Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 17

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  phronesis
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
In his Panathenaic speech, Isocrates contrasts his own teaching program with traditional models of Greek education, both the earlier one and the more scientific one that is favoured in his times: his aim is to form the minds of students in such a manner that they can seize any opportunity that comes along, that in the social intercourse they always remain indulgent and patient, and – what seems the most important here – that they become able to endure both luck and misfortune with courage and appreciate not the things obtained merely by chance, but the ones gained by their toil and effort (Panath. 30–32). And Isocrates’ respect to steadily working mind becomes even greater with time: the result of such a labour must be some prudence (“phronesis”) – the aim of every justly conceived education. Isocrates’ “phronesis” is not Platonic excellence of mind, permanent and always the same, it is the skill and talent of discovering how to adjust to changing public affairs, but at the same time it shall remain constant and unchangeable in its imperative good – the benefit of Athens and its citizens.
2
Content available remote

Fronésis v Platónovom dialógu „Menón“

100%
EN
In the passage of Plato’s Menon 88a–89a, phronesis appears in a web of relations with the other key concepts of the dialogue. It is identified with virtue itself, or a part of it; it causes a person to make the right decisions; its presence renders things useful. It is precisely this context of usefulness and good that can indicate that Plato, like Aristotle, understood phronesis as practical wisdom, while the term episteme was reserved for the theoretical aspect of knowledge. Phronesis is, then, the human form of wisdom which enables one to lead one’s life in the right way. Such wisdom cannot be transmitted in a ready form, as opinions and knowledge are passed from teacher to pupil. In this sense, practical reason has a relation to exercise, or to that part of the triad included in Menon’s introductory question about the cultivation of virtue which, at first sight, is not focused upon in the course of the dialogue.
EN
Environmental virtue ethics is quite a new area of research that undertakes the issue of moral dispositions enabling actions for environmental protection. In this article, I shall present and organise the claims of narrative, environmental, virtue ethics. The aim of my analysis is to highlight the dual role of narration in this concept of ethics, which can be used as a tool for individual and social transformation. This approach corresponds to the types of moral dispositions, within the concept formed by Brian Treanor, the author of the narrative virtues ethics. The analyses carried out, helped to show the narrative as a tool allowing to get to know oneself and, or more precisely, to answer the question: who am I? To be able to define and pursue what I want to become. In this way, auto-narration becomes a tool of personal transformation (metanoi). Narration not only serves personal development, but through the language of myths, metaphors, and images, supports the promotion of desired cultural codes. In this way, narration is a very effective tool for social transformation. Two instruments are key in narration. First, on an individual level, phronesis is important to help to choose a good narrative and interpret it in the proper way. The second tool, important at the social level, is moral education, which helps to shape the moral attitudes for the development of society in the desired direction. 
PL
Etyka cnót środowiskowych jest stosunkowo młodym obszarem badań, który podejmuje zagadnienie moralnych dyspozycji wspierających działania na rzecz ochrony środowiska. W niniejszym artykule przedstawiam i porządkuję tezy narracyjnej koncepcji etyki cnót środowiskowych. Celem moich analiz jest ukazanie podwójnej roli narracji w tej koncepcji etyki, to jest zarówno jako narzędzia transformacji indywidualnej, jak i społecznej. Takie ujęcie odpowiada rodzajom dyspozycji moralnych, w koncepcji Briana Treanora, twórcy narracyjnej etyki cnót. Przeprowadzone analizy pomogły pokazać narrację, jako narzędzie do poznawania siebie samego, a dokładniej odpowiadania na pytanie: kim jestem? By móc zdefiniować i dążyć do tego, kim chcę się stać. W ten sposób autonarracja staje się narzędziem osobistej przemiany (metanoi). Narracja nie tylko służy rozwojowi osobistemu, lecz także poprzez język mitów, metafor i obrazów wspiera promowanie pożądanych kodów kulturowych. W ten sposób narracja jest bardzo skutecznym narzędziem przemiany społecznej. Kluczowe w narracji są dwa narzędzia. Po pierwsze, na poziomie indywidualnym, istotne jest phronesis, które pomaga wybierać dobrą narrację i odpowiednio ją interpretować. Drugim narzędziem, ważnym na poziomie społecznym, jest edukacja moralna, która pozwala kształtować postawy moralne służące rozwojowi społeczeństwa w pożądanym kierunku.
Human Affairs
|
2009
|
vol. 19
|
issue 4
378-396
EN
The paper provides an overview of the current situation in the socio-human sciences, which is characterised by attempts to overcome traditional one-sided approaches and look for new alternatives. One of the latest alternatives to traditional approaches in the philosophy and methodology of the social sciences is the "practice turn". It is the turn to another, non-traditional approach to practice but also to Aristotelian phronesis. The author gives an account of three main tenets of this turn with reference to both ancient Greek and modern conceptions of practice.
PL
Hermeneutic existence is a phronetic existence aiming at nurturing practical wisdom in human life: It originates with life, affects life, and transforms life. Hermeneutic truth is a world-disclosive truth of understanding. The experience of hermeneutic truth calls for human Dasein’s personal engagement and existential answer, and expresses hermeneutic moral imperative. In his phenomenology of religious life, Heidegger reinterprets Augustine’s essential disclosure of the being that we are and formalizes his notion of inquietum cor, cura, memoria, and tentatio distorting their original religious context. With reference to Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein, Gadamer emphasizes that understanding is not only one of the human faculties, but a mode of Dasein’s being-in-theworld. Gadamer’s hermeneutics is not a methodology of interpretation, but a philosophical reflection on the nature of understanding, which transgresses the concept of a method. Since all true understanding is application of what is understood to the subject of understanding, understanding encompasses the whole of human life in its radical openness toward oneself, the other, and the world. Hermeneutics as practical philosophy motivates human beings to actively participate in the life of the community, which is our inherent and inalienable right and moral imperative.
