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Umění (Art)
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2020
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vol. 68
|
issue 3
271-277
EN
For Adolf Loos architectural meaning was not inherent in one‘s materials. Meaning, in other words, was historical, changing, and dependent on context. As I argue, Loos‘ normative approach to architectural meaning stood in direct contrast to the rise of an affective account of architecture that began to dominate architectural thinking and practice in the opening decades of the twentieth century. For August Endell, Hermann Obrist, Henry van de Velde and into the Bauhaus, architecture was increasingly conceived as generating material effects through formal qualities inherent in materials. Loos was prescient in his rejection of the growing consensus around the surefire effect of architectural forms and materials. At stake for Loos were qualities of risk, chance and failure that made meaning possible.
CS
Význam architektury pro Adolfa Loose nespočíval ve vlastních materiálech, ale pokládal ho za historický, proměnlivý a závislý na kontextu. Prokazuji, že Loosův normativní přístup k architektonickému významu byl v přímém protikladu ke vzestupu afektivního pojetí architektury, které v architektonickém myšlení a praxi začalo převládat v prvních desetiletích 20. století. Pojetí architektury Augusta Endella, Hermanna Obrista, Henryho van de Veldeho a členů Bauhausu spočívalo především na působení materiálu za využití jeho inherentních formálních vlastností. Loos prozíravě odmítal sílící obecnou shodu na jistém účinku architektonických forem a materiálů. Vsadil na přednosti risku, náhody a selhání dodávající význam.
Nowa Krytyka
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2012
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issue 29
247-266
EN
The article attempts at reinterpreting thought of Stanislaw Brzozowski as early philosophy of the political, as seen in post-structuralist political thought. The Polish thinker has faced the particular political situation of the Polish Kingdom in the early 20th century and dealt conceptually with impossibility of unproblematic political representation. Therefore, along with his heterodoxical, anti-ontological and praxistic Marxism, he also undertook the issue of construction of political subjectivities and engaged with groundless thinking not referring to any ultimate, stable ratio of class or nation. To put a long story short, he wrestled, and partially successfully ‘thought trough’ the “moments of the political” i.e. the radical contingency of the social field.
EN
The first part of the article focuses on how an accident or unexpected event may influence a performance piece. Examples of accidents with creative potential are described. The second part concerns improvisation; it investigates what it means to improvise in performance art and reveals the political potential of improvisation. Even though artists reluctantly admit they improvise or make errors, examples of such cases suggest this is not uncommon and usually involves unexpected audience interaction or occurs when the piece's structure is open. The article is based on artists' statements, performances described in the literature, and those witnessed by the author. The theoretical part is mainly based on articles by Alessandro Bertinetto.
Human Affairs
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2015
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vol. 25
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issue 2
164-172
EN
The turn of the 1990s saw the emergence of “the political” in feminist theory. Despite there being a number of publications devoted to the theme, the concept itself has remained rather undertheorized. Instead of producing a thoroughly developed concept, it served to create an epistemic community devoted to the (supposedly dead, modernist) political aim of women’s emancipation. In the article, I argue that it would be beneficent for feminist theory to adopt an affirmative stance towards the contingency of politics. This of course poses a challenge to feminist politics, which still operates mainly within the framework of the politics of representation. Nevertheless, Linda Zerilli’s approach, which interprets contingency in an Arendtian vein as the condition of the world-creating and world-building power of feminism as a practice of freedom may prove to be a productive way of approaching the challenging issue of contingency in feminist theory
XX
How we perceive a certain concept is grounded in the ‘language game’: the values, prejudices, dispositions, and cultural baggage among its interpretive communities. In other words, there is no ‘true meaning’ inherent in a word per se; rather the meaning is derived out of what Derrida (1993) calls the ‘chain’ of signifi cation: the context, history, contingency, and often semantic contradictions that render a word polysemic. Taking off from here, this paper seeks to unpack the social ‘constructivism’ immanent in the a priori assumptions that cloak the idea of the ‘vagabond’. While invoking the contingency in the genesis and semantic history of ‘vagabond’ as a case study, this paper illustrates how meanings of certain heuristic concepts – in this case, ‘vagabond’, without a fixed referent – are often (re)configured, not because of reasons entirely linguistic, but rather due to changes in the prevailing epistemic paradigms.
