof (1931-2007), bývá považován za jednoho z nejvlivnějších myslitelů poslední doby. Jeho hlavní teze se soustředí na kritiku reprezentacionalismu, tedy ambici klasické moderní filosofie poznávat přírodu v zrcadle lidské mysli. Odtud Rorty přechází v oblasti poznání, ale i společenské kritiky bigotnosti, k dílu Johna Deweye a chápe ho v zásadě relativisticky. Cílem tohoto článku je ukázat, kde jsou limity tohoto Rortyho relativismu a jak před ním zachránit Rortyho původní kritiku reprezentacionalismu. Navazuje se v něm na intenzivní debaty mezi pozdním Rortym a jeho kritiky a zejména na filosofii přírodních věd, která je v Rortyho díle výmluvně postavena stranou. Článek jako východisko z rortyánského relativismu nabízí pojem „otevřené autority“ a nový filosofický pohled, stále však ukotvený v tradici amerického pragmatismu, na lidskou racionalitu.

5

Filozofia a etyka stosowana. Dyskusja nad propozycją Richarda Rorty`ego

80%

Kamińska G.

Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym

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2008

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vol. 11

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issue 1

EN

In this article the relations between philosophy and applied ethics are considered. The presented deliberation is concentrated on the question whether philosophy has contributed to applied ethics, especially to business ethics. Trying to find an answer to this question I will refer to the discussion which was started by R. Rorty in which he presented his own point of view on the issues related to moral development and the role of philosophy and philosophers in the modern world. Rorty points at proper tools which, in his opinion, can be helpful to business ethicists and formulates the goal they should try to aim at. His opinions has started a vivid discussion. Patricia H. Werhane, Daryl Koehn and Richard T. De George try to discuss with Rorty’s statement. They oppose Rorty’s argument that philosophy is not more relevant to applied ethics than any other academic disciplines. They point to the facts which document philosophers’ contribution in forming business ethics. This article presents their arguments as well as an attempt of their critical assessment.

6

Profesjonalizacja wolności. Swoboda artysty w sztuce współczesnej

80%

Sztabiński G.

Estetyka i Krytyka

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2010

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issue 17-18

11-32

EN

The history of art is often discussed in connection with broadening the scope of artistic freedom. Such an approach is founded on the assumption that freedom is a constant, transhistorical value which may be increased or limited depending on social conditions. Invoking Boris Bernstein’s views, the author challenges this approach, which allows him to consider the singular features of freedom in contemporary art. He argues that these features are delimited by emphasizing the opposition between broadly understood totalitarianism and liberalism. Postmodernist thinkers have transferred these issues from the area of politics to the domain of culture, which has resulted in detecting a variety of freedom restrictions. As an example, the author discusses the views of Richard Rorty who opposed the model of cultural liberalism (based on scientific patterns) to „poeticized culture” (characterized by randomness, irony and individualism).

7

Dyskurs postmetafizyczny (post-Filozoficzny) Richarda Rorty'ego

71%

Umerle T.

Ogrody Nauk i Sztuk

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2011

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issue 1

PL

Celem tej pracy jest próba analizy dyskursu filozoficznego Przygodności, ironii i solidarności Richarda Rorty'ego. Szczególnie interesować mnie będzie to, w jaki sposób ów postmetafizyczny dyskurs angażuje się po stronie dość konkretnie określonych ideałów polityczno-społecznych. Będę chciał dowieść, iż czyni to za pomocą tzw. „momentów literackich”. Owe momenty mają u Rorty'ego swoją specyfikę – są m.in. językowo nierewolucyjne, gdyż i sam Rorty był zdeklarowanym, socjaldemokratycznym i liberalnym, reformistą.

EN

The aim of the article is an analysis of Richard Rorty’s philosophical discourse Contingency, irony and solidarity. Special attention will be paid to the way how post-metaphysical discourse is engaged in definite socio-political ideals. I will try to prove it is done thanks to “literary moments”. In Rorty’s discourse those moments are specific: they are language non-revolutionary because Rorty was a declared, social democratic and liberal reformist.

8

Amerykańska religia obywatelska Richarda Rorty’ego

71%

Gużyński J.

