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Human Affairs
|
2012
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vol. 22
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issue 4
603-612
EN
This study explores the effects of two different kinds of text addressed to young Italian students, which convey past in-group war-crimes either in a detailed or in an evasive way. After completing a first questionnaire (and confirming the social amnesia on these crimes) a sample of Italian university students (number: 103; average age: 21.79) read two versions (factual vs. evasive) of a same historical text on Italian invasion of Ethiopia (1935–36). The results show that participants reading a detailed text feel react more emotionally and feel more involved. However, the more negative reactions linked to the detailed text were also associated to a stronger will to repair intergroup relations with the descendents of ancient victims of the in-group crimes. Positive consequences of negative emotions linked to detailed text that challenge a widespread collective amnesia of war crimes are discussed.
EN
On February 2010 International Court of Justice decided that an Italian appeals court sentence Ferrini violated jurisdictional immunity of Germany, to which it is entitled in respect of acts de iure imperii. Adopting a restrictive approach Judges stated that procedural nature of the immunity shall be viewed separately from substantive provisions, according to which conduct of German armed forced had been qualified as war crimes. Accordingly enjoying protection of jurisdictional immunities does not, at the current stage of international law development, contradict protection of fundamental rights. This narrow perception of the problem and certain inconsistencies in legal reasoning between the Court and its judges will probably diminish importance of the judgment as a point of referral in further debates concerning the scope and nature of the jurisdictional immunities. At the same time complex factual and legal context of the proceedings allows to conjecture at to the reasons behind such a ruling.
EN
The aim of this paper is to present the prognosis of the judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Ratko Mladic´ case. Mladic´, who served as a general of the Bosnian Serb army, is responsible for the crimes committed in Srebrenica and Sarajevo. Based on the list of charges against Mladic´, and taking into account the previous ICTY judgments, the authoress makes an attempts to prove that Mladic´ will be convicted for crimes of genocide as well as unlawful attacks and terrorising the civilian population (the latter ones being war crimes). Moreover, General Mladic´ as the chief of staff of the Bosnian Serb army was giving orders to his subordinates including generals Krstic´ and Galic´. An analysis of their cases has also been made for the purpose of the paper, to the extent useful and meaningful to the Mladic´ case. It is then concluded that having been the Krtic´’s and Galic´’s commander, Mladic´ should also be found guilty of the same crimes they have been found to have committed.
PL
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie prognozy wyroku Międzynarodowego Trybunału Karnego ds. Zbrodni w b. Jugosławii (MTKJ) w sprawie Ratko Mladicia, generała armii bośniackich Serbów odpowiedzialnego za zbrodnie popełnione w Srebrenicy oraz Sarajewie. Po wskazaniu stawianych mu zarzutów autorka próbuje wykazać, że – biorąc pod uwagę dotychczasowe orzecznictwo MTKJ – Mladić zostanie uznany winnym zbrodni ludobójstwa w Srebrenicy oraz bezprawnych ataków i terroryzowania ludności cywilnej (te ostatnie jako zbrodnie wojenne). Mladić jako szef sztabu głównego armii bośniackich Serbów wydawał rozkazy swoim podwładnym (m.in. generałom Krsticiowi i Galiciowi). W artykule zostały przeanalizowane ich sprawy w takim zakresie, w jakim mają znaczenie dla sprawy Mladicia. Ten ostatni jako ich przełożony wydający im rozkazy powinien zostać uznany winnym takich samych zbrodni jak oni, to jest tych wymienionych wyżej.