EN
Hermeneutic existence is a phronetic existence aiming at nurturing practical wisdom in human life: It originates with life, affects life, and transforms life. Hermeneutic truth is a world-disclosive truth of understanding. The experience of hermeneutic truth calls for human Dasein’s personal engagement and existential answer, and expresses hermeneutic moral imperative. In his phenomenology of religious life, Heidegger reinterprets Augustine’s essential disclosure of the being that we are and formalizes his notion of inquietum cor, cura, memoria, and tentatio distorting their original religious context. With reference to Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein, Gadamer emphasizes that understanding is not only one of the human faculties, but a mode of Dasein’s being-in-theworld. Gadamer’s hermeneutics is not a methodology of interpretation, but a philosophical reflection on the nature of understanding, which transgresses the concept of a method. Since all true understanding is application of what is understood to the subject of understanding, understanding encompasses the whole of human life in its radical openness toward oneself, the other, and the world. Hermeneutics as practical philosophy motivates human beings to actively participate in the life of the community, which is our inherent and inalienable right and moral imperative.
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
|
2017
|
vol. 8
|
issue 1
359-370
EN
When analyzing the structure of the soul, Aristotle distinguished three faculties: the theoretical, the practical and the technical one. The latter two are the focus of this paper. The division could be perceived as an abstract description of diverse functions and purposes of the faculties, but it does not imply factual dissociation between them if we take under consideration their functioning. On the contrary, Aristotle suggested that it would be impossible to detach the practical reasoning from the operational one, for the former stipulated the goal, whereas the latter provided the means for its fulfillment. The genuine intellectual disposition, which supplements the practical reason with the proper means was referred to as ‘cleverness’ (δεινότης). Cleverness has usually been associated with the technical faculty but it also seems to be, first and foremost, the disposition to inventiveness in a broader sense. Although Aristotle did not formulate this directly, it is plausible to view the practical and technical faculty as depending on each other, as far as their products and works are useful to pursue the practical goals and the practical reasoning determines the extent of the possibilities and limitations of their utility in the field of politics. The disposition to cleverness made the cooperation of those faculties possible.
EN
The 2.0 law has come into force. However, its effects will be determined by the methods of its implementation by the staff of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, the authorities of Higher Education Institutions in Poland and academics dealing with science and arts. Achieving a consensus that satisfies all parties requires cooperation, openness to others, as well as work on the development of cooperation itself. The aim of the article is to emphasize the development of cooperation, which, according to the author, should be conditioned by “research in action”. Therefore, drawing attention to the elements of this structure, taking into account the “historical consciousness”, embedding these activities in the phronesis and developing the forms of understanding included in it, should be the foundations of an interpretation of the 2.0 law. However, the interpretation of this law will prove more friendly (useful) for the interested parties themselves, if the research in action will take into account the general idea of praxis.
9
76%
EN
The paper is an attempt to rethink the problem of rationality in the humanities in the context of hermeneutics. The author argues that this concept of rationality must be founded on the Aristotelian concept of practical reason (phronesis). Phronesis is a need for discernment of the self or rather to find itself in its own, tangible, specific situation. This understanding concerns Being-inthe-world and belongs to what in Martin Heidegger’s ontohermeneutics we can determine precisely as understanding in the hermeneutic sense.
EN
The article presents experience from educational action research in teacher education, which was obtained by conducting an investigation with first year students during the first semester of their studies. The aim of this action research is focused on the concept of phronesis, which was theoretically substantiated by Aristotle and further elaborated by several contemporary scholars. The article emphasises the need to recognise different kinds of action research.This study focuses on the investigation of specific characteristics of phronetic processes. The content of our educational action research is people's attitudes towards own and other species. It was considered a tool for investigating the research aim, which is to develop the ability to find wisdom of insight in phronesis. Three stages of prhonesis (A, B and C) can be distinguished in this educational action research. This article reflects the organisation of action research and evaluates the use of communicative space at the initial stage of research from the perspective of researchers and research participants. The article also contains evaluation of research outcomes concerning the extension of communication discourse and the evaluation of experiences regarding attitudes towards own and other species in various contexts. Finally, the article proposes a brief review of tendencies that reflect changes in the research participant opinions. Discussion and conclusions reflect the specific features of phronetically-oriented action research. The article presents the first experience from phronetically-oriented action research and seeks conditions for promoting wisdom of insight (phronetic skills) in communication and through discourse.
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
|
2019
|
vol. 10
|
issue 1
153-170
EN
Although Bertrand Russell is probably most famous for his “logi­cal atomism,” it is his ethical thought that this article will attempt to contrast with the ethics of the founder of the ancient atomism: Democritus of Abdera. Russell has himself suggested certain affinity here. More concerned with practice than theory, both philosophers advocate a certain teleological and eudemonistic morality; furthermore, they both adopt the same approaches to various related topics. Yet, what had only been outlined by Democritus was extensively developed by Russell. Hence, it is worth examining whether there is any deeper common ground between the two: can Russell’s clarity throw some light on Democritus’ fragments?
12
Content available remote

