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EN
Two possible interpretations of the notion of a “Shakespearean world” are considered; one for which the phrase connotes facts, processes and judgements which are taken by speakers to be provisional, unstable, morally “biassed”, yet in some sense “realistic”; another for which a “singular” character, a character-type or a particular experience is perceived as not only coherent and intensive in itself but as, potentially or actually, the source of a larger coherence and intelligibility. A number of citations display the different features salient to each of these two lines of interpretation. It is argued that, for some “singularities”, which take themselves and their powers and properties to be self-sufficient and self-legitimating, exposure to the “world” is in practice morally reductive or destructive. In other “singular” cases, such exposure amounts to, and offers an understanding of, Shakespearean versions of protagonism, heroism, and empathetic charm.
EN
This article argues for the need of a rapprochement between scholars who study ethnographic and literary ways of knowing minority communities that have limited access to self-representation. While in the past literary critics and cultural anthropologists tended to emphasize their distinctive methodologies and conventions of writing about such communities, this article draws on the work of postmodern anthropologists, critical theorists, literary critics, and historians to demarcate the common ground between ethnography and literature. Through the efforts of Clifford Geertz, James Clifford, Mary Louise Pratt, George Marcus, Michael Fisher, and many others, cultural anthropology has, at least to some extent, come to terms with the limitations of participant observation and the textuality of its product. However, a parallel reckoning has not taken place within literary studies. It is the goal of this article to push the process a step further by emphasizing the mutual indebtedness of literary and ethnographic writing.
EN
After a brief account of Derrida’s notion of singularity as an irreducible, quasi-material layer of (literary) texts, this article attempts to delineate its effects on theoretical or scientific mastery over literature. Invention and law are examined as necessary but mutually cancelling origins of aesthetic and scientific institutions, and the final chapter – following Derrida’s Ulysse gramophone – questions the limits of theoretical competence in collision with the incalculable swerve of literarity.
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Lyotard a tvář bez Levinase

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EN
This article pauses and reflects on why Lyotard (who was an avid reader of Levinas) discusses the face in a purely Merleau-Pontyesque context. Thus, in the matter of the face, Lyotard has decisively misappropriated Levinas’s thought. However, I would like to show that the obvious disagreement between Levinas and Lyotard in the issue of the face is, in fact, the result of Lyotard’s deep dedication to Levinas. We attempt to report about Lyotard’s silence on Levinas when he deals with the face; we also try to explain that point of affinity where both authors tell us of the reorganization of rela-tionships between singularity and anonymity by having the heretofore accepted oppo-sites disintegrate. Keeping in mind this weaving of the faithfulness and unfaithfulness of Lyotard to Levinas, we should ask ourselves one more question: is it truly necessary to choose between the shock of the ethical demand and the shock of the senses when dealing with the face? Is it necessary to choose between the “ethical face” that de-mands (Levinas), and the “face-landscape” as a libidinal kidnapping or instinct (Lyo-tard)?
EN
One of the most important transhumanistic ideas is singularity which can be described as a horizon of events, prediction horizon, transitional phase or emergence of conscious artificial intelligence. So nowadays it has different references. This article is an attempt to illustrate singularity based on Stanisław Lem’s novel and philosophical essay Golem XIV. This novel shows how the evolution of AI from ordinary computer to artificial conscious superintelligence could look like. It is also an illustration of possible relations between human and nonhuman intelligence. Lem appears here as philosopher and visionary who tries to think about the future, when human creates a being more perfect than himself. He is far from vision of omnipotence of computers.
EN
One of the most important transhumanistic ideas is singularity which can be described as a horizon of events, prediction horizon, transitional phase or emergence of conscious artificial intelligence. So nowadays it has different references. This article is an attempt to illustrate singularity based on Stanisław Lem’s novel and philosophical essay Golem XIV. This novel shows how the evolution of AI from ordinary computer to artificial conscious superintelligence could look like. It is also an illustration of possible relations between human and nonhuman intelligence. Lem appears here as philosopher and visionary who tries to think about the future, when human creates a being more perfect than himself. He is far from vision of omnipotence of computers.
7
86%
EN
This article argues for the need of a rapprochement between scholars who study ethnographic and literary ways of knowing minority communities that have limited access to self-representation. While in the past literary critics and cultural anthropologists tended to emphasize their distinctive methodologies and conventions of writing about such communities, this article draws on the work of postmodernanthropologists, critical theorists, literary critics, and historians to demarcate the common ground between ethnography and literature. Through the efforts of Clifford Geertz, James Clifford, Mary Louise Pratt, George Marcus, Michael Fisher, and many others, cultural anthropology has, at least to some extent, come to terms with the limitations of participant observation and the textuality of its product. However, a parallel reckoning has not taken place within literary studies. It is the goal of this article to push the process a step further by emphasizing the mutual indebtedness of literary and ethnographic writing.
8
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Jednostkowość

81%
EN
This text is devoted to the singularity and theatricalization of the humanities.
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Odpowiedź Davidowi Harveyowi

