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1

Nieudany projekt - demokratyczna Rosja

100%
Bartnicki A. R.
Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem
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2012
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vol. 34
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issue 1
61-79
EN
The reasons for the collapse of the processes of democratization in Russia can be described by four factors: 1. Understanding and perception of power in Russia at the level of the governed and the rulers has a largely historical and cultural background. 2. Russian authoritarianism is based on a combination of formal rules of democracy, psychological factors and political culture of subordi­nation of Russian society; 3. Contemporary political and social situation in Russia is a result of the fact that the Soviet system was not rejected, but only modified. 4. And last but not least, in Russia, there were only few and insiginificant forces interested in the actual democratization of the state.
2
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Wybrane problemu rosyjskiego quasi-autorytaryzmu

100%
Bartnicki A. R.
Studia Politologiczne
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2010
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vol. 18
206-220
EN
Russia’s government is a fulfillment of the cultural and political expectations of the society and a part of the elites who see in still somewhat unspecified authoritarianism the source of stabilization. The leader – the president / prime minister – who expresses the needs of an absolute sovereign – the state – and who has the “will” to monopolize completely the decision-making process, meets expectations of the society.This situtation of concetration of all the political power around the presidentail body and his loyal elites stabilizes the entire political system. Thus, authoritarianism becomes not only a necessity, but also the cultural and political value. One may ask, whether in the current situation in Russia, any other form of government is possible., Perhaps in a state which is so vast and varied, so full of contradictions and historical complexes and still so immature, a strong (maybe even authoritarian) political regime is the sole guarantee of stability.
3
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Rosja Borysa Jelcyna – polityczna spuścizna komunizmu

100%
Bartnicki A. R.
Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica
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2017
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vol. 16
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issue 1
93-110
EN
Boris Yeltsin was not able to (or could not) complete the democratic revolution, so he based state-building on the alliance of the old order and the new order. As a consequ- ence, Russia after 1991 was built on the foundation of the USSR, while further problems of the country were solved not by the intensification of democratic reforms, but rather by an increasingly stronger adaptation to new realities of solutions, people, systems, mechanisms and concepts from the communist era. The retreat from democratic ideas of society, and thus the weakening of the political power of democratic leaders, made Yeltsin more and more inclined towards the leadership model he knew from the time of his membership in the Communist party. His elite and interest management system, was in fact a copy of the Gorbachev system. It seemed to be a natural and obvious style of control and better from the state’s point of view.
4
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Borys Jelcyn jako przywódca polityczny

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Bartnicki A. R.
Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne
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2018
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issue 1
43-60
EN
Boris Yeltsin successfully led to the fall of the USSR and the monopolization of power. However, he was not mentally prepared to be the leader of the nation during the transformation in the 1990s. He did not attempt to consolidate the state, but rather to build his own leadership. The power system he had created became the foundation upon which the authoritarian regime of Vladimir Putin was formed. It was Yeltsin who taught the Russian elite how to bend and even dodge democratic procedures, how to dismiss and marginalize the opposition, appropriate mass media and corrupt journalists; how to incapacitate politicians and intelligentsia; how to push society away from influencing political life; how to disintegrate and disregard political life. All these factors triggered a social longing for stability and the rule of a “strong hand.” Yeltsindiscouraged Russians from democracy and the free market, allowed the emergence of Russian “oligarchism,” restored Russia’s old perception of international reality, and legalized state violence. In fact, it was not about ideology, but about the people who stood in his way. Many elements of the Soviet state were intentionally adopted by Yeltsin. In this way, a specific transposition of communism took place. Its imperial, social and political power was adapted to the idea of new Russia. Yeltsin undoubtedly contributed to the creation of independent Russia, but the whole sphere of freedom was only an active development of the changes initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev. 
PL
Borys Jelcyn bardzo sprawnie doprowadził do rozwiązania ZSRRi zmonopolizowania władzy, nie był jednak mentalnie przygotowany do tego, by być przywódcą narodu w okresie transformacji lat 90. W jego działaniach nie widać było zamiaru umocnienia, konsolidacji państwa, a jedynie chęć umocnienia własnego przywództwa. Budowany przez niego system władzy stał się fundamentem, na którym powstał reżim autorytarny Władimira Putina. To właśnie Jelcyn nauczył rosyjskie elity, jak naginać, anawet omijać procedury demokratyczne jak lekceważyć i marginalizować opozycję, zawłaszczać środki masowej informacji ikorumpować dziennikarzy; jak ubezwłasnowolnić polityków iinteligencję; jak odsuwać społezeństwo od wpływu na życie polityczne; w jaki sposób życie to dezintegrować lekceważyć, wywołał społeczną tęsknotę za stabilizacją i rządami „silnej ręki”,zniechęcił Rosjan do demokracji i wolnego rynku, umożliwił powstanie rosyjskiego „oligarchizmu”, przywrócił Rosji stare sowieckie postrzeganie rzeczywistości międzynarodowej, na nowo zalegalizował przemoc państwową. Jelcyn zwalczał komunizm, ale tak naprawdę nie chodziło tu o ideologię, tylko o ludzi, którzy stali na jego drodze. Wiele elementów państwa sowieckiego zrozmysłem zresztą przejął.W ten sposób doszło do swoistej transpozycji komunizmu. Jego część imperialną,społeczną itę dotyczącą władzy politycznej zaadaptowano do idei nowej Rosji.Jelcyn miał niewątpliwe zasługi w tworzeniu się niepodległej Rosji, cała sfera wolności była już jednak tylko aktywnym rozwinięciem przemian zapoczątkowanych przez Michaiła Gorbaczowa.
5