EN
Faulstich Werner, Teoria systemu społecznego obiegu literatury [Theory of the Social System of Literature Circulation]. „Przestrzenie Teorii” 32. Poznań 2019, Adam Mickiewicz University Press, pp. 435–451. ISSN 1644-6763. DOI 10.14746/pt.2019.32.24. The main hypothesis of literature circulation in a theory system can be formulated as follows: literature circulation is an inextricable element of literature, while literature constitutes an integral part of literature circulation. To provide evidence to this supposition, it is necessary to draw from the definition of a system proposed by Helmut Wilke in his Systemtheorie (1982). The social circulation of literature demands the emergence of a series of subsystems which, as part of the system, are characterised by their own factors, relations and ways of organisation. The most important category, enabling us to tell the difference between various subsystems of the literature circulation, is the medium. It goes without saying that any kind of literature is passed on via a particular kind of medium, i.e. the novel through the medium of the book, radio drama through the medium of radio, the feature film through the medium of film, stage drama through the medium of theatre, etc. It is impossible to separate “Literature” from “Circulation”. As a consequence, the history of literature is neither a pure history of a particularpiece or utopia (the latter being the approach of the idealistic literary studies), nor pure history of media (technology) as a part of a general history of communication and society (which is the journalism approach). Instead, it clearly separates itself from both, i.e. as a history of a mediated utopia.
EN
The present sketch discusses two poems written by R. Creeley, a poet initially associated with the Black Mountain College group, who later worked out his own idiosyncratic style, often referred to as minimalistic. Focusing on the two poems of the poet, one early poem and the other written towards the end of the poet’s life, the author of the article attempts to show how Creeley’s poetical technique, being remarkably disciplined and innerly organized variety of free verse, became his answer to the problem of contingency. Contingency, i.e. a lack of metaphysical protection, forms now the basic element of the poet in the democratic world. To facilitate this new modern understanding of the relationships between poetry and democracy, the author juxtaposes Creeley with Whitman in an attempt to outline post-religious spirituality close at hand for the poet who has no illusions as to human condition and who, at the same time, retains his creative power and drive that Creeley inherits from Whitman and Emerson.
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Supervenience, Dependence, Disjunction

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EN
This paper explores variations on and connections between the topics mentioned in its title, using as something of an anchor the discussion in Valentin Goranko and Antti Kuusisto’s “Logics for propositional determinacy and independence”, a venture into what the authors call the logic of determinacy, which they contrast with (a demodalized version of) Jouko Väänänen’s modal dependence logic. As they make clear in their discussion, these logics are closely connected with the topics of noncontingency and supervenience. Two opening sections of the present paper address some of these connections, including related earlier logical work by the present author as well as very recent work by Jie Fan. The Väänänen-inspired treatment is presented in a third section, and then, in Sections 4 and 5, as a kind of centerpiece for the discussion, we follow Goranko and Kuusisto in elaborating one principal reason offered for preferring their own approach over that treatment, which concerns some anomalies over the behaviour of disjunction in the latter treatment. Sections 6 and 7 look at dependence and (several different versions of) disjunction in inquisitive logic, especially as presented by Ivano Ciardelli. Section 8 revisits the less formal property-supervenience literature with issues from the first two sections of the paper in mind, and we conclude with a Postscript addressing a further conceptual issue pertaining to the relation between modal and quantificational dependence logics.
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Leibnizova kontingencia nie je náhoda ani nahodilost

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EN
Conceptual exactitude is one of the appanages of philosophical thinking and metaphysical thinking specifically. A slight semantic nuance may, in the case of a particular philosophical concept, lead to inaccuracy of thought. What thinking inaccuracy may then conceptual inaccuracy lead to? The consequences may be exceedingly disturbing unless and until corrections and reinstatements are made. This paper aims to use one translation example to highlight just such an extreme historical blunder in the Czechoslovak philosophical milieu. I will try to indicate, using precisely one of the key concepts of Leibniz’s metaphysics – the Latin contingentia, or the French contingence and its derivatives – that translations of philosophical texts may not be permanently reliable unless they are periodically revisited. The above concept of Leibniz and its mistranslation is a striking example of this.