Diametros

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2018

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issue 56

67-86

PL

Artykuł prezentuje stosowaną przez Richarda Rorty'ego metaforykę religijną w kontekście pojęcia religii obywatelskiej, wywodzącego się z Umowy społecznej Jeana Jacquesa Rousseau, a współcześnie stosowanego przede wszystkim w socjologicznej analizie związku państwa z religią. Zostaje ono zestawione z Rortiańską koncepcją pragmatyzmu jako romantycznego politeizmu oraz fundamentalnymi na jej gruncie pojęciami romantyczności, politeizmu oraz poezji. Szczegółów propozycji amerykańskiego neopragmatysty dostarczają formułowane przez niego porównania instytucji społecznych do instytucji religijnych, takich jak kapłaństwo czy świątynia. Istotną cechą filozofii Rorty'ego jest daleko idący sekularyzm, stąd też pomiędzy jego wizją a opisem innych badaczy dochodzi do nieścisłości. Mają one swoje źródło w pragmatystycznych poglądach autora Przygodności, ironii i solidarności oraz podkreślają polityczny charakter jego filozofii.

EN

The article presents Richard Rorty’s religious metaphors in the context of the concept of civil religion derived from The Social Contract of Jean Jacques Rousseau and primarily used today for the sociological analysis of the relationship between religion and the state. It is paired with Rorty’s conception of pragmatism as romantic polytheism and its fundamental notions of romance, polytheism, and poetry. Parallels between social and religious institutions formulated by the American neo-pragmatist, such as priesthood and sanctuary, provide the details of his proposition. The article opposes the interpretation of Jason Boffetti, who suggests that the use of religious language is a sign of a considerable change in Rorty’s standpoint. A characteristic feature of Rorty’s philosophy is its secularism. Therefore, there is a discrepancy between his vision of civil religion and that of other scholars. This discrepancy has its source in Rorty’s pragmatist position and underlines the political character of his philosophy.

9

Cognitive Innovation, Irony and Collaboration

70%

Punt M., Denham S. L.

Avant

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2017

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issue 8

EN

What seems clear from the experiences of researchers in CogNovo is that the concept of cognitive innovation offered a new vocabulary, and thus a clear space, within which creativity could be explored free from the baggage of prior conflicting definitions. The concept was, from its inception, intrinsically ironic in the sense that Richard Rorty developed the term. Although initially we did not fully appreciate the potential this offered, approaching creativity under the rubric of cognitive innovation led to novel ideas that would not have emerged if we had taken a more conventional discipline-led approach. One example was expressing creativity as a mathematical function and as a media form in a parallel text. The absurdity of describing a process of such complexity in this form did not pass us by. However, this self-conscious irony, not a common rhetorical strategy in the sciences, clarified our understanding of cognitive innovation as a recursive function that allowed us to express a continuity between the basic life processes of exploration, innovation and the construction of the self, and the social and cultural ramifications of these processes; creativity. It led us to conclude that cognitive innovation furnishes a view of the self as a dynamic entity, for whom reality and novelty are contingent on one’s current state, both of which can change and be changed, and offers a means for enhancing the rigor of the current debate on what counts as creative. It also reveals the value of irony in not disavowing the inevitability of multiple perspectives and prospectives on reality, and consequently offers a way to avoid unnecessary reductivism. In this paper, we will argue, as we take the insights of CogNovo forward, that irony offers a hitherto unappreciated strategy for collaborative research.

10

Rortyho pojetí poznání

70%

Ritter M.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2012

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vol. 60

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issue 6

869-883

EN

This study is a systematic interpretation of Rorty’s conception of knowledge as it can be reconstructed on the basis of the book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Although Rorty is sweeping in his criticism of theories of knowledge, it can still be shown that he himself works with a certain positive conception not only of what knowledge does not consist in, but also of what it positively concerns. The study describes the basic points of Rorty’s conception of knowledge (knowledge as the practice of justification, knowledge as description, knowledge as the modification of theory, knowledge as coping), and it presents Rorty’s critique of epistemology in favour of the concept of self-determination. The conclusion of the study looks at the question of how Rorty is able to justify the rejection of epistemology and the acceptance of a hermeneutical viewpoint.

CS

Studie je vnitřně soudržnou interpretací Rortyho pojetí poznání, jak je lze rekonstruovat na základě knihy Filosofie a zrcadlo přírody. Ačkoli Rorty kritizuje v podstatě všechny teorie poznání, lze ukázat, že sám pracuje s jistou pozitivní představou nejen o tom, v čem poznání nespočívá, nýbrž také o tom, oč v něm pozitivně jde. Studie popisuje podstatné ohledy Rortyho pojetí poznání (poznání jako praxe zdůvodňování, poznání jako popis, poznání jako upravování teorie, poznání jako zvládání) a předvádí Rortyho kritiku epistemologie s pozitivní oporou v konceptu sebeurčení. Závěr studie tematizuje otázku, jakým způsobem Rorty může zdůvodnit odmítnutí epistemologie a přijetí hermeneutického hlediska.

