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EN
The author in this study concerns himself with the question of animality especially as understood by Merleau-Ponty in his courses at the Collège de France. Merleau-Ponty’s starting point is a reading of Husserl’s manuscripts which, in a certain sense, define themselves in distinction to Heidegger’s position. In these manuscripts certain concepts appear in embryo which will later become decisive in Merleau-Ponty’s conception of animality – one example is inter-animality. In his lectures Merleau-Ponty enriches Husserl’s original outlook by his reading of Portmann, Konrad and Uexküll, so that his conception of animality is now informed by concepts such as Umwelt and building plan. In this way he gradually outlines a new and original conception of animality which is now not understood by a relation to the human world, but rather as an attempt to find the authentic animal mode of being, while still maintaining the characteristic emphasis of phenomenology on appearing. In the concluding part of the text, Merleau-Ponty’s conception of animality is compared with that of Gilles Deleuze, presented in his book What Is Philosophy? Both differences and resonances between the two perspectives are emphasised.
PL
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to answer the question of how the interpretation of the main character in The Stranger by Albert Camus as „an animal in the human skin” can be applied to understanding the actions of the character in the world. The next question posed is whether Camus describes Meursault literally as an animal or refers to the character symbolically. The author argues that such an extreme treatment of „the animality” of the character is useless in the broader context of this book since Meursault has a human nature which proves the complexity of his mental processes.
EN
The aim of this short article is to discuss the state of research in a field which attempts to combine animal studies with theology and religious studies, and to map its discourse, tentatively called “critical ecotheology” and construed as environmental ethics accompanied by a religious inspiration and theological justification which is derived from dogmas and religious attitudes of different world religions. The attempt at providing a theoretical framework for ecotheology was inspired by the pioneering work of scholars who came in September 2014 to Bonn, Germany, for a conference on human-animal relations in religious traditions. The problems brought up by their presentations provoked a discussion of the presence of animals in the thinking, practices, and rituals of various religions and their theologies, highlighting the role of religious culture in negotiating different senses of the animal. The article concludes with the idea that a review of religious and theological issues from the perspective of animal studies may lead to the revision of many concepts and theoretical paradigms within the history and anthropology of religion, while helping to articulate the significance of animals and the need for their protection in the activity of religious groups and individuals.
EN
The article discusses zoomorphism as part of the anthropocentric discourse aimed at establishing human dominance over animals. Basing on Jacques Derrida’s 1997 paper “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” the article approaches anthropomorphism and zoomorphism as culturally sanctioned ways of misrepresenting animality and shaping human attitudes towards real-life animals. A symptom of the misrepresentation is the gap between animals and their linguistic denotations. The specific aim of the article is to demonstrate that zoomorphism as used in everyday language conserves the human-centered vision of the world by ignoring the differences between individual animals. The discussion concludes by arguing that zoomorphism can be remedied by the individualizing aspects of anthropomorphism.
EN
The book by Étienne Bimbenet L’animal que je ne suis plus is an ambitious attempt to define humanity in relation to animality, a project that considers itself a part of the tradition of the “phenomenology of life”. The author displays a manifold debt to the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, but at the same time he adds to Merleau-Ponty’s thought, especially by tackling new findings in the area of psychology and linguistics. The basis of this account of the relation between man and animal is a philosophical interpretation of the phenomenon of “shared space”, i.e. the ability of the human individual to perceive another human being as an intentional being—an ability that is, according some linguists, an indispensable condition for the acquisition of language. From this viewpoint Bimbenet then inprets the relation of man to the world which, he argues, is in sharp contrast to the relation which an animal maintains with the world. This review not only summarises the conclusions that Bimbenet’s book comes to, but also puts the work into the broader context of the phenomenology of life, and of certain linguistic theories.