Przeszłość a teraźniejszość — o problemach postkomunistycznej transformacji w Rosji

100%
Bartnicki A. R.
Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem
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2013
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vol. 35
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issue 3
83 - 103
EN
The reasons for the collapse of the processes of democratization in Russia can be described by four factors: 1 Understanding and perception of power in Russia at the level of the governed and the rulers has largely historical and cultural background. 2. Russian authoritarianism is based on a combination of formal rules of democracy, psychological factors and political culture of subordination of Russian society; 3. Contemporary political and social situation in Russia is a result of the fact that the Soviet system was not rejected, but only modified. 4. And last but not least, in Russia, there were only few and insiginificant forces interested in the actual democratization of the state.
6
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Law vs. Interests Russia after 1991

100%
Bartnicki A. R.
Społeczeństwo i Polityka
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2021
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issue 3(68)
13-32
PL
W Rosji po 1991 r. można zaobserwować kryzys państwa prawa na polu politycznym, gospodarczym i społecznym. Kryminalizacja państwa, gospodarki i polityki była elementem swoistego spadku po czasach ZSRS. Jego istota przejawiała się we wszechwładzy i bezkarności elity, swobodnym żonglowaniu tezą o bezkonfliktowym społeczeństwie oraz propagandowej jedności interesów społeczeństwa i nomenklatury. Innymi składnikami owego „spadku” były: zachowanie władzy przez dużą część polityków z dawnego układu, elementy sowieckiej mentalności i zachowań, skłonność do klientelizmu i serwilizmu, zarówno w społeczeństwie, jak i w samych elitach. Niektóre elementy dawnego układu nie tylko zostały zaadaptowane do nowej rzeczywistości, ale uległy wręcz pogłębieniu. Takie zjawiska, jak korupcja, przemieszczanie się centrów władzy w stronę „ciemnych”, nielegalnych struktur, lekceważenie norm prawnych, sprzeczności zachodzące między oficjalną propagandą a realnym życiem, z pewnością były zjawiskiem częstym w ZSRS, ale to współczesna Rosja nadała im charakter quasi-legalny, a już prawie na pewno akceptowalny. Przykłady lekceważenia czy naginania prawa szły wertykalnie od władzy politycznej w dół drabiny społecznej. Wywierały i nadal wywierają bardzo destrukcyjny wpływ na system polityczny, społeczeństwo i gospodarkę Rosji.
EN
In Russia, after 1991, we can observe the crisis of rule of law in the political, economic and social area. The criminalization of the state, economy and the policy was part of a kind of inheritance from the Soviet Union. Its essence was manifested by omnipotence and impunity of elites, spreading the thesis about non conflict society and propaganda of common interests of society and oligarchs. Other components of the “decline” were: preservation of power by a large part of politicians from the former system and the elements of Soviet mentality and behaviour, the tendency to clientelism and servility, both in society and among the elites. Some elements of the old system were not only adapted to the new reality, but were even deeper. Such phenomena as corruption, shifts in power into the “dark” illegal structures, disregard of legal standards, contradictions existing between official propaganda and the real life, would be a common occurrence in the Soviet Union, but this contemporary Russia gave them a quasi-legal and almost certainly acceptable. Examples of how to ignore or bend the law went vertically from political power down the social ladder. Exerted and continues to exert a destructive influence on the political system, economy and society of Russia.
7
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Sukcesja władzy w uwarunkowaniach postsowieckiej quasi-demokracji 1991–2024

100%
Bartnicki A. R.
Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej
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2024
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vol. 59
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issue 2
169-189
EN
The analysis shows that despite formal evidence suggesting the existence of democratic processes in selected post-Soviet countries, an actual democratic exchange of power almost does not occur.
PL
W analizie pokazano, że pomimo formalnych przesłanek sugerujących występowanie w wybranych państwach postsowieckich procesów demokratycznych rzeczywista, demokratyczna wymiana władzy niemal nie występuje.
8
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Referendum w Rosji, na Białorusi i Ukrainie. Próba analizy porównawczej

63%
Kużelewska E., Bartnicki A. R.
Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne
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2010
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vol. 25
83-108
EN
Referendum as a direct democracy institution is taken into consideration in the constitutions of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. It was still during Soviet period when these countries began applying referendum (referendum of 17th March 1991). Ukraine and Russia performed their independent referenda while the Soviet system was dying. During the initial stage of the transformation using the referendum seemed to be a revolution. While the process of democratization in these three countries was collapsing the political role of referendum changed – it appeared to be a democratic way of legitimizing presidents’ anti-democratic actions. Boris Yeltsin, Alyaksandr Lukashenka and Leonid Kuchma used the lack of social understanding for the essence of democracy and free market for their own purposes. The aim of this analysis is to make an attempt to compare the referendum institution in political system solutions in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus as well as define the role of referendum in political systems of the countries being discussed. The authors will try to answer the questions concerning the significance and purpose of the referenda held in the countries being discussed.
9

Axiological foundation of non-democratic regimes in selected post-Soviet republics

63%
Bartnicki A. R., Kużelewska E.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
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2009
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issue 19(32)
153-170
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