81%
EN
The text is a response of authors of Commonwealth to criticism presented by David Harvey. Hard and Negri turn down the primacy of class division over other various identity formations (e.g. race, gender) and they perceive it as field of revolutionary struggle. Then, starting with Spinoza they highlight variety of definitions of singularity and do not agree withthe significant role ascribed to the notion of fictitious capital; they point out immaterial aspect of financialization and its role as a “central form of the accumulation of capital.” Finally, they emphasize the importance of recognition of present indignation and revolutionary actions, which could be made only from below.
PL
Tekst jest odpowiedzią autorów Rzeczy-pospolitej na krytykę przedstawioną przez Davida Harveya. Hardt i Negri odrzucają prymat podziału klasowego wobec innych podziałów (rasowych, genderowych) oraz poszerzają na te obszary pole możliwej działalności rewolucyjnej. Następnie, wychodząc od myśli Spinozy podkreślają różnorodność definicji pojedynczości, nie zgadzają się oni również z nadmierną rolą przypisywaną pojęciu kapitału fikcyjnego i wskazują na niematerialny aspekt finansjeryzacji i spełnianą przez nią rolę „centralnej formy akumulacji kapitału”. Na koniec podkreślają oni wagę właściwego rozpoznania panującego oburzenia i konieczną oddolność działań rewolucyjnych.
EN
This paper puts forward the problem of singularity – one of the most important issues in contemporary cosmology. Firstly, the history of “singularity” concept and basis of Penrose’s and Hawking’s theorem of singularity are discussed. Secondly, the problem of singularity is presented as a genesis of search of quantum theories of the beginning of the Universe, in which the concept of singularity is not present. One sophisticated concept of Hartle and Hawking is presented, in particular the authors’ methodology is described. The paper shows many possible philosophical problems which are connected with quantum cosmology.
PL
W artykule dokonuję przedstawienia oraz charakterystyki stanu „Osobliwości” jako nadchodzącego momentu w historii, który przepowiadany jest przez Raymonda Kurzweila – futurologa, informatyka oraz transhumanistę. Dokonuję również przedstawienia koncepcji podziału historii na sześć epok zaproponowanego przez Kurzweila, który ujmuje historię w kontekście całego wszechświata jako proces wzrostu ilości informacji. Przedstawiając myśl Kurzweila, dokonuję tego od strony filozoficznej, pokazując jej historiozoficzne momenty.
EN
In my article I present the characterization of the state of "singularity" as an upcoming moment in history, which is being foretold by Raymond Kurzweil – futurologist, computer scientist and transhumanist. I also present the concept of dividing history into six epochs proposed by Kurzweil, who captures the history of the whole universe as a process of increasing the amount of information. In describing Kurzweil's thought, I do it from the philosophical point of view, showing its historiosophical moments.
PL
W artykule dokonuję przedstawienia oraz charakterystyki stanu „Osobliwości” jako nadchodzącego momentu w historii, który przepowiadany jest przez Raymonda Kurzweila – futurologa, informatyka oraz transhumanistę. Dokonuję również przedstawienia koncepcji podziału historii na sześć epok zaproponowanego przez Kurzweila, który ujmuje historię w kontekście całego wszechświata jako proces wzrostu ilości informacji. Przedstawiając myśl Kurzweila, dokonuję tego od strony filozoficznej, pokazując jej historiozoficzne momenty.
EN
In my article I present the characterization of the state of "singularity" as an upcoming moment in history, which is being foretold by Raymond Kurzweil – futurologist, computer scientist and transhumanist. I also present the concept of dividing history into six epochs proposed by Kurzweil, who captures the history of the whole universe as a process of increasing the amount of information. In describing Kurzweil's thought, I do it from the philosophical point of view, showing its historiosophical moments.
Roczniki Teologiczne
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2022
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vol. 69
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issue 11
197-219
PL
Refleksje teologiczne oraz rozróżnienia podjęte przez sobory w pierwszych siedmiu wiekach historii Kościoła doprowadziły do powstania niezwykłego i oryginalnego pojęcia „Osoby”, które znajduje się w samym centrum chrześcijańskiego wyznania wiary. Wierzymy w jednego Boga w trzech Osobach oraz w Syna Bożego, drugą Osobę Trójcy Świętej, który łączy w sobie naturę boską i ludzką. Taka koncepcja osoby zastosowana do Boga nie przyczyniła się do równie głębokiej refleksji nad osobowością istot ludzkich innych niż Chrystus, czyli zwykłych ludzi. Co jednak stałoby się, gdybyśmy podążyli tym tropem myślowym? Niniejszy artykuł bada tę możliwość, podkreślając trzy cechy teologicznego rozumienia Osób Boskich: Osoby Boskie nie mogą być pojmowane w kategoriach pozytywnych; Osoby Boskie są całkowicie pojedyncze; oraz Osoby Boskie posiadają rzeczywistość tylko w relacji do siebie nawzajem. Chociaż na pierwszy rzut oka taki zabieg myślowy nie wygląda obiecująco, to jednak głębsza analiza sugeruje, że jest inaczej. Na tej podstawie artykuł bada niektóre z implikacji takiego rozumowania, wprowadzając przy tym pojęcie „semblantu” jako koniecznego pośrednika między pojęciem „osoby” a pojęciem „natury ludzkiej”.
EN
The theological concept of ‘person’ and its complementary notion of ‘nature’ were developed through early church teaching on the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation. Persons in this case referred solely to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit while ‘nature’ expressed the unity of the Godhead and encompassed those attributes which were shared by the divine Persons. The later history of this theologically derived notion of ‘person’ took a different turn, moving away from the early complementarity of nature and person in order to embrace the notion of human person for which complementarity seemed ill fitting. In this new conception, ‘person’ was subsumed under the category of ‘nature’. A human person came to refer to the full human reality, body and soul, while a more general notion, aimed at accommodating both divine and human personhood, as famously expressed by Boethius, thought of a person as an individual substance of a rational nature. One might ask, however, whether it is possible and fruitful to develop the initial, complementary concept of ‘person’ in a different direction, that is, so that it covers not only divine Persons but also mere humans. Does it give a coherence to the area of theological anthropology beyond that afforded by the classical, nature-based concept of ‘person’? Here I attempt to set out a conceptual framework for the application to humans of the concept of ‘person’ as it was developed with the theological controversies of the early Church – or at least according to one reading of that process. I first take note of the features of the theological notion of personhood and test whether human persons might be understood in the same or similar terms, taking into account the difference between divine and creaturely existence.   I then draw comparisons with the traditional concept of ‘person’ as it has been applied to human beings to show that the former version is to be preferred. I conclude with comments which draw out some of the implications of this theological notion of person.
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Analiza Rzeczy-pospolitej