Aristotelův pojem zdravého rozumu

75%
EN
The text interprets the particular concepts in Aristotle’s work which present themselves as candidates for being the counterpart to the modern concept of common sense, and it introduces them in their mutual relatedness. Aristotle works with the term endoxos, particularly in his logical and rhetorical texts, which he uses for statements and persons which are recognised in a given community. In epistemology he works with the term koiné aisthésis in connection with perception as such. The author points to a third concept, which Aristotle, thanks to his work in physiology, has a general ability to perceive, and which belongs to ethics: this is fronésis In an interpretation of fronésis there is also a place for the last directly relevant concept – orthos logos. Aristotle’s conception of conduct, which he sometimes interprets with the help of a so-called practical syllogism, displays the role of recognised statements as the typical general premisses in these syllogisms, and the role of persons recognised for their fronésis as the measure of the determining criteria for what is good conduct.
CS
Text vykládá jednotlivé pojmy, které v Aristotelově díle představují kandidáty na protějšek moderního pojmu zdravého rozumu, a uvádí je do vzájemné souvislosti. Především v logických a rétorických textech Aristotelés pracuje s termínem endoxos, který používá pro výroky a osoby, které jsou v daném společenství uznávány. V epistemologii pracuje s termínem koiné aisthésis v souvislosti s vnímáním jako takovým. Autor poukazuje na vazbu, kterou u Aristotela díky jeho práci ve fyziologii má obecná schopnost vnímat třetí klíčový pojem, který patří do etiky, totiž na fronésis. V rámci výkladu fronésis má místo také poslední bezprostředně relevantní pojem – orthos logos. Aristotelova koncepce jednání, jež Aristotelés vykládá někdy pomocí tzv. praktického sylogismu, pak ukazuje na roli uznávaných výroků jako typických obecných premis v těchto sylogismech a roli osob uznávaných pro svou fronésis jako měřítek určujících kritéria pro to, co je dobré jednání.
13
Content available remote