EN
Patočka´s and Rorty´s philosophy offer a foundation for the reconstruction of liberalism and a possibility of fulfilling individual´s freedom. Patočka intends to assess the value of transcendence and its relevance to life. He tries to save the metaphysics for it does not need to become necessarily dogmatic. Contemporary people may find Patočka´s reflections on freedom beneficial. Patočka invites people to connect their spirituality with skepticism and modesty, and according to Socratic knowing of unknowing, along with humility which makes man non-dogmatically open to transcendence. In the reflections on man, Rorty holds to moral responsibility and tries to bring man to self-awareness and taking responsibility for his acting, because it is only man who disposes of unique possibilities and abilities to shape his own authentic way of life. Rorty´s concept of freedom as an accidental phenomenon is based on the concept of history of Western philosophy and is closely linked with the problem of metaphysics and truth. Despite timeless reflections of both philosophers, any timeless ideal of human freedom is determined by the context in which we are thinking.
PL
From the time of its introduction, the concept of ‘transition’ has effected a tectonic shift in our understanding of post-socialism. In the process which has taken place during the last couple of decades after the collapse of East European socialist regimes, it has become transformed from one of the signifiers of the political and social change which occurred into a cornerstone for thinking, analyzing and predicting the future of post-socialism. Furthermore, in this article it is posited that all the political and social processes occurring in the ex-socialist countries are defined in relation to transition as an all-encompassing form of post-socialist experience. Relying on the discursive theory of Ernesto Laclau, this article attempts to consider together the usually separated questions of epistemology and ontology, and to ask what is the connection between scientific origins of the concept of transition and its political legitimacy. We claim that transition is a “sutured“ structure composed of various social experiences and political strategies, which naturalizes and universalizes the contingent power struggles that are taking place and will take place in the future of post-socialist countries. Therefore, severing the existing bonds between transition and the actually existing post-socialism is a necessary precondition for creating a more complex and productive understanding of the societies of East and South East Europe.
PL
Tekst dowodzi, że Quentin Meillassoux wprawdzie zasługuje na uznanie za sprawą swojego projektu przedstawionego w Poza skończonością – ponieważ słusznie zauważa, że należy odnowić wiarę filozofii w zdolność nauki do otwierania nowych wymiarów myślenia – lecz mimo to jego propozycja posiada dwie poważne słabości. Po pierwsze, opis nauki jako tworzenia twierdzeń ancestralnych nie wydobywa istoty naukowej kreatywności. Po drugie, teza o „koniecznej przygodności” stoi w fundamentalnej sprzeczności z wiedzą naukową. Dlatego autor artykułu przeciwstawia zasadzie koniecznej przygodności Meillassoux zasadę wydobytą z historycznej epistemologii Léon Brunschvicga i Antoine-Augustin Cournot. To znaczy, że zamiast zasady bezracji tekst broni zasady zmiennej racji bądź zmiennego rozumu (principle of a metamorphosing reason), opartej na tezie, iż żadna nieredukowalna przygodność nie jest praktycznie możliwa.
EN
The article argues that, while Quentin Meillassoux‘s project, undertaken in After Finitude, merits attention, since the French philosopher is right that faith in sciences‘ capacity to open up new domains to thought must be restored, the solutions he offers have two serious shortcomings. 1) His depiction of science as the producer of ancestral statements does not capture satisfactorily the essence of scientific creativity. 2) The claim that everything is necessarily contingent is fundamentally incompatible with scientific knowledge. The article, then, contrasts Meillassoux‘s principle of the necessity of contingency with a principle that is extracted from the historical epistemology of Léon Brunschvicg and Antoine-Augustin Cournot. Instead of a principle of unreason, the article defends a principle of a metamorphosing reason founded on the practical impossibility of irreducible contingency.