CS
Kniha Etienna Bimbeneta „L‘animal que je ne suis plus“ je ambiciózním pokusem o vymezení lidství ve vztahu k animalitě, přičemž tento projekt se vepisuje do tradice tzv. fenomenologie života. Autor v mnohém navazuje na filosofii Maurice Merleau-Pontyho, ale zároveň jeho myšlení doplňuje zejména tím, že se konfrontuje s novými poznatky v oblasti psychologie a lingvistiky. Základem jeho výkladu vztahu člověka a zvířete je filosofická interpretace fenoménu tzv. sdílené pozornosti, tj. schopnosti lidského jedince vnímat jinou lidskou bytost jako bytost intencionální, schopnosti, která je podle některých lingvistů nepostradatelnou podmínkou osvojení si řeči. Z tohoto východiska potom Bimbenet interpretuje vztah člověka ke světu, který se podle něho výrazně liší od vztahu, který se světem udržuje zvíře. Předkládaná recenzní studie jednak shrnuje závěry, k nimž Bimbenetova kniha dospívá, a jednak jeho dílo zařazuje do širšího kontextu fenomenologie života a některých lingvistických teorií.
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EN
The present paper represents a phenomenological reflexion on the question of animality. Drawing from a selection of phenomenological texts, ranging from Husserl and Heidegger to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the author pleads for a different view of animality than that which would posit a neatly cut anthropological difference between the human subject and animal. In the final section of the text, the difficult question of inter-animality (as opposed to intersubjectivity) is treated in some detail.
EN
The aim of the article is to re-evaluate the still-surviving anthropological trope which, in reaction to an inquiry into the essence of man, responds by way of a comparison with the animal and points to culture, as the means by which humans complete their “deficient” nature. This motif has been extended by A. Gehlen, who in contrast to the animal, characterises man as a “being of deficiencies”. The morphological-instinctive insufficiency of the human being must be, in his view, stabilised by cultural institutions, i.e. complexes of habitual actions. The texts of M. Merleau-Ponty, however, demon­strate that bodily beings always relate to their environment indirectly, on the basis of certain “standards” and “norms” of interaction which, in addition, exist by way of institution. The anthropological trope confronting humans and animals thus cannot produce, as in Gehlen, a contrast between an allegedly “direct” relationship to the world in animals and a supposedly “indirect” relationship to the world in humans. It can be meaningfully retained only if it is interpreted in a Merleau-Pontyan way, that is, as an invitation to understand the transformation of the norms of indirect interaction with the world found in animals into those found in people, that is, if viewed as a comparison of their respective institutions.
DE
Ziel des Artikels ist es, eine immer noch lebendige anthropologische Figur neu zu bewerten. Diese Figur beantwortet die Frage nach dem Wesen des Menschen mithilfe eines Vergleichs mit dem Tier und bezeichnet das Mittel, mit dem sich der von Natur aus unfertige Mensch formt, als Kultur. Dieses Motiv wurde von A. Gehlen vertieft, der den Menschen im Gegensatz zum Tier als „Mängelwesen“ bezeichnete. Das morphologisch-instinktiv nicht vollständig ausgestattete menschliche Wesen ist laut Gehlen gezwungen, sich durch kulturelle Institutionen und habitualisierte Verhaltenskomplexe zu stabilisieren. Die Texte von M. Merleau-Ponty zeigen jedoch, dass körperliche Wesen sich bereits stets indirekt auf ihr Umfeld beziehen, und zwar auf Grundlage eines bestimmten „Standards“ bzw. einer „Norm“ der Interaktion, die darüber hinaus seiner Ansicht nach selbst in Form einer Institution existiert. Die anthropologische Figur, die den Menschen mit dem Tier konfrontiert erweist sich daher nicht dann als sinnvoll, wenn wir im Sinne von Gehlen den angeblich „direkten“ Bezug zur Welt des Tieres und den „indirekten“ Menschen einander gegenüberstellen, sondern nur dann, wenn sie uns wie bei Merleau-Ponty, zum Verständnis der Transformation des „indirekten“ Tieres in die „Indirektheit“ des Menschen, d.h. in ihre „Institutionen“ führt.
EN
The idea of my article is to challenge traditional ways of confronting animality with humanity. Either in order to define human superiority over animals and construct “man” as an “animal and something much more,” or in order to launch the idea of an animal as being less stupid than it has always been supposed to be, the comparison between humans and animals is concentrated on suppressing animality (in humans as superiors as well as in animals—as wrongly conceived to be “stupid”) and affirming humanity. This is a dialectic interplay of two related concepts of “man” and “beast” petrifying a false vision of common fate of people and animals. This kind of false consciousness makes animals and people badly interdependent. I claim that this mental figure should be overcome by applying the very category of “being human” to so (far) called “animals.”