Fronésis a problém zvažování

75%
EN
The paper analyzes the Aristotelian concept of phronesis especially with regard to the political context that shapes certain aspects of this conception. After a general presentation of the role played by phronesis in individual and communal life, the performance of phronesis is further specified in connection with defining the field for deliberation (bouleusis). On this issue, the paper discusses not only the nature of possible objects of deliberation and the mechanisms of the deliberative process, but also possibly deficient forms of bouleusis. The ethical and political implications of different forms of deficient bouleusis are at the same time related to the political analysis of fundamental relationships within the structure of governance. The paper examines in detail the problematic bouleusis in the case of women and, in its final part, raises the question of to what extent Aristotle’s intention – in his analysis of phronesis and the associated concept bouleusis with men and their ethical, or rather political, virtue in mind – allows one to approach a more universal view of human phronesis.
Pamiętnik Literacki
|
2023
|
vol. 114
|
issue 3
235-242
PL
W krytycznym omówieniu książki Michała Januszkiewicza „W poszukiwaniu sensu. Phronesis i hermeneutyka” (2016) recenzent przybliża zasadnicze tezy postawione przez autora oraz omawia związki hermeneutyki z szeroko rozumianą filozofią egzystencjalną, zachęcając do namysłu nad problematyką mądrości praktycznej (phronesis).
EN
In his critical assessment of Michał Januszkiewicz’s book “W poszukiwaniu sensu. Phronesis i hermeneutyka” (“In Search of Meaning. Phronesis and Hermeneutics,” 2016), the reviewer describes the fundamental theses formulated by the author, presents the connections between hermeneutics and broadly understood existential philosophy, and simultaneously invites to ponder over the problems of practical wisdom (phronesis).
Zeszyty Naukowe KUL
|
2016
|
vol. 59
|
issue 1
41-57
EN
The functioning of prudence is characterized by following parts: integral, subjective, and potential. Fundamental importance for prudence have its integral parts. St. Thomas Aquinas treated them as constituting the virtue of prudence. They have the essential character. Their existence is necessary to achieve a perfect act (perfectum actum) of virtue. Thus it is not possible to explain prudence without taking into account its structure, pay attention to the integral parts. The factor of actualization and perfection, whereby prudence is realized, decided about crucial character of its integral parts.
PL
Funkcjonowanie roztropności charakteryzują części: integralne, subiektywne i potencjalne. Podstawowe znaczenie dla roztropności mają części integralne. Tomasz z Akwinu potraktował je jako konstytuujące cnotę roztropności. Posiadają one charakter konieczny. Ich zaistnienie jest niezbędne do tego, by zrealizował się doskonały akt (perfectum actum) cnoty. Dlatego nie jest możliwe wyjaśnienie roztropności bez ujęcia jej struktury, zwrócenia uwagi na części integralne. O ich kluczowym charakterze decyduje czynnik aktualizacyjno-doskonałościowy, dzięki któremu roztropność się realizuje.
PL
Dialogi obywatelskie (medborgardialoger) są w Szwecji zwykle organizowane przez urzędników (lub konsultantów) pracujących w administracji miejskiej, rozpoczynając się od spotkań doradczych w zakresie prawa w odniesieniu do planowania przestrzennego i są traktowane jako sposób na pogłębienie lub wskrzeszenie systemu demokratycznego. W tym artykule zostaną ukazane na zasadzie kontrastu z wiedzą fronetyczną (Arystotelesa). Fronesis wskazuje na zdolność radzenia sobie ze specyficznymi sytuacjami w konkretnym kontekście, gdy reguły i wiedza ogólna nie pomagają w podejmowaniu decyzji, gdzie raczej potrzebna jest ich osobista ocena. Napięcie między fronesis a ideałami neutralności ocennej jest obecne w planowaniu miast i w filozofii politycznej, czego przykładem są myśli Paula i Lindy Davidoff, Horsta Rittela i Melvina Webbera, Chantal Mouffe czy Hannah Arendt.
EN
Citizen dialogues (medborgardialoger) are in Sweden normally organized by officials (or consultants) working in the municipal administration. Such dialogues are in Sweden developed by the authorities with starting point in legislated counseling meetings in city planning processes and developed as a way to deepen or resurrect the democratic system. In this article I will contrast this state of affairs with what is less spoken of, and less valued, in modern bureaucracy: phronetic knowledge (Aristotle). Phronesis points toward the capacity to deal with specific situations in their specific context, situations where rules and general knowledge does not help us all the way, but where a personal judgement is needed. The tension between phronesis and ideals of neutrality is present in city planning and political philosophy, which are exemplified by the thoughts of Paul and Linda Davidoff, Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber, Chantal Mouffe or Hannah Arendt.
XX
The aim of this study is to refute the frequent and repeated critical objections to Singer’s almost four-decades-old argument against speciesism. These objections are based, above all, on misunderstanding. There is misunderstanding not only of the argument itself, but also of Singer’s methodological starting point, which we have termed “Singer’s ethical razor”. In the text we show why it is not possible to reject Singer’s utilitarian argument only by rejecting utilitarianism en bloc. In the same way, we show why it is not appropriate to charge Singer with failing to extend his ethics to include plants and lifeless nature. In fact the opposite is true because Singer clearly demonstrates how environmental ethics relating to the protection of the wild can be based on the same principle of the equal consideration of interests which is the basis for the moral unacceptability of speciesism.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.