EN
One of the most frightening aspects of the crime of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity is not so much their scale as their relationship with the sovereign power of the state, which either condone, or even participate in their making. It happens when the theoretically unlimited sovereign state power, which is connected with a monopoly on the use of coercive measures, begins to be used against its own citizens. Because of such a misuse of the state functions in the second half of the 20th century international law began to be treated as an element of protection of innocent people against the unpredictable sovereign state. Providing such a protection is enshrined in the international conventions, and in the activities of various international bodies, including in particular the Security Council of the United Nations. But so far there has not been found in the international law an ideal way to solve the conflict between the need to protect fundamental individual rights and the respect of sovereignty of the state. Creation by an international treaty of the International Criminal Court can be described as a major step on the way to the final determination of the relationship between human rights and state sovereignty. Hence, the process of its creation and first years of operation was marked by a dispute between the defenders of those values. In particular this is reflected in a controversy that caused the issuing by the Court of the arrest warrant for the Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, suspected of committing on the territory of Darfur war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. One of the key issues emerging in connection with the Arrest Warrant issued for the head of state is a way to determine the mutual relationship between the obligations of states towards the international court, appointed for the purpose to prevent the gravest international crimes remaining unpunished, and the norms of international law obligating respect for the state sovereignty, by ensuring the immunity of his head is being observed. This article is an attempt to analyze this relationship, regarding the provisions of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the wording of Security Council Resolution 1593, refering to the Court situation in Darfur and the Security Council Resolution 1970 refering to the Court situation in Libya, and also appropriate rules of customary international law and decisions of international courts.
EN
On 30 March 1943 the Decree of the President of the Polish Republic on Criminal Liability for War Crimes, the first normative act setting down the legal basis for persecution of war criminals issued by one of the Allies during the Second World War, was proclaimed. The promulgation of the decree can be considered as the turning point in the Polish government-in-exile’s policy towards the problem of the prosecution and punishment of Nazi criminals, which started in autumn 1939. After the announcement of the draft decree, developed by the Polish minister of justice, professor of state law, Wacław Komarnicki and by an international lawyer, professor of criminal law, Stefan Glaser in the spring of 1942, a fierce discussion on the legal act’s concept broke out in the Polish government and lasted until November 1942. Although all Polish politicians agreed on the need to define the principles of individual criminal liability for war crimes, the proposal to promulgate criminal legislation with retroactive effect aroused much controversy. However, as the course of these debates shows, the critical point was not the mere fact of violating the lex retro non agit principle. The scepticism of some Polish politicians towards this idea resulted from purely pragmatic reasons and was caused by lack of support from the American and British governments for the proposal to define legal frames for the future trials of war criminals (this attitude changed only in spring 1945). This article presents the genesis and provisions of the Decree of the President of the Polish Republic on Criminal Liability for War Crimes of 30 March 1943 in the context of international debates on international criminal law and individual liability for war crimes. It argues that the legislative works on the decree and its proclamation in March 1943 mark an important point in the process of shaping the concept of prosecution and punishment of war criminals during the Second World War.
EN
Croatian and Serbian War Crimes, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and the Judicial Systems of Serbia and CroatiaThe war in former Yugoslavia (1991–1995) was marked by war crimes which still affect Serbian–Croatian political relations. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which operated between 1993–2017, was supposed to pass fair verdicts on those responsible for war crimes, but its verdicts have been surrounded by controversy in Post-Yugoslav states. The article analyzes Serbian and Croatian war crimes in Croatian territory between 1991–1995 as well as the verdicts passed by the ICTY against the most prominent war criminals. The actions taken by the Serbian and Croatian judicial systems are also discussed. The analysis presented in the article indicates that the verdicts delivered by the ICTY were selective and difficult to accept for both sides of the conflict. Unfortunately, Serbo-Croatian cooperation on war crimes has been developing for only a few years and has not produced the expected results. For these reasons, war crimes and war criminals still have a negative influence on political and social relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Serbia. Chorwackie i serbskie zbrodnie wojenne, Międzynarodowy Trybunał Karny da Byłej Jugosławii oraz serbski i chorwacki wymiar sprawiedliwościKwestia zbrodni wojennych i obiektywnego osądzenia zbrodniarzy wojennych jest wysoce problematyczna. Bezspornie wojna w byłej Jugosławii z lat 1991-1995 była tragiczna w skutkach i naznaczona wydarzeniami, którym można nadać miano zbrodni wojennych. Międzynarodowy Trybunał Karny dla Byłej Jugosławii (MTKJ) funkcjonujący w latach 1993-2017 miał w założeniu sprawiedliwie osądzić osoby odpowiedzialne za zbrodnie wojenne. Niemniej jego działalność (orzeczone kary) wzbudza pewne kontrowersje, a co za tym idzie może być i jest krytycznie oceniana. W artykule przedstawiono syntetyczną analizę serbskich oraz chorwackich zbrodni wojennych mających miejsce na terytorium Chorwacji w latach 1991-1995. Następnie odniesiono się do kar orzeczonych przez MTKJ wobec najważniejszych zbrodniarzy wojennych. W tym też aspekcie zwrócono uwagę na aktywność serbskiego i chorwackiego wymiaru sprawiedliwości. Analiza zawarta w artykule potwierdza tezę że wydawane wyroki przez MTKJ odznaczały się selektywnością, dlatego też w niektórych przypadkach były one trudne do zaakceptowania przez obie strony konfliktu. Niestety serbsko-chorwacka współpraca w zakresie zbrodni wojennych rozwija się dopiero od kilku lat i nie przyniosła oczekiwanych rezultatów. Z tych też powodów zbrodnie wojenne i zbrodniarze wojenni nadal mają negatywny wpływ na stosunki polityczne i społeczne między Republiką Chorwacji a Republiką Serbii.
EN
The sheer number and scale of the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Russian military in Ukraine since the beginning of their all-out invasion, has prompted many experts and politicians to define this brutality as a genocide and seek for the prosecution of perpetrators under international law. The lawyers are cautious in this regard, however, maintaining that crucial element of the criminal case – the clear-cut proof of a genocidal intent on the side of the Russian leadership – might be missing or largely unprovable in the court. This article provides an overview of the ongoing debate on the alleged Russian genocide in Ukraine and argues that the Kremlin’s genocidal intent can be proved if the anti-Ukrainian rhetoric of Russian officials, pundits, and propagandists is systemically scrutinized, deconstructed, and contextualized.
EN
The article presents, based on the archival materials, the major events that led to the creation of the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC). The author points out that the development of the international criminal law, which was in its initial stage until 1939, was the work of some outstanding laweyers. The acomplishments of the UNWCC have enabled the establishment of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg and Tokyo and carrying out the trials against war criminals.
EN
The article sets out the nature, the history and the general structure of the crime against humanity and provides a comprehensive analytical commentary of the elements of such crimes as a problem of international law. The contextual element determines that crimes against humanity involve either large-scale violence in relation to the number of victims or its extension over a broad geographic area (widespread), or a methodical type of violence (systematic). This excludes random, accidental or isolated acts of violence. In addition, Article 7(2) (a) of the Rome Statute determines that crimes against humanity must be committed in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit an attack. The plan or policy does not need to be explicitly stipulated or formally adopted and can, therefore, be inferred from the totality of the circumstances. In contrast with genocide, crimes against humanity do not need to target a specific group. Instead, the victim of the attack can be any civilian population, regardless of its affiliation or identity.
EN
This article aims to give an overview of how human rights violations that occurred during the Homeland War in Croatia are redressed by conducting criminal prosecution in the Republic of Croatia. Namely, criminal prosecution as one of the elements of transitional justice is essential not only for establishing the accountability of war crime perpetrators, but also as a warning that such violations shall not be tolerated in the future. Moreover, drawing on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, this article examines how the efforts made by national prosecution bodies to investigate war crimes are assessed by this court. It concludes with the idea that both prosecution of war crimes and protection of human rights, as guaranteed by The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Court of Human Rights, seek to achieve the same goal, i.e. protecting the most basic human rights of the war crimes victims and other individuals.