EN
The paper deals with the Sartrean concept of lived experience which constitutes a bridge between phenomenology and Marxism, psychology and ontology, individual and society, as well as between philosophy and literary criticism. The notion of lived experience is rooted in psychology, at the same time being embedded in literary criti-cism and phenomenology. It is interlinked with the notions of facticity, contingency, singularity, intersubjectivity, and body in the Being and Nothingness, and became the theoretical base of Sartre’s essays on Baudelaire, Genet, and especially of that on Flau-bert. This lived experience is closely related to the Sartrean phenomenological concept of nature which consists in the non-reflexive conscience of our own presence-at-the-world, including corporeality.
EN
This comparative paper analyses in detail the contexts in which the “contingency” category was used by the philosophers mentioned in its title. While Odo Marquard and Richard Rorty situated contingency within the antifundamentalist discourse, especially in the sphere of philosophical anthropology, epistemology and ethics, Jürgen Habermas drew his conception of the contingency of human birth from the “human nature”— related discourse against modern-day genetic engineering. Marquard’s and Rorty’s theories differ in their philosophical assumptions (scepticism vs. neopragmatism). Among others, the author shows that none of the mentioned thinkers accepted the radically relativistic consequences of the debate around the “contingency” conception. In his analyses, he also makes frequent use of Marquard’s distinction between “arbitrarily accidental” and “fatefully accidental.”
Studia Gilsoniana
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2017
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vol. 6
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issue 2
249-267
EN
Is man capax Dei? Zofia J. Zdybicka answers this question drawing on the entire tradition of classical philosophy which culminates in St. Thomas Aquinas. She considers the problem from the perspective of: (1) man who transcends the precariousness of human nature by his specific capabilities (intellectual knowing, loving, ability to freedom and religion); (2) faculties of the human soul (reason and will) which condition man’s disposition to knowing and loving God; (3) the metaphisical necessity for God to exist as the Supreme Truth and Good. The article concludes with threefold thesis. First, man is capax Dei because—within his capabilities which make him go beyond the entire world of beings (cosmos)—he is open to the Supreme Truth and Supreme Good. Secondly, man is capax Dei because—through his soul’s faculties fittingly developed (recta ratio and recta voluntas)—he can succeed in cognizing and loving God. Thirdly, man is capax Dei because God (the Supreme Truth and Good)—as proven by St. Thomas Aquinas in his Forth Way in particular—really exists.
EN
Thomas Aquinas’ intentions in his position that God acts through secondary causes are both laudable and correct. In affirming God’s action within secondary causes Thomas intended to affirm true freedom and contingency in the world and the creatures’ limited participation in God’s creative power. But his interpretation of these topics rests on assumptions about divinity that subvert his intentions. This article summarizes Thomas’ analysis and discusses the principal difficulties with his interpretation of God’s action. It then presents an interpretation of how Alfred North Whitehead’s position on divine action avoids these difficulties and achieves a more coherent understanding of God’s action in the world, even though it too requires revision. If Whitehead’s metaphysics is revised to think of creativity as the divine life rather than as ultimately distinct from God, then it, too, presents God as sharing the divine life with creatures by endowing them with the creativity and freedom to create themselves on the divinely-given ground of possibility. Thomas’ intentions and a revised Whiteheadian interpretation of divine action are compatible and complement each other on the topic of divine action in and through creatures and on the idea of existence as participation in the divine life.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
|
2017
|
vol. 65
|
issue 4
23-36
PL