11

What do thermonuclear bombs have to do with intercultural hermeneutics? (Or on the superiority of Dickens over Heidegger)

70%

Małecki W.

Human Affairs

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2011

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vol. 21

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issue 4

393-402

EN

In this paper, I discuss Richard Rorty’s views on intercultural hermeneutics as presented in his essay “Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens” and in his correspondence with the Indian philosopher Anindita Niyogi Balslev. In doing so, I focus primarily on Rorty’s presumption that instead of providing an “authentic” picture of another culture, the goal of intercultural studies or hermeneutics should be to look if there is anything “of use” that a given culture offers and that is not offered by ours.

12

Religion as a bond – a delusive hope of politics

70%

Grzybowski J.

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

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2020

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vol. 56

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issue S2

237-258

EN

Politics is on the one hand an attempt to implement certain good, a desire for achieving agreed objectives, on the other hand – as Max Weber says – a simultaneous a#empt to avoid a particular evil. If in defining the notion of politics there are references to good and evil, purpose and desire, it has to include the non-political spheres – culture, axiology, religion. Mark Lilla argues that for decades we have been aware of the great and final separation that has taken place in Western Europe between political and religious life. This awareness implies a conviction, which is obligatory today in most countries and societies, that to separate politics from religion is a great achievement. For many thinkers and politicians this is an undisputed success from which the West learns to benefit while preparing other regions of the world for such separation. Therefore it seems that modern politics should be free from religious inspiration and temptation. On the other hand, many sociologists and political scientists show the vitality of religious attitudes, proving that in its deepest essence religion is an expression of human behaviour. Each person and each community always has an element of irreducibility which is an internal defence against reducing man to “here and now”, restricting his world to what is useful and usable. We experience that in man there is a natural opening to what is transcendent. Thus, if man is ever to achieve individual and social reconciliation with himself, he will always look for rational and moral meanings. This situation creates a platform for the emergence of a completely new a#itude in society and politics – to seek and pursue spirituality in a world without religion. Increasingly, the understanding of religion reveals itself in a wide etymological sense, sociological and ethnological: religare – “to connect”, “to bind”, “to build community ties”. Religion so understood would be a great solution to the dilemma of separation – the adoption of religion (bonds) without the doctrine, while ensuring social cohesion, strengthening the feeling of being together, maintaining a spiritual connection. Many thinkers are convinced that we cannot base social life only on fear, discipline and economy; we need a deeper and stronger foundations for Community Cohesion. But is such a project possible at all? Is politics becoming a place for the formation of relationships, education and conservation of values, a narrative space which tells citizens what is good and right and what is wrong and alien? Can it replace religion in its deepest essence – in its intimate sense of an exploration and discovery of transcendence? Will it not become a caricature of religion, and a caricature of politics, and ultimately a trap for freedom?

13

Cognitive Innovation, Irony and Collaboration

70%

Punt M., Denham S. L.

Avant

|

2017

|

vol. 8

EN

What seems clear from the experiences of researchers in CogNovo is that the concept of cognitive innovation offered a new vocabulary, and thus a clear space, within which creativity could be explored free from the baggage of prior conflicting definitions. The concept was, from its inception, intrinsically ironic in the sense that Richard Rorty developed the term. Although initially we did not fully appreciate the potential this offered, approaching creativity under the rubric of cognitive innovation led to novel ideas that would not have emerged if we had taken a more conventional discipline-led approach. One example was expressing creativity as a mathematical function and as a media form in a parallel text. The absurdity of describing a process of such complexity in this form did not pass us by. However, this self-conscious irony, not a common rhetorical strategy in the sciences, clarified our understanding of cognitive innovation as a recursive function that allowed us to express a continuity between the basic life processes of exploration, innovation and the construction of the self, and the social and cultural ramifications of these processes; creativity. It led us to conclude that cognitive innovation furnishes a view of the self as a dynamic entity, for whom reality and novelty are contingent on one’s current state, both of which can change and be changed, and offers a means for enhancing the rigor of the current debate on what counts as creative. It also reveals the value of irony in not disavowing the inevitability of multiple perspectives and prospectives on reality, and consequently offers a way to avoid unnecessary reductivism. In this paper, we will argue, as we take the insights of CogNovo forward, that irony offers a hitherto unappreciated strategy for collaborative research.