EN
This paper uses (West) Germany as an exemplary case to analyse the formation of collective memories over a period of more than two decades after 1945. It traces the formation of collective memories in the German public through a decade of collective amnesia, followed by a period of regaining collective memories. It argues that the formation of collective memories is embedded in social and normative change, and identifies three causal factors that were responsible for the oscillation between amnesia and memory: the absence of victims in the imminent post-war period, that promoted the ‘myth of innocence’ (Fulbrook 1999); a series of major trials that started in the 1960s; and young elites who acknowledged moral and legal guilt and supported the trials, reconciliation and compensation. Data from public opinion polls covering the period from 1950–1970 are presented.
PL
Celem artykułu jest wykazanie ideologicznych przyczyn zbrodni nacjonalistów ukraińskich w województwie rzeszowskim w latach 1944 – 1947 (a częściowo również w okresie wcześniejszym), dokonanie oceny prawnej dowodów tychże zbrodni oraz, w oparciu o zebrany materiał, udzielenie odpowiedzi na pytanie: czy OUN i UPA zasługują na miano organizacji narodowowyzwoleńczych narodu ukraińskiego?
EN
The Ukrainian nationalists committed many crimes in Poland before WW II, e.g. they murdered the Polish Minister of Interior Bronisław Pieracki. The work by Dmytro Doncow “Nacjonalizm” (published in 1926) and the work by Stepan Łenkawśkyj “The Decalogue of a Ukrainian nationalist” were very popular with them. Both of them promoted fascist ideology of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists [OUN] (est. 1929). OUN collaborated with the Germans during WW II, e.g. the Ukrainian auxiliary police escorted Jews from ghettoes to the places of execution and murdered many of them. Although the Germans did not approved of their proclamation of independence and arrested the leaders of the radical fraction of OUN Stepan Bandera and Jarosław Stećko (and some others) in July 1941, they did not stop collaborating with the Germans. The Ukrainian nationalists decided to start the genocide of Polish people in Volhynia, where the Poles constituted a minority. For this reason, they established the Ukrainian Insurgent Army [UPA] in March 1943. They murdered most of their victims by deception, some of them were even killed in churches during services. Their goal was to exterminate as many Poles as possible. They tortured their victims in a very sadistic way, with no exception for infants, children, pregnant women and old men. The structures of the Polish self-defence protected people at risk from OUN and UPA. Moreover, sometimes the armed Polish secret forces, executed those Ukrainians, who collaborated with OUN and UPA, as a revenge for killing Polish civilians. Many of the Ukrainians supported OUN and UPA and supplied them with food. For this reason the Polish communist authorities, decided to relocate the Ukrainian civilians and to smash OUN and UPA in the south – eastern territories of Poland. The military operation “Vistula” achieved these goals in the summer, 1947. Regarding OUN and UPA as the Ukrainian independence movement seems to be wrong, because of their criminal activity, imposing compulsory service in UPA and murdering those Ukrainians, who did not support them.
EN
This article discusses definitions of crimes included into the Act of 18 December 1998 on the Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation, and their usefulness in prosecuting individuals who committed international crimes. It is argued that the provisions of the Act cannot constitute a ground for criminal responsibility of individuals, as they violate the principle of nullum crimen sine lege certa.
EN
Death Valley in Chojnice, Poland, is a mass murder site from World War II where Germans and various officials of the Third Reich organised and carried out mass executions of Poles. The site and the events that took place there have been the subject of scholarly research and war crimes prosecutions since 2020. This paper intends to outline three aspects of them: 1) how playing in Death Valley as a child determined the later scholarly interest in the site, 2) how reading of a book Chojnice 1939–1945, about World War II and the crimes committed in the region, drew attention to undiscovered aspects of the site, 3) the last parts present the course and preliminary results of three seasons of scientific research and prosecution of war crimes committed on the northern outskirts of the town.