Tekst jest próbą przedstawienia fundamentalnych perspektyw, które są konieczne dla zrozu­mienia stanowiska Akwinaty na temat przygodności, wolności i indywiduacji w zestawieniu z pro­pozycją Dunsa Szkota. Autor stara się wziąć pod uwagę ostrzeżenie É. Gilsona: niewiele da porównywanie wybranych szczegółów wspomnianych pozycji filozoficznych bez zrozumienia fun­da­mentalnej różnicy między porównywanymi metafizykami. Pierwsza część artykułu przedstawia różnicę rozumienia relacji między naturą i wolą. Duns Szkot interpretuje wolę, przeciwstawiając ją naturze, i rozumie prawdziwie osobowe, wolne i chrze­ścijańskie działanie w opozycji do deterministycznych działań natury. Dla Akwinaty praw­dziwie osobowe działanie może być wpisane w naturę jako jej wolne dopełnienie. Różnica jest ufundowana w rozmaitych interpretacjach filozofii Arystotelesa. Druga część opisuje różnicę w rozumieniu transcendencji boskich działań. Tomasz posługuje się bardzo mocnym rozumie­niem transcendencji, które pozwala przyjąć tezę: niezmienność (= konieczność) woli Boga uzy­skuje swoje cele zarówno przez konieczne, jak i wolne (!) działania stworzeń (por. De veritate, q. 6, a. 3, ad 3). Duns Szkot szuka bardziej intuicyjnie dostępnego rozumienia relacji między boskimi i ludzkimi działaniami. Z tego powodu opisuje boskie działania jako przygodne, podej­mowane w wiecznym „teraz”. Trzecia część zajmuje się doktryną indywiduacji. Duns Szkot pro­ponował rozwiązać problem przez odwołanie do słynnej formy haecceitas. Chociaż dla Tomasza nośnikiem indywidualności po zindywidualizowaniu bytu jest także forma jako źródło sub­stan­cjalności i chociaż Tomasz musiał być świadomy trudności klasycznego stanowiska, odwo­łującego się do Arystotelesa (materia jako główny czynnik indywiduacji), trzyma się stanowczo arystotelesowskiego rozwiązania, nieznacznie je przeformułowując (materia quantitate signata). Były najprawdopodobniej dwa powody wiernego podążania Tomasza za Arystotelesem, mimo wątpli­wości Alberta Wielkiego i Bonawentury: chęć podkreślenia hylemorficznej struktury bytu i próba wskazania trwałej podstawy dla pojęciowych genera. Ostatni problem prowadzi do naj­ważniejszej metafizycznej różnicy między analizowanymi propozycjami. Duns Szkot jako esen­cjalista musi wpisać wszystko, co rzeczywiste, w porządek istotowy. Tomasz artykułuje rzeczy­wistość bytu, biorąc pod uwagę istotę i istnienie. Jego stanowisko daje tym sposobem więcej możliwości do odczytania bytu.
EN
The paper attempts to present the fundamental perspectives which are necessary to understand Aquinas’s position on contingency, freedom and individuation in order to compare his thinking with Duns Scotus’s. The author wants to take into account Gilson’s warning: it is useless to com­pare chosen details of the aforementioned philosophical proposals, if there is no understanding of the deep difference between the metaphysical systems of the two philosophers. The first section presents the difference in the understanding of the relationship between na­ture and will. Duns Scotus interprets the will as opposed to nature and sees a truly free and Christian person acting as opposed to the deterministic operations of nature. For Aquinas the truly personal acting may be inscribed in nature as its free fulfilment. The difference is based on the different readings of Aristotle’s philosophy. The second section describes the difference in the understanding of the transcendence of the divine actions. Thomas uses a very strong concept of transcendence that allows him to accept the thesis that God’s immutable (= necessary) will achieves its purposes through the necessary and free (sic!) actions of the creatures (cf. De veri­tate, q. 6, a. 3, ad 3). Duns Scotus looks for a more intuitive understanding of the relationship between divine and human acting. Because of that he describes the divine actions as contingent, under­taken in the eternal “now”. The third section deals with the doctrine of individuation. Duns Scotus’s proposed solution to this problem is his famous form haecceitas. Although the form as the source of substantiality is the sign of individuality for Thomas, as well, in his case this has been achieved through individua­tion, and although he must have been aware of some difficulties in the classical Aristotelian position (matter as the main factor in individuation), he sticks to the Ari­sto­telian solution, only slightly reformulating it (materia quantitate signata). There are two reasons for his fidelity to Aristotle in spite of doubts expressed by Albert the Great and Bona­venture: the stress on the hylemorphic structure of being and the attempt to articulate the con­sistency of the conceptual genera. The last problem leads to the main metaphysical difference of the analysed proposals. Duns Scotus as an essentialist has to inscribe everything that is real with­in the order of essence; Thomas articulates reality by taking into account essence and existence. His position opens wider possibilities for the understanding of being.