14

Czy prawnicy powinni być pragmatystami?

61%

Rakoczy F.

Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne studia nad prawem

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2016

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vol. 8

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issue 3

118-135

EN

In my paper I would like to analyze the topic o academic legal education, using for that purpose tool granted by Rochard Rorty’s neopragmatism and Artur Kozak’s juriscentrism. In this article I consider the possibility of describing higher education and legal culture using both of those concepts, and to form some proposals for future shaping of this proces. In my text I aim to prove, tha contemporary legal education is basem mostly on the mechanisms of socialisation and professional training, which base rather on transfer of rules of legal reasoning and discussion within legal community, than on transfer of actual skills. Therefore I consider to which extent this process should be suplemented by methods which individualise students, and which allow the autocreation, which is, according to Rorty, should be the mian task of higher education. In the further parts of my paper I consuder, how those mechanisms will impact shaping of future lawyers, and by that, the legal community itself, and what benefits could we achieve this way.

PL

W swojej pracy poruszam zagadnienie akademickiej edukacji prawniczej, korzystając w tym celu z narzędzi zapewnionych przez neopragmatyzm Richarda Rorty’ego oraz juryscentryzm Artura Kozaka. Rozważam możliwość opisu edukacji wyższej i kultury prawniczej za pomocą tych dwóch koncepcji, a także staram się formułować wnioski dotyczące przyszłego ukształtowania tego procesu. Próbuję wykazać, że współczesna edukacja prawnicza oparta jest głównie na mechanizmach socjalizacji i treningu zawodowego, które polegają raczej na przekazywaniu reguł rozumowania prawniczego i dyskusji wewnątrz wspólnoty prawniczej, niż na przekazywaniu konkretnych umiejętności. W związku z tym rozważam, w jakim stopniu proces ten powinien zostać uzupełniony o metody indywidualizujące kształconych, umożliwiające im autokreację, co, zdaniem Rorty’ego, powinno stanowić główne zadanie studiów wyższych. W dalszej części pracy zastanawiam się, w jaki sposób tego rodzaju mechanizmy wpłyną na ukształtowanie przyszłych prawników, a tym samym wspólnoty prawniczej oraz jakie ewentualne korzyści możemy w ten sposób osiągnąć.

15

Wypisy z ksiąg użytecznych jako wypowiedź programowa Czesława Miłosza

61%

Partyka J.

Białostockie Studia Literaturoznawcze

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2014

|

vol. 5

EN

The purpose of this article is to reconsider Czesław Miłosz’s two anthologies of poetry, "Wypisy z ksiąg użytecznych" (1994) and its counterpart in the English language "A Book of Luminous Things" (1996), as metapoetic reflections on the obligations of contemporary poetry. In particular, it highlights the nature of Miłosz’s ideological contention with Wallace Stevens and Richard Rorty.

16

Versions of Pragmatic Liberalism: from Rorty back to Dewey

61%

Dubniak Z.

Journal of Education Culture and Society

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2021

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vol. 12

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issue 2

15-30

EN

Aim. The aim of this study is to analyze and evaluate two versions of the theory of liberalism which emerged within the philosophical tradition of pragmatism: Richard Rorty’s “ironic liberalism” and John Dewey’s “renascent liberalism”. Methods. The study is based on: 1) comparative analysis, which shows the differences and points of contact between Dewey’s classical pragmatism and Rorty’s neo-pragmatism, in particular, between different versions of their liberal theories; 2) critical analysis, which made it possible to identify the shortcomings and advantages in the arguments of the above-mentioned philosophers. Results. The author analyzed Rorty’s and Dewey’s theories of liberalism in relation to their theories of reality, human specificity, and ethics. In this way, the specific liberal views of these American philosophers on such issues as the relationship between private and public, the main goals of politics, and the values of the social order were explicated. It allowed offering a thorough critique of Rorty’s “ironic liberalism”, and supporting of Dewey’s “renascent liberalism”. Conclusion. While Dewey saw the mission of liberalism in enabling individuals to improve their experience, Rorty insisted on the need for a liberal policy of providing the basic conditions for individual self-creation. The main disadvantage of Rorty’s neo-pragmatism, and, in particular, “ironic liberalism”, was the exclusion from the philosophy of the modifying tools of human behavior, which were expressed by the concepts of “good” or “virtue”, in Dewey’s “renascent liberalism”. This circumstance necessitates a return from Rorty back to Dewey in the discussions on pragmatic liberalism. Key words: philosophy of pragmatism, Richard Rorty, John Dewey, historicism, naturalism, liberalism.