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O co usilovala asubjektivní fenomenologi

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EN
This essay outlines some of the key philosophical gestures that define Jan Patočka’s project of an “asubjective phenomenology”, with particular attention paid to the themes of the world, meaning, body, movement, selfhood, reflection, and the critique of Cartesianism. The essay concludes with some remarks on the resources in Patocka’s thinking for a philosophical reflection on animality.
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Jak se tvoří zvířecí a lidské tělo?

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EN
The present paper concentrates on the gradual transformation of phenomenology in the work of Martin Heidegger and attempts to show in what way this transformation leads Heidegger to abandon the phenomenology itself. We attempt to confront the theoretical position of late Heidegger with the thought of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, pointing out the anti-transcendental and non-dialectical elements in Heidegger’s conception of four-dimensional temporality and identity of thought and being. The notion of Ereignis is understood as a becoming of being on the position of „thought“: in this perspective, if it may precisely be confronted with Deleuze’s and Guattari’s thought. Our principle aim, on the basis of this confrontation, is to rethink the relationship between humanity and animality and between the human and the animal body.
EN
This article examines Klíma’s concept of so-called egodeism, attempting to interpret it as a rigorous thinking through of the problem of suffering. It’s a problematic that draws from the various traditions (Buddhism, Stoicism, Schopenhauer) that Klíma builds on. The aim is to show that, while Klíma’s egodeism is more problematic thought experiment than coherent theoretical concept, the path by which Klíma reaches egodeism is philosophically legitimate. The author indicates how Klíma develops his ideas by way of modern metaphysical idealism (Berkeley, Schopenhauer), as well as the more problematic stages of his progress (so-called extended Kantianism). As Klíma has been described as an epigone of F. Nietzsche, the author also — using comparative method — focuses on several aspects by which Klíma may be distinguished from Nietzsche. To some extent, J. Patočka’s concerns are discussed as well.
EN
It is a recent tendency to read certain pre- and early-modern thinkers as “anticipatory critics” of modernity; the name of Michel de Montaigne often comes up in this context. Most of the critical approaches treat Montaigne like a pre-Rousseau proto-romantic which is indeed is an important part of Montaigne’s thinking. However, as I show in this paper, his Essays also allow for a different interpretation. Namely, I demonstrate that 1) Montaigne’s appraisal of Nature is far from a romantic-idyllic one; 2) his understanding of the interspecies division is more subtle than it is often thought; 3) his thought thus interpreted includes an ethics of becoming-animal that is based on a radically anti-Platonic (and thus anti-Cartesian) body-mind economy.
EN
I focus on the monastery life in Europe and its predomination of vita contemplativa upon vita activa. It is not hard to distinguish within Christianity its Manichaean component whose characteristic feature is a grudge against matter, body and sexuality. This complexity of ideas brought about the contempt of vital elements of human existence, so that its animal past, still present in Zivilisationsprozess. An alternative anthropology inspired by an evolutionism should based on the presumption that only through the appreciation of an animal dimension of us—instead of monastic desire of becoming an angel—will it be possible to create new perspectives for renegotiation of the human– animal boundaries.
EN
Diverse concepts of animality have played important role within the processes of modern secularisation and its anti-theological turn in the modern making of “man.” By turning the conceptual focus towards the animal side of human being, and specifically by describing and explaining “the human nature” in terms of its “animality,” modern philosophical anthropology has changed, gradually, into naturalistic, godless discourse of a purely material life. The discovery of the “animal in man,” its increasing impact through evolution theory eventually led to the denial of human supremacy. Since secularisation in its essence intends to emancipate humanity, it is interesting how animalisation can be related to emancipation. In the article Montaigne’s conception of animality is examined as an early case of this thinking.