RU
Целью данной статьи является сбор и интерпретация размышлений Мишеля де Монтеня о лошадях и верховой езде. Автор утверждает, что существуют две основные области, в которых эта тема использовалась Монтенем, то есть хрупкость и непредсказуемость человеческой жизни, а также взаимоотношения души и тела. В обоих случаях Монтень делает переоценку классической культуры. В первом случае интерпретация «обучения смерти» это искусство подвергать себя непредсказуемому, во втором – тесная связь умственной деятельности с телесными процессами.
EN
In this text I am collecting and interpreting Michel de Montaigne’s reflections on the horses and horse-riding. I argue that there are two basic problems in which this theme was used by Montaigne: the fragility and unexpectedness of human life and body-mind relation. In both fields Montaigne proposed a re-evaluation in relation to the classical culture. In the first one, by interpreting Plato’s “practice of death” as an art of exposing oneself to an unexpected, and in the second, by linking mind activity with the bodily processes.
EN
The undertaken considerations in the presented article belong to the broader context of metaphysical analyzes concerning one of the aspects of the creative action of the Absolute, which is the preservation of the world in existence (conservatio mundi). This issue is considered from the perspective of created substances and therefore it is expressed in the question of whether they have the possibility of non-existence, which, based on Thomas Aquinas’ creatio ex nihilo theory, is tantamount to the question of whether they were created by God in destructible natures and as such they aim at to self-annihilation. The negation in the substantial order of the disposition to non-existence in contingent beings seems to justify the conclusion that their duration is founded not only in the divine act of preserving in existence but also in their inherent nature, which is oriented rather towards being than non-being. In order to solve the problem formulated in this way, in the first place, the principles responsible for the destructibility of beings will be analyzed, then the considerations focus on the necessity of the existence of created sub-stances, and the whole is completed by the presentation of the relation between contingency and destructibility.
PL
Tematem artykułu są różne sposoby radzenia sobie z przygodnością, która jest nieodłączną częścią doświadczenia człowieka. Pierwszym z analizowanych form konfrontacji z przygodnością jest nowożytna nauka, która w dużym stopniu ogranicza przygodność, ale nie jest w stanie jej znieść. Drugą formą takiej konfrontacji jest religia, która udziela odpowiedzi na problem przygodności, ale też go radykalizuje. Autor skupia się na doświadczeniu przygodności egzystencjalnej, której wyrazem jest istnienie człowieka w czasie, korzystając z analiz dwóch autorów: R. Ingardena i K. Wojtyły. Według Ingardena człowiek w pewien sposób wznosi się ponad swoją przygodność wówczas, gdy oddaje się na służbę wartościom: prawdzie, dobru i pięknu. Również według Wojtyły transcendencja osoby polega na przekraczaniu siebie ku wartościom, ale jednocześnie wartości mogą trwać dlatego, że są zakorzenione w Osobie Boga.
EN
The paper aims to show some possible ways of facing contingency, which is an inevitable element of human experience. The first of the discussed ways is modern science, which dramatically limits the contingency of human life, but cannot eliminate it completely. The other is religion, which not only offers a solution to the problem of the existential contingency of the human being, but also makes the problem even more radical. The paper analyzes existential contingence as expressed in the temporality of the human person, drawing on two authors: R. Ingarden and K. Wojtyła. According to Ingarden, the human person transcends contingency, realizing the values of Truth, Beauty and Good that persist in time. Wojtyła also states that the transcendence of the human person consists in realizing those values, but he adds that the values themselves can persist only if they are rooted in the eternity of the Absolute Person.
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