17

Rorty’s philosophy of religion

61%

Višňovský E.

Human Affairs

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2015

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vol. 26

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issue 3

329-339

EN

Richard Rorty interpreted religion as a historically constituted part of culture. As a philosopher, he sought primarily to understand religion’s socio-cultural nature and role. His approach was socio-critical, intellectually sympathetic and humanistic. The paper provides an account of Rorty’s key phases in his philosophy of religion. During phase one (the 1990s), he was primarily interested in whether, in a democratic society, religion should simply be a private matter or also one of public concern (and if so, then in what way and to what extent). During phase two (post-2000), his thinking on cultural politics developed more broadly, and he wrote about ‘romantic polytheism’ and the future of religion, etc. In his writing from phase one, he portrays himself as a ‘secular humanist’ as well as an atheist and, in his writing from phase two, as a ‘non-theist’ and ‘anti-clericalist’.

18

Problem dualistycznego podziału na naturę i kulturę. O postkonstruktywizmie i konstruktywizmie kulturowym

61%

Markiewka T. S.

Przegląd Kulturoznawczy

|

2013

|

issue 1(15)

100–110

EN

The aim of the article is to present how postconstructivism tries to overcome the dualistic distinction between nature and culture (and why this is so important issue). In order to do this, the author of the text compares postconstructivism with cultural constructivism (and its way of dealing with above-mentioned dualism). The former is represented by Bruno Latour, the latter is represented by Richard Rorty. Cultural constructivists want to weaken the nature/culture distinction by persuade us that every object of our knowledge is a cultural object and one should never use nature as an argument. Postconstructivists say that we should stop using both the notion of nature and the notion of culture in our debates.

19

Abandoning Truth is not a Solution. A Discussion with Richard Rorty

61%

Kilanowski M.

Diametros

|

2019

|

vol. 16

|

issue 61

34-50

EN

Richard Rorty suggests that we should stop looking for something common to us all, for universal justifi cations and truth. Rorty argues that focusing on a single truth sooner or later serves those who claim that there is a proper, true model of living. In the end, they use violence and cause pain, as they are driven by the idea that everyone should accept their truth. In this article I shall argue that such reasoning is not justifi ed and whether we are universalists or constructivists, our actions may be the same and cause pain. At the same time, having the same beliefs will not stop us from acting differently. What matters is how we use a particular concept in accordance with our interests and not the concept itself. I shall also argue that dialog can help to prevent violence and that while Rorty is right, there are also a number of problems with that proposition.

20

Leszek Kołakowski – nieznany konstruktywista

57%

Chałubiński M.

Filozofia i Nauka

|

2016

|

vol. 4

231-240

EN

The paper presents Leszek Kołakowski’s philosophy by comparing it not only with different constructivist threads in epistemology (among others, Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism and methodological anarchism), but also with Marxist revisionism (Stanisław Brzozowski, Antonio Gramsci, György Lukács). The epistemologies emphasizing an active role of the subject in cognition are here taken into account. Their common attribute is frequently scepticism and agnosticism. The paper also shows some ideological-political implications of Kołakowski’s research in the period of the Warsaw School of History of Ideas in 1955–1968.

PL

Artykuł prezentuje filozofię Leszka Kołakowskiego nie tylko na tle konstruktywistycznych nurtów w epistemologii (m.in. neopragmatyzmu Richarda Rorty’ego i metodologicznego anarchizmu), lecz również w kontekście rewizjonizmu marksistowskiego (m.in. Stanisława Brzozowskiego, Antonio Gramsciego i György Lukácsa). Wspólny teoretyczny mianownik stanowią dla nich te rodzaje teorii poznania, które akcentują czynną rolę podmiotu w poznaniu. Cechuje je też zazwyczaj sceptycyzm i agnostycyzm. Artykuł ten pokazuje także ideologiczno-polityczne implikacje filozoficznych badań Kołakowskiego w okresie istnienia Warszawskiej Szkoły Historii Idei w latach 1955–1968.

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Rorty’s philosophy of religion

Problem dualistycznego podziału na naturę i kulturę. O postkonstruktywizmie i konstruktywizmie kulturowym

Abandoning Truth is not a Solution. A Discussion with Richard Rorty

Leszek Kołakowski – nieznany konstruktywista