EN
In 2013, the publishing house Word/Image Territory [Słowo/ obraz terytoria] reissued the book Bellmer, or The Anatomy of Physical Unconsciousness and Love. On one of its final pages is Hans Bellmer’s dedication, addressed to a surrealist painter. It reads as follows: ‘When everything that a man is not joins him, then he finally seems to be himself’. This inscription is the focal point of this paper. The discussion will concern the aspect of Bellmer’s work referring to the masculine‑feminine fantasies, blurring of genders and the search for one’s identity. It seems that the artist, who snatched a doll from a child’s embraces and exalted it to the rank of a work of art, only to apply to it ball joints and a defragmented body so that its parts could be assembled freely, then locked this Pygmalion of his in erotic photographs or drawings, must have sought alienation. His efforts gave rise to phantasmagorias evident in each of his works. Experiencing the works of Bellmer raises a question which is complementary to the title of the paper: How much Hans is there in Bellmer?
Vox Patrum
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2017
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vol. 67
631-652
PL
Człowiek jako istota cielesna jest częścią świata materialnego, żyje i podle­ga procesom podobnym do tych, które panują w świecie zwierząt, a przewyższa go tylko dzięki posiadaniu duszy rozumnej. Chociaż więc ciało umożliwia za­istnienie i funkcjonowanie zwierzęcości w człowieku, to jednak jej istota, czyli podobieństwo człowieka do zwierząt, jest określone przede wszystkim przez re­lację duszy do ciała. Ponieważ zwierzęta nie posiadają rozumu, to zwierzęcość rozumianą na poziomie ontologicznym, jaką dzieli człowiek ze zwierzętami, św. Augustyn opisuje jako przeżywanie i doświadczanie doznań cielesnych przez byt o charakterze zmysłowym, który jako zwrócony w stronę rzeczy materialnych i żyjący w świecie doznań cielesnych, znajduje w nich właściwe sobie miejsce. Jest więc ona bezrozumnym rozkoszowaniem się sprawami cielesnymi. Zwierzęcość człowieka jest również rozważana jako możliwość bycia, co oznacza, że jest ona przedmiotem wyboru woli i przyjmuje postać procesu upodobnienia się do zwierząt rozumianego w sensie moralnym. Polega ona na tym, że człowiek, który został stworzony na obraz i podobieństwo Boga, będąc ze swej natury zwrócony ku Niemu, poprzez grzech pychy odwraca się od Niego i od kontemplacji prawd wiecznych zwracając się poprzez pożądliwość w stro­nę świata cielesnego. Ciesząc się dobrami doczesnymi oraz kierując ku nim swe pragnienia, człowiek przyzwyczaja się do przebywania pośród rzeczy cielesnych, zapomina o Bogu oraz o własnej rozumnej naturze, a dąży do zmysłowej przy­jemności. Konsekwencją odwrócenia się od Stwórcy i pożądliwego skierowania się ku rzeczom doczesnym jest więc zaślepienie prowadzące do niewoli cielesno­ści i bałwochwalstwa.
EN
As a corporeal being, man is part of the material world, he lives and is subject to processes similar to those which prevail in the world of animals and exceeds them only owing to the fact that he possesses a rational soul. Thus, although a body makes animality possible for a man to exist and function, its nature, meaning man’s similarity to animals, is defined mainly by the relationship between the soul and body. Since animals do not have minds, animality understood on the ontological level is something man and animals share in common. St. Augustine describes this as experiencing bodily sensations by the sensual being, which, because of their turning towards material things, lives in the world of bodily sensations and finds their place in it. Therefore, this is irrational delectation in bodily matters. This animality in humans is also considered as a possible lifestyle, which means it is an object of the will’s choice and assumes the form of the process of becoming similar to animals in the moral sense. It consists in the fact that man, who is created in the image and likeness of God, being turned to Him by nature, yet due to the sin of pride turns away from Him and from contemplation of eternal truths, and because of covetousness goes towards the carnal world. Being pleased with worldly possessions and directing his desires towards them, man becomes accustomed to existing among corporeal matters, forgetting about God and his own nature, and aspires to sensual pleasures. Therefore, the consequence of turn­ing away from the Creator and lustfully turning to worldly possessions is blind­ness that leads him or her into slavery of corporeality and idolatry.
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