EN
The article aims to present the problem of the ineffectiveness of international legal instruments for the protection of cultural heritage. It presents examples of where such laws were violated and suggests that international criminal law can contribute to a better condition of cultural property. The author emphasizes that the International Criminal Court should play an important role in safeguarding such property from destruction in the future. In that context, the article presents inter allia the case of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, which is claimed to be a milestone in the protection of cultural heritage.
Facta Simonidis
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2016
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vol. 9
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issue 1
279-293
EN
The issue of war crimes in the Balkans at the turn of the eleventh century focused mainly on the Serb war crimes, ignoring or dropping the veil to the other perpetrators of the Balkan tragedy; Croats, Bosnians and Kosovo Albanians. Created by Western politicians and perpetuated by the world’s media a pejorative stereotypical view of the inhabitants of the Balkan region (specifically negative perception of the Serbs) was launched in Sarajevo, and continues to this day. The article consists of four parts. The first relates to the Croatian war crimes in the twentieth century in a historical context. The second contains a description of the Croatian war crimes in the second half of the twentieth century, and the third refers to the description of case studies. The fourth part presents the war crimes committed by high-ranking officers of the Croatian state. Text closes with conclusions.
PL
Problematyka zbrodni wojennych na Bałkanach w XX wieku koncentruje się głównie wokół serbskich zbrodni wojennych, ignorując innych sprawców bałkańskiej tragedii – Chorwatów, Bośniaków (Boszniaków) czy Kosowskich Albańczyków. Wykreowane przez zachodnioeuropejskich polityków i utrwalone przez światowe media stereotypowe, pejoratywne spojrzenie na mieszkańców regionu bałkańskiego (szczególne negatywne postrzeganie Serbów) zostało zapoczątkowane w Sarajewie i trwa do dnia dzisiejszego. Artykuł składa się z pięciu części. Pierwsza z nich dotyczy chorwackich zbrodni wojennych w XX wieku w kontekście historycznym. Druga zawiera opis kolejnych chorwackich zbrodni pod koniec ubiegłego stulecia, trzecia zaś odnosi się do studium przypadków. Z kolei czwarta część prezentuje zbrodnie wojenne popełniane przez wysoko postawionych funkcjonariuszy państwa chorwackiego. Tekst zamykają wnioski końcowe.
EN
George C. Marshall, famed U.S. World War II general and eventual U.S. Secretary of State and Nobel Peace Prize winner, on his first assignment fresh out of military school, told a fellow officer: Once an army is involved in war, there is a beast in every fighting man which begins tugging at its chains. And a good officer must learn early on how to keep the beast under control, both in his men and himself Even for nations possessing a reputation for stringent compliance with the law of war, the annals of history, to include more contemporary military engagements, are littered with cases of atrocities committed by soldiers. All too often the beast wins, and because every nation has an obligation to minimize the reality described above, nations must continue to dedicate time, thought and resources to best prepare their forces for future military operations. Unrestrained warfare has a direct negative military impact on both winning the war and winning the peace. This corollary remains as true today as it has ever been. What is meant by a ‘reluctant warrior’? Put simply, a reluctant warrior is one who while ready to employ lethal force when the situation demands, is not eager to do so in “the moment”. He answers the questions: “Can I, If I, Should I”, and then takes decisive action – or employs uncommon restraint – with a goal of accomplishing the mission all the while staying true to the value imbedded in the U.S. Marines’ Hymn, “to keep our honor clean”. To fully develop the ‘reluctant warrior’ needed on today’s and tomorrow’s battlefields, this article will look at the role of legal regulation and the practice of military education and training, as well as some of the other factors that influence behavior and decisionmaking during instances of armed conflict. This article will also comment on the costs to the individual soldier and to the mission when a nation fails to prepare ‘reluctant warriors’.