51%
EN
The text provides a deep and critical review of Hardt and Negri’s Commonwealth. In his criticism Harvey focuses primarily on the perspective of class struggle, underestimated by the authors, as well as on the lack of developed analysis of fictitious capital and contemporary finanscialization of the economy. According to the geographer, in the Commonwealth too much emphasis is placed on consideration of Spinozian categories (such as singularity) and the issue of immateriality, which may result in drawing away Hardt and Negri’s attention from the formulation of a concrete proposals of political activities of the multitude.
PL
Tekst stanowi pogłębioną, krytyczną recenzję Rzeczy-pospolitej Michaela Hardta i Antonia Negriego. W swojej krytyce Harvey skupia się nade wszystko na niedowartościowaniu przez autorów perspektywy walki klasowej oraz braku rozwiniętej analizy kapitału fikcyjnego i współczesnej finansjeryzacji gospodarki. Zdaniem geografa w Rzeczy-pospolitej zbyt duży nacisk położono na rozważanie Spinozjańskich kategorii (takich jak pojedynczość) oraz problem niematerialności, co mogło odciągnąć uwagę Hardta i Negriego od sformułowania propozycji konkretnych działań politycznych wielości.
15
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Od estetiky k poetike chvenia

51%
EN
The paper is built on the formulation by Vladimír Svatoň about the binary aesthetics of beauty and nobleness in modern literature from the 18th to the 20th century, and it outlines the historical line of the aesthetics of nobleness from the ancient times until the present. Subsequently, there arises a question of a possible transition from aesthetics to the poetics of shimmering as a part of a new poetics following the constituent rules, grammars and algorithms of the creation of literary texts and events. At the same time, existential poetics, a means of expression and a manifestation of the situation of human being, is reflected.
Rocznik Lubuski
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2016
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vol. 42
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issue 2
97-113
PL
Artykuł stara się pokazać podobieństwa i różnice miedzy posthumanizmem i transhumanizmem oraz dociec czy więcej dzieli czy łączy oba te nurty. Rozważania prowadzone są na przykładzie dwóch filmów w których węzłowe problemy tego dylematu są wyraźnie widoczne: „Ona”,2013, reż. Spike Jonze, „Ex Machina" 2015, reż. Alex Garland. W konkluzji autor konstatuje, że oba nurty poruszają się w kręgu tych samych kwestii, lecz mają inne aksjologiczne nastawienie – transhumanizm reprezentuje klasyczny oświeceniowy optymizm, jest romantyczny i progresywistyczny, zaś posthumanizm: rozważny, ostrożny, praktyczny, realistyczny.
EN
The article tries to present the similarities and the differences between posthumanism and transhumanism, it tries also to check whether there is more that joins or that separates them. The analysis is illustrated with the examples of two films where the reader may observe the crucial problems for this dilemma. The first film is entitled "Ona" (2013, directed by Spike Jonze), the second "Ex Machina" (2015, directed by Alex Garland). As a conclusion the author states that both trends concern the same questions, however, they have different axiological attitude: transhumanism represents the classical Enlightenment optimism, it is romantic and progressive, while the posthumanism presents the reasonable, careful, practical and realistic standpoint.
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