PL
Autor przeprowadza analizę trzech rodzajów zbrodni: ludobójstwa, przeciwko ludzkości oraz wojennych z punktu widzenia możliwości ich popełnienia na skutek użycia broni nuklearnej. Artykuł składa się z: wprowadzenia (podrozdziały: broń masowego rażenia a broń nuklearna oraz międzynarodowe prawo karne), merytorycznego rozwinięcia oraz podsumowania, gdzie zaprezentowane zostały wnioski z przeprowadzonych badań.
EN
The author conducts the analysis of three kinds of crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes from the point of view of the possibilities of their committing as a result of the use of nuclear weapon. The article consists of: introduction (sub-chapters: weapon of mass destruction vs. nuclear weapon, international criminal law), substantive analysis and summary where the conclusions after conducted research were presented.
PL
Problematyka zbrodni wojennych na Bałkanach w XX wieku koncentruje się głównie wokół serbskich zbrodni wojennych, ignorując innych sprawców bałkańskiej tragedii – Chorwatów, Bośniaków (Boszniaków) czy Kosowskich Albańczyków. Wykreowane przez zachodnioeuropejskich polityków i utrwalone przez światowe media stereotypowe, pejoratywne spojrzenie na mieszkańców regionu bałkańskiego (szczególne negatywne postrzeganie Serbów) zostało zapoczątkowane w Sarajewie i trwa do dnia dzisiejszego. Artykuł składa się z pięciu części. Pierwsza z nich dotyczy chorwackich zbrodni wojennych w XX wieku w kontekście historycznym. Druga zawiera opis kolejnych chorwackich zbrodni pod koniec ubiegłego stulecia, trzecia zaś odnosi się do studium przypadków. Z kolei czwarta część prezentuje zbrodnie wojenne popełniane przez wysoko postawionych funkcjonariuszy państwa chorwackiego. Tekst zamykają wnioski końcowe.
EN
The issue of war crimes in the Balkans at the turn of the eleventh century focused mainly on the Serb war crimes, ignoring or dropping the veil to the other perpetrators of the Balkan tragedy; Croats, Bosnians and Kosovo Albanians. Created by Western politicians and perpetuated by the world’s media a pejorative stereotypical view of the inhabitants of the Balkan region (specifically negative perception of the Serbs) was launched in Sarajevo, and continues to this day. The article consists of four parts. The first relates to the Croatian war crimes in the twentieth century in a historical context. The second contains a description of the Croatian war crimes in the second half of the twentieth century, and the third refers to the description of case studies. The fourth part presents the war crimes committed by high- -ranking officers of the Croatian state. Text closes with conclusions.
EN
Bringing most carefully guarded secrets into light, political whistleblowers deconstruct the essential oppositions upon which superpower ideologies are founded: they draw popular attention to what has been relegated to the margins of the dominant discourses. Torpedoing the reputations of the most powerful organizations in the world, and well aware of the inevitability of retaliation, they put themselves in a most precarious position. Fighting against impossible odds in the name of the greater good, facing the gravity of the consequences, they become heroes in the classical sense of the word: arguably, their dilemmas are not unlike those faced by Antigone, Hamlet and other iconic figures in history, literature and mythology. Such is the central premise of this article. The methodological frame for the analysis of the material in this study has been adopted from Zygmunt Adamczewski’s The Tragic Protest, whose theory, bringing together classical and modern approaches to tragedy, allows for the extrapolation of the principles underlying the protest of such iconic figures as Prometheus, Orestes, Faust, Hamlet, Thomas Stockman or Willy Loman to discourses outside the grand narratives of culture. His theory of the tragic protest serves as a tool facilitating the identification of the features of a quintessential tragic protester, which Adamczewski attains by means of the study of the defining traits of mythological and literary tragic heroes. It is against such a backdrop that I adapt and apply Adamczewski’s model to the study of materials related to Chelsea Manning in search of parallels that locate her own form of protest in the universal space of tragedy.
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